Citizenship of the Union as a cornerstone of European integration : a study of its impact on policies and competences of the Member States. by Cambien, Nathan
 
 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Faculteit Rechtsgeleerdheid 
Instituut voor Europees Recht 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION AS A CORNERSTONE 
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
 
A Study of its Impact on Policies and Competences of the 
Member States 
 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift ingediend met het oog op het behalen van de graad van Doctor 
in de Rechten aan de Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Thesis submitted with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor in Laws at 
the Faculty of Law of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
 
 
 
Nathan Cambien 
 
 
Promotor: 
Prof. Dr. Koen Lenaerts 
 
Leuven, 2011 
   
 
 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION I 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 1 
I OPENING REMARKS: UNION CITIZENSHIP AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1 
II SUBJECTS COVERED AND STRUCTURE 2 
A. PART I PERSONAL SCOPE OF UNION CITIZENSHIP 3 
B. PART II FREE MOVEMENT OF UNION CITIZENS 3 
III METHODOLOGY 4 
 
PART I  
PERSONAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION 7 
CHAPTER 2 DETERMINATION OF THE PERSONAL SCOPE OF UNION CITIZENSHIP 9 
I INTRODUCTION 9 
II TRADITIONAL POSITION UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 
A. GENERAL LIMITATION 10 
B. CONVENTIONAL LIMITATIONS 12 
III IMPACT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF UNION CITIZENSHIP 13 
A. MEMBER STATES REMAIN COMPETENT TO REGULATE NATIONALITY 13 
1. Treaty provisions 13 
2. Case law of the Union Courts 16 
3. Member State declarations on nationality 19 
B. WHAT ROLE FOR UNION LAW? 21 
IV INDIRECT INFLUENCE FLOWING FROM UNION CITIZENSHIP 21 
A. ACQUISITION OF NATIONALITY 22 
1. Micheletti and the unconditional recognition of Member State nationality 22 
2. Ireland 25 
a) Traditional Irish nationality law and the Zhu and Chen case 25 
b) 2004 change in Irish nationality legislation and its explanation 30 
3. Spain 35 
B. LOSS OF NATIONALITY 38 
1. Outline 38 
2. Situation in the Baltic States 41 
V DIRECT LIMITATIONS FLOWING FROM UNION CITIZENSHIP 47 
A. DUE REGARD TO UNION LAW 47 
1. An enigmatic phrase 48 
2. The Rottmann case 49 
a) Judgment 49 
b) Appraisal 51 
B. APPLICABILITY OF UNION LAW IN THE SPHERE OF NATIONALITY 52 
1. Nationality as an exclusive competence of the Member States? 53 
2. Link with Union law? 56 
a) Generally speaking: two points of view 56 
b) Nationality law as a “cas spécial” 59 
i) Wide interpretation of the link with Union law 59 
ii) Acquisition and loss of Member State nationality 63 
iii) Consequences 66 
C. POSSIBLE UNION LAW LIMITATIONS 67 
1. Guarantee of free movement rights 68 
ii 
2. Duty to respect fundamental rights 72 
a) Fundamental right to equal treatment 73 
b) Reduction of Statelessness 77 
c) European Convention on Nationality 79 
d) Fundamental right to respect for family life 84 
3. Principle of proportionality 85 
4. Principle of sincere cooperation 91 
a) Acquisition of Member State nationality 91 
b) Loss of Member State nationality 97 
5. Principle of legitimate expectations 100 
D. CONSEQUENCES 103 
1. Acquisition of Member State nationality 103 
2. Loss of Member State nationality 106 
3. Refusal of Member State nationality 109 
VI CONCLUSION 111 
 
CHAPTER 3 OCTS AND UNION CITIZENSHIP 117 
I INTRODUCTION 117 
II OVERVIEW  118 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE TREATIES 118 
1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands 120 
a) Constitutional structure 120 
b) Applicability of the Treaties 122 
2. France 126 
a) Overseas Departments and Regions 126 
b) Overseas Collectivities 127 
c) French Southern and Antarctic Territories 128 
d) New Caledonia and Dependencies 129 
e) Clipperton Island 129 
3. Denmark 130 
4. The United Kingdom 131 
a) Overseas Territories 132 
b) Crown Dependencies 134 
B. NATIONALITY LAWS AND PERSONAL SCOPE OF THE CITIZENSHIP PROVISIONS 135 
1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands 135 
a) One single nationality 135 
b) Consequences with regard to Union citizenship 136 
2. France 136 
3. Denmark 137 
4. The United Kingdom 138 
a) Different categories of British nationals: overview 138 
i) British Nationality Act 1948 139 
ii) Immigration Act 1971 139 
iii) British Nationality Act 1981 140 
iv) British Overseas Territories Act 2002 141 
b) Consequences with regard to Union citizenship 142 
i) Union citizens 142 
ii) Not Union citizens 145 
III CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS 146 
A. INTRODUCTION: UNION CITIZENSHIP AND THE PARTICULAR LEGAL STATUS OF THE OCTS 146 
1. OCT nationals are Union citizens 146 
2. The Treaties are not fully applicable to the OCTs 148 
3. Interaction between provisions on Union citizenship and provisions on OCTs 151 
a) Traditional approach 151 
b) Dynamic approach 152 
i) General Treaty provisions 153 
iii 
ii) Union citizenship provisions 158 
c) Outline of the analysis 159 
B. FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS 160 
1. Economic free movement rights 160 
2. General right to free movement 163 
a) Article 21 TFEU applies to movement between OCTs and the Member States 165 
b) Legal consequences 167 
i) Union law provisions 167 
ii) Rules issued by the associated Member State 171 
3. Conclusion 178 
C. ELECTORAL RIGHTS 178 
1. Elections to the European Parliament 179 
a) Phase 1: national and EU provisions 180 
i) General situation 180 
ii) Case study: the Netherlands 184 
b) Phase 2: enlarging the personal scope 188 
c) Towards more inclusion of OCT nationals? 194 
2. Municipal elections 196 
a) Phase 1: national and EU provisions 197 
b) Phase 2: enlarging the personal scope 198 
3. Conclusion 201 
IV CONCLUSION 201 
 
PART II  
FREE MOVEMENT OF UNION CITIZENS 205 
CHAPTER 4 APPLICABILITY OF THE PROVISIONS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF 
UNION CITIZENS  207 
I INTRODUCTION 207 
II WHO NEEDS TO MOVE: THE CITIZEN OR THE FAMILY MEMBER? 207 
A. MIXED SIGNALS IN EARLIER CASE LAW 208 
B. METOCK AND OTHERS AND THE EMPHASIS ON THE UNION CITIZEN 213 
1. Case 213 
a) Facts 213 
b) Judgment 214 
2. Analysis 216 
a) Division of competences 218 
i) Considerations supporting a broad construction of the free movement provisions 219 
ii) Evaluation 224 
b) Scope for effective immigration policies in the Member States? 224 
i) Limited impact 226 
ii) Consequences 230 
C. CONCLUSION 232 
III IS MOVEMENT REQUIRED AT ALL? 234 
A. TRADITIONAL APPROACH 234 
1. Link with Union law 234 
2. Reverse discrimination 236 
3. Outline 237 
B. FUTURE EVOLUTION: WIDENING THE SCOPE OF UNION LAW? 239 
1. Proposals in case law 240 
a) Proposals AG Sharpston 240 
i) Flemish Care Insurance case 240 
ii) Ruiz Zambrano 244 
b) Ruiz Zambrano judgment 246 
c) McCarthy judgment 248 
2. Article 21 TFEU 251 
iv 
a) Self-standing right of residence 251 
b) Obstacles to future movement 258 
3. Articles 18 and 21 TFEU 260 
4. Article 20 TFEU 267 
a) Analysis 269 
i) Substance of citizenship rights 269 
ii) Article 20 TFEU vs Article 21 TFEU 271 
iii) Genuine enjoyment 272 
iv) Scope for justification 273 
b) Consequences 275 
5. Conclusion 278 
C. CLARIFYING THE INTER-STATE ELEMENT 281 
D. CONCLUSION 287 
IV CONCLUSION 289 
 
CHAPTER 5 RELATIVES IN THE ASCENDING LINE 293 
I INTRODUCTION 293 
A. FREE MOVEMENT FOR UNION CITIZENS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS 293 
B. DIRECTIVE 2004/38 293 
1. Legislative history 294 
2. Family members 295 
a) Definition 295 
b) Differentiated regime for ascendants and descendants 297 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 298 
II DIRECT DESCENDANTS AND DIRECT ASCENDANTS 301 
A. NOTION DIRECT DESCENDANTS 301 
B. NOTION DIRECT ASCENDANTS 304 
C. CONCLUSION 311 
III DEPENDENCY 311 
A. MEANING 311 
1. Possible justifications 311 
2. Case law 312 
3. Evaluation 317 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 321 
1. Essential needs 321 
2. Financial and social conditions 323 
3. Implementation in Belgium 325 
4. Proof 328 
C. CONCLUSION 328 
IV PRIMARY CARER 329 
A. JUSTIFICATION 329 
1. Effet utile 330 
a) Zhu and Chen 331 
b) Baumbast and R 333 
c) Ibrahim and Teixeira 336 
d) Carpenter 338 
2. Right to respect for family life (Article 8 ECHR) 341 
3. Conclusion 350 
B. NOTION PRIMARY CARER 350 
1. Terminology 352 
2. Case law analysis 355 
a) Regulation 1612/68 vs Directive 2004/38 355 
i) School-going children vs non school-going children 356 
ii) Children of migrant workers vs children of other Union citizens 359 
iii) Conclusion 367 
v 
b) Primary carer other than parents of a child 368 
i) Effet utile reasoning 369 
ii) Fundamental rights based reasoning 373 
iii) Conclusion 379 
c) Multiple primary carers 380 
C. IMPLEMENTATION BY THE UK 383 
1. Implications of Zhu and Chen 383 
2. Implications of Ibrahim and Teixeira 388 
D. CONCLUSION 392 
V CONCLUSION 394 
 
CONCLUSION  397 
CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION 399 
I GENERAL FINDINGS 399 
II PART I PERSONAL SCOPE OF UNION CITIZENSHIP 400 
III PART II FREE MOVEMENT OF UNION CITIZENS 403 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 407 
 
vi 
 
 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 1
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I OPENING REMARKS: UNION CITIZENSHIP AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
 
“Why then European citizenship? Because it can provide a model for democratic 
participation and freedom of movement beyond the borders of states. This should be attractive 
in a world whose greatest problems cannot be addressed by national governments acting 
independently of each other.”1 
 
Citizenship of the Union – or Union citizenship, as I will mostly refer to it throughout this 
dissertation – is a fascinating concept.  The idea of creating a European form of citizenship 
besides and above our national citizenship is both revolutionary, exciting, but at the same time 
somewhat frightening.  Not surprisingly, it has commanded a vast amount of literature from 
scholars of differing disciplines, including well know lawyers, sociologists and philosophers 
such as Jürgen Habermas, to name just one.2 
 
Whereas Union citizenship was in its initial years of existence often considered to be a hollow 
concept of a mere symbolic value, it has in the last decade gradually developed into one of the 
most dynamic concepts of Union law.  The growing importance of Union citizenship is 
witnessed, for instance, by the creation in 2010 of the post of “European Commissioner for 
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship” and by the great many high profile judgments 
rendered in the area of Union citizenship in recent years.  The provisions on Union citizenship 
are now frequently relied on by Union institutions and individuals alike in a vast array of 
fields, even in competence areas traditionally thought to fall outside the scope of Union law.  
All this illustrates the potential of Union citizenship as a tool for European integration. 
 
At the same time, it cannot go unnoticed that the development of Union citizenship does not 
always run smoothly.  Recent cases on Union citizenship see the intervention of an increasing 
number of Member States who vehemently argue before the Court in favour of a restrictive 
interpretation of the citizenship provisions.  Some of these cases even receive a significant 
amount of attention in popular press, with commentators sometimes strongly attacking the – 
perceived – perverse effects of Union citizenship.  The reason for these counter-reactions is 
invariably the influence exerted by Union law through the provisions on Union citizenship on 
key areas of Member State competence.  The implementation of the Union citizenship 
concept often creates tensions in these areas with certain legitimate interests of the Member 
States, such as the need to preserve a balanced social system and the desire to preserve 
                                                 
1  Bauböck, "Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Supranational Union" (2007) 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 488. 
2  Habermas, “The European nation state. Its achievements and its limitations: on the past and future of 
sovereignty and citizenship”, (1996) Ratio Juris, 125-137. For an interesting account of the different 
angles and disciplines found in the literature on Union citizenship, see Shaw, "Citizenship: Contrasting 
Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism", in Craig and De Búrca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 580-583.  
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national political sovereignty.3  These tensions can cause a strain on the development of the 
full potential of Union citizenship. 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation – entitled “Citizenship of the Union as a cornerstone of European 
integration: a study of its impact on policies and competences of the Member States” – 
examines, from a legal perspective, the extent to which the provisions on Union citizenship 
can bring an actual contribution to the European integration process.  This analysis is firmly 
situated against the background of the tensions described between the potential contribution 
of Union citizenship to European integration, on the one hand, and its impact on certain key 
policies and competences of the Member States, on the other hand – or, with some measure of 
generalisation, the tension between European integration and national sovereignty.  The 
dissertation is intended to determine more clearly to what extent the provisions on Union 
citizenship have an impact on the policies and competences of the Member States and how 
this impact can best be reconciled with the Member States’ key interests.  Accordingly, two 
fundamental questions are addressed.  On the one hand, I will examine the present state of the 
Union citizenship acquis and evaluate whether it is satisfactory.  On the other hand, I will 
examine de lege ferenda how a better balance can be achieved between the effet utile of the 
Union citizenship provisions and the competences of the Member States.   
 
II SUBJECTS COVERED AND STRUCTURE 
 
It would, of course, be virtually impossible to study this subject in its totality, given the vast 
size of the Member States’ competences and policies affected.  Therefore, I have limited my 
analysis to just two aspects of Union citizenship, namely the personal scope of Union 
citizenship, on the one hand, and the free movement of Union citizens and their family 
members, on the other hand.  My choice for these particular two aspects of Union citizenship 
rests on three main reasons.  First, these aspects can without much hesitation be labelled as 
two of the most fundamental aspects of Union citizenship.  There can logically be no Union 
citizenship before it is determined who is a Union citizen and who can, therefore, enjoy the 
rights attached to that status.  The right to free movement for Union citizens and their family 
members, for its part, has often been earmarked as the most important right attached to Union 
citizenship.  At the same time, the strong focus of the citizenship provisions on free 
movement and its continued relevance has been the subject of some of the most important 
debates concerning Union citizenship in recent times.  Second, the two aspects mentioned are 
two of the most controversial aspects of Union citizenship, given their potentially profound 
impact on two of the most significant competences of sovereign States, namely the 
competence to regulate nationality and the competence to regulate immigration.  The need for 
a satisfactory balance between Union citizenship and its impact on the key interests of the 
Member States is perhaps most strongly felt in these fields.  Third, the two aspects mentioned 
are two of the most dynamic aspects of Union citizenship.  In recent years high profile cases 
judgments been rendered on both aspects which have completely changed the traditional 
understanding of the legal regime surrounding Union citizenship in these fields.  For this 
reason too, it is most appropriate to focus the evaluation of the current legal framework and 
the examination of the way to achieve an appropriate balance between Union citizenship and 
Member State competences on these particular aspects of Union citizenship.  
 
                                                 
3  Admittedly, these tensions are stronger in some Member States than in others. See the interesting 
contributions in Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2003), 
556 pp. 
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The structure of my dissertation neatly follows the two fundamental aspects of Union 
citizenship covered, namely the personal scope of Union citizenship (Part I) and the free 
movement of Union citizens (Part II).  Each part consists of a more general chapter (Chapters 
2 and 4) and a chapter dealing with a more specific related issue (Chapters 3 and 5). 
 
A. Part I Personal scope of Union citizenship 
 
Part I of the dissertation discusses the personal scope of Union citizenship by tackling a 
number of fundamental questions.  On a more general level, the question will be answered 
who is a Union citizen and who is not.  More important still is the related question of who is 
competent to lay down the rules governing the conferral and loss of Union citizenship, namely 
the Union or the Member States.  This, in turn, will allow an analysis of the extent to which 
the application of the rules governing the personal scope of Union citizenship has an impact 
on the competences and policies of the Member States and thus the extent to which Union 
citizenship can be a real factor of European integration. 
 
Chapter 2 analyses the legal regime surrounding the determination of the personal scope of 
Union citizenship.  It starts from the traditional assumption that the Member States are 
exclusively competent to determine this scope, on account of their competence to regulate 
nationality, and examines to what extent this traditional assumption must be discarded in view 
of the provisions on Union citizenship.  In this connection it is examined in depth precisely 
how Union law limits the competence of the Member States in this regard, both directly and 
indirectly, and what the consequences are for the Member States’ nationality policies.  
Besides, the Chapter reflects on likely and desirable evolutions regarding the legal framework 
governing the determination of the personal scope of Union citizenship.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the specific situation of Member State nationals resident in the Overseas 
Countries and Territories (OCTs), a topic which had until recently been given sparse attention 
only in legal literature.  The Chapter examines whether OCT nationals having the nationality 
of a Member State should be considered full-blown Union citizens, and should fully enjoy the 
rights associated with that status, given the limited applicability ratione loci of Union law in 
the OCTs.  For that purpose it analyses both the constitutional structure and nationality laws 
of the four Member States possessing OCTs and the consequences of the particular status of 
the OCTs and their residents for the application of the provisions on Union citizenship.  In 
this context it is also examined to what extent the provisions on Union citizenship can 
function as a catalyst for integrating the OCTs and their residents in the European Union. 
 
B. Part II Free movement of Union citizens 
 
Part II of the dissertation analyses the right of free movement and residence of Union citizens 
and their family members, focussing on the rights enjoyed by non-EU family members and 
the restrictive conditions surrounding these rights.  It examines how and to what extent the 
requirements deriving from the implementation of this right can be reconciled with the 
legitimate interest of the Member State in adopting and maintaining an effective immigration 
policy.   
 
Chapter 4 examines the elements that determine the applicability of the provisions on Union 
citizenship and of those relating to family reunification in particular.  It examines first of all 
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what kind of “movement” between Member States is required in order to trigger the 
applicability of the right for Union citizens to be joined or accompanied by family members.  
The deeper underlying question concerns the continued relevance of free movement for the 
application of the Union citizenship provisions.  In this connection, a detailed study is 
undertaken of recent case law in which the Court appears to partially discard the traditional 
movement rationale.  The underlying justifications of the case law are evaluated in light of its 
consequences for the effet utile of the provisions on Union citizenship, on the one hand, and 
its impact on the immigration policies of the Member States, on the other hand.  This, in turn, 
will be the basis for proposals relating to the desirable evolution of the Union legal framework 
on this point. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses the right of Union citizens to be joined or accompanied by family 
members in the host Member State in accordance with Directive 2004/38 and focuses in this 
connection on ascendants of Union citizens.  It critically analyses the interpretation given to 
this category of family members and to the restrictive conditions surrounding their residence 
rights and assesses whether it strikes a proper balance between guaranteeing the freedom of 
movement of Union citizens and their family members and the interests of the Member States.  
In this connection, particular attention is paid to a recent line of cases in which certain of the 
said restrictive conditions were left unapplied in favour of the “primary carer” of Union 
citizens.  The analysis of this case law forms the starting point for more fundamental 
observations about the interplay between the Union judicial and political institutions in the 
development of Union citizenship and the promotion of its role as a cornerstone of European 
integration. 
 
III METHODOLOGY 
 
The traditional legal method has been used for the research carried out for this Ph.D. 
dissertation.  Accordingly, the legal sources relied on are the basic Union Treaties, secondary 
Union legislation, the case law of the Union Courts and policy documents of the Union 
institutions.  Besides, great use has been made of the (sometimes abundant) legal literature on 
the subjects covered, in the form of books, book chapters, journal articles and case notes.  The 
majority of the doctrine referred to consists of English language sources.  This is based on a 
conscious choice.  English language sources are often of a virtually unrivalled quality and 
depth4 and, given the status of English as a de facto academic lingua franca,5 they have the 
additional advantage of offering a broader range of perspectives presented by authors from 
different Member States 6 and even from countries outside the EU. 7  Nevertheless, other 
                                                 
4  This is the case, in particular, for renowned English language legal journals such as the Common Market 
Law Review, the European Law Journal and the European Law Review.  
5  See Arnull, "The Americanization of EU Law Scholarship", in Arnull, Eeckhout and Tridimas (eds.), 
Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 416. 
6  This assumption is borne out by a study by De Witte in which different EU law journals are compared in 
terms of the country of affiliation of their contributors. English language journals appear to be by far the 
most “international” in this regard, when compared to EU law journals in other languages. See de Witte, 
"European Union Law: A Unified Academic Discipline?" (2008) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2008/34, 
available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/10028.  
7  The Columbia Journal of European Law, for instance, is based in the US and frequently contains articles 
by American scholars. For another example of a scholarly work on EU law written by authors from a third 
country, see Harvey and Longo, European Union Law: An Australian View (Chatswood, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2008), 242 pp.  
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language sources have not been neglected and are also regularly referred to throughout this 
dissertation.  This is true, in particular, for sources in the Dutch8 and French language and, to 
a minor extent, for sources in German or Spanish.9 
 
The most important source by far, apart from academic legal literature, is the case law of the 
ECJ.  The ECJ can be credited with putting “flesh on the bones of Union citizenship”10 and 
transforming it into a dynamic and powerful concept with a strong added value.  It can with 
reason be said to be the driving force behind the development of Union citizenship into a real 
factor of European integration.  This explains the heavy reliance on ECJ case law in this 
dissertation.  My analysis often starts with a description of the case law in order to explain the 
current legal framework, but the case law will equally be a starting point to evaluate the 
present stance of the law and examine what the likely and desirable developments would be 
de lege ferenda.  In this connection, it must be remarked that Union citizenship is a very 
dynamic field, in which prior status quos have been frequently known to be radically changed 
by later cases.  For this reason, much importance is also attributed to Opinions of Advocates 
General.  Although such Opinions do not have legally binding force, they are of a high 
authoritative value and often contain a more elaborate and sometimes more revolutionary 
reasoning than ECJ judgments, thereby often providing a conceptual framework for future 
developments.11   
 
The analysis carried out in this dissertation is not limited to Union law, strictly speaking.  
Union law does not operate in a vacuum, but has its place in a wide spectrum of legal 
systems, which are increasingly interconnected.  For this reason, the solutions adopted under 
Union law will at times be compared with, contrasted to or evaluated against the applicable 
regime under general international law.  Besides, the research carried out would be 
incomplete without due consideration of the ECHR12 and the case law of the ECtHR,13 in 
particular given the fact that fundamental rights rank amongst the most vital rights enjoyed by 
Union citizens.  Finally, because the research is firmly situated against the background of 
tensions between the Union level and the national level, the national provisions of a number 
of Member States will also be studied with regard to specific points.  Indeed, a study of the 
national legal framework surrounding Union citizenship helps to identify the difficulties 
inherent in the existing state of the Union citizenship acquis and can be an inspirational 
ground for future legal solutions.  Still, it must be emphasised from the outset that this 
                                                 
8  A prominent Dutch language source is the Dutch journal “Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving: Tijdschrift 
voor Europees en Economisch Recht”, which is one of the oldest continuing legal journals specialised in 
EU law. 
9  Legal literature in most other languages will necessarily be excluded, given my limited knowledge of 
these languages. 
10  Expression borrowed from O'Leary, "Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship" (1999) 
24 E.L. Rev., 68-79. 
11  See, on the role of Advocates General and their influence on the judgments of the ECJ, Burrows and 
Greaves The Advocate General and EC Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 317 pp. (see, in 
particular, Chapter10, devoted to Union citizenship). See also the classic contribution on the subject by 
Tridimas: Tridimas, “The Role of the Advocate General in the Development of Community Law: Some 
Reflections” (1997) 34 CML Rev., 1349-1387. 
12  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 
1950 (“ECHR”) was concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe, an international organisation 
with, at the time of the writing, 47 member countries, among which are all the EU Member States. For its 
website, see www.coe.int/.  
13  The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) was set up in 1959 and has its seat in Strasbourg. It 
rules, in last resort, on applications alleging violations of the fundamental rights set out in the ECHR. For 
its website, see www.echr.coe.int/echr/.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 6
dissertation approaches the subjects studied from a Union law perspective.  Accordingly, 
national law will be referred to in function of the analysis of the Union legal framework.  It 
logically follows that only some national systems will be studied in the context of this 
dissertation and in a rather fragmented way only.  
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CHAPTER 2 DETERMINATION OF THE PERSONAL SCOPE OF 
UNION CITIZENSHIP 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Article 20(1) TFEU states: “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union”.1  Similarly, Article 9(1) TEU states: “Every national of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union”.2  Consequently, the personal scope of Union citizenship is 
determined by reference to the nationality of the Member States.  If a person acquires the 
nationality of a Member State, he or she automatically becomes a Union citizen.  Conversely, 
loss of the nationality of a Member State would seem to entail loss of Union citizenship.  The 
question I will try to answer in this chapter is which level of government is competent to 
determine the conditions for acquisition and loss of the nationality of a Member State, and 
hence to determine the personal scope of Union citizenship.  To answer this question, I will 
first briefly analyse the traditional position under international law regarding competence to 
determine the nationality of a State.  Next I will consider the particular situation within the 
framework of Union law, having regard to the provisions on Union citizenship.  It will be 
shown that under international law the Member States are competent to determine nationality 
and that the introduction of Union citizenship prima facie did not change this traditional 
position.  However, it will also be demonstrated that, on a closer look, Union law, through the 
concept of Union citizenship, significantly influences the competence of the Member States in 
this connection, both indirectly and through direct limitations. 
 
II TRADITIONAL POSITION UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
                                                 
1 Article 20(1) TFEU replaced Article 17(1) TFEU, which contained in its first sentence the same definition. 
The European Parliament already used this definition in its Declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms of 
12 April 1989, [1989] O.J. C120/51, Article 25(3) of which states that a Community citizen shall be "any 
person possessing the nationality of one of the Member States". 
2  This article, which figures under Title II of the TEU on “Democratic Principles”, was introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty. The full Article states: “In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the 
equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. 
Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship”. It is rather odd that the Treaties contain the same 
definition (although in slightly different wording) of Union citizenship in two different provisions. To my 
knowledge this is the only example of a duplication in the Treaties. Jo Shaw has described it as 
“obviously clumsy”, but at the same time inevitable, “given what the parliamentarians saw as a severe 
threat to the status of citizenship if it was not mentioned in terms in the TEU itself” (Shaw, "Citizenship: 
Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism", in Craig and De Búrca 
(eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 599). In any event, Article 
20(1) TFEU in my view remains the main provision for determining the personal scope of Union 
citizenship, because it is the provision that was added by the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced the 
provisions on Union citizenship and because of its location under Part Two of the TFEU titled “Non-
discrimination and citizenship of the Union” (see, in this sense, also de Waele, "EU Citizenship: 
Revisting its Meaning, Place and Potential" (2010) 12 Eur. J. Migration & L., 320-321). Consequently, 
Article 9 TEU is not central to my analysis in this chapter and will only be referred to sporadically.  
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It is a basic principle of international law that it is for States to determine who is to have their 
nationality and who is not.3  The determination of nationality is traditionally one of the strong 
prerogatives of every sovereign State, 4  and this is confirmed both by international 
conventions, like the 1930 Hague Convention,5 and in the case law of the International Court 
of Justice.6  At the same time, it is important to stress that States are, when exercising this 
competence, subject to a number of important rules deriving from international law.  These 
rules limit the effects to be given to a domestic determination of nationality under 
international law.  It would be wrong, therefore, to confine the determination of nationality 
completely to the reserved domain of competence of sovereign States.  The right way to put it 
is probably that nationality in principle has two aspects, both a national one and an 
international one: 7  States can autonomously lay down the rules on acquisition of their 
nationality, and determine the effects flowing from it in their domestic legal order, but in 
order for this conferral of nationality to have effect with regard to other States it will have to 
comply with certain rules of international law.8 
 
In the following I will discuss two limitations to the competence of sovereign States to 
determine nationality: a general limitation deriving from international law, on the one hand 
(A) and further conventional limitations, on the other hand (B).  They will be discussed only 
briefly here, but considered in more detail below, when considering to what extent they can 
play a role within the European Union, taking into account the particular nature of Union 
citizenship.   
A. General limitation 
 
                                                 
3  See e.g. Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008), 383; Hailbronner, "Nationality in Public International Law and European Law", in Bauböck, 
Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 
15 European Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 
2006), 35, at 52; Bossuyt and Wouters Grondlijnen van internationaal recht (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005), 
310; Shaw International Law (6th ed.) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 660; Makarov 
Allgemeine Lehren des Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1962), 57. 
4  According to Jessurun d’ Oliveira it belongs to the “hard core of the identity and independence of the 
States” (Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam", in O’Keeffe and 
Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999), 410-
412). 
5  Hague Convention concerning Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, League of 
Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) vol. 179; also published in The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 24, No. 3, Supplement: Official Documents (Jul., 1930), pp. 192-200. Article 1 of the Convention 
states: “It is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals.” The Convention entered 
into force on 1 July 1937, having been ratified by 19 States. 27 States signed but did not ratify. 
6  See ICJ, Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco [1923] PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 24: “The question of 
whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative 
question…in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of this 
court, in principle within this reserved domain”. 
7  See Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 
384-385.  
8  The fact that nationality has two aspects also clearly surfaces in the Nottebohm case (ICJ, Nottebohm Case 
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] ICJ Reports 4), where the ICJ states: “The naturalization of 
Nottebohm was an act performed by Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. The 
question to be decided is whether that act has the international effect here under consideration.” See also 
the replies of the German and the British government to the Hague Codification Conference (League of 
Nations, Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of Discussion, I, Nationality (1929), 
V.I.13 and 17, 169. 
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As pointed out above, Article 1 of the Hague Convention states that it is for each State to 
determine under its own law who are its nationals.  However, that article adds:  
 
“This law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with international 
conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to 
nationality.”9   
 
This principle is, for obvious reasons, only directly binding on State-parties to the 
Convention.  Arguably however it also forms a principle of customary international law, and 
therefore also binding upon States not party to the convention.10  The bottom-line is that, 
under international law, States only have to recognize the nationality of another State where it 
was granted with due respect to certain rules or principles deriving from international law. 
 
The most famous illustration of this principle is without any doubt to be found in the 
Nottebohm11 case.  In that case, the ICJ stated:  
 
“…nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection 
of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It 
may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is 
conferred […] is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring 
nationality than with that of any other State.”12  
 
This led the ICJ to observe that if a State granted its nationality to a person lacking any 
genuine connection with that State, this grant was “without regard to the concept of 
nationality adopted in international relations”.13  It followed that a State could not extend its 
diplomatic protection to such a person vis-à-vis a third State.  In the words of the ICJ:  
 
“…a State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another 
State unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim of making the legal bond of 
nationality accord with the individual’s genuine connection with the State which assumes the 
defence of its citizens by means of protection as against other States.”14 
 
                                                 
9  See also European Convention on Nationality, [1997] ETS No. 166, Article 3 of which provides: “1. Each 
State shall determine under its own law who are its nationals. 2. This law shall be accepted by other States 
in so far as it is consistent with applicable international conventions, customary international law and the 
principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality.” 
10  See De Groot, "Naar een harmonisatie van het nationaliteitsrecht in Europa?", in X (ed.), Het plezier van 
de rechtsvergelijking: opstellen over unificatie en harmonisatie van het recht in Europa (Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2003), 67; Dehousse, Garcia Martines, Thiry and Volpi Droit international public, Tome II: Les 
acteurs de la société internationale (Liège, Editions de l'Université de Liège, 2005), 83. At the same time, 
it must be remarked that Article 18 of the Hague Convention explicitly states that the inclusion of the 
principles and rules in the Convention shall in no way be deemed to prejudice the question whether they 
do or do not already form part of international law. 
11  ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] ICJ Reports 4. For a discussion, see Kunz, 
"The Nottebohm Judgment" (1960) 54 Am. J. Int. L., 536-571; Jones, "The Nottebohm Case" (1956) 5 
Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 230-244; Glazer, "Affaire Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala)--A Critique" 
(1955-1956) 44 Geo. L.J., 314-325. 
12  Nottebohm, at p. 23 (italics added). Brownlie has remarked that, even before the Nottebohm Case there 
was already substantial evidence for the doctrine of effective link (genuine connection): Brownlie, "The 
Place of the Individual in International Law " (1964) 50 Va. L. Rev. 435, at 441. 
13  Nottebohm, at p. 26. 
14  Nottebohm, at p. 23. In this connection, the Court explicitly referred to Article 1 of the Hague Convention 
(see n. 5, supra). 
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It would seem to follow that under international law States can only extend their nationality 
to persons having a genuine connection15 with them.16  In the absence of such a genuine 
connection, other States do not have to recognise their grant of nationality.  However, it must 
immediately be added that it is not sure that such a broad principle can be derived from the 
Nottebohm case, as some authors have pointed out.17  For instance, the ILC Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection 18  do not require the establishment of a genuine connection as a 
requirement of nationality.  The Commentary to these articles explains that the Commission 
took the view that there were certain factors that served to limit Nottebohm to the facts of the 
case in question, and that the ICJ in that case did not intend to expound a general rule 
applicable to all States.  It remains to be considered therefore whether, in the context of the 
European Union, the Nottebohm principle can be said to be of general application.  I will 
answer this question below.19 
 
B. Conventional limitations 
 
States can further limit their competence to determine nationality by concluding international 
agreements regarding nationality law. 20   The most important one is probably the Hague 
Convention of 1930,21 Article 1 of which has already been mentioned.  Another example is 
provided by international conventions on the reduction of statelessness, in particular the 
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.22  Within Europe, mention 
must be made of the European Convention on Nationality (“ECN”), concluded under the 
auspices of the Council of Europe.23  One of the aims of this convention is to create more 
uniformity in matters relating to nationality.24  To this aim, it establishes principles and rules 
                                                 
15  I will not make the distinction sometimes made between a “genuine connection” and an “effective link” 
and treat both concepts as aspects of the same requirement, namely that of a certain connection between 
an individual and a State, without further elaborating on the exact meaning of these concepts under 
international law as such is not crucial to my analysis. For a more detailed discussion, see Brownlie 
Principles of Public International Law (7th ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 399 et seq. For 
a recent critical discussion of the “genuine connection” doctrine, see Sloane, “Breaking the genuine link: 
the contemporary international legal regulation of nationality” (2009) Harv. Int’l L;J. 1-60. 
16  An interesting parallel can be drawn with the “nationality” of vessels. Article 91(1) of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (‘UNCLOS’) and 
approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 98/392/EC of 23 March 1998, 
[1998] O.J. L179/1 states “Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for 
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the 
State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.” 
This provision lacks direct effect; see ECJ, Case C-308/06 Intertanko [2008] E.C.R. I-4057, para. 65. 
17  De Groot, "Naar een harmonisatie van het nationaliteitsrecht in Europa?", in X (ed.), Het plezier van de 
rechtsvergelijking: opstellen over unificatie en harmonisatie van het recht in Europa (Deventer, Kluwer, 
2003), 70; Shaw International Law (6th ed.) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 813-814. 
18  ILC Draft articles on Diplomatic Protection, adopted during the 58th session, in 2006, Article 4. 
19  See under IV.A., infra. 
20  See Hailbronner and Renner Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht (München, Beck, 2005), 51 et seq. 
21 See n. 5, supra.  
22  989 UNTS 175. 13 Member States have ratified the Convention, whereas France has only signed it: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterV/treaty4.asp.  
23  European Convention on Nationality, [1997] ETS No. 166. See, in great detail: De Groot, "The European 
Convention on Nationality: A Step Towards a Ius Commune in the Field of Nationality Law" (2000) 7 
MJ, 117-157; Hall, "The European Convention on Nationality and the Right to Have Rights" (1999) 24 
E.L. Rev., 586-602. 
24  According to its preamble, the signatory states to the Convention are: “Desiring to promote the 
progressive development of legal principles concerning nationality, as well as their adoption in internal 
law and desiring to avoid, as far as possible, cases of statelessness”. 
Chapter 2: Determination of the Personal Scope of Union Citizenship 
 13
relating to the nationality of natural persons to which the internal law of States Parties has to 
conform (Article 1).  It follows that signatory States voluntarily limit their sovereignty with 
regard to nationality in order to secure more uniformity within Europe.  Especially important 
are the “general principles relating to nationality” (Articles 3-5), to which no reservations may 
be made (Article 29(1)).  The Convention is obviously only applicable in States which have 
ratified the Convention.  At present, this includes only 12 of the EU Member States. 25  
However, as De Groot 26  argues, the principles contained in Articles 3-5 could possibly 
become binding as customary international law.  The role of the ECN in the EU will be 
discussed in more detail below.27 
 
III IMPACT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF UNION CITIZENSHIP  
 
A. Member States remain competent to regulate nationality 
 
Under this heading, I will consider if, and to what extent, the introduction of Union 
citizenship has changed anything for the Member States of the European Union with regard to 
the traditional principle of international law that Sovereign States are competent to determine 
nationality, be it within certain limitations deriving from international law.  It has already 
been noted that the status of Union citizenship depends first and foremost on having the 
nationality of a Member State.  One could be forgiven for thinking that, in parallel with the 
introduction of Union citizenship, some common rules or principles on the determination of 
Member State nationality would have been introduced at the level of the EU.  Given the 
important rights deriving from the status of Union citizenship, one could have expected the 
EU to intervene with regard to the conferral of this status.  Such rules or principles would 
have served to circumscribe the competence of the Member State to confer or withdraw their 
nationality in order to better guarantee the effect of the provisions on Union citizenship, by 
not making its scope fully subject to the will of the Member States.  Yet, an analysis of the 
Treaty provisions (1) and the case law of the Union courts (2) shows that the determination of 
nationality has remained fully within the competence of the Member States.28  This is also 
confirmed by the fact that Member States can make unilateral declarations on the definition of 
their nationals for the purposes of Union law, which are binding for the other Member States 
(3). 
 
1. Treaty provisions 
 
                                                 
25  Being Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. See: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=166&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG.  
26  De Groot, "Naar een harmonisatie van het nationaliteitsrecht in Europa?", in X (ed.), Het plezier van de 
rechtsvergelijking: opstellen over unificatie en harmonisatie van het recht in Europa (Deventer, Kluwer, 
2003), 71. 
27  See under V.C.2., infra.  
28  In the sense that neither the Union legislator nor the Union Courts have formulated (minimum) rules or 
principles regarding the determination or definition of the nationality of the Member States. It should not 
be taken to mean that Union law does not have any influence on the competence of the Member States in 
this connection (see the discussion under Titles III and IV, infra). 
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The provisions on Union citizenship were introduced with the Maastricht Treaty.29  It is clear 
from the political climate and the negotiations surrounding the Maastricht Treaty that the EU 
Member States wanted to fully preserve their power as sovereign States to determine 
nationality.  They were clearly not prepared to transfer this competence to the Union.  This 
can probably be explained by a certain fear on part of the Member States of losing an 
important part of their sovereignty.30  Handoll has remarked in this regard that “to transfer the 
power to determine nationality to the [Union] would, perhaps more than the transfer of any 
other power, sound the death-knell of the Member State qua independent State”.31  To take 
away any possible doubt in this regard it was firmly stated in a declaration annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty that:  
 
“The Conference declares that, wherever in the Treaty establishing the European Community 
reference is made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual possesses 
the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the 
Member State concerned32”.   
 
Some Member States were clearly concerned that Union citizenship would compete with or 
even dominate Member State nationality.  Precisely for this reason it was agreed that the 
personal scope of Union citizenship was to be determined by reference to the nationality of 
the Member States (see Article 20(1) TFEU).  This allows the Member States, prima facie at 
least, to retain control over the status of Union citizen.  Apparently, some Member States even 
feared that original Article 8(1) TEC33 (later Article 17(1) TEC; present Article 20(1) TFEU) 
did not stress clearly enough the autonomy of Member State nationality.  For this reason the 
Treaty of Amsterdam34 added a second sentence to Article 17(1) TEC, reading “Citizenship of 
the Union complements and does not replace national citizenship”.35  The Treaty of Lisbon 
changed this sentence into “Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace 
national citizenship” (Article 20(1) TFEU). 36   The aim of this rewording is probably to 
express even more clearly the idea that Union citizenship leaves the competence of the 
Member States regarding nationality untouched, at least as a matter of principle.  It could be 
understood as stating that Union citizenship must not be seen as in some way transforming the 
nationality of the Member States (by “complementing it and hence transforming its nature”), 
                                                 
29  For a detailed discussion, see Kovar and Simon, "La citoyenneté européenne" (1993) C.D.E., 285-316. 
30  The same concern is apparent from a number of other provisions introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. 
Note, for instance, the insistence of the Member States on the respect for the national identities of 
Member States (Article 6(3) TEU) and on the fact that the powers of the European Union are limited 
(introduction of the principle of subsidiarity; Article 5, second para., TEC [now Article 5(3) TEU]).  
31  Handoll Free Movement of Persons in the EU (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 283. Jessurun 
d’Oliveira for his part, has pointed out that nationality is central to the existence of Member States: see 
Jessurun d’Oliveira, "European Citizenship: Its Meaning, Its Potential", in Monar, Ungerer and Wessels 
(eds.), The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (Brussels, European University Press, 1993), 85. 
32  Declaration (No 2) on nationality of a Member State, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, [1992] 
O.J. C191/98. 
33  As introduced by the Maastricht Treaty: Treaty on European Union, [1992] O.J. C191. Article 8(1) read: 
“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union”. 
34  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and related acts, [1997] O.J. C340. 
 35  The Treaty of Amsterdam added this provision so as to make it absolutely clear that Union citizenship is 
complementary. See also Closa, "Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States" (1995) 32 CML 
Rev., 487-518.  
36  The same sentence also figures in Article 9 TEU (see my comments in n. 2, supra). See also the similarly 
worded Article I-10(1), second sentence, of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
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but as a concept separate from that of Member State nationality.37  This is also clear from the 
French version of the Treaties, in which the word “complète” is replaced with “s'ajoute à”, 
and perhaps even more clear from the Dutch version, in which the expression “vult het 
nationale burgerschap aan” is replaced with “komt naast het nationale burgerschap”.  Another 
explanation that has been advanced for the changed wording is that the new wording better 
indicates that Member State nationality is to be the primary status of a person and Union 
citizenship a secondary, accessory status.38  However, this explanation is clearly at odds with 
the case law of the ECJ, proclaiming that Union citizenship is “destined to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member States”.39  In my view, the new wording accommodates this 
case law of the ECJ, since it describes Union citizenship as a full-blown additional 
fundamental status rather than an ancillary accessory status which merely complements 
Member State nationality.40  As such the new wording confirms both the competence of the 
Member States regarding nationality and the fundamental status of Union citizenship.41 
 
The concern for competing forms of citizenships has perhaps been given the clearest 
expression in the Danish declaration on citizenship of the Union on the occasion of the Danish 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,42 part 1 of which states:  
 
“Citizenship of the Union is a political and legal concept which is entirely different from the 
concept of citizenship within the meaning of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark and of 
the Danish legal system. Nothing in the Treaty on European Union implies or foresees an 
undertaking to create a citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of a nation-state. The 
question of Denmark participating in any such development does, therefore, not arise.”  
 
Remarkable in this regard is that the Treaty Article defining Union citizenship in the Danish 
version of the TFEU uses two times the word “borger(skab”),43 and does not use the word 
“indfødsret”, the Danish word for nationality used in the Danish Nationality Act.  This may 
perhaps partly explain the Danish fear that the creation of Union citizenship could be the first 
                                                 
37  Schrauwen, "European Union citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: any change at all?” (2008) 1 MJ, 60. 
See also the discussion in Shaw, "Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and 
Constitutionalism", in Craig and De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 598-600. 
38  De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 2. This interpretation is also advanced by Konstadinides, who, rather 
curiously, argues that “additional” and “complementary” are synonymous, leaving one wondering why 
any change at all has occurred in the wording of the provision (Konstadinides, "La fraternite europeene? 
The extent of national competence to condition the acquisition and loss of nationality from the 
perspective of EU citizenship" (2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 406). 
39  ECJ, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193, para. 31 and often reiterated in later cases: e.g. ECJ, 
Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719, para. 32; ECJ, Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz 
[2007] E.C.R. I-6849, para. 86; ECJ, Case C-50/06 Commission v the Netherlands [2007] E.C.R. I-4383, 
para. 32. See also recital 3 to Directive 2004/38 (n. 194, infra). 
40  In this sense, de Waele, "EU Citizenship: Revisting its Meaning, Place and Potential" (2010) 12 Eur. J. 
Migration & L., 322-323. 
41  See, in this sense, Hailbronner, "Nationality in Public International Law and European Law", in Bauböck, 
Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 
15 European Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 
2006), 35, at 87. 
42  Declaration on citizenship of the Union, to be associated to the Danish act of ratification of the Treaty on 
European Union, [1992] O.J. C348/1. 
43  Article 20(1), second sentence, TFEU in the Danish language version reads: “Unionsborgerskab har 
enhver, der er statsborger i en Medlemsstat" (as did Article 8(1) of the Danish version of the TEC in its 
pre-Amsterdam version). 
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step towards the decline of their own (Danish) nationality.44  Indeed, it may have conveyed the 
impression that Union citizenship is not defined with reference to or dependent on the Danish 
domestic nationality concept (“indfødsret”).  This impression was, of course, not justified since 
the reference in the Treaty article to the nationality of a Member State undoubtedly referred to 
nationality as it was conceived of under the domestic laws of the different Member States.   
 
In reaction to the Danish declaration, the Heads of State or Government, meeting in the 
European Council, issued the following statement:  
 
“The provisions of Part Two of the Treaty establishing the European Community relating to 
citizenship of the Union give nationals of the Member States additional rights and protection as 
specified in that Part. They do not in any way take the place of national citizenship. The question 
whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State will be settled solely by 
reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.”45   
 
This confirms the general principle contained in the Declaration on nationality.46  It makes it 
explicit, moreover, that Union citizenship in no way encroaches on the powers of the Member 
State to regulate nationality.  This is clearly intended to alleviate the fear of some Member 
States for competing forms of citizenship.  However, it must not be overlooked that strictly 
speaking, the statement applies to Denmark only and not to other existing or acceding 
Member States.47  Moreover, it must be pointed out that a declaration annexed to a final act, 
like the Declaration on nationality, nor a decision of the Heads of State or Government have 
the same legal force as the Treaties.  At least one author considers, therefore, that these 
instruments are not sufficient to protect the Member States nationality legislation from being 
encroached upon by Union law and has called on the Member States to include a provision 
stating the exclusive competence of the Member States regarding nationality in the Treaties 
themselves.48  This point will be extensively discussed below.49 
 
2. Case law of the Union Courts  
 
In the absence of common rules on Member State nationality, one could have expected the 
ECJ to have “Europeanised”50 the concept of Member State nationality, like it has done, for 
                                                 
44  De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 4. 
45  Decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning certain 
problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union, [1992] O.J. C348/1. For a discussion, see 
Curtin and van Ooik, “Denmark and the Edinburgh Summit: Maastricht without Tears”, in O’Keeffe and 
Twomey, Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (London, Chancery Law Publishing, 1994), 349-365; 
Curtin and van Ooik, "De bijzondere positie van Denemarken in de Europese Unie" (1993) SEW, 675-
689. See also the Solemn Declaration of the Birmingham European Council, which states that 
“citizenship of the Union brings our citizens additional rights and protection without in any way taking 
the place of their national citizenship” (Declaration on a Community close to its citizens, Annex I Bull. 
EC 10-1992). 
46  Supra, n. 32. 
47  See the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of 11 and 12 December 1992 ('Denmark 
and the Treaty on European Union'), [1992] O.J. C348/1. 
48  Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Ontkoppeling van nationaliteit en Unieburgerschap? Opmerkingen over de 
Rottmann zaak" (2010) NJB, 1028, at 1033 (commenting on the Rottmann judgment, in which the Court 
did consider that the said instruments cannot be interpreted as shielding the Member States’ competence 
regarding nationality from the duty to respect Union law; see the discussion under V.A.2., infra). 
49  See under V.B.1., infra.  
50  See Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam", in O’Keeffe and 
Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999), 396. 
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example, with the concept of “worker”.51  Just like “nationality of a Member State”, the 
concept of “worker” was not expressly defined in the Treaties or in any provision of 
secondary legislation on the subject.  Yet, the ECJ considered that the term “worker” has an 
independent Union meaning and may not be defined by reference to the national laws of the 
Member States, because otherwise:  
 
“the [Union] rules on freedom of movement for workers would be frustrated, as the meaning of 
those terms could be fixed and modified unilaterally, without any control by the [Union] 
institutions, by national laws which would thus be able to exclude at will certain categories of 
persons from the benefit of the [Treaties].”52   
 
Thus, the ECJ conferred on itself a “hermeneutic monopoly” to counteract possible unilateral 
restrictions of the applications of the rules on freedom of movement by the different Member 
States.53   
 
One could point out that Union citizenship is considered by the Court to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member States and that, just like the status of worker, it entails 
important rights under Union law, such as a fundamental right to free movement of Union 
citizens (Article 21 TFEU).  One could argue that the aim of the provisions on Union 
citizenship would be frustrated if Member States could unilaterally restrict their application.  
That situation could arise if Member States remained exclusively competent to confer or 
withdraw their nationality, given that the status of Union citizen is defined wholly with regard 
to Member State nationality (Article 20(1) TFEU).  Applying a similar reasoning to the one 
adopted by the Court in the Levin case, one could conclude that “nationality of a Member 
State” is to have an independent Union meaning, and must not be determined solely by 
reference to the laws of the Member States.  Just to illustrate this possibility: the ECJ could 
have put forward the view that third country nationals are to be considered nationals of a 
Member State for the purposes of the provisions on Union citizenship after having legally 
resided for at least five years in the territory of the Member States.  Yet the ECJ has never 
made such a bold move, and has repeatedly held that the determination of nationality remains 
a matter for the Member States, although at the same time qualifying this finding.54  
 
There are probably good reasons for this.  First of all, with regard to the provisions on Union 
citizenship there is less scope to argue that the basic terms were not defined in the Treaties or 
in legislation, to the difference of the provisions on free movement of workers.  Union 
citizenship, the central concept we are concerned here with, is expressly defined in Article 
20(1) TFEU.  And with regard to nationality of the Member States, it clearly follows from the 
Declaration on nationality that Member State nationality is to be determined solely by 
                                                 
51  Other examples of concepts that were given an independent Union meaning are the terms “staying” and 
“resident” in the context of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (see ECJ, Case C-
66/08 Kozłowski [2008] E.C.R. I-6041, paras 41-43). 
52  E.g. ECJ, Case 75/63 Hoekstra [1964] E.C.R. 177, 184; ECJ, Case 53/81 Levin [1982] E.C.R. 1035, para. 
11 and numerous later cases (for recent examples, see: ECJ, Case C-228/07 Petersen [2008] E.C.R. I-
6989, para. 45; ECJ, Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] E.C.R. I-
4585, para. 26). The Court’s approach has been fiercely criticized by O’Brien, who argues that this well 
established case law should be reviewed in the light of recent developments like the expanding case law 
on Union citizenship (O'Brien, "Social Blind Spots and Monocular Policy Making: the ECJ’s Migrant 
Worker Model" (2009) 46 CML Rev., 1107-1141). 
53  Mancini, "The Free Movement of Workers in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice", in Curtin 
and O'Keeffe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law (London, 
Butterworths, 1992), 67. 
54  In the sense that it has held that the Member States must exercise this competence with due regard to 
Union law (see the discussion under V.A., infra). 
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reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.  Declarations annexed to a Final 
Act may not have the same legal force of the Treaties,55 but the Declaration on nationality at 
the very least shows, just like other documents discussed above, the clear intention of the 
Member States that Member State nationality should not be considered as an autonomous 
Union concept.56  The intention of the Masters of the Treaties is obviously an important 
element for the ECJ when interpreting Union law.  It cannot without convincing reasons deny 
it.57  The ECJ has recently confirmed that the Declaration on nationality (and the statement of 
the Heads of State or Government on this issue 58) must be taken into account as being 
instruments for the interpretation of the Treaties, in particular for the purpose of determining 
the ambit ratione personae of the Treaties.59  Besides, the above cited case law, holding that 
certain concepts are to have an independent Union meaning, explicitly states that this is the 
case only with regard to provisions of Union law “which make no express reference to the law 
of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope”.60  This again, 
breaks down a possible parallel in the said case law with regard to Member State nationality. 
 
Furthermore, as was set out above, it is a general principle of international law that sovereign 
States are competent to determine their nationality.61  A similar principle obviously does not 
exist with regard to the concept of “worker”.  This too has clearly been a determining factor in 
the finding of the ECJ that Member States remain competent to determine nationality.  
Holding differently would probably have been seen by many Member States as an 
unacceptable encroachment on their sovereign powers.  Besides, Union instruments have from 
early on restricted the application of Treaty provisions to workers who are nationals of the 
Member States.62  Given that the ECJ did not find it necessary to give an autonomous Union 
meaning to “nationals of a Member State” in order to preserve the effectiveness of the 
provisions on free movement of workers, it is not immediately clear why it should find it 
necessary to do so when dealing with the provisions on Union citizenship.  Nevertheless, I 
will argue below that the provisions on Union citizenship and the integration dynamics behind 
them do provide the Court with good arguments for treating the nationality rules of the 
                                                 
55  Toth, "The Legal Status of the Declarations Annexed to the Single European Act" (1986) CML Rev. 803, at 
812. 
56  See the discussion in O'Leary The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: from the Free movement 
of Persons to Union Citizenship (London, Kluwer Law International, 1996), 59-62. 
57  See, in this connection, Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the law of treaties, 
which for the purpose of interpreting a treaty considers its context to be, inter alia, any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties 
as an instrument related to the treaty. See also Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-64/05 P Sweden v 
Commission [2007] E.C.R. I-11389, para. 34 and Schermers, "The Effect of the Date 31 December 1992" 
(1991) CML Rev. 275, at 276. 
58  See n. 45, supra. 
59  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 40. 
60  The ECJ has on numerous occasions held that “it follows from the need for uniform application of 
[Union] law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of [Union] law which makes 
no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and 
scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the [Union], having 
regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question” (see, e.g., 
ECJ, Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] E.C.R. 107, para. 11; ECJ, Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] E.C.R. I-6917, 
para. 43; ECJ, Case C-170/03 Feron [2005] E.C.R. I-2299, para. 26; ECJ, Case C-316/05 Nokia [2006] 
E.C.R. I-12083, para. 21; ECJ, Case C-66/08 Kozłowski [2008] E.C.R. I-6041, paras 41-43). 
61  See the discussion under Title II, supra. 
62  See, in particular, Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of 
movement for workers within the Community, [1968] J.O. L257/2. 
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Member States in certain circumstances as falling within the scope of Union law and for 
assessing their compliance with certain principles of Union law.63 
 
3. Member State declarations on nationality  
 
The conclusion from the foregoing must be that the Member States, and the Member States 
alone, are competent to determine who is a national, and that this remains true even after the 
introduction of the provisions on Union citizenship.  Of great interest to note in this context is 
that the definition of a national for the purposes of Union citizenship can be different from the 
definition of nationals under the internal law of the Member State concerned.  Indeed, the 
Declaration on nationality mentioned above64 does not merely proclaim that nationality is to 
be determined by the Member States.  It adds the following sentence:  
 
“Member States may declare, for information, who are to be considered their nationals for [Union] 
purposes by way of a declaration lodged with the Presidency and may amend any such declaration 
when necessary.”65   
 
So far, only two Member States have made a declaration on the definition of nationals for 
Union purposes: the UK and Germany.  It must immediately be pointed out however that both 
declarations date back to before the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, and have not therefore 
been adopted pursuant to the said Declaration on nationality.  The UK, on the one hand, made 
a unilateral declaration on nationality upon signing the 1972 Treaty of Accession.66  This 
declaration, which was reiterated in slightly different terms upon signing the Lisbon Treaty, 
will be discussed elsewhere.67  
 
The German declaration,68 on the other hand, was made at the time of the signature of the 
TEEC and TEAEC.  It reads: “All Germans as defined in the Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany shall be considered nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany”.  
This definition refers to Article 116 of the German Basic Law and is broader than the 
definition then found in the German Nationality Act 1913, because it includes ethnic Germans 
in Eastern Europe who entered Germany as refugees (Vertriebene). 69   Declarations to 
identical effect were made by Germany upon signing the 1979 Treaty of Accession and the 
1985 Treaty of Accession.  However, these declarations have become without practical 
relevance since 1 January 2000, the date of the entry into force of the revised German 
                                                 
63  See the discussion under V.B., infra. 
64  Supra, n. 32. 
65  Declaration (No 2) on nationality of a Member State, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, [1992] 
O.J. C191/98. 
66  Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic the 
Italian Republic, The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands ( Member States of 
the European Communities), The Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community [1972] O.J. L5/164. 
67  See Chapter 3, under II.B.4., infra. 
68  Declaration of 25 March 1957 by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the definition of 
the expression "German National". In the final act annexed to the TEEC, it is stated that the 
intergovernmental conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the founding Member States took note 
of this declaration. For a discussion, see Bleckmann, "German Nationality Within the Meaning of the 
EEC Treaty" (1978) 15 CML Rev., 435-446. 
69  See Piotrowicz, “The Status of Germany in International Law: Deutschland über Deutschland?” 38 (1989) 
I.C.L.Q., 609. 
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Nationality Act.70  Indeed, anyone recognised as German within the meaning of Article 116 
of the Basic Law now simultaneously acquires German nationality ex lege on the basis of the 
revised German Nationality Act.71  It follows that the said declarations add nothing to the 
default situation, whereby “national of the Member State for Union purposes” would be 
determined with regard to the German nationality act.  It is not opportune therefore to discuss 
these declarations in any detail here. 
 
All the same, the aspect of these declarations that matters in this context is not so much their 
content, but rather their legal value, because this determines the power of the Member States 
to define nationality for the purposes of the application of, inter alia, the provisions on Union 
citizenship.  It was not clear from the outset what legal value any of these declarations would 
have.  Especially the expression “for information” in the Declaration on nationality raised 
doubts concerning their binding force.  However, this issue has been clarified by the ECJ.  In 
Kaur, 72  the ECJ firmly stated that declarations on the definition of nationals for Union 
purposes have an authoritative value with regard to the determination of the scope of the 
Treaties ratione personae.73  In other words, these declarations determine, in a way that is 
binding for all Member States, who is to be considered a national of the Member State 
concerned for Union purposes. 
 
This confirms once more that under Union law, the Member States are fully competent to 
regulate nationality.  As such, Union law confirms the traditional principle of international 
law that States are sovereign in determining nationality.  Moreover, it appears from the 
foregoing that Member States are competent to restrict the effects of their nationality at the 
Union level.  This possibility has not been used so far – at least not since the introduction of 
Union citizenship.  Still, it must be remarked that the possibility is increasingly being 
discussed in legal literature,74 in particular since the recent Rottmann judgment which seems 
to have paved the way for greater intrusion of Union law in the field of nationality 
regulation.75  In this connection, it is sometimes suggested that Member States could use the 
said possibility of submitting a declaration in order to shield certain contentious aspects of 
their nationality legislation from the influence of Union law.  The argument has also been 
invoked in relation to the Member States’ policies vis-à-vis the Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCTs).76  Since most OCT nationals are Union citizens, they can claim the rights 
attached to that status and this has recently given rise to disputes before the Union Courts, in 
particular in the famous Eman and Sevinger case.77  In this connection it has been suggested 
                                                 
70  Law on the reform of the German citizenship law (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) of 15 July 1999, 
Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette), vol. 1, 1618. For an overview of the historical development of 
German nationality law, see: Hailbronner, "Germany", in Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch 
(eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. Volume 2: 
Country Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 217 et seq. 
71  See: De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 8. 
72  ECJ, Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] E.C.R. I-1237, para. 24. See Hall, "Determining the Scope ratione 
personae of European Citizenship: Customary International Law Prevails for Now" (2001) 28 LIEI, 355-
360. 
73  See further the submissions of Spain in ECJ, Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] E.C.R. I-
7917, in which Spain uses the Kaur dictum to argue that the UK could not validly extend the right to vote 
and stand as a candidate in elections to the EP to “Qualifying Commonwealth Citizens”. 
74  See, e.g., the discussion in Kochenov, "Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the 
Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 186-190. 
75  See the detailed discussion under IV.A.2., infra. 
76  See the detailed analysis in Chapter 3, infra. 
77  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055. 
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that Member States could take such issues outside the reach of Union law by submitting a 
declaration to the effect that OCT nationals, while being Member State nationals under the 
internal law of the Member State concerned, are not “nationals” for Union purposes.  I will 
come back to this argument in the framework of the detailed discussion in Chapter 3 on 
“OCTs and Union citizenship” (see III.C.1, in particular). 
 
B. What role for Union law? 
 
Even though within the framework of Union law Member States remain competent to 
determine the rules governing nationality, it is my view that they will not act completely 
autonomously in this regard.  Through the concept of Union citizenship, Union law will exert 
a considerable influence over the Member States in this policy area.  This influence can be 
rather indirect, in that the consequences Union citizenship attaches to the possession of 
Member State nationality, and the effect this has on other Member States, could bring a 
Member State to change its nationality legislation.  But Union law arguably also sets direct 
limitations to the competence of the Member States regarding nationality.  It must be 
remembered in this regard that already in 1992 the ECJ stated that “it is for each Member 
State, having due regard to [Union] law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and 
loss of nationality”.78 
 
In the following, I will consider, first, the indirect influence Union law may have on the 
competence of the Member States regarding nationality, by determining the effects to be 
given to Member State nationality in the framework of the provisions on Union citizenship 
(Title III).  In this context I will make a distinction between the Member States’ competence 
regarding acquisition of nationality, on the one hand, and regarding loss of nationality, on the 
other hand, because it would seem to be the case that the influence deriving from Union law 
may well be different depending on whether the first or the second is at stake.  Next I will 
consider whether Union law also directly limits the Member States’ competence in this regard 
(Title IV).79  I will consider what principles of Union law could serve as such limitations and 
what consequences this may have for the nationality laws of the Member States.   
 
IV INDIRECT INFLUENCE FLOWING FROM UNION CITIZENSHIP 
 
                                                 
78  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 10 (italics added). See the discussion under 
IV.A.1., infra. 
79  I will limit my analysis to the possible influence of Union law on the national laws of EU Member States. 
For a discussion of the influence Union law may have on candidate Member States, see: Kochenov, "EU 
Influence on the Citizenship Policies of the Candidate Countries: The Case of the Roma Exclusion in the 
Czech Republic" (2007) 3 Journal of Contemporary European Research, 124-140; Kochenov, "Pre-
accession, Naturalization, and 'Due Regard to Community Law': the European Union’s ‘Steering’ of 
Citizenship Policies in Candidate Countries during the Fifth Enlargement" (2004) 4 Romanian J. Pol. Sci., 
71-97. 
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A. Acquisition of nationality 
1. Micheletti80 and the unconditional recognition of Member State nationality 
 
This famous landmark case is about a dentist from Argentina, Mr. Micheletti, one of whose 
grandparents was Italian.  According to Italian law, he therefore had the Italian nationality.81  
Mr. Micheletti wanted to establish himself in Spain, invoking his freedom of establishment as 
a national of a Member State (Article 44 TEC; now Article 50 TFEU).  The Spanish 
authorities, however, refused to recognise him as an Italian national.  They pointed out that 
according to the Spanish Civil Code in cases of dual nationality, where neither nationality was 
Spanish, the nationality corresponding to the habitual residence of the person concerned 
before his arrival in Spain was to take precedence.82  In the case of Mr. Micheletti, this 
habitual residence corresponded to Argentina.  Accordingly, he was to be considered as an 
Argentinean, and not an Italian national, and thus did not have the right to establish himself in 
Spain on the basis of the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment.83 
 
The ECJ found the decision of the Spanish authorities to be in breach of Union law.  It 
famously stated that where one Member State had granted its nationality to someone, this had 
to be unconditionally accepted by all other Member States.84  It was not permissible for a 
Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of the nationality of another Member State by 
imposing an additional condition for recognition of that nationality with a view to the exercise 
of the fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaties.85  Hence, since Italy had chosen to 
bestow the Italian nationality on Mr. Micheletti, Spain had to unconditionally recognise this 
and treat him as an Italian national.  It could not restrict the effects of the acquisition of Italian 
nationality by imposing an additional condition for taking that nationality into account, such 
as a condition of habitual residence in its territory.86   
 
The ECJ’s holding in Micheletti can be fruitfully contrasted with the traditional position in 
international law.  As outlined above, 87  under international law, States do not have to 
unconditionally recognise the grant of nationality by another State.  They may refuse to 
recognise an individual’s nationality if it was granted contrary to international law.  
                                                 
80  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239. See the case note by Jessurun d'Oliveira in (1993) 
CML Rev., 623-637 and Ruzié in (1993) R.G.D.I.P., 107-120 and the analysis by Iglesias Buhigues, 
"Doble nacionalidad y derecho comunitario. A propósito del asunto C 369/90, Micheletti, sentencia del 
TJCE de 7 de Julio de 1992", in Perez Gonzalez and others (eds.), Hacia un nuevo orden internacional y 
europeo. Homenaje al profesor M. Diéz de Velasco (Madrid, Tecnos, 1993), 953-967. 
81  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 2. 
82  See Article 9.9., first subpara., of the Código Civil (“A los efectos de este capítulo, respecto de las 
situaciones de doble nacionalidad previstas en las Leyes españolas se estará a lo que determinen los 
tratados internacionales, y, si nada estableciesen, será preferida la nacionalidad coincidente con la última 
residencia habitual y, en su defecto, la última adquirida”). 
83  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, paras 4-5.  
84  Ibid., para. 10. 
85  Ibid., para. 10. 
86  Ibid., para. 10. It appears that Spain took up this obligation with much hesitance and discontent. 
According to De Groot, the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) in the years following the 
Micheletti judgment kept interpreting Spanish nationality law vis-à-vis Argentinean-Italian nationals in a 
way contrary to the Micheletti judgment (De Groot, "Latin-American European Citizens: Some 
Consequences of the Autonomy of the Member States of the European Union in Nationality Matters 
(editorial)" (2002) 9 MJ118; De Groot, "Negeert Spanje de Micheletti-beslissing van het Europees Hof 
van Justitie?" (1998) Migrantenrecht, 123). 
87  Supra, under II. 
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Moreover, in the case of a person having plural nationality, i.e. the nationality of two or more 
States, States may give preference to the so-called “real and effective nationality”.88  Union 
law on the other hand, as is clear from Micheletti, does not at all allow Member States to 
refuse to recognise nationality in the absence of a genuine connection89 or because it was 
granted contrary to international law.  A further difference with international law is that under 
the latter a State is allowed to treat a person having dual nationality including the nationality 
of that State as its own national, thereby “ignoring” the other nationality for certain 
purposes.90  Union law, by contrast, does not seem to allow a Member State to treat one of its 
nationals who also possesses the nationality of another Member State as merely having its 
own nationality.  In Garcia Avello the ECJ pointed out that the 1930 Hague Convention91 
does not impose an obligation but simply provides an option, in the case of dual nationality, 
for the contracting parties to give priority to their own nationality over any other. 92   It 
followed that the Hague Convention could not be relied upon by the Member States in the 
context of Union law to “ignore” the nationality of another Member State.  The bottom-line 
seems to be that, within the context of the EU, Member States do not only have to 
unconditionally recognise the grant of nationality by another Member State, but also actively 
take it into account where it would have consequences under Union law.93 
 
The ECJ is probably right in taking this approach.  Any other approach would potentially 
undermine some of the basic philosophies underlying the creation of the EU.  If Member 
States were allowed to recognise a person as having the nationality of another Member State 
under certain conditions only, the consequence would be that the class of persons to whom 
Union rules applied could vary from one Member State to another (as was explicitly remarked 
by the ECJ in Micheletti94).  Situations could arise in which some Member States would 
recognise a person as having the nationality of another Member State, whereas other Member 
States would refuse to recognise this.  The person in question would have the right to exercise 
his or her Union rights in the first category of Member States, but not in the second one.  Such 
a situation would run counter to the Union objective of free movement of persons, as the free 
movement of persons in a Member State whose nationality they do not possess would vary 
                                                 
88  See: Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 
400 et seq.; Zimmermann, "Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Staatsangehörigkeit der Mitgliedstaaten 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Probleme mehrfacher Staatsangehörigkeit" (1995) EuR., 45-70; Kovar 
and Simon, "La citoyenneté européenne" (1993) C.D.E., at 291-292. 
89  Noteworthy in this regard is that AG Tesauro in Micheletti explicitly remarked that: “I do not believe that 
the case before the Court constitutes an appropriate setting in which to raise the problems relating to 
effective nationality, whose origin lies in a ‘romantic period’ of international relations and, in particular, 
in the concept of diplomatic protection; still less, in my view, is the well known (and, it is worth 
remembering, controversial) Nottebohm judgment of the International Court of Justice (8) of any 
relevance” (Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 5). 
90  See Article 3 of the Hague Convention, stating: “Subject to the provisions of the present Convention, a 
person having two or more nationalities may be regarded as its national by each of the States whose 
nationality he possesses”. 
91  See n. 5, supra. Article 3 of the Convention states: “Subject to the provisions of the present Convention, a 
person having two or more nationalities may be regarded as its national by each of the States whose 
nationality he possesses.” 
 92  ECJ, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, para. 28. Similarly, AG Jacobs in his Opinion 
to the case remarked that “Whilst the 1930 Hague Convention entitles the Belgian authorities to treat the 
children as Belgian nationals within Belgium, it does not require those authorities to ignore their other 
nationality” (see Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, para. 52). 
93  Admittedly, such is not always the case. It will depend on the national measure which is disputed. I refer 
to the judgment in McCarthy (ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr.) And the detailed 
discussion thereof in Chapter 4, infra. 
94  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 12.  
Chapter 2: Determination of the Personal Scope of Union Citizenship 
 24
from one Member State to another.  More broadly, it would run counter to the objective of an 
internal market,95 which implies that the conditions of entry and residence of a Union citizen 
in a Member State whose nationality he does not possess are the same in all the Member 
States.96 
 
The Micheletti judgment predates the introduction of Union citizenship, but its rationale has 
become even more compelling since.  Not surprisingly, the judgment has been referred to in a 
number of cases on Union citizenship. 97  Indeed, given that Union citizenship has to be 
viewed as the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, 98  entailing certain 
uniform rights and duties throughout the Union, it has become even more important that the 
scope of “nationals of a Member State” is determined uniformly and unambiguously 
throughout the EU.  Hence, the duty on the part of the Member States to unconditionally 
recognise nationality conferrals by other Member States has become inevitable in a way.  The 
absence of this duty would not only run counter to the objective of an internal market, by 
impeding the exercise of economically active persons of their rights in all the Member States.  
It would, since the introduction of Union citizenship, equally prevent economically non active 
persons from exercising their rights in a uniform way throughout the Union.  Such would be 
irreconcilable with the objective of the Union to create an “ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe”99 and to create a “Citizens’ Europe”.100  
 
The only other conceivable option to preserve the effet utile of the provisions on Union 
citizenship would be the enactment of uniform rules at Union level to determine its scope 
ratione personae.  But, as explained above, Member States do not seem prepared at present101 
to accept such rules for fear of losing one of their key competences.  They have always 
wanted to preserve their sovereign competence concerning nationality.  However, there is an 
obvious flipside to the sovereign competence of a given Member State to determine 
nationality.  That flipside is that all other Member States too have the competence to 
determine who is to have their nationality and who is not.  A Member Sate cannot, within the 
framework of the EU, claim the competence to determine nationality in a completely 
sovereign way, but at the same time deny other Member States this competence.  Such would 
run counter to some of the most fundamental principles of Union law, such as the principle of 
sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU).  As such, the ECJ, in imposing the duty of 
unconditional recognition, does actually no more than taking this situation to its logical 
consequences.  That seems to be an additional strong argument for approving the Micheletti 
judgment.  
                                                 
95  See Article 26(2) TFEU, stating that “[t]he internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaties”. 
96  See ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 68. 
97  In particular: ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, paras 39 and 45 (see the discussion 
below). See also ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 39; ECJ, Case C-148/02 
Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, para. 28; ECJ, Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] E.C.R. I-1237, para. 19. 
Besides, the judgment has been referred to by a number of Advocatea General in cases on Union 
citizenship; see e.g. Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, 
paras 20 and 32; Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 38; 
Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] E.C.R. I-2703, para. 23; Opinion 
of AG Jacobs in Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, para. 52.  
98  See n. 39, supra. 
99  See the preambles to the TEU and TFEU and Article 1, second para., TEU. 
100  See, by analogy, Tryfonidou, "Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a 
Citizens' Europe" (2008) 35 LIEI, 50-51.  
101  For possible future developments, see under VI., infra. 
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The Micheletti principle of unconditional recognition potentially has significant consequences 
with regard to the Member States’ competence regarding nationality.  Admittedly, it confirms 
– as a matter of principle at least102 – the competence of the Member States in the field of 
nationality.  However, the ECJ couples this a priori competence with the duty to 
unconditionally respect the like competence of the other Member States.  On closer 
examination, this duty appears to set in action a subtle mechanism of interplay between the 
Member States.  The reason is that a decision taken by one Member State to grant its 
nationality to a certain group of persons can have important consequences for other Member 
States, as they have to unconditionally recognise the persons in question as Union citizens 
entitled to claim certain rights throughout the Union, including the territory of their own 
Member State.  As Meehan has put it: the establishment of Union citizenship entails “stronger 
commonality and reciprocity of rights in different Member States”.103  More specifically, it 
would seem to be the case that Member States with flexible nationality legislation in place 
will potentially attract a greater number of non-EU immigrants intending to acquire the 
nationality for themselves or for their children.104  This nationality will permit them in turn, as 
Union citizens or family members of a Union citizen to claim, under certain conditions, a 
number of important rights and benefits in other Member States such as social security 
benefits for instance.105  Eventually this phenomenon may result in political pressure by some 
Member States on other Member States to change their nationality laws, in order to make 
them more restrictive.  As such, Union citizenship may, through this subtle mechanism, 
indirectly influence Member State policies in the field of nationality.  In the following I will 
analyse this possibility by considering in some detail fairly recent changes in the nationality 
laws of two Member States: Ireland, on the one hand, and Spain, on the other hand.  
 
2. Ireland 
a) Traditional Irish nationality law and the Zhu and Chen case 
 
Traditionally, Ireland’s nationality legislation was centred on the ius soli principle (also 
known as “birthright citizenship”).106  This meant that every person born on the Irish territory 
                                                 
102  The Court slightly qualified its dictum by adding that this competence had to be exercised having due 
regard to Union law. See the discussion under V., infra. 
103  Meehan, “Europeanization and Citizenship of the European Union”, in (2000) Yearbook of European 
Studies, 169-172 (cited by Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship 
Policies" (2007) Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F., 124). 
104  See the discussion of the Zhu and Chen case under IV.A.2., infra. Another case in point is Ruiz Zambrano 
(see the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, infra). 
105  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193. 
106  For an overview of the history of Irish nationality legislation, see Handoll, "Ireland", in Bauböck, Ersbøll, 
Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 
European Countries. Volume 2: Country Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 292-
305; Ryan, "The Celtic Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland" (2004) 6 Eur. J. 
Migration & L., 124-125, 173-193. In the EU, Ireland was the only Member State applying an 
unconditional ius soli principle in its nationality legislation. Other Member States, like Germany since the 
year 2000, apply the principle, but surrounded by other conditions related to the residence of the parents 
(for a discussion, see Hailbronner, "Germany", in R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk and H. 
Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and loss of nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. 
Volume 2: Country Analyses, (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 213-251). For an 
overview of recent developments in European Countries with regard ius soli citizenship, see Honohan, 
"Ius Soli Citizenship" (2010) EUDO CITIZENSHIP Policy Brief No. 1, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/policy-briefs, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/policy-briefs (the author concludes that 
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automatically became an Irish citizen.107  In 1956 the ius soli principle was extended to those 
born in Northern Ireland108 and, as a result of the 1998 referendum on Northern Ireland, the 
birthright citizenship for all persons born on the island of Ireland became a constitutional 
right.109  Since 2005 however, Irish nationality legislation has become more restrictive and the 
unconditional ius soli principle no longer applies. 110   Below I will discuss these recent 
changes to the Irish nationality law in detail.  I will argue that they were to a large extent 
prompted by influences deriving from Union law.  Before doing so it is necessary, however, 
to discuss the Zhu and Chen111 case of 2004 in some detail, as it will be very important for my 
argumentation.  
 
The Zhu and Chen case concerns Chinese parents who wanted to have more than one child, 
but were not so entitled under Chinese law.112  After careful consideration, they decided to 
have their second baby, Catherine Zhu, born in Belfast.  Belfast was chosen because, as was 
just explained, Irish nationality law at the time of the facts entitled anyone born on the island 
                                                                                                                                                        
there is a trend towards the wider availability of ius soli citizenship, but in more conditional forms, 
dependent on limited forms of prior parental residence and other conditions identified with integration). 
Outside Europe, the ius soli principle is adhered to by a number of countries, most importantly perhaps by 
the US (for a discussion of US birthright citizenship and its historical origins, see Ngai, "Birthright 
Citizenship and the Alien Citizen" (2006) 75 Fordham L. Rev., 2521-2530). For further discussion, see 
also M Bös, ‘The Legal Construction of Membership: Nationality Law in Germany and the United States’, 
in Germany and Europe Working Papers Series 00.5, The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European 
Studies at Harvard University, http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Boes.pdf.  
107  See already the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935, providing that all those born in the Irish Free 
State (Saorstát Éireann) on or after 6 December 1922 were classed as “natural-born citizens” (s 2(1)(a) 
and (b) of the Act). 
108  Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, s 6(1). 
109  In the referendum an overwhelming majority approved an amendment to Article 2 of the Irish 
Constitution, which took effect on 2 December 1999. The amended Article 2 read: “It is the entitlement 
and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part 
of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to 
be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish 
ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.” Being part of the Irish nation was to 
be understood as being an Irish citizen (see A.O. and D.L. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform [2003] 1 IR 1, 131).   
110  It appears that the Irish restriction of birthright citizenship is not a lone-standing case. In the last decades, 
other countries formerly applying an unconditional ius soli principle have modified or abolished their 
legislation on this point. A recent example is New Zealand: see the Citizenship Amendment Act 2005, 
2005 S.N.Z. No. 43 (N.Z.) (limiting territorial birthright citizenship to children with at least one New 
Zealand citizen or permanent-resident parent). See also the discussion in Grossman, "Birthright 
Citizenship as Nationality of Convenience" (2004) Proceedings, Council of Europe, Third Conference on 
Nationality, Strasbourg, 11-12 Oct. 2004,114-117. The abolishment of birthright citizenship is also the 
subject of recent debates in the US. Proposals to abolish US birthright citizenship in 2005, 2007 and 2009 
did not gain approval in Congress. For a comment, see Schumacher-Matos, Denying citizenship for illegal 
immigrants' children is a bad idea, (2010) Wahington Post, 27 June 2010. See also Lacey, “Birthright 
Citizenship Looms as Next Immigration Battle” (2011) New York Times, 4 January 2011. 
111  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, with case notes by King in (2007) 29 Loy. L.A. 
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 291-307; Kunoy in (2006) 43 CML Rev., 179-190; Carlier in (2005) 42 CML Rev., 
1121-1131; Tryfonidou in (2005) E.P.L., 527-541; Vanvoorden in (2005) 4 Colum. J. Eur. L., 305-32. 
112  Under Chinese law, each family was entitled to have only one child unless they satisfied certain special 
criteria for a second child. See the Population and Family Planning Law (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 1, 2002), Article 18, available at 
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/11/content_75954.htm (P.R.C.). See also Skalla, "China's One-Child 
Policy: Illegal Children and the Family Planning Law" (2004) 30 Brook. J. Int'l L., 334. Women who 
became pregnant a second time faced the imposition of fines, the disqualification of benefits, the 
deprivation of farmland, the destruction of homes, and/or “psychological mauling, sleep deprivation, 
arrest and grueling mistreatment” (Ibid., 338-40). 
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of Ireland (including Northern-Ireland) to claim Irish nationality113 and thereby become a 
Union citizen (see Article 20(1) TEC).  Catherine's parents intended to use the child's Union 
citizenship to ensure that both the child and her mother would be granted a right to reside in 
the United Kingdom under Directive 90/364, which conferred this right on Union citizens and 
their family members.114  The UK authorities, however, refused to issue a long-term residence 
permit, arguing inter alia that a party cannot rely on EU provisions where purposefully 
exploiting Union law.115  According to the UK authorities, Mrs. Chen’s116 move to Northern 
Ireland was solely motivated by the desire to have her baby acquire Irish nationality, in order 
for the family to then be able to claim a right of residence in the UK.  The crux of the 
argument was that Mrs. Chen tried to circumvent UK regulations on residence permits by 
taking advantage of Ireland’s more expansive citizenship rules.  This argument was based in 
essence on earlier case law in which the ECJ had held that Member States were entitled to 
take measures designed to prevent nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created 
by the Treaties, improperly to circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals 
from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Union law117 (sometimes 
referred to as the “U-turn doctrine”).  
 
In the Zhu and Chen case, the ECJ had no difficulty at all in rejecting the argument.118  It 
pointed at the simple fact that baby Catherine had validly obtained the Irish nationality, in 
accordance with the rules laid down in the Irish nationality act.119  As a consequence, she had 
to be recognised by the UK as an Irish national.  The fact that Mrs. Chen’s residence in 
Belfast was fully aimed at producing the right circumstances to obtain a right of residence in 
the UK was not relevant in this regard.  Indeed, it followed from Micheletti that the UK had to 
unconditionally accept the grant of Irish nationality and could not attach a further condition to 
this recognition, such as a condition that that nationality should not have been acquired in 
order to obtain a right of residence for a third country national in another Member State.120  
Besides, the ECJ decided that, in order to satisfy the condition of possessing sufficient 
resources, as prescribed by Directive 90/364, the origin of those resources did not matter and 
that they could for instance be provided by the mother of a dependent Union citizen.121  
Furthermore it was of the opinion that, despite the wording of the Directive 90/364, not only 
dependent ascendants were entitled to join a Union citizen in the host Member State, but that 
                                                 
113  S 6(1) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1956, as amended by the Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 1986, the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1994 and the Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 2001. 
114  See Article 1 of Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, [1990] O.J. 
L180/26 , now replaced by Directive 2004/38 (n. 194, infra). 
115  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 34. 
116  Catherine’s mother was born Man Lavette Man Chen, but upon her marriage to Guoqing Zhu (known as 
Hopkins Zhu) she in fact became Mrs. Zhu, and this is the name she bore when the case was lodged. The 
reference to “Chen” in the name of the case therefore probably ensues from a misunderstanding (see the 
clarifications made by Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 
47, footnote 22). I will however, refer to the mother as Mrs. Chen, since this is the name by which the 
case has become famous. 
117  See e.g. ECJ, Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] E.C.R. 1299, para. 13; ECJ, Case 115/78 Knoors [1979] 
E.C.R. 399, para. 25; ECJ, Case 229/83 Leclerc and Others [1985] E.C.R. 1, para. 27; ECJ, Case 39/86 
Lair [1988] E.C.R. 3161, para. 43; ECJ, Case C-61/89 Bouchoucha [1990] E.C.R. I-3551, para. 14 and, 
for more recent examples, ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 24; Case C-196/04 
Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] E.C.R. I-7995, para. 35. 
118  This was hardly a surprise: to date, the argument has virtually never been accepted by the ECJ in the 
circumstances of a specific case. 
119  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 39. 
120  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 40. 
121  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 28-33. 
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the same was true for the parent of a minor who is that minor’s primary carer.122  The end 
result was that Catherine and her mother, who fulfilled the conditions of the directive as they 
were interpreted by the ECJ, had a right to reside for an indefinite period in the UK.123 
 
The Zhu and Chen case confirms, in very clear terms, that Member States cannot in any way 
refuse to recognise a person’s nationality where it was validly obtained under the nationality 
legislation of another Member State, even where this nationality was acquired precisely to be 
able to exploit the rights attached to the status of Union citizenship.  It is perfectly permissible 
under Union law for a third country national to acquire the nationality of the Member State 
with the most flexible nationality law with the sole purpose of thereby acquiring, under 
certain conditions, a right of residence in another Member State, for example the Member 
State with the most generous social security payments.  Such behaviour does not in any way 
constitute an abuse of law.  Quite to the contrary, it is using the citizenship provisions to attain 
one the objectives they seek to attain, namely the free movement of Union citizens.  As AG 
Tizzano observed in Zhu and Chen: 
 
“This is not a case of people ‘improperly or fraudulently invoking [Union] law’, failing to observe 
the scope and purposes of the provisions of that legal system, but rather one of people who, 
apprised of the nature of the freedoms provided for by [Union] law, take advantage of them by 
legitimate means, specifically in order to attain the objective which the [Union] provision seeks to 
uphold: the child’s right of residence.”124 
 
At the same time, Zhu and Chen neatly illustrates the significant effects the more flexible 
nationality legislation of one Member State may have on other Member States.  The flexible 
Irish nationality legislation made it rather easy for third country nationals to obtain a right of 
residence in the Member States.  It was sufficient for third country nationals to come to 
Ireland under a temporary residence permit such as a tourist visa and have their children born 
there, in order to derive a right of residence in the other Member States, as long as the 
conditions of the Directive 90/364 were met.125  This right of residence entitled these third 
country nationals, moreover, to claim in the host Member State, the UK in the Zhu and Chen 
case, equal access to a number of important rights and benefits, such as social security 
benefits. 126   This shows how Union law mandates the Member States to accept as 
beneficiaries of certain rights and benefits individuals they could, in the absence of flexible 
nationality legislation in place in another Member State, have excluded therefrom.  It is clear 
that this imposed enlargement of the circle of beneficiaries can have significant financial 
consequences for the host Member State.  This might lead to a concern in certain Member 
States that the influx of Union citizens and their family members might upset the financial 
balance and distort the socio-economic conditions in that Member State.  Naturally this will 
lead to political forces to counter this phenomenon: the Member State with flexible nationality 
                                                 
122  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 42-46. On this issue, see in great detail 
Chapter 5, infra. 
123  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 47. 
124  Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 122 (italics as they 
appear in the text of the opinion). 
125  King (King, "Chen v. Secretary of State: Expanding the Residency Rights of Non-nationals in the 
European Community" (2007) 29 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 291) remarks in this regard that the 
USA face a similar form of “birth tourism” because of the ius soli principle enshrined in the 14th 
amendment to the US Constitution. Although the drafters of the 14th Amendment only envisioned 
extending citizenship to the newly freed slaves, the US Supreme Court later interpreted the amendment as 
granting citizenship to all children born to immigrants (United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 
(1898)). 
126  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193. 
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legislation may well face a lot of political pressure from other Member States to make its 
nationality legislation more stringent.127 
 
Moreover, it must be remarked that consequences will flow from the provisions on Union 
citizenship even for the Member State which conferred its nationality.  The reason is that, as 
was explained higher with regard to the Zhu and Chen case, every Union citizen has the right, 
under certain circumstances, to be joined by his non-EU family members.  This holds true in 
the first place with regard to other Member States, of which the Union citizen concerned does 
not have the nationality.  Indeed, in his or her own Member State the Union citizen will often 
not be able to rely on the right to family reunification because he or she will find himself or 
herself in a “purely internal situation”.128  However, such will no longer be the case once he 
has exercised his rights of free movement by moving to another Member State.  The ECJ has 
firmly held for instance that if a Union citizen was joined by his spouse in the host Member 
State he must have the same rights upon return to his own Member State because he might be 
deterred from leaving his country of origin if, on returning to the Member State of which he is 
a national “the conditions of his entry and residence were not at least equivalent to those 
which he would enjoy under the [Treaties] or secondary law in the territory of another 
Member State”. 129  As a consequence of this, Ireland would in certain circumstances be 
obliged under Union law to grant a right of residence to third country family members of Irish 
nationals whom would not have enjoyed this right under domestic Irish law.130   
 
The bottom-line is that, through the provisions on Union citizenship, the more flexible 
nationality laws of one Member State can have serious consequences for the budget and the 
system of immigration control of all Member States.  These consequences might very well 
explain the recent changes in Irish nationality legislation.  Indeed, in essence, problems like 
the one faced by the UK in the case of Zhu and Chen did not stem from the Union provisions 
on Union citizenship as such, but rather from Irish nationality law. 131   As AG Tizzano 
remarked132:  
 
“The fact is that the problem, if problem there be, lies in the criterion used by the Irish legislation 
for granting nationality, the ius soli, which lends itself to the emergence of situations like the one 
at issue in this case. In order to avoid such situations, the criterion could have been moderated by 
the addition of a condition of settled residence of the parent within the territory of the island of 
Ireland. But there is no such additional condition in Irish legislation, or in any event no such 
condition was applicable to Catherine”.   
                                                 
127  See the discussion and references in Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National 
Citizenship Policies" (2006) 10 European Integration Online Papers, available at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop, 11 et seq. See also the more elaborate version of this contribution 
published as Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies" 
(2007) Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F., 89-156. 
128  ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 76-78. If certain conditions are 
fulfilled, a Union citizen can even claim the right to be joined or accompanied by a family member in his 
own Member State in what is traditionally considered to be a purely internal situation (see ECJ, Case C-
34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr and the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, infra, under III.). 
129  ECJ, Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] E.C.R. I-4265, paras 19-20 in particular. 
130  It unambiguously follows from the case law of the Irish Supreme Court that family members of an Irish 
citizen do not have an automatic right under Irish law to reside in Ireland; see e.g. A.O. and D.L. v. 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2003] 1 IR 1, 131. See on this case law, in some detail, 
Mullally, "Citizenship and Family Life in Ireland: asking the Question 'Who belongs'?" (2005) 25 Legal 
Stud., 582-585; Ryan, "The Celtic Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland" (2004) 6 
Eur. J. Migration & L., 180-185. 
131  See Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 114. 
132  Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 124-125. 
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In the following I will first set out the 2004 change of Irish nationality legislation in some 
detail, before setting out to determine to what extent it might have been prompted by 
considerations linked to the provisions on Union citizenship. 
 
b) 2004 change in Irish nationality legislation and its explanation 
 
In March 2004, the Irish Government officially announced a proposal to restrict the 
constitutional provision for birthright citizenship in the case of children of non-nationals.133  
The constitutional amendment was approved on 11 June 2004 through a referendum, by an 
overwhelming majority (79% to 21% on a 60% turnout).134  The amendment did not modify 
Article 2 of the Constitution (quoted above), but inserted a new Article 9(2) reading135:  
 
“1° Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in the island of Ireland, 
which includes its islands and seas, who does not have, at the time of the birth of that person, at 
least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish 
citizenship or nationality, unless provided for by law.  
2° This section shall not apply to persons born before the date of the enactment of this section.” 
 
The amendment returned to the Irish Parliament the power to determine the conditions for 
acquiring Irish citizenship.  Approval of the constitutional amendment was followed by the 
adoption of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004, which once again modified the 
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, and entered into force on 1 January 2005.136  The 
new act confirmed that children born in Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 would no longer 
acquire the Irish nationality automatically. 137   In order to obtain Irish citizenship, an 
additional element is now required to birth in the island of Ireland, like the fact that a parent 
has lawfully resided for a certain period in Ireland (or was entitled thereto) prior to birth or 
elements of ius sanguinis, such as being born to a parent with (an entitlement to) Irish 
citizenship or with British citizenship.  The Act maintains an exception however for persons 
born in the island of Ireland who are not entitled to citizenship of any other country.138   
 
It is clear from these changes that, at present, Irish nationality laws are no longer based on 
unconditional ius soli.139  The changes are radical, given the longstanding republican tradition 
of birthright citizenship and also remarkable in the light of the Belfast Agreement and the 
consequent 1998 referendum, where the Irish people, by a vast majority, voted for the 
                                                 
133  The proposed amendment, and a draft of the legislation to follow it, were published in April; see 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Citizenship Referendum: The Government's Proposals 
(April 2004). 
134  Ryan, "The Celtic Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland" (2004) 6 Eur. J. 
Migration & L., 189. 
135  See the Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution Act, 2004 of 24 June 2004 [Irish citizenship of 
children of non-national parents]. 
136  The Act entered into force on 1 January 2005: Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 
(Commencement) Order 2004. 
137  See s 4 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004, adding a s 6A and a s 6B to the 1956 Act. 
138  See s 6(3) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, which provides “A person born in the island of 
Ireland is an Irish citizen from birth if he or she is not entitled to citizenship of any other country”. This is 
consistent with Ireland’s human rights obligations (Hofstotter, "A Cascade of Rights, or Who Shall Care 
For Little Catherine? Some Reflections on the Chen Case" (2005) 30 E.L. Rev., 557). 
139  A same similar move to abandon traditionally ius soli based nationality laws had already taken place in 
the UK and Australia; see Mullally, "Citizenship and Family Life in Ireland: asking the Question 'Who 
belongs'?" (2005) 25 Legal Stud. 593-594. 
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inclusion of unconditional ius soli into the Irish Constitution.140  Such changes must have 
been prompted by strong motives.  It is now time to inquire to what extent they might have 
been prompted by considerations related to Union law, as was suggested higher. 
 
I will start my analysis by pointing out that it is not immediately self-evident that 
considerations deriving from Union law have indeed played a preponderant role in the recent 
reforms of Irish nationality law.  One could prima facie well explain the changes as being 
prompted by purely domestic issues.  As is well-known, Ireland experienced in the 1990s a 
period of rapid economic growth, for which it became known as the “Celtic tiger”.141  This 
rapid growth attracted a large number of third country immigrants in search for work.  It 
appears that many of them used the flexible Irish nationality laws to obtain Irish citizenship 
for their children, and then claimed a right of residence in Ireland as family members of an 
Irish citizen.142  This was demonstrated by the fact that a large number of immigrants came to 
Ireland heavily pregnant expressly to give birth in order to obtain Irish citizenship for their 
babies.143  This phenomenon of “citizenship tourism” stirred up a lot of controversy and many 
Irish citizens felt the flexible Irish rules were abused and that there was too large an intake of 
immigrants.144  This concern was given voice in the build-up to the referendum by the then 
Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, who officially stated that the birthright citizenship was 
being “rampantly abused”, with 60% of all asylum seekers being pregnant when they made 
their applications.145  Closing this “loophole”, and hence preventing the abuse of birthright 
citizenship, was one of the main reasons advanced for the proposed amendments to the Irish 
constitution. 146   The Irish government added that because of the said abuse, Dublin’s 
maternity hospitals had become overburdened, which was, according to the government, an 
additional strong argument for change.147 
                                                 
140  See n. 109, supra. In order to avoid the impression that the proposed 2004 amendments to the 
Constitution would come down to a unilateral change of the Belfast Agreement, the Irish and British 
governments even issued an interpretative declaration, stating that “it was not their intention in making the 
said Agreement that it should impose on either Government any obligation to confer nationality or 
citizenship on persons born on the island of Ireland whose parents do not have sufficient connection with 
the island of Ireland”. 
141  See e.g. Murphy, The “Celtic Tiger”, European University Institute working paper, 2000, 35 pp; 
MacSharry and White, The Making of the Celtic Tiger: The Inside Story of Ireland’s Boom Economy 
(Dublin: Mercier Press, 2000), 280 pp.  
142  In application of the Supreme Court in Fajujonu (Fajujonu v Minister for Justice [1990] 2 IR 151; [1990] 
ILRM 234), family members of Irish citizens were in most cases allowed to stay in Ireland. This case law 
was reversed however in 2003, with A.O. and D.L. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2003] 1 IR 1 (cf. n. 130, supra). See on the evolution in the case law: Ryan, "The Celtic Cubs: The 
Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland" (2004) 6 Eur. J. Migration & L., 180-185; Mullally, 
"Citizenship and Family Life in Ireland: asking the Question 'Who belongs'?" (2005) 25 Legal Stud., 582-
585. 
143  Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies" (2006) 10 
European Integration Online Papers, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop, 17-18. 
144  Rostek and Davies quote figures which clearly demonstrate the spectacular increase in immigration. For 
instance, the number of babies born to non-nationals skyrocketed from 2% in 1999 to almost 20% in 2004 
(Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies" (2006) 10 
European Integration Online Papers, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop, 17-18). 
145  Quoted by (148) Helm, “Ireland struggles with immigration issue”, (4/4/2004) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3595547.stm.  
146  Harrington, "Citizenship and the Biopolitics of Post-nationalist Ireland" (2005) 32 Journal of Law and 
Society, 444. 
147  The Irish Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, soon after the referendum was announced, declared: 
“Our maternity services come under pressure because they have to deal at short notice with women who 
may have communications difficulties, about whom no previous history of the pregnancy or of the 
mother's health is known, and who in about half of cases of first arrival ... are already at or near labour. 
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As such, the need to make Irish nationality laws more restrictive could have been explained 
by skyrocketing immigration, especially since a similar move to make nationality laws more 
restrictive has been noticed in the past in other countries which experienced an economic 
boom.148  Yet there are important indications that the foregoing cannot wholly explain the 
2004 amendments to the Irish constitution.  First of all, it must be remarked that the case for a 
restriction of nationality laws in order to reduce the potential for citizenship tourism had been 
greatly diminished by the above mentioned change in the case law of the Irish Supreme Court, 
holding that third country family members of an Irish citizen no longer had an automatic right 
of residence in Ireland.149  As a consequence of this case law, the possibility for citizenship 
tourism was greatly reduced, as many non-EU parents were not granted a right to reside in 
Ireland.  Of course third country nationals could still, under certain conditions, derive a right 
of residence in the other Member States, and even in Ireland itself, from Union law, even in 
the absence of such right under domestic Irish law.  This probably explains why the Supreme 
Court’s judgment did not eventually lead to the predicted decrease in inward migration in 
Ireland.150 
 
The possibility for third country nationals travelling to Ireland to give birth in order to derive 
a right of residence in another Member State was highlighted, of course, by the Zhu and Chen 
case, which seems to have had a strong impact on the Irish decision-makers.  Admittedly, the 
result of the 2004 referendum can not have been influenced by the outcome of Zhu and Chen.  
In fact the referendum, which took place on 11 June 2004, predated the judgment in Zhu and 
Chen, which was pronounced on 19 October 2004.  Still the case seems to have had a 
considerable impact on the proposals of the Irish government and on the result of the 
referendum.  It must be pointed out in this connection that the Opinion of AG Tizzano,151 
which was later substantially taken over by the Court, was delivered on 18 May 2004, i.e. 
during the Irish referendum campaign, and was heavily debated in the press.152  Moreover, the 
Irish Minister of Justice publicly stated that the Zhu and Chen case had acted as “an impetus” 
in the preparations of the citizenship referendum, and the government claimed, in reaction to 
the AG’s opinion that, the case had vindicated the decision to hold the referendum.153   
 
It clearly results from the foregoing that considerations connected to Union citizenship, 
highlighted by the Zhu and Chen case, were arguably a dominant factor explaining the recent 
changes in Irish nationality legislation.  The flexible Irish nationality rules seem to have been 
systematically used by third country nationals to obtain residence rights in other Member 
States as (family members of) Union citizens.  The resulting increase in immigration must 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hospitals cannot predict the demand on resources from month to month, and all the resources in the world 
would be of little use in dealing with suddenly-presenting crisis pregnancies (quoted by Ryan, "The Celtic 
Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland" (2004) 6 Eur. J. Migration & L., 188). The 
argument is discussed in some detail in Harrington, "Citizenship and the Biopolitics of Post-nationalist 
Ireland" (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society, 444-446. 
148  A well-documented example is the US. See also supra, n. 106 and 125. 
149  A.O. and D.L. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2003] 1 IR 1. 
150  See “the argument for”, presented by Noel Whelan, available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/referendum2004/for_2.html; Mullally, "Citizenship and Family Life in 
Ireland: asking the Question 'Who belongs'?" (2005) 25 Legal Stud., 585. 
151  Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925. 
152  Harrington, "Citizenship and the Biopolitics of Post-nationalist Ireland" (2005) 32 Journal of Law and 
Society, 446-447, citing Coulter, “European Court Decision Casts doubt on Policy of Deportation”, Irish 
Times, 20 May 2004. 
153  “McDowell insists his action heads off 'threat'” (Mark Hennessy, Wed. 19 May 2004), available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/referendum2004/pathtopoll/1084325396929.html.  
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have been a cause of concern for the other Member States, especially for those with strict 
nationality and migration laws, because the impact of their efforts to protect their borders was 
reduced by the fact that immigrants could make use of the flexible Irish legislation to gain 
access to their territory.154  Whilst there never was a formal request from the Commission or 
from one of the Member States to change the Irish legislation,155 it seems very plausible that 
was some informal pressur on Ireland to change its laws and align its policies with current EU 
trends. 156  Telling in this regard are the declarations of the Irish Minister for Justice, in 
reaction to the Opinion of the AG in Zhu and Chen, that a failure to adopt the proposed 
changes to the Irish constitution could cause “massive difficulties for our relations with other 
states in the EU”. 157   Furthermore, there was a recurring insistence by pro-amendment 
commentators on the fact that the Irish laws stood out from the laws in all other Member 
States and that the problems incurred could be solved by bringing them more in line with the 
laws of the other Member States. 158  One can conclude that the Irish case convincingly 
illustrates the indirect influence Union law may have on the nationality legislation of the 
Member States.  The bottom-line is that the Irish decision-makers responded to impulses 
connected with Union citizenship by making their nationality laws more restrictive and thus 
bringing them more in line with the nationality laws of other Member States.159 
 
                                                 
154  Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies" (2006) 10 
European Integration Online Papers, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop, 19. 
155  Some opponents of the suggested amendment expressly denied the need to change their citizenship 
legislation due to the EU membership, pointing out that there had never been a formal request from 
Europe, or any pressure to alter their nationality law. See e.g. the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, 
‘Briefing on proposal for a referendum on citizenship’ May 2004, available at 
http://iccl.ie/DB_Data/publications/04_draft_referendumpaper.pdf and its “No Vote Campaign Flyer”, 
available at http://iccl.ie/DB_Data/publications/vote_no_extra.pdf.  
156  Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies" (2006) 10 
European Integration Online Papers, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop, 20, who point out 
that a Member State aware of its political interdependence on neighbouring states, and not wishing to 
alienate them and incur possible future ‘revenge’ costs, may choose to voluntarily align their policies with 
current EU trends and that the Irish case is probably a good example of this. Harrington observes in this 
regard that “the Irish elite was anxious to remedy the state’s porosity and to overcome metropolitan 
perceptions of its questionable Europeanness” (Harrington, "Citizenship and the Biopolitics of Post-
nationalist Ireland" (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society, 447). Handoll, for his part, remarks in this 
regard: “It was, to say the least, potentially embarrassing to the Irish Government to retain a citizenship 
regime, with such [Union] law consequences in another Member State, especially where [a similar right of 
residence for non-EU parents] had been rejected in Irish law” (Handoll, "Ireland", in Bauböck, Ersbøll, 
Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 
European Countries. Volume 2: Country Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 306). 
157  “McDowell insists his action heads off 'threat'” (Mark Hennessy, Wed. 19 May 2004), available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/referendum2004/pathtopoll/1084325396929.html. 
158  See “the argument for”, presented by Michael McDowell, former Minister for Justice, available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/referendum2004/for_1.html.  
159  Another example of a change in Member State nationality legislation under influence of Eu law is the 
restriction of Belgian nationality legislation in 2006. The previously existing flexible Belgian nationality 
legislation allowed children born in Belgium to adopt the Belgian nationality and this, in turn, gave rise to 
entitlement to residence to their third country parents. This flexible nationality legislation was the basis 
for the dispute in the famous Ruiz Zambrano case (see the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, infra). 
Admittedly, the change in the Belgian nationality legislation occurred long before the judgment in the 
Ruiz Zambrano case. Still, the 2006 restriction of the conditions for acquisition of the Belgian nationality 
can arguably be explained by the occurrence of many cases with facts similar to those of Ruiz Zambrano. 
See the discussion in Foblets and Loones, “Het Wetboek van de Belgische nationaliteit andermaal herzien 
(2006): het parlement ontzien of gezien?” (2007) T.Vreemd., 23-39. See also Maes, “Vreemdelingen 
zonder legaal verblijf met Belgische kinderen: uitzetting van onderdanen of beschermd gezinsleven als 
hefboom voor regelmatig verblijf” (2005) T. Vreemd., 332-339. For a more detailed discussion, I refer to 
Chapter 4, infra. 
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As a final remark, it must be pointed out that Irish nationality laws are still more lenient than 
those of most other Member States.  In particular, it is very easy for descendants of Irish 
emigrants, who were born abroad, to obtain an Irish passport and thereby Union citizenship.  
Under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, a person born outside the island of Ireland is 
an Irish citizen even if the parent through whom he or she derives citizenship was also born 
outside the island of Ireland, on condition that that person’s birth is registered160 or that the 
parent through whom that person derives citizenship was at the time of that person’s birth 
abroad in the public service.161  Third generation Irish descendants from various places all 
over the world have claimed their Irish citizenship, which enabled them to travel and work in 
the whole EU, even though they did not have any personal connection with Ireland.162  One 
could wonder whether this too will need to be changed in the future as a consequence of the 
interplay described above.  Other Member States may find the easy access for third country 
nationals living abroad to Irish, and hence European, citizenship worrisome for the same 
reasons as set out above.163  In reaction to these concerns they might very well put political 
pressure on Ireland to make the possibility of acquiring the Irish nationality through ius 
sanguinis more restrictive.  
 
Yet, it is unlikely that this mechanism will lead to a restriction of Irish citizenship by descent 
just like it did with regard to Irish birthright citizenship.  It must be noted, in the first place, 
that the connection between Ireland and its citizens and their descendants living abroad is 
very important, especially in the light of the past waves of emigration.164  It will probably not 
be changed, therefore, except for the most convincing of reasons.  Moreover, other Member 
States will probably not react in the same way as with regard to the former unconditional ius 
soli legislation.  The reason is that most other Member States have nationality legislations 
based on ius sanguinis, and some of them are even more generous with regard to citizenship 
by descent.165  It can be expected therefore that Irish nationality legislation as it is currently in 
place will not undergo further changes as a result of political pressure from other Member 
States in the near future. 
 
                                                 
160  See Article 27 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, “Registry of births abroad”. 
161  See Article 7 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, “Citizenship by descent”. 
162  Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies" (2006) 10 
European Integration Online Papers, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop, 21. 
163  It must be noted in this regard that the lenient possibilities for acquisition of Irish citizenship through 
descent were used as an argument against the 2004 proposals to amend the constitution. It was argued that 
if the governments primary concern was one of immigration control, it was acting inconsistently in 
restricting birthright citizenship while not changing the provisions on citizenship by descent, as 
entitlement to citizenship by descent was said to open up citizenship status to much greater numbers than 
did the application of the ius soli principle. See Mullally, "Citizenship and Family Life in Ireland: asking 
the Question 'Who belongs'?" (2005) 25 Legal Stud., 587. 
164  See e.g. the Address by former Irish President Mary Robinson to a Joint Sitting of the Houses of the 
Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) (2 February 1995), available at 
http://oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/addresses/2Feb1995.htm (on the importance of the Irish 
Diaspora). See also Article 2 of the Irish Constitution, stating that “the Irish nation cherishes its special 
affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage”. 
165  Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies" (2006) 10 
European Integration Online Papers, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop, 21. See, for 
instance, on Italian nationality legislation, Arena, Nascimbene and Zincone, "Italy", in R. Bauböck, E. 
Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk and H. Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and loss of nationality: Policies and Trends 
in 15 European Countries. Volume 2: Country Analyses, (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 
2006), 329-366. 
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3. Spain 
 
Another Member State with a tradition of very flexible nationality legislation is Spain.166  In 
contrast to Ireland, where traditionally the system was based on an unconditional ius soli, 
Spain has a strong tradition of ius sanguinis, although elements of ius soli are now also 
present.  Accordingly, the Spanish nationality is automatically acquired by descendants of a 
Spanish mother or father, regardless of the place of birth.167  Besides, individuals whose 
father or mother originally had the Spanish nationality and was born in Spain have the option 
to acquire the Spanish nationality at their request168 and the children or grandchildren of 
persons who originally had the Spanish nationality can acquire the Spanish nationality after 
only one year of residence in Spain.169  This open attitude towards granting the Spanish 
nationality to individuals without substantial links to the Spanish territory has been explained 
by the fact that Spain has a long history of emigration, mostly to Latin-American countries.170  
A ius sanguinis based system of nationality has allowed Spain to maintain links with its 
emigrants and their descendants.   
 
The strong historical and cultural ties with certain countries, 171  in particular the Latin-
American countries also explain the special regime nationals of these countries enjoy under 
Spanish nationality law.172  Nationals of Latin American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, 
Equatorial Guinea and Portugal and Sephardic Jews can obtain the Spanish nationality after 
two years of continuous legal residence in Spain, in contrast to the general requirement of ten 
years of residence.173  Besides, a special regime concerning dual nationality is in place with 
regard to the said countries, which is even enshrined in the Spanish Constitution of 1978.174  
Nationals of Latin American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and 
Portugal do not have to renounce their original nationality when they acquire the Spanish 
nationality. 175   Conversely, Spanish nationals acquiring the nationality of one of those 
countries do not lose their Spanish nationality.176 
                                                 
166  For a concise overview of the nationality rules in force, see Álvarez Rodríguez, Nacionalidad Española. 
Normativa Vigente e Interpretación Jurisprudencial (Navarra, Aranzadi, 2008), 292 pp. 
167  See Article 17.1.a) of the Código Civil (“los nacidos de padre o madre españoles”). 
168  See Article 20.1.b) of the Código Civil (“cuyo padre o madre hubiera sido originariamente español y 
nacido en España”). 
169  See Article 22.1.f) of the Código Civil (“El nacido fuera de España de padre o madre, abuelo o abuela, 
que originariamente hubieran sido españoles”).  
170  See the historical overview in Rubio Marìn and Sobrino, "Country Report: Spain" (2010) EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Spain.pdf, 4 et seq.; 
Rubio Marìn, “Spain”, in R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk and H. Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition 
and loss of nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. Volume 2: Country Analyses, 
(Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 480 et seq.; Fuentes, “Migration and Spanish 
Nationality Law”, in Hansen and Weil (eds) Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration 
and Nationality Law in the EU (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001) 138-139. 
171  Or the historical debt Spain may have towards certain groups of people, which explains notably the 
preferential treatment of Sephardic Jews (see Rubio Marìn and Sobrino, "Country Report: Spain" (2010) 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Spain.pdf, 
23). 
172  For a detailed discussion, see Rubio Marìn and Sobrino, "Country Report: Spain" (2010) EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Spain.pdf.   
173  See Article 22 of the Código Civil. 
174  See Article 11.3 of the Constitution (“El Estado podrá concertar tratados de doble nacionalidad con los 
países iberoamericanos o con aquellos que hayan tenido o tengan una particular vinculación con España. 
En estos mismos países, aun cuando no reconozcan a sus ciudadanos un derecho recíproco, podrán 
naturalizarse los españoles sin perder su nacionalidad de origen.”). 
175  Article 23.b) and 24.1 of the Código Civil. 
176  Article 24.1, second subpara., of the Código Civil. 
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Historically, the issue of dual nationality was regulated first and foremost by Treaties on dual 
nationality (“Tratados de doble nacionalidad”) concluded between Spain and most Latin-
American countries. 177   These Treaties entitle nationals of these countries to keep their 
original nationality when they acquire the Spanish nationality and Spanish nationals to keep 
their Spanish nationality when they acquire the nationality of one of these countries.  
Originally, the Treaties provided that only the nationality of the country of domicile 
(“domicilio”) would be the “active” nationality, while the other nationality would be 
“dormant”  (“una nacionalidad durmiente/en estado de latencia”).178  This meant that Latin-
American nationals with the Spanish nationality could only claim the benefits of this 
nationality, and thus the rights associated with Union citizenship,179 as long as they resided in 
Spain.  More recently, however, the Treaties have been amended by protocols which allow 
Latin American nationals with the Spanish nationality to obtain a Spanish passport – allowing 
them to claim Union citizenship – without having to transfer their domicile to Spain.180  These 
Treaties have lost most of their significance after the introduction of the wide possibilities for 
dual nationality in the Código Civil, set out above.181 
 
The bottom-line is that the flexible conditions for acquiring the Spanish nationality, combined 
with the tolerance for dual nationality make it very attractive for nationals abroad, in 
particular nationals from Latin-American countries, to acquire or preserve the Spanish 
nationality and, ipso facto, the status of Union citizen.  Recent legal developments have only 
reinforced these attractive conditions, inter alia by widening the tolerant stance on dual 
nationality.  The recent protocols to the Treaties on dual nationality, for instance, make it far 
more attractive to acquire the Spanish nationality to those Latin-American nationals who 
satisfy the requisite conditions,182 because this nationality will henceforth give entitlement to 
a Spanish passport.  De Groot has submitted in this connection that the recent protocol to the 
                                                 
177  Such Treaties have been concluded between 1979 and 1980, in chronological order, with Peru, Paraguay, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Argentina and Colombia. 
The texts and full references of the Treaties are available at 
http://extranjeros.mtas.es/es/NormativaJurisprudencia/Internacional/ConveniosBilaterales/ConveniosDobl
eNacionalidad/. See the discussion in Vonk, "Latijns-Amerikaanse Spanjaarden en het Europees 
burgerschap" (2006) Migrantenrecht, 187-195; De Groot, "Latin-American European Citizens: Some 
Consequences of the Autonomy of the Member States of the European Union in Nationality Matters 
(editorial)" (2002) 9 MJ, 115-120; 128-129. 
178  In case of residence in a third country, the nationality of the country of last residence was regarded as the 
“active” nationality. See Vonk, "Latijns-Amerikaanse Spanjaarden en het Europees burgerschap" (2006) 
Migrantenrecht, 189. See also the submissions of Spain in the Micheletti case, which concerned the 
application of identically worded provisions of the Treaty of dual nationality between Italy and Argentina 
and article 9.9. of the Código Civil (see n. 82, supra), which refers to the provision in the Treaties just 
described and contains a similar default regulation for cases where the Treaties are silent on this matter. 
179  De Groot, "The Relationship between the Nationality of the Member States of the European Union and 
European Citizenship", in La Torre (ed.), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1998), 128-129 (referring to Perez Vera, “El sistema español de doble 
nacionalidad ante la futura adhesión de España a las Comunidades Europeas” (1981) Revista de 
institutions europeas, 685-703). 
180  Protocols to the various Treaties on dual nationality, employing different legal techniques, were signed 
between 1997 and 2001. See the discussion and the references in Cano Bazaga, “La Doble Nacionalidad 
con los Países Iberoamericanos y la Constitución de 1978”, in Carrasco Durán, Pérez Royo, Urías 
Martínez and Terol Becerra (coord.), Derecho Constitucional para el Siglo XXI (Navarra, Aranzadi. Vol. 
2. 2006), 1905-1918. 
181  Rubio Marìn and Sobrino, "Country Report: Spain" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Spain.pdf, 23. 
182  The Treaties, or the protocols thereto, do not themselves have an impact on the conditions for the 
acquisition of nationality, but they certainly make it more attractive to acquire a second nationality. 
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Treaty on dual nationality with Argentina has led to a significant increase in the number of 
Argentineans applying for a Spanish passport.183   
 
This wide access to the Spanish nationality may well be felt in significant part by Member 
States other than Spain, 184 which will be required, by virtue of the provisions on Union 
citizenship, to open up their borders to the Spanish citizens concerned.  One can readily 
imagine that this will lead to political pressure on Spain by other Member States to make its 
nationality provisions more restrictive, in particular because they have to accept as Union 
citizens Spanish nationals with no substantial links to Spain.  Remarkably, however, it 
appears that, to the difference with the Irish case, other Member States have not yet applied 
political pressure on Spain to this purpose.  The Commission too, at present, appears to lack 
any interest in intervening in the Spanish flexible policy on nationality. 185   Somewhat 
paradoxically, the recent relaxation of the Spanish rules on dual nationality has been 
explained as partly having been caused by the judgment in Micheletti.  Indeed, it has been 
argued that Spain has interpreted the Court’s judgment as an approval of cases of two “active 
nationalities and as guaranteeing complete autonomy in nationality matters.186  One could add 
that the Court’s acceptance of the Italian interpretation of the Treaty at stake in Micheletti - 
which was very similar to the Spanish Treaties on dual nationality - as guaranteeing Italian 
nationality even in the absence of any domicile in Italy was a strong argument in Spain’s 
favour in this connection.   
 
Be that as it may, it cannot be excluded that in the foreseeable future Spain may be under 
pressure to tighten its nationality rules, for instance, by being more insistent on a certain 
connection with the Spanish territory as a condition to acquire the Spanish nationality.  In this 
regard, one could see a limited precedent in the Spanish amnesty for illegal immigrants, 
which resulted in 700,000 illegal immigrants obtaining legal residence in Spain.187  This 
provoked very negative reactions from other Member States, France in particular, and led to 
pressure on the Spanish government to change its plans, although Spain did not eventually 
abandon them.  Admittedly, the 2005 amnesty did not confer Spanish nationality, but, given 
the possibility of residence-based acquisition of Spanish nationality and the lenient conditions 
in this regard for Latin-American nationals described above, it may eventually have led to 
many formerly illegally residing persons obtaining Union citizenship.  If certain Member 
States are in the future confronted with a mass influx of “Latin-American” Spanish citizens, 
they may well have a similar reaction and it may well be that Spain will this time have to give 
in and reconsider its position.  Moreover, below I will argue that, in extreme cases, the 
conferral of the Spanish nationality upon persons possessing no real links with the Spanish 
territory may constitute a violation of the principle of sincere cooperation.188 
 
                                                 
183  De Groot, "Latin-American European Citizens: Some Consequences of the Autonomy of the Member 
States of the European Union in Nationality Matters (editorial)" (2002) 9 MJ, 120. 
184  A parallel can be drawn with the Treaty between Italy and Argentina at stake in the Micheletti case. Given 
the close cultural and linguistic ties between Argentina and Spain, many Argentineans entitled to Italian 
nationality would likely opt to go to Spain rather than to Italy. 
185  Margiotta and Vonk, "Nationality Law and European Citizenship: the Role of Dual Nationality" (2010) 
EUDO Citizenship Working Paper, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/RSCAS%202010_66.pdf, 
17. 
186  Vonk, "Latijns-Amerikaanse Spanjaarden en het Europees burgerschap" (2006) Migrantenrecht, 195. 
187  See the discussion in Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship 
Policies" (2007) Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F., 123-125. 
188  Infra, under V.C.4. 
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B. Loss of nationality 
1. Outline 
 
A question which is even more difficult to answer is whether Union law, through the 
provisions on Union citizenship, sets in motion an interplay between Member States which 
may result in pressure on certain Member States to change their rules regarding loss of 
nationality.  One could assume that loss of the nationality of one Member State may, through 
the concept of Union citizenship, have important consequences for other Member States.  The 
reason is that withdrawal of Member State nationality would seem, prima facie at least, to 
result in most cases for the persons concerned in the loss of their Union citizenship an, hence, 
of the rights they enjoy under the Treaties in the territory of the Member States.  This would 
only seem to be different where the person(s) concerned would preserve or at the same time 
acquire the nationality of another Member State.  Consequently, one could expect there to be 
an interplay between Member States which could lead to political pressure on some Member 
States to change their laws and practices regarding loss of nationality, similar to what was 
explained above in the context of rules on acquisition of Member State nationality.189  More 
in particular, if one Member State were to adopt rules or practices on loss of nationality 
which, in the view of one or more other Member States, would violate certain fundamental 
rights, values or principles, it may well come under political pressure to change them. 
 
However, one should be careful in drawing this parallel with cases of acquisition of Member 
State nationality, for three main reasons.  First of all, it is not immediately clear whether loss 
of Member State nationality, in those cases where it is not accompanied by the acquisition or 
preservation of another Member State nationality, automatically leads to loss of Union 
citizenship and, therefore, has the Union-wide consequences just described.  The reason for 
doubting this is that Article 20(1) TFEU, states that “Every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”, but does not state, conversely, that persons not 
holding Member State nationality are not Union citizens.190  Moreover, some scholars have 
advocated a decoupling of Union citizenship and Member State nationality in cases of loss of 
nationality and have argued that loss of Member State nationality does not automatically lead 
to loss of Union citizenship.191  
 
I submit that, at present – and without considering plausible or desirable future developments 
for a moment –, loss of one’s only Member State nationality will automatically entail loss of 
Union citizenship.192  Such would seem to be the most natural interpretation of Article 20(1) 
TFEU.  Furthermore, it is clear from the context surrounding the introduction of Union 
citizenship that Member States intended to confer that status only on nationals of the Member 
States.  Holding differently would come down to acknowledging that individuals holding only 
the nationality of a third State or even no nationality at all could also have the status of Union 
citizen.  That holding would open the door to giving Union citizenship a completely 
independent meaning from the nationality of the Member States, an avenue which the 
Member States clearly wanted to foreclose.  It would, moreover, potentially cause significant 
                                                 
189  Supra, under IV.A. 
190  Although this is generally accepted to be the case (see the discussion below). 
191  See inter alia Kostakopoulou, "European Union Citizenship: the Journey goes on ", in Ott and Vos (eds.), 
Fifty Years of European Integration (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), 271-290. See the discussion 
under VI., infra. 
192  See also my analysis of the Union law consequences of withdrawal measures that violate certain Union 
limitations described below (see under V.C. and V.D., infra). 
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practical problems.193  Indeed, a Union citizen who is not a national of one of the Member 
States would not be guaranteed residence in the European Union.  He would not have a “home 
Member State” which would have to allow him on its territory and neither would other 
Member States where he would not satisfy the conditions of Directive 2004/38. 194  Not 
surprisingly, the ECJ, in its case law until now, has taken for a fact that loss of Member State 
nationality will normally entail loss of Union citizenship.195  At present, it can be safely 
concluded, therefore, that loss of one’s only Member State nationality will lead to that person 
losing his Union citizenship, and thus have the Union wide consequences ascribed to it above.  
Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that future Union law will move into the 
direction of a refusal to give effect to the withdrawal of Member State nationality, at least as 
far as the consequences for Union citizenship are concerned, in those cases where the 
withdrawal was effected in violation of Union law.196   
 
Second, it must be noted that the dynamics underlying the indirect influence deriving from 
Union citizenship discussed above were prompted in great part by the duty of unconditional 
recognition of Member State nationality.  It is not obvious that this principle, as articulated by 
the Court in Micheletti, applies in the context of loss of Member State nationality.  Put 
differently, the question is whether the Member States are under a duty, not only to 
unconditionally recognise the conferral of nationality by another Member State but, similarly, 
also the withdrawal of nationality by another Member State.  Such would mean that a person 
whose nationality was withdrawn by one Member State could no longer be treated as a Union 
citizen – a status he or she formerly enjoyed under Article 20(1) TFEU – by the other Member 
States.  By contrast, in the absence of a duty of unconditional recognition, other Member 
States could, under certain circumstances, refuse to recognise his or her loss of Member State 
nationality and continue to treat him or her as a Union citizen. 
 
Prima facie, there are two important reasons for doubting whether the principle announced by 
the Court in Micheletti, should apply mutatis mutandis to cases of loss of nationality.  In the 
first place, the Micheletti case, on its facts, was only concerned with the non-recognition of 
(Italian) nationality and not with the non-recognition of a loss of nationality.  In this regard it 
must certainly be remarked that, although the ECJ referred to both loss and acquisition of 
nationality when confirming the competence of the Member States regarding nationality,197 it 
did not make any reference to “loss of nationality” when enouncing the principle of 
unconditional recognition.198  In the second place, in relation to acquisition of nationality, the 
duty of unconditional recognition serves to guarantee the possibility for the individual 
                                                 
193 Hall, "Loss of Union Citizenship in Breach of Fundamental Rights" (1996) 21 E.L. Rev., 141.  
194  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of the 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, [2004] O.J. L158/77. 
195  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 42. See the detailed discussion of the 
Rottmann case (infra, under V.2.). 
196  As was acknowledged by AG Poiares Maduro (Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 
Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 34, footnote 42). See the discussion under VI., infra. 
197  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 10: “Under international law, it is for each 
Member State, having due regard to [Union] law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss 
of nationality.” (italics added). 
198  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 10: “However, it is not permissible for the 
legislation of a Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of the nationality of another Member State 
by imposing an additional condition for recognition of that nationality with a view to the exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms provided for in the [Treaties]” (italics added). 
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concerned to exercise his or her citizenship rights throughout the Union.  With regard to loss 
of nationality, a duty of unconditional recognition would effectively guarantee the person 
concerned the loss of his Union citizenship and the associated rights throughout the Union.  
This may be undesirable, especially where other Member States consider that the individual 
concerned has lost his Member State nationality for reasons which are not acceptable to them. 
 
Nevertheless, I think these objections are not altogether convincing and I submit that the duty 
of unconditional recognition should also apply with regard to cases of loss of nationality.199  
Above I considered in some detail that the duty of unconditional recognition could be 
convincingly defended on the ground that in the absence of such a duty the class of persons to 
whom Union rules apply could vary from one Member State to another and that such a 
situation would be at odds with the internal market, and, more broadly, with the objectives of 
a Citizens’ Europe.  The same argument could be used for defending a duty of unconditional 
recognition of loss of Member State nationality.  If the person concerned were in some 
Member States still recognised as having the nationality of a Member State, and as a Union 
citizen therefore, but not in other Member States, his or her rights under Union law would 
vary from one Member State to another.  That would be detrimental to the Union’s aims of 
establishing an internal market and a Citizens’ Europe.  Besides, the principle of 
unconditional recognition serves to safeguard the principled competence of each of the 
Member States to regulate its nationality.  It should be clear that, in this regard too, no 
distinction can be made between the competence with regard to acquisition of nationality and 
the competence with regard to loss of nationality. 
 
Consequently, where one Member State withdraws its nationality, this should be 
unconditionally recognised by other Member States, as is the case with conferrals of 
nationality.  Of course, nothing prevents a Member State to accord a person who does not 
have the nationality of a Member State the same rights under its internal law as persons who 
do have the nationality of a Member State.  Accordingly, a Member State could choose to 
continue to treat a person who it considers to have unjustifiably lost his Member State 
nationality as a Union citizen in its internal legal order. 
 
Third, withdrawal of nationality will not normally have the same worrying effects on other 
Member States as conferral of nationality.  Indeed, it will not lead to an enlargement of the 
group of persons that can claim benefits in all the Member States, and hence not endanger the 
socioeconomic balance in those Member States. 200   Therefore, with regard to loss of 
nationality, the dynamics behind the interplay between Member States may be very different 
from those at play with regard to acquisition of nationality.  At the same time, it must be 
remarked that other considerations, which apply specifically to cases of loss of nationality, 
may prompt a Member State to put political pressure on other Member States.  In this regard, 
it must be pointed out that loss of Member State nationality, entailing loss of Union 
citizenship, has normally far worse consequences for the individual concerned.  He or she will 
lose certain vital rights, with Union-wide consequences, in a way which is potentially even in 
violation of his or her fundamental rights.  These considerations may bring a Member State to 
bring pressure upon another Member State to change its rules or policy regarding loss of 
nationality.  Moreover, where a Member State would withdraw its nationality from substantial 
groups of people, such may threaten the cohesion in that Member State and hamper European 
                                                 
199  See also the discussion of the consequences of loss of nationality in violation of certain limitations set by 
Union law (infra, under V.D.2.). 
200  On the potential worrying effects of conferral of nationality, supra, under IV.A. 
Chapter 2: Determination of the Personal Scope of Union Citizenship 
 41
integration.  This too may be a concern that may lead Member States to react, certainly in 
view of possible spill-over effects.  
 
The same considerations apply where a Member State refuses to confer its nationality on 
(groups of) individuals in a way which other Member States feel is contrary to certain 
fundamental values or principles.  Here too, political pressure may ensue from the fact that 
these Member States consider that certain (groups of) individuals are unjustifiably being 
denied the benefits of Union citizenship.  This will be illustrated by considering the situation 
in the Baltic States in some detail. 
 
2. Situation in the Baltic States 
 
Latvia is – together with Estonia (see the discussion, infra) – rather unique among the 
Member States in that its population is made up for a large part by “non-citizens”.201  This 
particular situation derives from the fact that during the Soviet rule a significant Russian-
speaking minority had established itself in Latvia, partly as a result of a hidden agenda of 
“Russification”.202  In 1989, at the eve of independence,203 ethnic Latvians accounted for only 
52 % of the population, whereas ethnic Russians accounted for 34% of the population.204  
Upon its independence, Latvia relied on the principle of State continuity to grant citizenship 
only to individuals who had been Latvian nationals in 1940 and their descendants, i.e. only to 
individuals who satisfied strict ius sanguinis requirements.205  Other residents, even second or 
third generation immigrants born and resident in Latvia, had to satisfy stringent naturalisation 
conditions in order to obtain citizenship.  These conditions, including the requirement of 
command of the Latvian language, were impossible to satisfy for many ethnic Russians, many 
                                                 
201  For a detailed analysis of the Latvian nationality legislation and its historical development, see Kruma, 
"Country Report: Latvia" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Latvia and the literature referred to; Guliyeva, "Lost in 
Transition: Russian-speaking Non-citizens in Latvia and the Protection of Minority Rights in the 
European Union" (2008) 33 E.L. Rev., 843-869; Lottmann, "No Direction Home: Nationalism and 
Statelessness in the Baltics" (2008) 43 Tex. Int'l L.J., 503-520; Ziemele, State Continuity and Nationality: 
The Baltic States and Russia. Past, Present and Future as Defined by International Law (Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 424 pp; Hughes, “'Exit' in Deeply Divided Societies: Regimes of Discrimination 
in Estonia and Latvia and the Potential for Russophone Migration” (2005) J.C.M.S., 739-762; Gelazis, 
“The European Union and the Statelessness Problem in the Baltic States” (2004) Eur. J. Migration & L., 
225-229. See also the analysis in Shaw The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: 
Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of Political Space (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
329-343. My description of the situation in Latvia is loosely based on these different sources.  
202  The immigration of ethnic Russians was coupled with the forced emigration within the USSR of 
important numbers of ethnic Latvians: Gelazis, “The European Union and the Statelessness Problem in 
the Baltic States” (2004) Eur. J. Migration & L., 226. The Russification of Baltic States was also effected 
through language policies. See Green, “Language of Lullabies: The Russification and De-Russification of 
the Baltic States” (1997) 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 219, at 233 et seq.  
203  Latvia became independent from the Russian empire in 1918. It was occupied by the Soviet Union in 
1939, after the conclusion of the famous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and regained independence in 1991. 
This regained independence did not lead to the creation of a newly independent State. Rather, Latvia 
asserted that it had been independent since 1918 and that the Soviet era was a period of “interrupted 
sovereignty”. 
204  See the figures cited in “Enacting EU Citizenship in Latvia: the Case of Non-Citizens” (2008) ENACT WP 
8, available at http://www.enacting-citizenship.eu/index.php/sections/deliverables_item/129/, 6.  
205  With certain exceptions, for instance for persons born and residing in Latvia whose parents were 
unknown. See Kruma, "Country Report: Latvia" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Latvia, 3-4. 
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of whom were not, moreover, all that keen on becoming Latvian nationals.206  As a result, 
substantial numbers of residents in Latvia remained stateless.  Under international pressure to 
avoid statelessness, Latvia introduced in 1995 the special status of “non-citizen” for former 
USSR nationals and their descendants resident in Latvia, on condition that they do not hold 
the nationality of another State.  “Non-citizens” obtain a special passport and enjoy important 
rights, such as the right not to be deported, the right to diplomatic protection and fundamental 
rights.  They do not, however, enjoy most political rights and are barred from practicing 
certain professions.207  Very important, moreover, is that veterans of the Soviet military and 
their family members are excluded from this status and from the possibility to naturalise.   
 
Similar historical events explain the current Estonian nationality laws.208  Just like Latvia, 
Estonia was confronted with a “Russification” agenda during the Soviet era.  In 1989 only 
61.5 % of its population consisted of ethnic Estonians, down from 97.3 % in 1945.209  After 
regaining independence, Estonia revived its pre-Soviet nationality legislation, granting 
citizenship only to ethnic Estonians and their descendants, coupled with restrictive 
possibilities for naturalisation.  As in Latvia, many of the mostly Russian immigrants and 
their descendants do not satisfy these conditions, or choose not to naturalise.  To counter this 
situation of statelessness, Estonia has offered “alien’s passports” to former USSR nationals 
with no other nationality and to their descendants.  As such, non-citizen residents210 enjoy 
important rights such as the right to vote in local elections and the right to unrestricted travel.  
Still, they are denied important political rights (such as the right to participate in national 
elections) and are denied access to certain jobs.  Again, certain categories of persons, notably 
former members of the Soviet army or individuals believed to have worked against Estonian 
independence, and their family members, have virtually no possibility to obtain Estonian 
citizenship. 
 
The situation in Lithuania is different from that in Latvia and Estonia in that a much smaller 
percentage of its post-independence population was ethnically Russian and that it has, inter 
alia for that reason, adopted much less restrictive nationality laws, allowing most Soviet era 
immigrants to obtain citizenship.211  For this reason, the situation in Lithuania will not be 
considered further in the following. 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that substantial numbers of residents in Estonia and Latvia are 
stateless in the sense that they do not have the nationality of either Estonia or Latvia or of a 
                                                 
206  On the reasons for this, see Lottmann, 510-513. 
207  Kruma, "Country Report: Latvia" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Latvia, 6-7.  
208  See, besides the references in n. 201, supra, Poleshchuk and Järve, "Country Report: Estonia" (2010) 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Estonia 
and the literature referred to. For an analysis of the historic background to Estonian citizenship policies, 
see Visek, “Creating the Ethnic Electorate Through Legal Restorationism: Citizenship Rights in Estonia” 
(1997) Harv. Int'l LJ., 315-374. My description of the situation in Estonia is loosely based on these 
different sources. 
209  Figures cited in Visek, “Creating the Ethnic Electorate Through Legal Restorationism: Citizenship Rights 
in Estonia” (1997) Harv. Int'l LJ., 321. 
210  In literature on Estonia, non-citizens are often referred to as residents “with undefined/undetermined 
citizenship”. I will refer to them as “non-citizens” in order to have a uniform terminology for the 
discussion of both Baltic States below. 
211  Lottmann, "No Direction Home: Nationalism and Statelessness in the Baltics" (2008) 43 Tex. Int'l L.J., 
509-510. For a detailed discussion of Lithuanian nationality law and its historical development, see - 
besides the references in n. 201, supra - Kuris, "Country report: Latvia” (2010) EUDO citizenship 
observatory, at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Lithuania. 
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third country, even though they may enjoy rights which to an important extent resemble those 
of nationals of these countries.  This group consists mostly of individuals belonging to the 
Russian-speaking communities who do not satisfy the burdensome requirements for 
naturalisation or deliberately choose not to naturalise, inter alia because such might 
deteriorate their relation with Russia.212  Besides, large numbers of residents of Latvia and 
Estonia are foreign nationals, mostly Russians, who can, given the impossibility of dual 
nationality in Latvia and Estonia, not obtain the nationality of their country of residence 
without losing their foreign nationality.  In 2009, 7,6 % of the Estonian population consisted 
of stateless former USSR citizens and 8,4 % were citizens of foreign states, mostly 
Russians.213  In 2008 in Latvia, those percentages were at 17,3 and 2.0, respectively.214  
 
Stateless persons, even those holding an alien’s passport, do not have the nationality of their 
Member State and are not Union citizens therefore.215  This means that they cannot exercise 
the rights associated with Union citizenship in the different Member States.  Accordingly, 
they cannot participate in local and European Parliamentary elections (Article 22(2) 
TFEU216), they are not entitled to diplomatic protection by the authorities of other Member 
States in third countries (Article 23 TFEU) and they cannot challenge their exclusion from the 
possibility to practice certain jobs, as nationals from other Member States could.217  More 
importantly still, they do not enjoy the right to equal treatment laid down in Article 18 TFEU 
and the right to free movement laid down in Article 21 TFEU, unless they are a family 
member of a “moving Union citizen”. 218   With regard to Article 21 TFEU it must be 
remarked, however, that Estonian and Latvian non-citizens are exempt from visa requirements 
within the Schengen zone.  Indeed, Regulation 539/2001219 was amended in 2006 and now 
exempts “stateless persons and other persons who do not hold the nationality of any country 
who reside in a Member State and are holders of a travel document issued by that Member 
                                                 
212  Lottmann notes in this regard that it is easier for non-citizens to travel to Russia (for instance in order to 
visit family members) than for Baltic nationals (Lottmann, "No Direction Home: Nationalism and 
Statelessness in the Baltics" (2008) 43 Tex. Int'l L.J., 513). 
213  Figures cited in Poleshchuk and Järve, "Country Report: Estonia" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 
available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Estonia, 4. 
214  See the figures cited in “Enacting EU Citizenship in Latvia: the Case of Non-Citizens” (2008) ENACT WP 
8, available at http://www.enacting-citizenship.eu/index.php/sections/deliverables_item/129/, 15.  
215  See the Commission reply of 3 February to Petition 0214/2005 by Nadya Yasinsky (stating that Latvian 
non-citizens are not citizens of the Union and setting out the scope of their free movement rights on 
grounds of other provisions). See further the discussion in Van Elsuwege From Soviet Republics to EU 
Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession on to the EU (Leiden and 
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 434 et seq. 
216  Article 22 TFEU is, by its wording, applicable to resident citizens from other Member States. Domestic 
Estonian laws allow non-citizens to participate in local elections. In Latvia they are denied the right to 
participate in both local and European Parliamentary elections. See Van Elsuwege From Soviet Republics 
to EU Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession on to the EU 
(Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 490-495. 
217  It is settled case law that Member States may only reserve certain functions related to the exercise of 
official authority to their own nationals. See, e.g., ECJ, Case 2/74 Reyners [1975] E.C.R. 631, paras 45-
46. 
218  Directive 2004/38 grants the right to family members to “accompany” or “join” a Union citizen in a 
Member State. In that Member State they also enjoy a right of equal treatment (Article 24 of Directive 
2004/38). Clearly, however, these rights are derivative rights and cannot be exercised independently from 
those of the Union citizen concerned, for instance in another Member State than his or her Member State 
of residence. See Cambien, "Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., at 338-341 and the sources referred to. 
219  Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from 
that requirement, [2001] O.J. L81/1. 
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State”.220  This amendment was introduced precisely to cover the case of non-citizens in 
Estonia and Latvia.221  Accordingly, as far as short-period travel between Schengen States222 
is concerned, non-citizens are in a comparable position as Union citizens.  For residence 
periods longer than three months, however, they can not rely on provisions comparable to the 
ones in place for Union citizens.223   
 
Of course, non-citizens could, on the basis of Directive 2003/109,224 obtain long-term resident 
status.  That status would, in turn, give them the right to equal treatment and the right to 
residence in other Member States for longer periods.225  However, both rights are subject to 
important restrictions and pale in comparison to the corresponding rights enjoyed by Union 
citizens.226  The right to equal treatment enjoyed by long-term residents is limited to certain 
fields and can be subjected to important restrictions by the Member States.227  Member States 
may, for instance, require proof of appropriate language proficiency for access to education 
and training.228  Long term residents and their family members also enjoy a right of residence 
in other Member States229 for periods exceeding three months.  However, again, this right can 
be made subject to important limitations which cannot be imposed vis-à-vis Union citizens.  
Member States may, for instance, limit the total number of persons entitled to be granted a 
right of residence or make residence subject to compliance with integration measures.230  
Moreover, this right of residence does not extend to persons moving to another Member State 
in order to pursue studies or vocational training.231  Besides, the circle of “privileged family 
members” is defined more narrowly than in the case of Union citizens.232   
 
                                                 
220  See the amendment introduced by Article 1 (b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1932/2006 of 21 
December 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from 
that requirement, [2006] O.J. L405/23. 
221  Van Elsuwege From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the 
Baltic States' Accession on to the EU (Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 444-446. 
222  At the moment of writing, this includes all Member States except for Ireland and the United Kingdom 
(who do not take part in the Schengen acquis) and Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania (who have not yet 
implemented the acquis). It also includes Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.  
223  See Article 7 of Directive 2004/38.  
224  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents, [2004] O.J. L16/44. According to Article 2) (a) “‘third-country national’ 
means any person who is not a citizen of the Union within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Treaty [now 
Article 20(1) TFEU]”. Accordingly the Directive applies to non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia, even 
though they do not, strictly speaking, have the nationality of a third country. 
225  See the discussion in Van Elsuwege From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political 
Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession on to the EU (Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2008), 437 et seq. 
226  See the analysis by Halleskov, “The Long-Term Residents Directive: A Fulfilment of the Tampere 
Objective of Near-Equality” (2005) 7 Eur. J. Migration & L., 181-201 and Boelaert-Suominen, “Non-EU 
Nationals and Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the Status of Third-Country Nationals Who Are Long-
Term Residents: Five Paces Forward and Possibly Three Paces Back” (2005) CML Rev., 1011-1052. 
227  Article 11 of Directive 2003/109. Article 11(5) provides that Member States may extend the right to equal 
treatment further than the fields mentioned. 
228  Article 11(3)(b) of Directive 2003/109. 
229  But not in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, as they are not bound by the provisions of the 
Directive. 
230  Articles 14(3) and 15(3) of Directive 2003/109. 
231  Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2003/109. 
232  See Article 16 of Directive 2003/109, referring to Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on 
the right to family reunification, [2003] O.J. L251/12. 
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The biggest problem, perhaps, is that obtaining the status of long-term resident itself can be 
rather burdensome.  Generally, the status can be obtained after five years of legal and 
continuous residence in a Member State and on condition that the person concerned has 
sufficient resources for himself and his family members and has sufficient sickness 
insurance. 233   However, a Member State may also require compliance with integration 
conditions, such as language exams.  It appears that in Estonia234 and Latvia235 proof of 
sufficient command of the national language is required in order to obtain permanent resident 
status under Directive 2003/109.  This is significant, because precisely knowledge of one of 
the Baltic languages is a sore point for Russian-speaking minorities, who may, for that reason, 
see themselves excluded from the status of EU long-term resident.   
 
This situation is worrisome from the point of view of European integration and the objectives 
of a Citizens’ Europe, such as social cohesion and political integration.236  A situation in 
which substantial groups of residents in a Member State are denied Member State nationality 
and access to some of the basic rights associated with Union citizenship goes directly against 
the idea of establishing an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.237  It would only 
be normal then if the EU and the Member States were to bring pressure on Estonia and Latvia 
to change their citizenship policies and widen access to their nationalities for non-citizens and 
stateless persons resident in their territories.  All Member States have an interest in this, 
because problems with European integration can be expected to affect the political cohesion 
of the Union and disturb the functioning of the internal market.  Moreover, the situation of the 
Russian-speaking minorities affects the EU’s relation with Russia.238   
 
It appears that the EU has had a bearing on citizenship policies during the pre-accession stage, 
i.e. in the process leading up to Estonia and Latvia joining the Union as full-blown Member 
States,239 although the significance of the EU’s influence is disputed.240  In this connection, it 
                                                 
233  Articles 4 and 5(1) of Directive 2003/109. 
234  See the website of the Estonian Police- and Border Guard Board: 
http://www.politsei.ee/en/teenused/residence-permit/long-term-residence-permit/. The language 
requirements only apply, however, for the future (from 1 June 2006 onwards) and do not therefore affect 
the possibilities for Soviet era immigrants to obtain EU long-term residence status. 
235  See the website of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs: 
http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/en/pakalpojumi/eiropa.html.  
236  The promotion of cohesion and integration are fundamental objectives of the Union, as is clear from 
Article 3(3) TEU and Title XVIII of the TFEU and from the preamble to the TEU). The aims of fostering 
social cohesion and integration are also expressly stated in recitals 17 and 18 to the preamble of Directive 
2004/38 (see, in this connection, ECJ, Case C-162/09 Lassal [2010] E.C.R. nyr., paras 32 and 53). 
Arguably, a situation in which large numbers of residents of a country are denied important political rights 
and access to certain professions is detrimental to political integration. The fact that these residents do not 
enjoy these rights in contrast to other residents also hampers the social cohesion of the population of that 
country and, thereby, of the European Union. Admittedly, these arguments do not just apply with regard 
to “non-citizens”, but equally hold good with regard to third country nationals. The growing discrepancy 
between the rights enjoyed by Union citizens and those enjoyed by third country nationals has frequently 
been denounced in this light, and rightly so. Still, the problems stated are particularly pressing with regard 
to non-citizens, since they presumably enjoy lesser rights than third-country nationals, for instance as far 
as diplomatic protection is concerned, and are denied the realistic possibility to acquire the nationality of 
the country they are resident in.  
237  See the preambles to the TEU and TFEU and Article 1, second para., TEU. 
238  As was already clear from the “medium-term strategy for the development of relations between the 
Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)”. For an illustration of tensions between the EU 
and Russia caused by the situation of Russian minorities in the Baltic States, see “EU-Russian talks end in 
acrimony”, BBC News 18 May 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6668111.stm.  
239  See, on this subject, Sasse, "The politics of EU conditionality: the norm of minority protection during and 
beyond EU accession” (2008) 15 Journal of European Public Policy, 842-860; Van Elsuwege From 
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must be remarked that the Accession Partnership Agreements with Estonia and Latvia, which 
were followed up and assessed by the Commission, provided for enhanced minority 
protection.241  There is in any event a good case for arguing that some of the changes in 
Latvian and Estonian nationality legislation in the nineties, to the effect of a relaxing of 
naturalisation requirements, have been strongly influenced by the monitoring by the 
Commission of the accession process and the regular Commission progress and monitoring 
reports.242  Here I am concerned, however, with the possible influence of Union law on the 
nationality laws of Member States, not candidate Member States.  The point will not be 
further elaborated therefore. 
 
Since the accession of Latvia and Estonia, the EU has fewer mechanisms to influence the 
citizenship policies in these countries.  Indeed, it is no longer possible to use EU Membership 
as a “carrot” in order to induce or even force certain changes in nationality legislation.  The 
EU has even been said to no longer play any role at all in relation to naturalisation and 
integration issues in the Baltic States.243  Some have even argued that accession to the EU is 
seen by Estonia and Latvia as the ultimate approval of their citizenship policies.244  It appears 
indeed that the Commission is no longer applying concrete pressure on these Member States.  
In this connection it must be noted that, as a result of their accession to the EU, the 
Commission no longer issues regular reports on the situation in the Baltic States.  Nonetheless, 
the accession of Latvia and Estonia can in no way be taken to mean that the EU and its 
Member States have no more role to play in this regard and can no longer demand from 
Estonia and Latvia to further relax their naturalisation requirements.245  It appears that the 
Commission is still closely watching the citizenship policies in these countries and its 
implications for a Citizens’ Europe.  In fact, the Commission, in its 2008 report on citizenship 
of the Union explicitly expressed concern over the situation246: 
                                                                                                                                                        
Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession 
on to the EU (Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 268-275; Gelazis, "The European 
Union and the Statelessness Problem in the Baltic States" (2004 ) 6 Eur. J. Migration & L., 226-232. For a 
general study of the EU’s influence on the rules and policies of candidate countries, see Kochenov, EU 
Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy 
and the Rule of Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2008), 358 pp. 
240  See the references cited in Van Elsuwege From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and 
Political Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession on to the EU (Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008), 268. 
241  Respect for and protection of minorities is one of the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”. For a discussion, 
see Hillion, “Enlargement of the European Union: The Discrepancy between Membership Obligations and 
Accession Conditions as regards the Protection of Minorities” (2003) Fordham Int’l L.J., 715-740. 
242  See the discussion and references in Van Elsuwege From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal 
and Political Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession on to the EU (Leiden and Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 269-275. For an example of a Commission monitoring report mentioning the 
issue, see the Comprehensive monitoring reports on Estonia’s and Latvia’s preparations for membership, 
both available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_2003_en.htm (strongly 
encouraging both countries “to promote integration of the Russian minority by, in particular, continuing to 
accelerate the speed of naturalisation procedures, and by taking other proactive measures to increase the 
rate of naturalisation”). 
243  Kruma, "Country Report: Latvia" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Latvia, 18. 
244  Poleshchuk and Järve, "Country Report: Estonia" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Estonia, 13. 
245  See the informative discussion (approaching the issue from the angle of “minority rights”) in Guliyeva, 
"Lost in Transition: Russian-speaking Non-citizens in Latvia and the Protection of Minority Rights in the 
European Union" (2008) 33 E.L. Rev., 854-867. 
246  Fifth Report from the Commission on Citizenship of the Union (1 May 2004 – 30 June 2007), 
COM(2008) 85 final, 3 (bold words as they appear in the original). 
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“In particular, the Commission is aware of questions related to persons belonging to the Russian-
speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia who are considered to be ‘non-citizens’ […]” 
 
The Commission at the same time, acknowledging that it had no direct power to regulate 
nationality, stated that it had nevertheless sought, using the powers at its disposal: 
 
“to contribute to solutions linked to this issue by promoting integration and by using the [Union] 
instruments at its disposal such as ensuring that Member States strictly implement [EU] anti-
discrimination legislation.”247  
 
The situation of Russian-speaking minorities is also closely watched by the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights.248 
 
There is no reason why, as both the Union citizenship and fundamental rights acquis are very 
dynamic and having an ever greater impact on the rules and policies of the Member States, the 
Commission and other Member States could or would not bring pressure on Estonia and 
Latvia to bring the current situation of large numbers of stateless residents to an end.  
Below 249  I will argue that a refusal of Member State nationality can, under certain 
circumstances, be considered to fall within the scope of Union law, and, hence, must respect 
certain limitations deriving from Union law.  I will not develop the point further here.  I just 
want to point out that certain Union principles would prima facie seem relevant as regards the 
situation in Estonia and Latvia, such as the duty to respect fundamental rights, in particular 
the right to nationality and the right to respect for family life, 250  the principle of non-
discrimination,251 in particular on grounds of race, and the principle of proportionality.252  
Below, I will argue that the Commission (or another Member State) could bring an 
infringement action where one of these principles is violated.  The prospect of such actions 
would seem to significantly enhance the effectiveness of political pressure and help to induce 
the desired changes in Estonia’s and Latvia’s citizenship policies. 
 
V DIRECT LIMITATIONS FLOWING FROM UNION CITIZENSHIP 
 
A. Due regard to Union law 
 
                                                 
247  Ibid. 
248  See the EU-MIDIS: European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, Main Results Report, 
available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/eu-midis/index_en.htm, 176 et seq. 
249  See the discussion under V., infra. 
250  Several cases have already been brought before the ECtHR by stateless residents against Latvia. So far, 
the Court has never concluded that there was a breach of the ECHR. For a discussion, see Thym, 
"Respect for private and family life under article 8 ECHR in immigration cases: a human right to 
regularize illegal stay?” (2008) 57 I.C.L.Q., 87-112. See also the discussion (from an international law 
perspective) in Ziemele State Continuity and Nationality: The Baltic States and Russia. Past, Present and 
Future as Defined by International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 314-327. 
251  See the discussion in Van Elsuwege From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political 
Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession on to the EU (Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2008), 428-434; Ziemele State Continuity and Nationality: The Baltic States and Russia. Past, Present 
and Future as Defined by International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 332-340. 
252  It could be argued, for instance, that the exclusion of family members from ex Soviet soldiers who were 
born and reside in Estonia and Latvia from the possibility of acquiring nationality is in violation of the 
principle of proportionality. 
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1. An enigmatic phrase 
 
As was pointed out above, the ECJ has confirmed the competence of the Member States to 
regulate nationality, but at the same has time made it subject to an important proviso.  The 
famous dictum from the Micheletti case reads: “Under international law, it is for each 
Member State, having due regard to [Union] law, to lay down the conditions for the 
acquisition and loss of nationality”.253  It clearly appears from this dictum that there is room 
to argue that Union law sets direct limitations to the competence of the Member States to 
determine nationality.  Such is true, in line with the dictum, both with regard to their 
competence to lay down rules concerning acquisition of nationality and for their competence 
to lay down rules concerning loss of nationality.  However, while in the almost 20 years 
following Micheletti, the ECJ repeated this dictum in a number of cases,254 it had never 
clarified its meaning by stating what principles of Union law Member States must respect in 
this connection or found a Member State’s nationality legislation to be in breach of Union 
law.  This led to a vivid debate in legal literature about the possible meaning and significance 
of the dictum.255  
 
In its Rottmann judgment256 of 2 March 2010, the ECJ for the first time clarified to some 
extent the meaning of the phrase “having due regard to Union law”.  Furthermore, in that case 
it examined for the first time the compatibility of Member State nationality legislation with 
fundamental principles of Union law.257  The Rottmann case is no doubt a landmark case.  Its 
contribution to clarifying the on this point ambiguous case law should not be underestimated.  
At the same time, the case does far from bringing the academic debate to an end.  First of all, 
“one swallow does not make a summer”.  It would be unwise to build too much reliance on 
one case, given that the ECJ could in the (near) future implicitly revise or explicitly overturn 
this case.258  One commentator even calls on the Member States to amend the Treaties in 
order to correct the Court’s erroneous interpretation of the Treaties in Rottmann.259  Besides, 
                                                 
253  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 10 (italics added).  
254  ECJ, Case C-179/98 Mesbah [1999] E.C.R. I-7955, para. 29; ECJ, Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] E.C.R. I-
1237, para. 19; ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 37. 
255  See, for instance, the longstanding debate in the Netherlands between De Groot (see De Groot, "Towards 
a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF and the 
literature cited therein) and Jessurun d’Oliveira (see inter alia Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the 
European Union after Amsterdam", in O’Keeffe and Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam 
Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999), 395-412). 
256  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449., with case notes by Cambien in (2011) 17 Colum. J. 
Eur. L., 375-394 and in (2010) SEW, 379-382; De Groot in (2010) Asiel & Migratierecht, 293-300; De 
Groot and Selling in (2011) EuConst, 150-160; Jessurun d’Oliveira in (2010) NJB, 1028-1033 and in 
(2011) EuConst, 138-149; Kochenov in (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1831-1846; Mouton in (2010) Revue de 
Droit International Public, 257-280; Oosterom-Staples in (2010) N.T.E.R., 188-194.  
257  As I have explained above, in Micheletti, the Court did not so much scrutinise Spanish nationality 
legislation, but rather imposed on Spain the duty to unconditionally recognise the Italian nationality of 
Mr. Micheletti. Accordingly, Micheletti did not invalidate provisions of Spanish nationality legislation, 
although it cast doubt on the validity under Union law of certain provisions of the Spanish civil code. See 
the analysis by, Iglesias Buhigues, "Doble nacionalidad y derecho comunitario. A propósito del asunto C 
369/90, Micheletti, sentencia del TJCE de 7 de Julio de 1992", in Perez Gonzalez and others (eds.), Hacia 
un nuevo orden internacional y europeo. Homenaje al profesor M. Diéz de Velasco (Madrid, Tecnos, 
1993), at 966-967 in particular. 
258  The latter scenario is very unusual, but does happen: see the explicit reversal of the Akrich case (ECJ, 
Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607) in ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-
6241, para. 58. See my case note in (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 321, at 341. 
259  Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Ontkoppeling van nationaliteit en Unieburgerschap? Opmerkingen over de 
Rottmann zaak" (2010) NJB, 1028, at 1033. 
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many questions remain unanswered even after Rottmann.  In fact, the judgment raises a 
number of important new questions.  Future cases will have to further clarify the Court’s 
stance. 
 
Given the importance of the Rottmann case to my analysis, I will first discuss the case in 
some detail.  Next I will tackle the important question of the scope of Union law inroads into 
the nationality laws of the Member States, before discussing possible limitations with regard 
to, on the one hand, rules on acquisition of nationality and, on the other hand, rules on loss of 
nationality.  
 
2. The Rottmann case 
a) Judgment 
 
The facts of the case are rather straightforward.260  The applicant in the case, Mr. Rottmann, 
was an Austrian national by birth.  In 1995, a case was brought against him before an Austrian 
criminal court on account of suspected serious fraud in his profession.  In 1997, the criminal 
court issued a national warrant for the arrest of Mr. Rottmann.  At that point in time, however, 
Mr. Rottmann no longer lived in Austria.  He had moved to Germany in 1995, after the 
hearing before the criminal court.  In 1998, Mr. Rottmann applied for German nationality and 
in early 1999 he effectively became a German national.  A few months later, the Austrian 
authorities informed the German authorities of the criminal proceedings pending against Mr. 
Rottmann.  The competent German authority (the Freistaat Bayern) reacted by withdrawing 
Mr. Rottmann’s naturalisation with retroactive effect.  It based this decision (hereinafter 
“withdrawal decision”) on the fact that Mr. Rottmann had never disclosed during the 
naturalisation procedure that he was the subject of judicial investigation in Austria and that, 
by failing to disclose this relevant information, he had obtained German nationality by 
deception.   
 
The withdrawal decision had rather disastrous consequences for Mr. Rottmann.  As a 
consequence of his naturalisation he had lost his Austrian nationality, in accordance with both 
Austrian 261  and German 262  law.  The withdrawal decision would strip him of his only 
remaining nationality, the German nationality.  Moreover, under Austrian law, he could 
regain his Austrian nationality only under very burdensome conditions, which he did not 
appear to satisfy. 263   Consequently, the interplay of Austrian and German provisions on 
nationality in the circumstances of the case threatened264 to render Mr. Rottmann stateless.  
The question the ECJ had to answer was whether this outcome was in accordance with Union 
                                                 
260  For a more detailed account, see my case note in (2010) SEW, 379-382. 
261  Paragraph 27(1) of the Law on nationality (Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz, BGBl. 311/1985) provides: “Any 
person who acquires foreign nationality at his own request, or by reason of a declaration made by him or 
with his express consent, shall lose his Austrian nationality unless he has expressly been given the right to 
retain [it]”. 
262  According to the applicable provisions of German law relating to nationality, naturalisation of an alien 
depended, as a rule, on his giving up or losing his previous nationality (ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 7). 
263  See Article 10 of the Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz, which requires, in principle, the absence of a criminal 
conviction of a certain gravity. 
264  The effects of the withdrawal decision were suspended by the appeal brought against it by Mr. Rottmann. 
Accordingly, the effects of the decision under Austrian and German law had not yet materialised when the 
ECJ delivered its judgment. 
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law, in particular with the provisions on Union citizenship.  The referring Court asked the ECJ 
to assess the validity of the provisions at stake of both the Austrian and the German 
nationality laws.  This was the ideal scenario for the Court to clarify the meaning of its 
proviso “having due regard to Union265 law”.  
 
Very important is that the Court started by tackling the question of admissibility,266 namely by 
determining whether Union law was applicable to the dispute at all.267  This was disputed by a 
number of Member States, on two grounds: on the one hand, because the rules on acquisition 
and loss of nationality fall within the competence of the Member States and, on the other 
hand, because the case concerned a “purely internal situation” since the withdrawal decision 
was taken by the German authorities vis-à-vis a German national.  The Court firmly dismissed 
these arguments.  It recalled, first of all, that the Member States, in situations covered by 
Union law, must exercise their competences – such as the one regarding nationality – with 
due regard to Union law.  It found, moreover, that the situation at hand was one covered by 
Union law.  It famously stated that:  
 
“the situation of a citizen of the Union who […] is faced with a decision withdrawing his 
naturalisation […] placing him […] in a position capable of causing him to lose the status 
conferred by Article [20 TFEU] and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and 
its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law.”268 
 
This is a point of paramount importance, which I will come back to in more detail below. 
 
Next, the Court assessed whether the withdrawal decision was taken in accordance with 
Union law.269  The Court clarified that the principle that Member States must exercise their 
power regarding nationality with due regard to Union law enshrines the principle that the 
exercise of that power, “in so far as it affects the rights conferred and protected by the legal 
order of the Union”, is amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of European Union 
law.270  The Court accepted that withdrawal of nationality for reasons of deception could be 
compatible with Union law, since such corresponds to a reason relating to the public interest, 
namely the protection of the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between a 
Member State and its nationals.  The Court found confirmation of this point of view in the 
relevant provisions of the Convention on the reduction of statelessness and of the ECN and in 
the general principle of international law that no one is arbitrarily to be deprived of his 
nationality.271  The ECJ added, however, that, where the withdrawal of nationality has for a 
consequence that the person concerned loses his Union citizenship, this decision must respect 
the principle of proportionality, under Union law and, where applicable, also under national 
law.  It was necessary, therefore, to balance the consequences of the withdrawal decision for 
the person concerned and his or her family members with regard to the loss of the rights 
enjoyed by every Union citizen against the gravity of the offence committed by that person, 
                                                 
265  The Court has, of course, consistently referred to “having due regard to Community law” because the facts 
of all the cases so far decided took place before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Because the 
Lisbon Treaty has now entered into force, I will consistently refer to “Union law” instead of “Community 
law”. 
266  Even though the judgment does not contain a separate section on “admissibility” in contrast with the 
Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro. 
267  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, paras 37-45. 
268  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 42 (italics added). 
269  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, paras 46-59. 
270  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 48. 
271  Which, as the ECJ remarks, is reproduced in Article 15(2) of the UDHR and Article 4(c) ECN (ECJ, Case 
C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 53). 
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the lapse of time between the naturalisation decision and the withdrawal decision and the 
possibilities for that person to recover his original nationality.  The Court clarified that 
principle of proportionality would not be violated by the mere fact that the person concerned 
had not recovered his or her original nationality.  Nevertheless, the principle could require the 
person concerned to be afforded a reasonable period of time in order to try to recover the 
nationality of his Member State of origin. 
 
Lastly, the ECJ considered whether, in the circumstances of the case, Austria was obliged to 
interpret its legislation in such a way as to allow Mr. Rottmann to recover his original 
nationality.272  The Court merely remarked that it could not answer this question since the 
Austrian authorities had not yet taken a decision regarding the possible recovery of Mr. 
Rottmann’s Austrian nationality, given the fact that the withdrawal decision had not yet 
become definitive.  It could not, in other words, assess the validity under Union law of a 
decision not yet adopted.  Still, the Court added that the principles enounced in the judgment 
with regard to the powers of the Member States in the sphere of nationality applied to both the 
Member State of naturalisation and to the Member State of the original nationality. 
 
b) Appraisal 
 
The Rottmann case is most probably the most important ECJ case in the field of nationality 
law since the classic Micheletti case.  It has rightly been described as a landmark case,273 
providing a more than welcome clarification with regard to the relationship between Union 
citizenship, on the one hand, and the nationality laws of the Member States, on the other 
hand.274  Curiously, the Court has been fiercely criticised for overstretching the reach of 
Union law,275 and, at the same time, for not going far enough in its scrutiny on the compliance 
of national rules with Union law. 276  No wonder that the case has sparked a passionate 
academic debate (or, one might say, revived the academic debated set in motion by 
Micheletti) about the influence of Union law on the nationality laws of the Member States.277   
 
As Davies has remarked, in common with other seminal cases, the Court has hung a far 
reaching judgment on a relatively innocuous and sympathetic fact set.  Indeed, the Rottmann 
                                                 
272  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, paras 60-64. 
273  See Davies, "The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of Union Citizenship and Rights" (2010) EUDO 
Citizenship Forum, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/254-has-the-european-court-
of-justice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-law?start=2. De Groot even labels 
Rottmann as a “classic of European jurisprudence” and as a judgment of the same rank as seminal cases 
like Van Gend & Loos, Costa-Enel, Cassis de Dijon, Baumbast and Grzelczyk (De Groot, "Invloed van 
het Unierecht op het nationaliteitsrecht van de Lidstaten: Overwegingen over de Janko Rottmann-
beslissing van het Europees Hof van Justitie" (2010) Asiel & Migratierecht, 300). 
274  See my case note in (2010) SEW, 381. 
275  Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Ontkoppeling van nationaliteit en Unieburgerschap? Opmerkingen over de 
Rottmann zaak" (2010) NJB, 1028-1033. 
276  Kochenov, "Two Sovereign States vs. A Human Being: ECJ as a Guardian of Arbitrariness in Citizenship 
Matters" (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593220; Kochenov, "Case C-135/08 Janko 
Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010, not yet 
reported" (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1842-1845 (denouncing the fact that the ECJ did not take a firm stance in 
protecting the individual concerned against statelessness).  
277  Kochenov (writing before the Rottmann judgment was delivered) even remarked that this important topic 
has never enjoyed sufficient scholarly attention (Kochenov, "Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of 
Member States' Nationalities under Pressure from EU Citizenship" (2010) EUI RSCAS Paper 2010/23, 
available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/13634/1/RSCAS_2010_23.pdf, 1). 
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case is not so much important for its facts, which are in many respects rather unusual.  The 
judgment is of utmost importance on a more principled level.  The Court’s reasoning is 
groundbreaking on two points.  First of all, the Court’s reasoning on the scope of Union law 
in the sphere of nationality laws is very innovative.  Secondly, the judgment confirms the 
existence of direct Union law limitations to the Member State’s competence and provides a 
first indication as to what these limitations are.  For this reason the Rottmann judgment will be 
an important point of discussion throughout my analysis.  In the following, I will first analyse 
whether and to what extent Union law is applicable (or should apply) to issues of Member 
State nationality (B).  Next, I will discuss possible Union law limitations to the competence of 
the Member States as regards acquisition of nationality (C) and loss of nationality (D).  Both 
issues, applicability of Union law and limits deriving from Union law, are to some extent 
intertwined.  On an abstract level of reasoning, one could say that the nationality laws of the 
Member States fall within the scope of Union law to the extent that they infringe a principle 
of Union law.  This principle, for example the free movement of persons, would then be a 
Union law limitation.  However, this is not necessarily the case.  Below I will advocate a 
systemic distinction between the scope of Union law and limitations deriving from Union law.  
This will allow me to treat both issues separately. 
 
B. Applicability of Union law in the sphere of nationality 
 
A preliminary point to any discussion about the influence of Union law on the nationality 
laws of the Member States is whether Union law is applicable at all in this field and, if so, to 
what extent.  Logically speaking, this is a point that has to be addressed first, before 
discussing any possible limitations deriving from Union law.  The point is highly 
controversial.  Some commentators have argued that Union law has no role to play in this 
field because the competence of the Member States regarding nationality is an exclusive 
competence.  Accordingly, some have criticised the Court’s judgment in Rottmann as being 
an erroneous decision.278  Others agree that Union law can have an impact on the nationality 
rules of the Member States but only in situations that present a clear link with Union law279 – 
a link which is mostly thought of a “cross border” element – , and not in “purely internal 
situations”.280  I will now consider both these issues in some detail.  My analysis will show 
that Union law does apply in the sphere of nationality legislation.  Moreover I will argue that, 
as regards rules on acquisition or loss of nationality, conferral, refusal or loss of Member State 
nationality can in itself be a sufficient link to bring a situation within the scope of Union law 
when it has an impact on Union citizenship. 
 
                                                 
278  See Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Decoupling Nationality and Union Citizenship?" (2011) 7 EuConst, 139. 
279  For a very interesting analysis of the link required with Union law in the case law of the ECJ, see 
Lenaerts, “Federalism and the Rule of Law. Perspectives from the European Court of Justice” (2010) 
Fordham International Law Journal, 1338-1387. 
280  The competence-based argument should be distinguished from the argument based on the absence of a 
link with Union law, although both arguments are sometimes mixed. In Rottmann , for instance AG 
Poiares Maduro notes that it “seems to emerge from the observations of certain Member States, that the 
situation in this case is a purely internal one, on the pretext that the subject-matter of the proceedings, in 
this instance the acquisition and loss of nationality, is regulated exclusively by national law” (at para. 10). 
In my view, it would be better to reserve the label “internal” for situations which present no link with 
Union law, usually due to the absence of a “cross-border” element, and not apply it to competences which 
are said to be exclusive competences of the Member States. As we know, the fact that the Member States 
are competent to lay down rules in a given field does not have for a consequence that Union law is not 
applicable or should not be complied with. 
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1. Nationality as an exclusive competence of the Member States? 
 
The argument that Union law cannot apply to the Member States’ rules on nationality because 
the Member States are exclusively competent in this field is both a familiar one and an 
understandable one.  The argument is familiar because it has since long been advanced in a 
well-known debate in legal literature between scholars defending the position that nationality 
belongs to the “reserved domain” of the Member States 281  and scholars defending the 
possibility that Union law sets direct limits to this competence. 282   The argument is 
understandable because it can be traced back to the fear of some Member States, described 
above, of Union law encroaching upon their competence regarding nationality, one of the key 
competences of sovereign states.  The popularity of the argument in the Member States is 
illustrated by the fact that eight of the Member States made submissions to this effect in the 
Rottmann case.283   
 
Nevertheless, the said argument is, in my view, rather besides the point.  It is not helpful to 
classify certain competences as “exclusive Member State competences” or belonging to the 
“reserved domain”.  Of course, there are numerous fields which the Member States remain 
competent to regulate and in which the Union is not competent to lay down rules.  Still, even 
in those fields, the Member States must exercise their competence with due regard to Union 
law.  This is a natural imperative of the Union legal order, which flows from the primacy of 
Union law.  It is inconceivable that Member States would, when laying down rules in fields in 
which the Union is not competent to do so, be entitled to deviate from Union rules in other 
fields or even enact rules that would put in peril the effectiveness of Union law.  Past cases 
have made clear that Union law has to be respected by the Member States even in the fields 
of, inter alia, criminal legislation,284 direct taxation,285 rules governing a person’s name,286 
                                                 
281  See, inter alia, Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Ontkoppeling van nationaliteit en Unieburgerschap? Opmerkingen 
over de Rottmann zaak" (2010) NJB, 1033; Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the European Union 
after Amsterdam", in O’Keeffe and Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999), 395, at 397 et seq.; Closa, "Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of 
Member States" (1995) 32 CML Rev., 487, at 509-514; Kovar and Simon, "La citoyenneté européenne" 
(1993) C.D.E., 285, at 289-295. It cannot be ignored that this view had far more proponents in the “initial 
years” of Union citizenship, and is not widely defended anymore at present, in particular since the 
Rottmann ruling.  
282  See, inter alia, Kochenov, "Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States' Nationalities under 
Pressure from EU Citizenship" (2010) EUI RSCAS Paper 2010/23, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/13634/1/RSCAS_2010_23.pdf; Rostek and Davies, "The 
Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies” (2007) Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F., 89-156; De 
Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law” (2004) 8.3 EJCL, 1-37; Kotalakidis Von der nationalen 
Staatsangehörigkeit zur Unionsbürgerschaft: die Person und das Gemeinwesen (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
2000), at 605 et seq. in particular; De Groot, "The Relationship between the Nationality of the Member 
States of the European Union and European Citizenship", in La Torre (ed.), European Citizenship: An 
Institutional Challenge (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998), 115-147; O'Leary The Evolving 
Concept of Community Citizenship: from the Free movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (London, 
Kluwer Law International, 1996), at 57 et seq.; Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the 
Union (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), in particular at Chapter3; Marias, 
"From Market Citizen to Union Citizen", in Marias (ed.), European Citizenship (Maastricht, EIPA, 1994), 
1-24, at 15; O'Leary, "Nationality Law and Community Citizenship: A Tale of Two Uneay Bedfellows" 
(1992) YbEL, 353, at 378-381 and, already, Evans, "Nationality Law and European Integration" (1991) 16 
E.L. Rev., 190-215. 
283  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 37. 
284  The ECJ has held for instance that “Although in principle criminal legislation and the rules of criminal 
procedure, among which the national provision in issue is to be found, are matters for which the Member 
States are responsible, the Court has consistently held that Union law sets certain limits to their power.” 
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disability pensions for victims of war287 and the organisation of social security schemes, 288 
fields which the Member States without any doubt remain competent to regulate. 289  
Consequently, there does not seem to be room anymore for competences which the Member 
States can exercise without having regard to at least certain principles or rules of Union law, 
which limit their discretion in the field.  In that sense no competence can ever be labelled an 
exclusive Member State competence.  As Lenaerts has famously stated: “There simply is no 
nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the [Union]”.290  
Of course, one could reserve the label “exclusive Member State competence” for fields in 
which the Union is not competent to lay down rules as such,291 but in which general principles 
of Union law and Treaty provisions nevertheless have to be complied with.  This use of the 
term is not entirely accurate and, in my view, rather confusing.  Moreover, it is somewhat 
dangerous to use the label, as it seems to refer to a status quo, a sort of fossilised 
categorisation of competences, and such does not do justice to the dynamic nature of the 
Union legal order. 
 
It cannot readily be seen why the foregoing considerations should not apply with regard to the 
competence to lay down the rules on acquisition or loss of nationality.  As in all other fields, 
Member States must exercise their competence regarding nationality with due regard to Union 
law – be it only, of course, in situations that fall within the scope of Union law, an issue that 
will be discussed under “2”.  Accordingly, the Micheletti dictum requiring the Member States 
to have “due regard to Union law” seems to be no more than a specific expression of the case 
law just referred in the field of nationality law, as was rightly remarked by the ECJ in 
Rottmann.292  Jessurun d’Oliveira has objected that the parallel with the said case law is 
erroneous, since that case law concerns the scope of Union citizenship and the rights attached 
to it and not the conditions governing the acquisition and loss of Union citizenship.  
According to that author, the latter remain determined exclusively by the nationality laws of 
the Member States without any limitation deriving from Union law.  Still according to that 
author, nationality legislation must have this “privileged position” because if it would be 
                                                                                                                                                        
See ECJ, Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] E.C.R. 195, para. 19; ECJ, Case 203/80 Guerrino Casati [1981] 
E.C.R. 2595, para. 27. 
285  See, e.g., the Turpeinen-judgment, where the ECJ observed: “while in the present state of [Union] law 
direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less exercise 
that competence in accordance with [Union] law, in particular the provisions of the [Treaties] concerning 
the right of every citizen of the European Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States (ECJ, Case C-520/04 Turpeinen [2006] E.C.R. I-10685, para. 11). For another example, 
see ECJ, Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] E.C.R. I-6421, para. 41.  
286  ECJ, Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul [2008] E.C.R. I-7639, para. 16; ECJ, Case C-148/02 Garcia 
Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, para. 26. 
287  ECJ, Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas [2006] E.C.R. I-10451, paras 21-22. See also ECJ, Case C-
221/07 Zablocka-Weyhermüller [2008] E.C.R. I-9029, paras 27-28; ECJ, Case C-499/06 Nerkowska 
[2008] E.C.R. I-3993, paras 23-24. 
288  ECJ, Case C-135/99 Elsen [2000] E.C.R. I-1049, para. 33. 
289  See also the discussion in Van Nuffel and Cambien, "De vrijheid van economisch niet-actieve EU-burgers 
om binnen de EU te reizen, te verblijven en te studeren" (2009) 57 SEW, 143, at 148-150. 
290  Lenaerts, "Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism" (1990) 38 Am. J. Comp. L., 205, at 220. 
For critical reflections on that view, see Dashwood, "The Limits of European Community Powers" (1996) 
21 E.L. Rev., 113, at 114 et seq.; Majone, "Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': the Question of Standards" 
(1998) 4 E.L.J., 5, at 8 et seq.   
291  It clearly follows from the Treaties that the Union is not competent to regulate certain fields. Since the 
Lisbon Treaty it is specified that the Union cannot rely on the flexibility clause of Article 352 TFEU to 
adopt rules in these fields. 
292  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 41. See also Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in 
Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449,, para. 20. 
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(even partially) governed by Union law, such would endanger the existence and identity of the 
Member States or their autonomous status as States.293  In my view, this argument is not 
conclusive.  Even if we accept that the case law discussed in the previous paragraph applies to 
nationality legislation, Member States remain competent to determine who their nationals are 
and have not, therefore, lost their sovereignty or statehood for this reason.  At the same time, 
it must be acknowledged that the EU Member States have partially replaced their 
independence with interdependence, in the framework of the European Union.  They will 
therefore, when exercising their sovereign powers, inevitably have to take into account certain 
imperatives deriving from the Union legal order.  It would be wrong to exempt nationality law 
from this obligation, since Member State nationality is one of the key concepts of the Union 
legal order, giving entitlement to the fundamental status of the nationals of the Member 
States, Union citizenship.  It follows from the case law referred to above that Member States 
may not, in the exercise of their competence, enact rules that are liable to hinder or make less 
attractive the exercise of the rights attached to Union citizenship.294  A fortiori, Member 
States cannot at liberty regulate the very status that gives entitlement to these rights.295   
 
Another objection to applying the said case law to Member State nationality legislation is that 
Article 20(1) TFEU explicitly defines Union citizenship with regard to Member State 
nationality and that both a declaration annexed to the Treaties and a decision of the Heads of 
State or Government meeting within the European Council 296  state that Member State 
nationality is to be determined solely by reference to the national law of the Member State 
concerned.  However, it does not follow from these provisions, and certainly not from Article 
20(1) TFEU, that the nationality legislation of the Member States can entirely disregard 
fundamental principles of Union law.  Such authorisation could never flow from the said 
declaration and decision, as they rank lower in the hierarchy of Union law than Treaty 
provisions and general principles of Union law.  As discussed higher, these instruments have 
a significant authoritative value for the interpretation of the Treaties,297 as was explicitly 
acknowledged by the ECJ in Rottmann.298  They cannot, however, be a basis, for shielding 
nationality law from the imperative inherent in the Union legal order of “having due regard to 
Union law”. 
 
In my view, it follows that Union law can set limitations to the competence of the Member 
States regarding nationality.  In that sense, nationality is not an exclusive Member State 
                                                 
293  Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Ontkoppeling van nationaliteit en Unieburgerschap? Opmerkingen over de 
Rottmann zaak" (2010) NJB, 1033. The argument is also made in earlier works by the author (e.g. 
Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam", in O’Keeffe and Twomey 
(eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999), 410-411) and 
in Evans and Jessurun d'Oliveira, "Nationality and Citizenship", in Cassese, Clapham and Weiler (eds.), 
Human Rights and the European Community: Methods of Protection (Part II) (Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), 309 and discussed in O'Leary The Evolving Concept of Community 
Citizenship: from the Free movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (London, Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), 39-40. 
294  The citizenship rights at stake in the cases referred to above are invariably two of the most fundamental 
rights (arguably the most fundamental rights) of Union citizens, namely the right to free movement and 
the right to equal treatment.   
295  See, in this sense Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 
26 (where the AG remarks that “otherwise the competence of the Union to determine the rights and duties 
of its citizens would be affected”).  
296  See supra, n. 32 and n. 45, respectively. 
297  See the discussion in O'Leary The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: from the Free movement 
of Persons to Union Citizenship (London, Kluwer Law International, 1996), 59-62. 
298  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 40. 
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competence.299  Now that it has been determined that Union law is applicable even in matters 
concerning Member State nationality, it must be determined precisely what rules or principles 
of Union law can serve as a limitation to the Member States’ competence in this connection.  
However, it must immediately be remarked that such limitations will only apply in situations 
falling within the scope of Union law.  There has to be, in other words, a link with Union law 
in order for these limitations to be applicable.  Before discussing possible Union limitations, I 
will, therefore, first discuss the link required with Union law. 
 
2. Link with Union law?  
a) Generally speaking: two points of view 
 
If the obligation to have due regard to Union law only applies in situations falling within the 
scope of Union law, the crucial question becomes: when do rules or decisions relating to 
Member State nationality come within the scope of Union law?  This begs the question what 
link with Union law is required in order for nationality to come under scrutiny of Union law.  
As far as the area of free movement of persons and Union citizenship is concerned, two main 
points of view exist, a traditional one, requiring a “cross border” element and a more radical 
one, requiring a more abstract link with the Union legal order.  These views express different 
opinions on the issue of the so-called “purely internal situation” – also referred to as the 
“purely internal rule” or “wholly internal rule”300 –, a long-standing controversial issue that 
has provoked a vigorous debate among European scholars.301  As I will set out below, these 
two views can be fruitfully employed in the field of nationality law. 
 
In the first place, there is the view that only situations having an “inter-State” element or a 
“cross-border” dimension fall within the scope of Union law.  This requires that a link can be 
proven between the situation of the person concerned and two or more specific Member 
States.  Traditionally, the most common technique used by the ECJ to bring situations within 
the scope of Union law was a line of reasoning based on a combination of Articles 18 and 21 
                                                 
299  It can be so labelled only in the sense that the Union is at present most likely not competent to regulate 
nationality (see also the discussion under VI., infra). It is in this sense that AG Poiares Maduro’s 
characterisation of the competence regarding nationality as an exclusive Member State competence must 
be understood (Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, paras 
17 and 23, in fine). For reasons stated higher I consider it preferable to avoid using the label “exclusive 
Member State competence” altogether and I will refrain from doing so in the rest of this chapter. 
300  Poiares Maduro has rightly remarked that the notion of purely internal situation varies depending on the 
area of Union law invoked and the degree of legal integration in that area. Accordingly, certain rules of 
Union law can be applied in situations which for the purpose of the application of other rules of Union 
law would be considered as outside the scope of Union law (Poiares Maduro, "The Scope of European 
Remedies: The Case of Reverse Discrimination and Purely Internal Situations", in Kilpatrick, Novitz and 
Skidmore (eds.), The Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), at 120-
023). See also Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and 
Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 136. Taking this observation 
into account, I will limit my discussion to the area of free movement of persons and Union citizenship, 
which are relevant for my analysis. 
301  See, among the first contributions on the issue, Druesne, “Discriminations à rebours. Peuvent elles tenir 
en echec la liberte de circulation des personnes?” (1979) R.T.D.E., 429-439 and Kon, “Aspects of reverse 
discrimination in Community law” (1981) E.L. Rev., 75-101. For a detailed discussion and numerous 
references, see Tryfonidou Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2009), 271 pp. 
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TFEU which is built around three elements.302  First, Article 18 TFEU confers on every 
Union citizen the right to equal treatment within the scope of the Treaties.  Second, the 
situations which fall within the scope of the Treaties include those involving the exercise of 
the freedom, conferred by Article 21 TFEU, to move and reside within the territory of the 
Member States.  Consequently, Union citizens who reside in another Member State can claim 
the right to equal treatment in matters which the Union has no competence to regulate.  More 
recently, the ECJ has brought situations within the scope of Union law on the sole basis of 
Article 21 TFEU.  Where Union citizens were treated less favourably by their own Member 
State on the ground that they (or a (former) family member)303 had exercised their right to 
free movement, such was held – in the absence of a compelling justification – to be an 
infringement of Article 21 TFEU.  Again, this allows Union citizens who reside in a Member 
State other than the one of which they are a national (even if they have never resided in the 
latter304) to claim rights in areas which are not directly regulated by Union law.  The right of 
residence in another Member State must, moreover, not derive from Article 21 TFEU, but can 
also derive from other rules of Union law305 or even from national legislation in the Member 
State concerned.306   
 
A second, broader point of view, considers as a sufficient link with Union law a more abstract 
link with the Union legal order.  Accordingly, there is no need for a “cross border dimension” 
in the sense of a demonstrable link with two or more specific Member States.  According to 
this point of view, the situation of a Union citizen can be considered to fall within the scope of 
Union law even in the absence of any element of free movement or the nationality of another 
Member State.  Different theories have been put forward to sustain this point, all of them 
centred on the provisions concerning Union citizenship.  First, it has been argued that the right 
to free movement and residence should be considered to cover also residence within one’s 
own Member State, irrespective of any movement between Member States.  This point of 
view has notably been advocated by AG Sharpston.307  Another possibility is to consider the 
exercise of any of the rights associated with Union citizenship, even in one’s own Member 
State, as a sufficient link with Union law.308  For instance, a Union citizen who has taken part 
in a citizen’s initiative, petitioned the European Parliament, applied to the Ombudsman or 
written to any of the institutions or bodies of the Union309 could be said to have brought his 
situation within the scope of Union law, even if no link with a specific other Member State, 
such as a period of residence abroad, is present.  The same is, arguably, true for a citizen who 
                                                 
302  See the discussion in Van Nuffel and Cambien, "Schoolgeld, Studiebeurzen, Sociale bijstand: de 
groeiende betekenis van Europees Recht in niet-economische domeinen", in Lenaerts and Wouters (eds.), 
Internationaal en Europees recht (Themis School voor postacademische juridische vorming) (Bruges, Die 
Keure, 2008), 77-98 and Tryfonidou Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer 
Law International, 2009), 144-153. 
303  See ECJ, Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] E.C.R. I-6421, paras 22-25. 
304  See ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 19. 
305  For example as an (EU) family member of a Union citizen under Directive 2004/38. 
306  See ECJ, Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-7573. 
307  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 100, 101 and 122 in 
particular; Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and 
Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 144 in particular. The AG 
hereby invited the ECJ to reconsider its stance on purely internal situations, but at the same time 
suggested that the Court reopen the oral procedure and invite Member States to make their views on the 
issue known (see para. 157). The Court, however did not take up the AG’s suggestion in its judgment. See 
the discussion by Van der Steen, “Zuiver interne situaties: geen omwenteling, wel inperking” (2008) 
N.T.E.R., 301, at 303-304.   
308  See the analysis in O'Leary The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: from the Free movement of 
Persons to Union Citizenship (London, Kluwer Law International, 1996), 278 et seq. 
309  In accordance with Article 24 TFEU. 
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has participated in European Parliamentary elections.310  Put differently, this second theory 
does not privilege the exercise of the right to free movement as a desired link with Union law, 
like the first view does.  Rather, the exercise of any of the rights attached to Union citizenship 
is considered sufficient to bring a situation under Union law.311  Lastly, it has been argued 
that Union citizens could derive a sufficient link with the Union legal order from Article 20 
TFEU, which confers on nationals of the Member States a fundamental status with Union-
wide rights attached to it.  This argument has been mostly presented in connection with the 
principle of equal treatment.312  More specifically, the view has been defended that Union 
citizens in “purely internal” situations should be able to invoke the principle of equal 
treatment, since “reverse discrimination”313 is no longer defensible in a Citizens’ Europe.314  
In other words, it is argued that Union law does not tolerate the unequal treatment of Union 
citizens depending on whether they can demonstrate a cross-border element. 
 
Adopting the second point of view just set out in its purest form would come down, more or 
less, to de facto abolishing the “wholly internal rule” for Union citizens and their family 
                                                 
310  However, Article 22(2) TFEU grants this right only to “every citizen of the Union residing in a Member 
State of which he is not a national”. Naturally, therefore, it applies only to citizens who have already 
exercised their right to free movement (see Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-145/04 and C-
300/04 Spain v United Kingdom; Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-7917, para. 143). Those citizens are 
in any event covered, even under the first point of view. Yet, it could be argued that Union citizens who 
participate in European Parliamentary elections without moving to another Member State have also 
exercised a right connected with Union citizenship (in this sense Spaventa, "Seeing the Wood Despite the 
Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects" (2008) 45 CML Rev., 18). In the 
Eman and Sevinger case, which concerned the denial to certain groups of Dutch nationals from the right 
to vote in European Parliamentary elections, the Court applied the principle of equal treatment without 
explicating why Union law was applicable in the case (ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] 
E.C.R. I-8055). Arguably, that link consisted in the fact that the case concerned the organization of 
European Parliamentary elections (see Claes, "Zaak C-300/04, M.G. Eman en O.B. Sevinger t. College 
van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag en Zaak C-145/04 Koninkrijk Spanje t. Verenigd 
Koninkrijk van Groot-Brittanië en Noord-Ierland" (2007) SEW, 216). Clearly, that link did not consist in 
the fact that the applicants in the case had exercised their right to vote, since they had been precluded from 
doing so. 
311  This possible approach is described by Jessurun d’Oliveira: Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the 
European Union after Amsterdam", in O’Keeffe and Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam 
Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999), 407-408. The author uses this arrgument to show the 
inconsistency in the current approach of the ECJ - which leans towards the first point of view set out 
above, requiring a “cross-border-element” - and to argue for the inapplicability of Union law to the 
nationality legislation of the Member States. 
312  See, for instance, Spaventa, "Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and 
its Constitutional Effects" (2008) 45 CML Rev.,13, at 30 et seq. in particluar; Spaventa, "From Gebhard to 
Carpenter: Towards a (non-)economic European Constitution" (2004) 41 CML Rev., 743, at 771. See also 
Nic Shuibhne, "Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" (2002) 39 
CML Rev., 731, at 762 et seq. in particular.  
313  Reverse discrimination is an issue because Member States are, in situations falling outside the scope of 
Union law, not obliged to extend the rights and privileges deriving from Union law to their own nationals. 
Consequently, these nationals are treated less favourably than other Union citizens. They cannot rely on 
the Union law principle of equal treatment because that principle is simply not applicable. Reverse 
discrimination is no longer an issue, however, if the status of Union citizen in itself suffices to consider a 
person as falling within the scope of Union law, because Member State nationals would no longer ever be 
in a situation outside the scope of Union law, in which they could be treated less favourably. For a very 
detailed analysis of reverse discrimination, see Tryfonidou Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2009), 271 pp. 
314  Tryfonidou, "Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens' Europe" 
(2008) 35 LIEI, 43-67. 
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members315 since they would almost automatically fall within the scope of Union law.  Such 
would have considerable advantages (such as curing “reverse discrimination) and 
considerable drawbacks (such as possibly upsetting the division of competence between the 
Union and its Member States).316  While the ECJ traditionally consistently held that Union 
law is not applicable to purely internal situations and that the provisions on Union citizenship 
as such do not provide a sufficient link with Union law,317 it appears in a number of recent 
cases to have considered that the provisions on Union citizenship could provide a sufficient 
link with Union law.  It has done so, notably, in a nationality related dispute (Rottmann) and 
in a dispute relating to family reunification (Ruiz Zambrano).  In Chapter 4, I will discuss the 
judgment in Ruiz Zambrano318 - and the follow-up judgment in McCarthy319 - in some detail 
and consider the likely and desirable evolution of the wholly internal rule, in particular in the 
field of family reunification.  In this chapter I will limit myself to the field of nationality law.  
Specifically with regard to nationality matters, I will argue that there is much to be said for 
taking the second point of view.  
 
b) Nationality law as a “cas spécial” 
 
i) Wide interpretation of the link with Union law 
 
The two points of view regarding the link required for a situation to fall within the scope of 
Union law can usefully be applied to disputes concerning the nationality rules of one or more 
Member States.  Under the first view set out above, a link with at least two specified Member 
States – even a most tenuous one – must be demonstrated for a situation to come within the 
scope of Union law.  Applied to the field of nationality law, this means basically that 
nationality rules or decisions concerning nationality applied to Union citizens who exercise or 
have exercised their right to free movement by residing in another Member State than their 
Member State of nationality come under the scrutiny of Union law. 
 
This line of reasoning was explicitly adopted in Rottmann by AG Poiares Maduro (but not 
followed by the Court in its judgment in the case).  The AG considered that Mr. Rottmann had 
exercised his right to free movement by moving from Austria to Germany and that this 
exercise, indirectly, gave rise to his eventual status which was contested before the national 
court.320  Yet, at the same time, the AG acknowledged that the link between the withdrawal of 
                                                 
315  See Tryfonidou Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2009), at 166-171. 
316  Dautricourt and Thomas, for instance, argue that the suppression of reverse discrimination (as well as the 
very concept of purely internal situations) generally speaking by relying on the provisions on citizenship 
of the Union would be “a premature step at the present state of development of [Union] law” (Dautricourt 
and Thomas, "Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons under Community Law: All For 
Ulysses, Nothing For Penelope?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 454). 
317  See para. 23 of ECJ, Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] E.C.R. I-3171: “In 
that regard, it must be noted that citizenship of the Union […] is not intended to extend the scope ratione 
materiae of the [Treaties] also to internal situations which have no link with [Union] law […] Any 
discrimination which nationals of a Member State may suffer under the law of that State fall within the 
scope of that law and must therefore be dealt with within the framework of the internal legal system of 
that State.” This paragraph has consistently been referred to by the Court in later case law and is 
invariably discussed in the literature on reverse discrimination. 
318  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr.  
319  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr. 
320  Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, paras 11-13. 
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naturalisation at issue and the Union fundamental freedom was less direct than in most other 
cases.321  The disadvantage suffered by Mr. Rottmann, namely the loss of his nationality, was 
caused by the fact that he committed fraud rather than by the fact that he had exercised his 
right to free movement.  All the same, in my view, the AG was probably right to see an 
element of “movement” in the situation of Mr. Rottmann that could provide a sufficient link 
with Union law.  After all, it was undisputed that Mr. Rottmann had exercised his right to free 
movement as an Union citizen by moving from Austria to Germany and that this movement 
had made it possible for him to start the naturalisation procedure which eventually gave rise to 
the disputed decision.  The fact that the loss of German nationality was only a remote 
consequence of the exercise of the right to free movement cannot change this finding.  As the 
AG somewhat hesitantly acknowledged himself, such a direct causal relationship between 
free movement and the disputed rule is not always required by the Court in order for that rule 
to be considered to fall within the scope of Union law.  Neither did it matter that the 
withdrawal decision was taken by the German authorities vis-à-vis a (at that moment) German 
national,322 because it is well established that Union law can be invoked by nationals who 
have exercised their free movement rights even against their own Member State.323   
 
AG Poiares Maduro’s hesitance with regard to finding a sufficient link with Union law can in 
fact be traced back to an evolution in the case law of the ECJ, which is analysed by 
Tryfonidou.324  Traditionally, a national measure was considered to fall within the scope of 
Union law because it hindered the exercise of free movement rights, for instance because it 
discriminated nationals from other Member States and thereby made it less attractive for them 
to leave their Member State.  In more recent case law, the Court of Justice appears willing to 
treat the scope of Union law and possible violations of the rights of Union citizens separately.  
It will examine, first, whether the applicant falls within the scope of Union law by reason of a 
cross-border element, and consider, next, whether the contested national rules infringe Union 
law, most commonly because they are discriminatory or because they are an obstacle to the 
exercise of free movement rights.325  Consequently, considering the new approach of the 
                                                 
321  Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 13. 
322  Oosterom-Staples (Oosterom-Staples, "Het internationale recht als beschermengel van de exclusieve 
bevoegdheden van lidstaten inzake verlies van nationaliteit?" (2010) N.T.E.R., 188, at 192) draws an 
interesting parallel with ECJ, Case C-419/92 Scholz [1994] E.C.R. I-505, in which the ECJ considered 
that the situation of a former German national who had moved to Italy and had acquired the Italian 
nationality fell within the scope of Union law and that she could, therefore, challenge the decision of 
Italian authorities taken vis-à-vis her. The Court considered that “Any [Union] national who, irrespective 
of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers 
and who has been employed in another Member State, falls within the scope of the [relevant Treaty] 
provisions”. 
323  See, in this connection, for instance, ECJ, Case C-224/98 D'Hoop [2002] E.C.R. I-6191, paras 34-35; 
ECJ, Case C-224/02 Pusa [2004] E.C.R. I-5763, para. 20; ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French 
Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 41. Of course, 
these cases concerned claims by nationals against their Member State who had exercised their right to free 
movement as nationals of that State. Mr. Rottmann, by contrast, had exercised his free movement rights 
when he was still an Austrian national. I do not think this would question the applicability of the case law 
just mentioned, since all that is required is that the exercise of the right to free movement provides a link 
with two or more identifiable Member States.   
324  Tryfonidou, "Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens' Europe" 
(2008) 35 LIEI, at 50-53 in particular. 
325  Tryfonidou (at p. 50-51) sees cases as Carpenter and Jia (to which I would add the Metock and Others 
case) as illustrations of the fact that “there is no longer a need for a link to be established between a 
deterrent effect on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms and the national measure that is contested”. 
However, the Court itself still qualified the national measures contested as obstacles to the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms. Admittedly, the Court may be said to have taken a lenient approach in these cases 
when accepting the existence of an obstacle to the fundamental freedoms. However, as far as the Court’s 
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Court, the movement centred reasoning of AG Poiares Maduro holds good, despite the lack of 
any direct link between the movement and the withdrawal decision.  From a systemic point of 
view, it would have been better, however, if the AG had not discussed possible obstacles to 
free movement at all when discussing the admissibility of the case, but only dealt with that 
issue when discussing possible violations of Union law. 
 
It is my conviction that, in matters concerning nationality law, it is certainly preferable to 
follow the Court’s recent approach to cross-border situations and make a categorical 
distinction between the scope of Union law and the possible violations of Union law.  The fact 
that an applicant has moved to another Member State should be sufficient to consider his 
situation as falling within the scope of Union law, even if the national measure that is disputed 
does not directly impact on the exercise of his or her free movement rights.  Of course, the 
right to free movement can, in addition, serve, as a limitation to the Member States’ 
competence regarding nationality in the sense that nationality rules that unjustifiably hinder 
the exercise of free movement rights should be invalidated under Union law.326  Still, free 
movement is not the only principle of Union law that functions as a limitation to the Member 
States’ competence in the field.  Whether there is an obstacle to the exercise of free movement 
rights should only be examined, therefore, when free movement is analysed as a possible 
ground for invalidating national rules or measures, not in order to determine whether they fall 
within the scope of Union law.  However, if the rationale for holding a national measure to 
fall within the scope of Union law is no longer necessarily that it forms an obstacle to 
movement, it is far more straightforward still to embrace the second point of view set out 
above, as I will explain in the following. 
 
The second point of view set out above holds that a “cross-border” dimension or an element 
of “movement” is not required.  A more abstract link with the Union legal order, through the 
status of Union citizenship, suffices to consider a person as falling within the scope of Union 
law.  Specifically in the field of nationality law, I would present this view as follows.  Since 
any conferral of nationality by a Member State entails the acquisition of Union citizenship 
and the rights associated with it327 – which can be exercised throughout the Union –, it will 
automatically present an (abstract) link with the Union legal order.  Accordingly, national 
rules on acquisition of nationality should be held to fall within the scope of Union law.  The 
same is true for national rules concerning loss of Member State nationality because loss of 
nationality entails loss of Union citizenship and the rights attached to it.328     
 
The Court in Rottmann seems to have implicitly endorsed this approach in relation to rules on 
loss of nationality, where it stated that, in the circumstances of the case the situation of the 
applicant fell “by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European 
                                                                                                                                                        
reasoning on the scope of Union law is concerned, these cases are no different from most other citizenship 
cases in that the exercise of a fundamental freedom was considered sufficient to bring a situation within 
the scope of Union law. On this very issue, I would not consider these cases as signalling a revolution, but 
rather as one among many illustrations of the Courts more flexible approach, separating scope of Union 
law and possible violations of Union law. I refer to the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, supra. 
326  See the discussion under V.C.A., infra. 
327  Leaving aside, for the purposes of this discussion, those instances where a person acquiring the 
nationality of a Member State already possessed the nationality of another Member State. 
328  Leaving aside, for the purposes of this discussion, those instances where the person losing the nationality 
of a Member State preserves or at the same time acquires the nationality of another Member State. 
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Union law”. 329   By this the Court most likely wanted to indicate two elements which, 
considered together, provided a sufficient link with Union law.  First, a decision to withdraw 
Member State nationality is linked to Union law because it, by its very nature, entails loss of 
Union citizenship.  Second, the consequences of such a decision for the person concerned are 
the loss of the rights attached to Union citizenship.  He or she will no longer be entitled to 
exercise these rights throughout the Union.  These consequences present a clear link with 
Union law.  The Court’s judgment on this point is groundbreaking, because it does not look 
for a “cross-border” dimension, even though such would not have been problematic, as is 
clear from AG Poiares Mauro’s opinion.  Rather, the Court saw Member State nationality and 
the possible loss thereof, given the inextricable links with Union citizenship, as a sufficient 
link in itself to consider a withdrawal of nationality to fall within the scope of Union law.   
 
In my view, this is the approach to be followed in cases concerning nationality.  Admittedly, 
Rottmann has a rather atypical fact set.  On this ground it could be argued that the reasoning 
followed in Rottmann reasoning could not apply more broadly and be extrapolated to other 
cases in which a nationality decision threatened to deprive a Union citizen of his Union 
citizenship and the rights attached to it.  The fact should not be overlooked that in Rottmann 
the Court was confronted with a situation in which, due to the lack of coordination between 
the nationality laws of two Member States, a person risked becoming stateless and losing his 
Union citizenship for having committed an offence which was in many ways not 
extraordinary.  It could be suggested that the Court was principally concerned with avoiding 
these negative consequences from happening all too readily,330 and that the Court’s reasoning 
should not, therefore, be extrapolated to cases with a different set of circumstances.331  It 
could, indeed, be questioned whether the fact that the nationality legislation of two specific 
Member States was at stake and the fact that there was an element of movement induced the 
Court to find that Union law was applicable.332  If this was the case, decisions regarding 
nationality taken by a Member State vis-à-vis a national who has never moved to another 
Member State and never had the nationality of another Member State would still fall outside 
the scope of Union law.  This would also apply where a Member States withdrew the 
naturalisation of a (former) third country national who had never exercised his right to free 
movement as a Union citizen.333   
                                                 
329  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 42 (italics added). AG Poiares Maduro in 
Rottmann explicitly rejected such approach as being too far-reaching (see Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro 
in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 10). 
330  Although the Court has been fiercely criticised for not going far enough in this regard: Kochenov, "Two 
Sovereign States vs. A Human Being: ECJ as a Guardian of Arbitrariness in Citizenship Matters" (2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593220; Kochenov, "Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat 
Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010, not yet reported" (2010) 47 CML 
Rev., 1842-1845. 
331  As has been observed by Davies (Davies, "The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of Union Citizenship 
and Rights" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Forum, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-
forum/254-has-the-european-court-of-justice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-
law?start=2). Davies takes the view, however, that neither the judgment nor common sense provide much 
support for this narrow view (Ibid.). I share his view, as will become clear from the discussion below. 
332  This seems to be confirmed by a literal reading of paragraph 42 of the Rottmann case, more in particular 
the phrase “after he has lost the nationality of another Member State that he originally possessed”. See the 
discussion in De Groot, "Invloed van het Unierecht op het nationaliteitsrecht van de Lidstaten: 
Overwegingen over de Janko Rottmann-beslissing van het Europees Hof van Justitie" (2010) Asiel & 
Migratierecht, 295-296. As I will explain below, I argue against such a literal and narrow reading. 
333  De Groot states that, precisely with regard to such circumstances, the consequences of the Rottmann 
decision are far from clear. At the same time, he submits that it would be unfortunate to make a distinction 
based on whether an element of movement is present (De Groot, "Invloed van het Unierecht op het 
nationaliteitsrecht van de Lidstaten: Overwegingen over de Janko Rottmann-beslissing van het Europees 
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I am convinced that the reasoning adopted by the Court in Rottmann should not be limited to 
the facts of that case and can be applied more generally.  Consequently, all cases of loss of 
Member State nationality can henceforth be considered to fall within the scope of Union law 
to the extent that they entail, for the person concerned, the loss of Union citizenship. 334  
Member State nationality in itself, given its inextricable link with Union citizenship, can be 
considered to provide a sufficient link with Union law, even in cases which were traditionally 
considered to be “purely internal”.  It is clear, for instance, that a Union citizen who loses the 
nationality of a Member State without at the same time preserving or acquiring the nationality 
of another Member State, loses the very same fundamental status and the very same rights 
under Union law regardless of whether she has exercised her right to free movement.  It is not 
defensible, therefore, to make a distinction in this regard between Union citizens who have 
moved or those who have not or, as Gerard-René De Groot has put it, between “average” 
Member State nationals and Member State nationals “carrying little Union stars around their 
head”.335  
ii) Acquisition and loss of Member State nationality 
 
Another important question left unanswered by the Rottmann case is whether, even if we 
accept that the Court’s reasoning can be applied more generally, it should be confined to cases 
of loss of nationality, with which the Court was concerned in Rottmann, or should be held 
equally applicable in cases of acquisition of nationality (or the refusal thereof).336  I see no 
reason for making a distinction between cases of acquisition and rules on loss of nationality.  
Such a distinction is not defensible, because the acquisition of Member State nationality has 
the same strong link with the Union legal order as the loss of a Member State nationality, at 
least where it entails Union citizenship.337  By its very nature the acquisition of Member State 
nationality confers upon an individual the most fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States and this automatically has Union wide consequences, in the sense that the person 
concerned will be entitled to exercise certain rights in all Member States.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hof van Justitie" (2010) Asiel & Migratierecht, 296). See also the observations by Oosterom-Staples 
concerning the possible consequences of a withdrawal of naturalisation vis-à-vis third country nationals 
(Oosterom-Staples, "Het internationale recht als beschermengel van de exclusieve bevoegdheden van 
lidstaten inzake verlies van nationaliteit?" (2010) N.T.E.R., at 193). 
334  Confirmation of this view is provided by the recent Ruiz Zambrano case, in which the Court held that the 
situation of a Union citizen fell within the scope of Union law, even though a cross-border dimension was 
lacking. In support of this finding, the Court explicitly referred to paragraph 42 of the Rottmann judgment 
(see ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 42). The Ruiz Zambrano judgment 
illustrates that the reasoning in Rottmann can find application more broadly even in disputes concerning 
other rules than nationality rules (Ruiz Zambrano concerned rules regarding family reunification).  
335  Gerard-René De Groot, Invloed van het Unierecht op het nationaliteitsrecht van de Lidstaten: 
Overwegingen over de Janko Rottmann-beslissing van het Europees Hof van Justitie, ASIEL & 
MIGRATIERECHT, 296 (2010). 
336  See the discussion in Davies, "The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of Union Citizenship and Rights" 
(2010) EUDO Citizenship Forum, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/254-has-the-
european-court-of-justice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-law?start=2 and my case 
note in (2010) SEW, 380. 
337  Higher, I argued that the loss of Member State nationality will not automatically fall within the scope of 
Union law where it does not entail the loss of Union citizenship, because the individual concerned at the 
same time acquires or maintains the citizenship of another Member State. Mutatis mutandis, the 
acquisition of nationality will not automatically fall within the scope of Union law where it does not entail 
the acquisition of Union citizenship, namely where the person concerned already had the nationality of a 
Member State. 
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It must be immediately pointed out that the competence of the Member States to lay down 
criteria for the acquisition of nationality necessarily implies the competence to deny 
nationality to persons who do not fulfil these criteria.  In other words the competence 
regarding acquisition of nationality embodies both the competence to confer nationality and to 
refuse to confer nationality.  The question that arises is whether a refusal of nationality can be 
said to fall within the scope of Union law, through its links with Union citizenship, in a way 
similar to what was concluded above with regard to conferral (and withdrawal) of Member 
State nationality.  The problem here is that an individual who is refused the nationality of a 
Member State – and who does not have nor ever had the nationality of a Member State338 – 
has never acquired Union citizenship.  He or she has never, through his or her very status, 
entered the “realm of Union law”.  It is certainly more difficult to argue, therefore, that his or 
her situation exemplifies the same strong links with Union law as that of an individual who 
has acquired or lost the status of Union citizen.  Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that 
refusal of Member State nationality has similar consequences under Union law as loss of 
nationality and should therefore be treated similarly from the viewpoint of Union law.  
Indeed, where an individual (or groups of individuals) is denied the nationality of a Member 
State, this has for a consequence that he (or they) will not be able to enjoy the rights 
associated with Union citizenship.  These are the very same rights that a Member State 
national would lose if his or her (only) Member State nationality were to be withdrawn.  It 
might be objected that the loss of rights which one previously had will normally have stronger 
consequences for an individual than the denial of rights which he or she never had.  This 
somehow limits the parallelism, but it does not make it meaningless, in particular since the 
consequences for the Member States are the same, namely the absence of the possibility for 
the individual concerned to exercise his rights in these States. 
 
There is some support for this view in the case law of the ECJ.  Already in Micheletti, the 
Court held that it is for each Member State, having due regard to [Union] law, to lay down the 
conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality.339  In Rottmann, the ECJ clarified that 
this case law means that the exercise of that power, in so far as it affects the rights of Union 
citizens, is amenable to judicial review, adding that this “is in particular the case of a decision 
withdrawing naturalisation such as that at issue in the main proceedings”.340  Moreover, in 
Rottmann the ECJ explained that “the principles stemming from this judgment with regard to 
the powers of the Member States in the sphere of nationality, and also their duty to exercise 
those powers having due regard to European Union law, apply both to the Member State of 
naturalisation and to the Member State of the original nationality.341  Accordingly, should 
Austria eventually refuse Mr. Rottmann the reacquisition of his (initial) Austrian nationality, 
the Court would seem prepared to scrutinise this decision on its compliance with Union law.  
All this seems to support the view that not only the loss of Member State nationality falls 
within the scope of Union law.342   
 
                                                 
338  As is the case with conferral or loss of Member State nationality, refusal of Member State nationality will, 
in any event, not automatically fall within the scope of Union law where it does not affect the status of 
Union citizenship of the person concerned, for example because that person already had the nationality of 
a Member State. 
339  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 10 (italics added). 
340  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 48 (italics added). The expression “in 
particular” seems to imply that other types of decisions regarding nationality are also amenable to judicial 
review. 
341  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 62 (italics added).  
342  See Kochenov, "Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 2 March 2010, not yet reported" (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1836. 
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On the other hand, Kaur 343  seems to support the opposite view, namely that only the 
deprivation of Union citizenship falls within the scope of Union law, not the denial thereof.  
The applicant in that case was a British Overseas citizen and therefore, in accordance with the 
declaration of the United Kingdom, not a national “for the purposes of Union law”.  She 
argued that the UK rules on nationality infringed Union law because they denied certain 
categories of British citizens the benefits associated with Union citizenship.  The Court 
considered that there was no question of any deprivation of rights under Union law since 
those rights had never arisen in the first place.344  The Court explicitly distinguished Rottmann 
from Kaur, pointing at the fact that Mr. Rottmann had unquestionably been a Union citizen.345  
Does this mean that the ECJ considers that denial of (full-blown) Member State nationality 
falls outside the scope of Union law?  I am strongly convinced that this question must be 
answered in the negative.  As just explained, other ECJ cases, including the Rottmann case, 
lend support for the view that cases of acquisition of nationality can fall within the scope of 
Union law and this is justified because cases of loss and acquisition of nationality have the 
same strong links with Union law.  The Kaur decision, which dealt with the specific issue of 
citizens of former colonies and the validity of the declaration of a Member State made when 
signing the Treaty, should probably best be confined to its specific facts.  In any event, in my 
view, the Court would be mistaken if it treated cases of (refusal of) acquisition differently 
from cases concerning loss of nationality, for reasons explained higher. 
 
It can be concluded that it probably follows from the Rottmann judgment that the Member 
States’ competence regarding both acquisition and loss of nationality falls within the scope of 
Union law to the extent that it has an impact on the status of Union citizenship.  Agreeing 
with Davies, I find a distinction between rules on acquisition of nationality and rules on loss 
of nationality highly illogical and inequitable.346  Moreover, once it is agreed that the Member 
States rules on acquisition of nationality come under the scrutiny of Union law, it would be 
illogical to distinguish between conferral and refusal of nationality, since the very same rules 
will embody the criteria that determine both of them.  Accordingly, I conclude that it should 
be possible to challenge cases of conferral, loss and, with some hesitance, 347  refusal of 
Member State nationality before the Union courts if they have an impact on the Union 
citizenship status of the persons concerned and this should be the case, irrespective of whether 
the situation of the person concerned presents a link with two or more specific Member 
States.348 
 
                                                 
343  ECJ, Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] E.C.R. I-1237. For more particulars, see the case note by Toner in 
(2002) CML Rev., 881-893. 
344  ECJ, Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] E.C.R. I-1237, para. 25. 
345  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 49. 
346  Davies, "The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of Union Citizenship and Rights" (2010) EUDO 
Citizenship Forum, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/254-has-the-european-court-
of-justice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-law?start=2. 
347  Given that is will be more difficult in these cases to establish a sufficient link with Union law, as I have 
explained higher. The Union Courts will therefore probably be more hesitant when confronted with cases 
of refusal of Member State nationality. 
348  A link with two specific Member States will presumably be least easy to demonstrate in cases where the 
(refusal or) acquisition of Member State nationality is disputed, since third country nationals will 
presumably find it more difficult to establish a link with two or more identifiable Member States than 
Member State nationals. Nevertheless, the situation of third country nationals may present a clear “cross-
border” or “free movement” element. See for instance, the Court’s judgment in Metock and Others (ECJ, 
Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241) and Cambien, "Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten 
Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 321-
341. 
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iii) Consequences 
 
Does all this mean that I propose to abolish the wholly internal rule?  Do I propose to do so as 
far as Union citizens and their family members are concerned?  The answer is no.  I do not 
suggest that the Court’s settled case law requiring a cross-border dimension should be 
reversed.  The consequences of such major reversal, in particular as regards the division of 
competences between the Union and its Member States would be most significant and the 
justifications for such a revolution in the case law cannot be appropriately analysed in the 
framework of this chapter.349  Consequently, I will refrain from drawing any conclusions as to 
the desirability of such change.  What I do propose, however, is – on a more limited scale – 
that in disputes concerning the nationality rules of one or more Member States, the 
acquisition, refusal, denial or loss of nationality should be considered as a sufficient link with 
Union law for such situations to be held to fall within the scope of Union law.  In my view, 
such does not come down to abolishing the wholly internal rule in such cases.  Rather I 
consider that Union citizenship and its growing significance in the case law of the ECJ and in 
the Union legal order in general prompt us to hold that such cases are no longer outside the 
reach of Union law.  Hence, such cases should no longer be considered as wholly internal to a 
Member State.  This should only be different if a second Member State nationality is at stake 
and, as a consequence thereof, the status of Union citizenship of the person is not affected.  
For instance, loss of Member State nationality does not lead to loss of Union citizenship 
where the person concerned possesses or at the same time acquires the nationality of another 
Member State.  Such cases of loss of nationality will not normally fall within the scope of 
Union law.  Similarly, the acquisition or denial of Member State nationality will, in the case 
of persons already possessing the nationality of another Member State, not fall within the 
scope of Union law.   
 
This limited revolution in the case law of the ECJ would leave the Court’s stance on the 
wholly internal rule in other fields intact.  For instance, a Member State national who could 
not demonstrate any inter-state link would still not be able to invoke the (possibly more 
generous) rules on family reunification laid down in Directive 2004/38.350  Accordingly, in 
these cases “movement” keeps its relevance.  Besides, even in cases of nationality disputes, 
free movement would remain relevant as a possible limitation to the competence of the 
Member States.351  The justification for treating nationality rules different from other national 
rules as far as the scope of Union law is concerned, rests, as will be clear from the foregoing, 
on two grounds.  First of all, nationality rules are by their very nature different from all other 
national rules in that they regulate, through Article 20(1) TFEU, the possession of a status 
which, in turn, gives entitlement to rights.  Accordingly they govern the “gateway” to a 
bundle of rights, rather than the exercise of a specific right, as other national rules will 
typically do.  The status in question is, moreover, the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States, namely Union citizenship.  Union citizenship is one of the key concepts of 
                                                 
349  See, however, the discussion in Chapter 4, infra, in which I analyse this issue in more detail with regard to 
the rights enjoyed by family members of Union citizens.  
350  See, in this sense, ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 76-78. See also, 
however, ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr. In the circumstances of that case, the 
Court considered that a young Union citizen could claim the right to be joined by a non-EU family 
member, despite the fact that no inter-State link was present. As I explain in Chapter 4, I believe the 
Court’s reasoning is probably limited to certain specific sets of cases. In other cases, the right to be joined 
by family members most probably still depends on the existence of an inter-State element. This is 
confirmed by the more recent McCarthy judgment (ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr.). 
See the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, infra, under III. 
351  See V.C.A., infra. 
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Union law, on which the application of numerous rules of Union law is dependent.352  On 
account of both aspects just described, nationality rules have a far more fundamental link with 
the Union legal order than other national rules.  For this reason I would argue that nationality 
rules – in contradistinction to other national rules – could never be considered not to fall 
outside the scope of Union law, to the extent that they impact on the possession of Union 
citizenship.  Rottmann may be seen as an indication that the Court is willing to go down this 
path and treat nationality rules differently from other national rules as far as the determination 
of the scope of Union law is concerned.   
 
It appears, however, from the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano353 that the Court is willing to 
consider Union citizenship as a sufficient link with Union law also in other contexts.  In that 
case, the Court was confronted with the refusal by the Belgian authorities of a right of 
residence to the non-EU parent of Belgian nationals who had never moved to another Member 
State.  The Court considered that this refusal was contrary to Union law because it would 
deprive the Union citizens in question of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their 
citizenship rights.  The Court cited its judgment in Rottmann in support of this holding.  As I 
explain in Chapter 4, a fruitful parallel can be drawn between the Ruiz Zambrano case and the 
Rottmann case, because the disputed national decision in both cases threatened to make it 
impossible for the Union citizens concerned to exercise some of the most important Union 
citizenship rights.  The bottom-line is probably that in certain circumstances a national 
measure refusing a right of residence to a family member of a Union citizen may be 
sufficiently similar in effect to a decision refusing or withdrawing a Member State nationality 
that the justifications for treating nationality rules as a “cas spécial” equally apply and, 
consequently, Union law will be applicable regardless of any inter-State element.  I am of the 
view, however, that this parallel will be limited to national rules or measures which have the 
effect of de iure or de facto annihilating an individual’s Union citizenship.354  
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that interpreting Member State nationality as a sufficient 
linking factor does not take away the Member States’ competence to regulate the acquisition 
and loss of nationality.355  It only has for a consequence that Member States have to take 
Union law into account when exercising this competence, even when regulating situations 
which present no cross-border dimension.  Such is perfectly compatible with the principled 
competence of the Member States in matters of nationality, as I have discussed above.     
 
C. Possible Union law limitations 
 
Under the previous heading I have explained that, where Union citizenship is at stake, the 
Member States’ competence regarding acquisition and loss of nationality should be 
considered to fall within the scope of Union law.  In this section, I will deal with possible 
Union law limitations to the Member States’ competence as regards the adoption and 
implementation356 of rules concerning nationality.357  I do not in any way attempt to give an 
                                                 
352  This is not just the case for the specific provisions on Union citizenship. The four freedoms, for instance, 
can only be relied on by (economically active) Union citizens. 
353  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr. See, similarly, ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy 
[2011] E.C.R. nyr. 
354  In refer to the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, infra. 
355  See the discussion under V.B.1., supra. 
356  I am not just concerned with general rules on nationality but also with individual decisions to (refuse to) 
grant nationality adopted on the basis of these rules. It is important to consider both, because Union law 
may well tolerate certain general rules on nationality, but not the way they are implemented in a particular 
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exhaustive overview of all possible such limitations.  I will limit my discussion to five 
possible limitations: the guarantee of free movement rights, the duty to respect fundamental 
rights, the principle of proportionality, the principle of sincere cooperation and the principle 
of legitimate expectations.  I will analyse in what situations these rules or principles can serve 
as a limitation to the competence of the Member States and to what extent they will likely do 
so.  As will become clear from the discussion below, some of these limitations are particularly 
relevant with regard to the Member States’ competence regarding acquisition of nationality 
(including refusal of nationality358), whereas others will be more relevant to rules on loss of 
nationality and, still others, to both of them.  It can be expected that the consequences of these 
limitations will be different depending on whether we are concerned with an acquisition of 
nationality, a refusal of nationality or loss of nationality.  These consequences will be 
discussed under the next heading (see infra, under “D”).   
 
Before I start my analysis, it is important to stress one point.  To understand how Union law 
influences Member States in the field of nationality measures, it is important to clearly make 
one distinction from the outset, namely that between recognition of Member State nationality, 
on the one hand, and conferral of Member State nationality, on the other hand.  With regard to 
the first concept, Union law mandates that Member States unconditionally recognise the 
nationality granted by another Member State.  This duty can result in an indirect de facto 
influence, discussed under title III.  With regard to the second one, I argue that Union law 
imposes certain direct limitations to the competence of the Member States.  It is with these 
direct limitations that I am concerned here.  Throughout the analysis it is important to bear in 
mind the stated distinction between conferral of Member State nationality and recognition of 
Member State nationality: Union law arguably imposes limitations with regard to the first one, 
but prohibits Member States from enacting or applying limitations with regard to the second 
one.  As far as loss of Member State nationality the same distinction applies, since the duty of 
unconditional recognition flowing from Micheletti arguably also applies to cases of loss of 
nationality.359  Accordingly, with regard to loss of nationality too it is important to stress that 
I am concerned with direct limitations deriving from Union law with regard to the Member 
States rules on loss of nationality, and not so much with the recognition of measures 
concerning loss of nationality by other Member States. 
 
1. Guarantee of free movement rights 
 
The first limitation that will be discussed is the right to free movement of persons within the 
territory of the Member States, as laid down in Article 21 TFEU and the Treaty provisions on 
the free movement of economic actors.360  Admittedly, the rules on nationality remain within 
                                                                                                                                                        
case.  This is perfectly illustrated (with regard to loss of nationality) by the Rottmann judgment: while the 
German rules on loss of nationality seemed to be perfectly in accordance with Union law, the individual 
withdrawal decision at hand could still possibly violate Union law, namely the principle of 
proportionality. I will hinge my analysis of the consequences of Union limitations to the competence of 
Member States on this distinction. 
357  As explained above, this analysis starts from the dictum in Micheletti: “Under international law, it is for 
each Member State, having due regard to [Union] law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and 
loss of nationality (ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 10 (italics added). 
358  As explained higher, the competence to lay down and implement rules on acquisition of nationality, by its 
very nature, entails the competence to refuse the acquisition of nationality. 
359  See the discussion under IV.B., supra. 
360  It is settled case law that the right set out in Article 21 TFEU finds specific expression in the provisions on 
the free movement of economic actors. See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-193/94 Skanavi [1996] E.C.R. I-929, para. 
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the competence of the Member States, but, as I discussed higher, according to settled case law 
the Member States have to exercise their competences in accordance with the provisions on 
free movement of Union citizens.361  It is settled case law that national legislation could 
violate these provisions not only by placing direct restrictions on the exercise of the right to 
free movement,362 but also by attaching negative consequences to the exercise of this right.363  
The ECJ has held, for instance, that this was the case where the legislation of a Member State 
made the entitlement to certain benefits conditional on residence in the territory of that 
State,364 because that legislation was liable to dissuade nationals of the Member State in 
question from exercising their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State.  The 
bottom-line is that, under such legislation, nationals of a Member State are “punished” for 
exercising their free movement rights, because by doing so they would forego certain rights or 
benefits under national law.  These laws therefore restrict the exercise of the right to free 
movement.  Of course, such restrictions can, according to settled case law, still be justified if 
they are based on objective considerations of public interest independent of the nationality of 
the persons concerned and proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national 
provisions.365  
 
This duty to safeguard the free movement of persons should most definitely also apply in the 
field of nationality rules.366  On similar grounds to the cases just referred to, one could well 
argue that Article 21 TFEU would be violated if a Member State’s nationality law were to 
provide that nationals of that Member State would lose their nationality after having lived in 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 (on the freedom of establishment); ECJ, Case C-100/01 Oteiza Olazabal [2002] E.C.R. I-10981, para. 
26 (on the free movement of workers); ECJ, Case C-208/05 ITC [2007] E.C.R. I-181, para. 64 (on the 
freedom to provide services). References to the free movement of persons in this context are therefore to 
be understood as references to free movement of both economically active persons and non-economically 
active persons. In some recent cases the ECJ interprets Article 21 TFEU in a very similar way as Articles 
45, 49 and 56 TFEU; see e.g. ECJ, Case C-152/05 Commission v Germany [2008] E.C.R. I-39, paras 20-
30. See also the Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Petersen, in which the AG proposes to interpret 
Article 21 TFEU in a way different from the provisions on the economic freedoms (Opinion of AG Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer in Case C-228/07 Petersen [2008] E.C.R. I-6989, paras 13-39). I refer to the detailed 
discussion in Chapter 4, infra. 
361  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul [2008] E.C.R. I-7639, para. 16; ECJ, Case C-76/05 
Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz [2007] E.C.R. I-6849, para. 99; ECJ, Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] 
E.C.R. I-6421, para. 19; ECJ, Case C-385/00 De Groot [2002] E.C.R. I-11819, para. 75. 
362  For a recent example, see e.g. ECJ, Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] E.C.R. I-5157. 
363  According to settled case law, Member State legislation which places at a disadvantage certain of its 
nationals simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member 
State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21 TFEU (see e.g. ECJ, Case C-224/98 D'Hoop 
[2002] E.C.R. I-6191, para. 31; ECJ, Case C-224/02 Pusa [2004] E.C.R. I-5763, para. 19).  
364  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] E.C.R. I-6947, para. 37; ECJ, Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen 
and Tas [2006] E.C.R. I-10451, para. 32; ECJ, Case C-499/06 Nerkowska [2008] E.C.R. I-3993, para. 33. 
365  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] E.C.R. I-6947, para. 40. See the more detailed discussion 
in Van Nuffel and Cambien, "De vrijheid van economisch niet-actieve EU-burgers om binnen de EU te 
reizen, te verblijven en te studeren" (2009) 57 SEW, 144-154. 
366  As AG Poiares Maduro has rightly remarked, already the Court’s holding in Micheletti that Member 
States are obliged to unconditionally recognize Member State nationality as conferred by another Member 
State “was based not only on the concern to protect the competence of a Member State to determine the 
status of national, but also on the concern to avoid any variation in the personal scope of the [Union] 
fundamental freedoms from one Member State to another depending on the rules laid down by them in 
regard to nationality” (see his Opinion in Rottmann, para. 32). I agree that the Court in Micheletti was 
concerned with safeguarding the free movement of persons. However, the free movement provisions did 
not so much function as a direct limitation to the nationality rules of the Member State concerned (Spain), 
but rather had an impact on his rules regarding recognition. Below I will analyse whether the free 
movement provisions can also serve as a direct limitation to the Member States’ competence regarding 
nationality.  
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another Member State during a certain period of time.367  Such a rule would have for a 
consequence that nationals of the Member State concerned who had exercised their right to 
free movement by residing in another Member State for a certain period of time, would lose 
the nationality of the first Member State, and hence the status of Union citizenship, at least 
where they would not possess or acquire the nationality of another Member State.368  Yet 
Union citizenship is the very status that gives entitlement to the right to free movement under 
the Treaties in the first place.  Hence, under rules as the one described, the exercise of free 
movement rights would not just be discouraged; exercising free movement rights would 
eventually become impossible.  Moreover, the national in question would not only lose his 
entitlement to the right to free movement.  He would at the same time lose entitlement to all 
other rights connected to the status of Union citizen, such as the right to equal treatment.  If, 
as is clear from the case law discussed in the previous paragraph, it runs counter to Article 21 
TFEU for a national rule to provide for a loss of certain rights or benefits under national law 
on the mere ground that the person in question has exercised his free movement rights, a 
fortiori it would run counter to Article 21 TFEU to provide for the loss of all rights attached 
to Union citizenship for the mere reason of having exercised one of these rights, namely the 
right to free movement.  
 
The exercise of the rights attached to Union citizenship should not result in losing the very 
status which entitles a person to these rights.  To further clarify this, I want to stress two 
points.  First, it is important not to overestimate the scope of this argument.  I am not arguing 
that Member States are no longer allowed to provide for the loss of Member State nationality 
vis-à-vis Union citizens who have exercised their right to free movement.  I am also not 
arguing that Member States cannot take away nationality where such entails the loss of the 
right to free movement in view of the fact that such “would be consistent with the Court’s 
tendency to maximise the number of beneficiaries of free movement”.369  What I suggest here 
is not that Member States are always precluded under Union law from withdrawing their 
nationality where this results in depriving the person concerned from its rights under Union 
law, but rather that this is the case where such withdrawal is triggered precisely because the 
person in question has decided to exercise his rights under Union law, and more precisely his 
right to free movement as a Union citizen.  This view finds convincing grounds in the recent 
case law of the ECJ, as just explained.  Second, it must be emphasised that the provisions on 
free movement provisions operate here as a limitation to the competence of the Member 
States and not as a linking factor providing a connection with Union law.  As I have explained 
higher, Member State nationality can, under certain circumstances, in itself be considered as 
                                                 
367  De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 14 et seq.; De Groot, "The Relationship between the Nationality of 
the Member States of the European Union and European Citizenship", in La Torre (ed.), European 
Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998), 136-139; also 
discussed in Kochenov, "Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship 
between Status and Rights" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 192 and Hailbronner, "Nationality in Public 
International Law and European Law", in Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), 
Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. Volume 1: 
Comparative Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 93. The argument was 
approvingly referred to by AG Poiares Maduro in his Opinion in the Rottmann case (Opinion of AG 
Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449., para. 32). 
368  Take the hypothetical example of a Member State A which would adopt the rule that residence in another 
country for a continuous period of 10 years would lead to loss of the nationality of Member State A. A 
person with the nationality of Member State A and of a third country could, as a consequence of this rule, 
after 10 years of residence in Member State B, be left with only the nationality of the third country 
concerned and thus have lost his Union citizenship.  
369  Handoll Free Movement of Persons in the EU (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 67. 
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an element providing a sufficient connection with Union law.  Accordingly, the free 
movement based argument could in principle be invoked even by a Union citizen who has 
never exercised his free movement rights.  Indeed, the application of a nationality rule as 
described above would have as a consequence that, if that person decided to exercise his free 
movement to the Member State concerned, he would eventually possibly lose his Union 
citizenship.  Such could discourage him from moving to the Member State concerned and on 
that basis the rule could be said to infringe Article 21 TFEU.370 
 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, it is submitted that Union law precludes Member States 
from providing for the automatic loss of nationality on grounds of residence in another 
Member State for a certain period of time.  Member States can accommodate this limitation 
imposed by Union law in at least three ways.  First of all, a Member State’s nationality law 
may provide for loss of nationality in case of lengthy residence abroad, if at the same time an 
exception is made for residence in another EU Member State.  A good illustration is Article 
15(1) of the Netherlands Nationality Act (Rijkswet op het Nederlandschap), which provides 
that “Netherlands nationality shall not be lost if the person involved is residing within the 
territory of the European Union”.371  The government added this phrase to an earlier proposal, 
specifically arguing that the text originally proposed might have violated the right of free 
movement within the EU.372  Secondly, a Member State’s legislation may provide that loss of 
nationality can be avoided by submitting a declaration.  Such a rule would not violate Union 
law because Union law does not preclude Member States from requiring reasonable diligence 
from their citizens in the exercise of their rights.373  De Groot cites Article 22 of the Belgian 
Nationality Act as an example.374  That article provides that a Belgian national born abroad, 
with the exception of former Belgian colonies, loses his nationality if he has been principally 
and continuously resident abroad between the age of 18 and 20, except under certain 
circumstances.  The article adds however that this will not be the case if the person concerned 
                                                 
370  In Jipa the ECJ held that “the right of freedom of movement includes both the right for citizens of the 
European Union to enter a Member State other than the one of origin and the right to leave the State of 
origin” (ECJ, Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] E.C.R. I-5157, para. 18). See the discussion in Oosterom-Staples, 
"Het fundamentele recht op vrij verkeer nader bepaald: het arrest Jipa onder de loep" (2009) N.T.E.R., 12-
17. 
371  The Dutch text of Article 15(1) reads: “Het Nederlanderschap gaat voor een meerderjarige verloren […] c. 
indien hij tevens een vreemde nationaliteit bezit en tijdens zijn meerderjarigheid gedurende een 
ononderbroken periode van tien jaar in het bezit van beide nationaliteiten zijn hoofdverblijf heeft buiten 
Nederland, de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba, en buiten de gebieden waarop het Verdrag betreffende de 
Europese Unie van toepassing is, anders dan in een dienstverband met Nederland, de Nederlandse 
Antillen of Aruba dan wel met een internationaal orgaan waarin het Koninkrijk is vertegenwoordigd, of 
als echtgenoot van of als ongehuwde in een duurzame relatie samenlevend met een persoon in een 
zodanig dienstverband[…]” (italics added). 
372  See the discussion in Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam", in 
O’Keeffe and Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart 
Publishing, 1999), 408. 
373  See e.g. ECJ, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Factortame [1996] E.C.R. I-1029, para. 84: “…in order 
to determine the loss or damage for which reparation may be granted, the national court may inquire 
whether the injured person showed reasonable diligence in order to avoid the loss or damage or limit its 
extent and whether, in particular, he availed himself in time of all the legal remedies available to him”. 
See also ECJ, Case 37/74 Van den Broeck [1975] E.C.R. 235, in which the ECJ held that the applicant had 
not been discriminated against, because she could have avoided the alleged worse off position by making 
a declaration to renounce her (Belgian) nationality. A similar reasoning was followed in ECJ, Case 257/78 
Devred [1979] E.C.R. 3767. 
374  De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 17. 
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declares, before attaining the age of 18, his wish to keep his Belgian nationality.375  A third 
alternative consists in providing for automatic loss of nationality in the case of lengthy 
residence abroad, but adding that residence in another Member State of the EU will not lead 
to loss of nationality if, at the relevant time, the person concerned does not posses the 
nationality of another Member State.376  An example may clarify this.  If, under a hypothetical 
Dutch nationality law, a person having both the Netherlands and the Belgian nationality were 
to lose his Netherlands nationality after having lived in Germany for 10 years, that rule would 
not infringe Union law if this person would at the same time keep his Belgian nationality, 
through a simple declaration for instance.  Similarly, if a Netherlands national would acquire 
the German nationality by marrying a German wife, and would, under the same law, lose his 
Netherlands nationality after having lived in Germany for 10 years, that nationality law would 
not infringe Union law either.  Indeed, what matters at the end of the day is that a person 
should not, in one way or another, lose his Union citizenship merely for the mere reason of 
having exercised his or her free movement rights.   
 
2. Duty to respect fundamental rights 
 
A second limitation to the competence of the Member States in nationality matters could be 
said to flow from the duty to respect fundamental rights.377  Arguably, Union law would be 
violated where domestic rules on nationality violated fundamental rights.378  Fundamental 
rights form part of the general principles of Union law379 and have to be respected, therefore, 
by the Member States when acting within the scope of Union law.380  It will be recalled that a 
conferral, refusal or withdrawal of Member State nationality should be considered as falling 
within the scope of Union law where it has an impact on the Union citizenship status of the 
person(s) concerned.  Once we accept that Member States are acting within the scope of 
Union law when adopting measures regarding nationality, it follows that they will have to 
exercise this competence in accordance with Union law, and thus with fundamental rights.  
Yet, understandably, given the sensitivity of the Member States in this field and the large 
discretion pertaining to them, the Courts will likely be reluctant to hold that nationality rules 
                                                 
375  The French text of the article reads: “Perdent la qualité de Belge: […] 5. le Belge né à l'étranger a 
l'exception des anciennes colonies belges lorsque: a) il a eu sa résidence principale et continue à l'étranger 
de dix-huit à vingt-huit ans; b) il n'exerce à l'étranger aucune fonction conférée par le Gouvernement 
belge ou à l'intervention de celui-ci, ou n'y est pas occupé par une société ou une association de droit 
belge au personnel de laquelle il appartient; c) il n'a pas déclare, avant d'atteindre l'âge de vingt-huit ans, 
vouloir conserver sa nationalité belge […]”. 
376  A point also made in Staples, "Wie is burger van de Unie?" (2001) N.T.E.R., 111. 
377  This proposition can draw inspiration from general international law. Note in particular a celebrated 
opinion of the American Court of Human Rights (RE Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the 
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 
No. 4 (1984)), in which the Court states: “despite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral 
and regulation of nationality are matters for each state to decide, contemporary developments indicate that 
international law does impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by the states in that area, and 
that the manners in which states regulate matters bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within 
their sole jurisdiction; those powers of the state are also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the 
full protection of human rights” (italics added). 
378  See the Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Rottmann, para. 28. 
379  E.g. ECJ, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] E.C.R. 419, para. 7; ECJ, Case 11/70 Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft [1970] E.C.R. 1125, par. 4. See also Article 6(3) TEU. 
380  Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2010] O.J. C83/389. See 
further Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 821 et seq. 
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or measures of the Member States violate fundamental rights except in the most clear-cut 
cases.  
 
The next step to determine then is what fundamental rights are crucial in this regard.  As a 
general principle it must be pointed out that, in safeguarding fundamental rights, the ECJ will 
draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions of the Member States and from 
international treaties on fundamental rights. 381  International treaties for the protection of 
fundamental rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are 
signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Union 
law.382  In that regard, the ECHR has special significance.383  As a consequence, the ECJ can 
have regard to Treaties by which not all Member States are necessarily bound.  
 
The limitation to the Member States’ competence regarding nationality deriving from the duty 
to respect fundamental rights will perhaps be most crucial with regard to withdrawal of 
nationality.  As Hall384 points out: “it will, from a fundamental rights perspective, ordinarily 
be a much more serious matter to be deprived of a nationality than to gain one”.  Yet it is also 
possible that rules on acquisition of nationality are couched in terms that violate fundamental 
rights such as the right to equal treatment.  Hence, a refusal of nationality based on such 
criteria may equally violate fundamental rights. 
 
a) Fundamental right to equal treatment  
 
The principle of equal treatment is a general principle of Union law385 which finds specific 
expressions in Articles 18 and 19 TFEU and the measures adopted under the latter.386  It is 
embodied, moreover, in a number of important international legal instruments, which can 
serve as guidelines for the ECJ when assessing the compatibility of the Member States’ 
(nationality) laws with this principle.  An important guiding source will normally be Article 
14 ECHR,387 given the special place of the ECHR in the protection of fundamental rights 
within the Union.388  Article 14 prohibits discrimination on grounds such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status.  Another important source could be Article 
                                                 
381  Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011), 824. 
382  ECJ, Case 4/73 Nold [1974] E.C.R. 491, para. 13. 
383  See e.g. ECJ, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] E.C.R. 419, para. 7; ECJ, Case C-274/99 P Connolly v 
Commission [2001] E.C.R. I-1611, para. 37; ECJ, Case C-283/05 ASML [2005] E.C.R. I-12041, para. 26; 
ECJ, Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] E.C.R. I-
5305, para. 29; ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, para. 283. 
384  Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 99. 
385  See e.g. ECJ, Joined Cases 103/77 and 145/77 Royal Scholten-Honig [1978] E.C.R. 2037, para. 26; ECJ, 
Case 300/86 Van Landschoot [1988] E.C.R. 3443, para. 9; ECJ, Case C-292/97 Karlsson [2000] E.C.R. 
2737, para. 39; ECJ, Case C-81/05, Anacleto Cordero Alonso [2006] E.C.R. I-7569, para. 37. See also 
ECJ, Case C-227/04 P Lindorfer [2007] E.C.R. I-6767, para. 50 (“general principle of equality of the 
sexes”). 
386  In particular Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, [2000] O.J. L180/22 and Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation, [2000] O.J. L303/16. 
387  See Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 88 et seq. 
388  See n. 383, supra.  
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26 ICCPR,389 prohibiting discrimination on similar grounds.  Interesting to note in this regard 
is that the preamble to the ICCPR refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Article 15(2) of which provides in part that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality”.390  This reinforces my belief that Article 26 ICCPR should be applied to cases of 
loss of nationality.  A third important guiding source will obviously be the Charter of 
fundamental rights,391 which contains a chapter on “equality” (Article 20 et seq.).  
 
Until now, the ECJ has only ever assessed the compatibility of a Member State’s nationality 
law with the principle of equal treatment in a number of “staff cases”.392  Traditionally, the 
nationality laws of a number of Member States provided that foreign women acquired the 
nationality of their husband upon marriage. 393  As a consequence of this legislation, the 
applicants in the said staff cases – all women working as Union officials – were not or no 
longer entitled to an expatriation allowance, because they had obtained through their marriage 
the nationality of the Member State in which they were working.394  They argued that this 
constituted discrimination on grounds of sex, as no similar rule applied to men in the same 
situation.  The ECJ held that the term “nationals” in the Staff Regulations had to be 
“interpreted in such a way as to avoid any unwarranted difference of treatment as between 
male and female officials […]”.395  Accordingly, it refused to interpret the term “nationals” in 
the Staff Regulations as referring to a nationality imposed by the nationality law of a Member 
State on a female official, and which she was unable to renounce.396  This case law has now 
been explicitly enshrined in annex VII to the Staff Regulations.397 
                                                 
389  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966 (UNTS, Vol. 99, p. 171). The 
ICCPR has been ratified by all EU Member States. The ECJ referred expressly to it in several cases. See 
e.g. ECJ, Case 374/87 Orkem v. Commission [1989] E.C.R. 3283, para. 31; ECJ, Joined Cases C-297/88 and 
C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990] E.C.R. I-3763, para. 68; ECJ, Case C-249/96 Grant [1998] E.C.R. I-621, replace 43-
47; CFI, Case T-48/96 Acme Industry v. Council [1999] E.C.R. II-3089, para. 30.   
390  This provision was explicitly relied on by the ECJ in Rottmann (see the discussion under V.A.2, supra). 
391  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2010] O.J. C83/389. 
392  See the overview in Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 46 et seq. 
393  This rule does no longer unconditionally apply in any of the Member States. It must be pointed out that it 
was targeted by a number of international conventions. See e.g. Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women, Article 1 of which provides that neither the celebration nor the dissolution of marriage shall 
automatically affect the nationality of the wife. This Convention was ratified by 18 Member States: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2.htm. See, similarly, Article 9(1) of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Stating: “States Parties shall grant women 
equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that 
neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically 
change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband”. 
That Convention was ratified by all Member States. See further, Article 4(d) ECN, providing “neither 
marriage nor the dissolution of a marriage between a national of a State Party and an alien, nor the change of 
nationality by one of the spouses during marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the other 
spouse”. 
394  Article 4(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations provides for payment of the expatriation allowance: 
“(a) to officials: who are not and have never been nationals of the State in whose territory the place where 
they are employed is situated; and who during the five years ending six months before they entered the 
service did not habitually reside or carry on their main occupation within the European territory of that 
State. For the purposes of this provision, circumstances arising from work done for another State or for an 
international organisation shall not be taken into account.” (italics added). 
395  See ECJ, Case 21/74 Airola [1975] E.C.R. 221, para. 10; ECJ, Case 37/74 Van den Broeck [1975] E.C.R. 
235, para. 10; ECJ, Case 257/78 Devred [1979] E.C.R. 3767, para. 9. 
396  ECJ, Case 21/74 Airola [1975] E.C.R. 221, para. 12.  
397  Article 4(3) provides “For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, an official who has, by marriage, 
automatically acquired, without the possibility of renouncing it, the nationality of the State in whose 
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These cases neatly illustrate how the principle of equal treatment can, at the level of Union 
law, limit the effects of conferral of nationality by a Member State.  However, it is important 
not to overlook the peculiar ratio legis of the provisions regulating payment of the 
expatriation allowance.398  The Staff Regulations indeed make entitlement to an expatriation 
allowance dependent on nationality, more precisely on not having the nationality of a certain 
Member State. 399   However, nationality only plays an ancillary role in determining the 
persons so entitled.  The primary criterion for the purposes of the grant of an expatriation 
allowance is that of “actual change of residence”.400  This makes for a strong argument to 
disregard national provisions on nationality where the person concerned has actually changed 
his or her residence in order to take up employment with the EU.  For this reason, the “staff 
cases” should probably be confined to their specific facts and not be considered as a generally 
applicable precedent as far as the application of the right to equal treatment to the nationality 
rules of the Member States is concerned.  The ECJ would most probably not have pronounced 
similar judgments outside these specific circumstances, at least not at the time the staff cases 
were pronounced.  In this connection, the fact should not be overlooked that the staff cases 
were all pronounced in the 1970s, and hence long before the advent of the Union citizenship.   
 
As I have argued higher, since the introduction of Union citizenship, the case for testing the 
nationality rules of the Member States against principles of Union law has become much 
stronger.  In cases where the nationality rules of the Member States would affect Union 
citizenship,401 infringements of the right to equal treatment should therefore be considered to 
be contrary to Union law more generally, i.e. also outside the specific context of cases dealing 
with the Staff Regulations.  Moreover, it is submitted that this should not be limited to cases 
of conferral of nationality, but also applies for cases of loss of nationality.402  Indeed, it will, 
from a fundamental rights perspective, ordinarily be a much more serious matter to be 
deprived of a nationality than to gain one.  Similarly, it can be argued that a refusal of 
Member State nationality to certain groups on the basis of discriminatory criteria should be 
considered invalid under Union law.  One example could be the fact that certain Member 
States have introduced “integration tests” which must be passed in order to acquire the 
nationality of that Member State, but have at the same time exempted from this test nationals 
from certain western States.403  It has been argued that these criteria are discriminatory.404  
                                                                                                                                                        
territory his or her place of employment is situated, shall be treated in the same way as an official covered 
by the first indent of paragraph 1(a)”. 
398  See the discussion in Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 54 et seq. 
399  Supra, n. 394: only officials not having the nationality of the Member State in which they work are 
entitled to an expatriation allowance. 
400  See ECJ, Case 21/74 Airola [1975] E.C.R. 221, paras 6-7: “In accordance with the general pattern of 
article 4 of annex VII this provision adopts the official's habitual residence before he entered the service 
as the paramount consideration in determining entitlement to an expatriation allowance. The official's 
nationality is regarded as being only a subsidiary consideration, i.e. as serving to define the effect of the 
length of such residence outside the territory in which the place where he is employed is situated”.  
401  Such would on the facts of the staff cases, probably not have been the case, since Member State 
nationality was imposed upon persons who already possessed the nationality of a Member State. 
402  See Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 99. 
403  I will not deal with this subject in detail, because it is so vast and touches upon fundamental issues of 
immigration policy which can not appropriately be discussed in the context of this chapter. For insightful 
discussions, see the contributions in Van Oers, Ersbøll and Kostakopolou (eds.), A Redefinition of 
Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe (The Hague, Brill Publishers/Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2010), 338 pp. and in Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera (eds.), Illiberal Liberal States: 
Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration in the EU (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 414 pp., in 
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Similarly, the content of these tests could be determined in such a way that certain groups can 
more easily satisfy them than others.  As such, they could also give rise to a form of 
prohibited discrimination.  One example could be the naturalisation tests applicable in the 
Baltic States.405  It has been argued that the requirement of high proficiency of one of the 
Baltic languages unreasonably discriminates against Russian-speaking minorities and that 
such could constitute an indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin.406  I do not have 
the space to elaborate these arguments in detail here.  More important is to flag the possibility 
that nationality rules can infringe the right to equal treatment.  
 
It already appears from the foregoing that there is no good reason to limit possible violations 
of the right to equal treatment by nationality measures to cases of discrimination on grounds 
of sex.  The reasoning followed can be applied to alleged discriminations on most of the other 
grounds mentioned higher.  For instance, a Member State making loss of nationality 
dependent on criteria such as race, religion, sexual orientation407 or political opinion could 
convincingly be held to violate the right to equal treatment.  In the case of nationality 
legislation making a distinction on grounds of race, the Convention on Racial 
Discrimination408 may serve as an extra guideline for assessing discrimination.  Article 5 of 
that Convention explicitly refers to the right to nationality as one of the rights States Parties 
undertake to guarantee the enjoyment of without distinction as to race, colour, or national or 
ethnic origin.  Only in the case of alleged discrimination on grounds of nationality, a violation 
of the principle of equal treatment is probably less straightforward.  The reason is that the 
possession of another nationality is a common ground for loss of nationality.409  Although the 
desirability of this ground of loss in the context of Union citizenship has been questioned,410 it 
is unlikely that the loss of nationality for reasons of acquisition of another nationality will 
ever be held to constitute a form of discrimination on grounds of nationality, because the 
acquisition of another nationality would seem to bring a person in a fundamentally different 
situation which would justify the application of a different rule with regard to its initial 
                                                                                                                                                        
particular: de Groot, Kuipers and Weber; “Passing citizenship tests as a requirement for naturalisation: a 
comparative perspective” (p. 51-77) and Van Oers, “Justifying citizenship tests in the Netherlands and the 
UK” (p. 113-129). See also De Groot and Mijts, "De onwenselijkheid van een dubbele taaltoets voor 
naturalisandi in Aruba en de Nederlandse Antillen" (2009) Migrantenrecht, 366-371 (discussing a 
legislative proposal to subject persons willing to acquire the Dutch nationality in the Dutch overseas 
possessions to different integration tests than those in the Netherlands; this proposal was eventually 
adopted as Rijkswet van 17 juni 2010, houdende wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap met 
betrekking tot meervoudige nationaliteit en andere nationaliteitsrechtelijke kwesties, [2010] Stb. 242). 
404  Carrera and Wiesbrock, “Civic Integration of Third Country Nationals: nationalism versus 
Europeanisation in the Common EU Immigration Policy”, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Series, 
available at www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/2179.  
405  See the discussion under IV.B.2., supra. 
406  Van Elsuwege From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the 
Baltic States' Accession on to the EU (Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 428-429. 
407  Union law provides legal safeguards against discrimination on this ground. See ECJ, Case C-147/08 
Römer [2011] E.C.R. nyr.; ECJ, Case C-267/06 Maruko [2008] E.C.R. I-1757. 
408  International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc A/811. All 
EU Member States signed this convention; see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_icerd.htm. The 
Convention has once been invoked in a staff case: CST (order of 27 September 2007), Case F-120/06 
Dálnoky [2007] E.C.R. nyr., para. 26 (however, the plea was declared inadmissible and the Court did not 
itself consider the legal effects of the said convention). 
409  See in this regard Article 7 of the European Convention on Nationality, which states that “A State Party 
may not provide in its internal law for the loss of its nationality ex lege or at the initiative of the State 
Party except in the following cases…(a) voluntary acquisition of another nationality…”. 
410  Kochenov, "Double nationality in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance" (2011) 17 E.L.J., 323-343. 
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nationality.411  Besides, where the nationality obtained is that of another Member State, the 
situation will normally fall outside the scope of Union law, since the Union citizenship status 
of the person concerned will not be affected. 
 
In sum, a Member State is probably precluded by Union law from laying down criteria for the 
acquisition of loss of nationality which discriminate on the grounds just discussed.  The 
precise consequences of this Union law limitation for the nationality laws of the Member 
States and, more in particular, the Union law consequences where a Member State acts in 
disregard of it, will be discussed in detail below.412  However, I find it important to stress in 
this context already that withdrawal of nationality cannot be considered discriminatory where 
such withdrawal could have been avoided through a declaration of the person in question.413  
Indeed, as pointed out above,414 under Union law national legislation may validly require a 
certain diligence on part of its citizens. 
 
b) Reduction of Statelessness  
 
A Member State’s rules concerning loss of nationality could violate fundamental rights where 
they would result in an individual being rendered stateless.415  Indeed, some authors have 
argued that the right to nationality is a fundamental right. 416  To determine whether the 
fundamental right to nationality can act as a limitation to the Member States’ competence in 
regulating loss of nationality, essentially two questions need to be answered.  First, can the 
right to nationality be considered to be a fundamental right?  Second, if the first question is 
answered in the affirmative, is it among the fundamental rights that are protected within the 
Union legal order?  If both questions are answered in the affirmative, it follows, for reasons 
explained above, that national rules on loss of nationality must respect the right to nationality. 
 
I will start my analysis by pointing out that support for the view that the right to nationality is 
a fundamental right can be found in a number of fundamental rights instruments.  Two 
categories must be distinguished.  In the first place, some instruments explicitly enlist the 
fundamental right to nationality.  The clearest example can be found in Article 15 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), proclaiming that:  
 
                                                 
411  More precisely, it could be argued that the acquisition of the nationality of another State reduces or even 
breaks down the “special relationship of solidarity and good faith” between a Member State and its 
national, which would justify that Member State to apply particular rules to this situation (see, in this 
regard, ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 51). 
412  See under VI., infra. 
413  See mutatis mutandis ECJ, Case 37/74 Van den Broeck [1975] E.C.R. 235; ECJ, Case 257/78 Devred 
[1979] E.C.R. 3767.  
414  See under V.C.1., supra. 
415  Arguably, this would similarly be the case where a Member State’s rules concerning acquisition of 
nationality would result in an individual remaining stateless, namely where the nationality of that State 
would be refused to him. 
416  Hall, "The European Convention on Nationality and the Right to Have Rights" (1999) 24 E.L. Rev., 587 et 
seq; Chan, "The Right to Nationality as a Human Right: the Current Trend Towards Recognition" (1991) 
12 HRLJ, 1-14. See already: Lauterpacht International Law and Human Rights (USA, Archon Books, 
1968), 346 et seq., who states that every person should be entitled to the nationality of the State where he 
is born, but without considering nationality to be a “natural” or “inalienable” right. See further the 
discussion in Hailbronner, "Nationality in Public International Law and European Law", in Bauböck, 
Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 
15 European Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 
2006), 37-46. 
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“1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality.”  
 
The only enunciation of a general right to nationality in a legally binding fundamental rights 
treaty can be found in Article 20 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.417  
Very interesting to note in this regard is a celebrated opinion of the Inter-American Court of 
Human rights,418 in which it states that “[i]t is generally accepted today that nationality is an 
inherent right of all human beings…”.  Some other conventions contain the right to nationality 
in a more limited form.  A good example is Article 24(3) of the ICCPR, which states that 
every child has the right to acquire a nationality.419  In the second place, there are a number of 
international conventions aiming at the reduction of cases of statelessness.  These conventions 
do not refer to the right to nationality as a fundamental right, but they could be said to 
implement that right and provide it with substantive content, in that they impose concrete 
obligations upon States in order to reduce statelessness. 420  The most important of these 
conventions is probably the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,421 
Article 8 of which provides:  
 
“1. A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would 
render him stateless. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a person may be deprived of the 
nationality of a Contracting State: 
(a) in the circumstances in which, under paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 7, it is permissible that a 
person should lose his nationality; 
(b) where the nationality has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.” 
 
Also very important are Articles 7 and 8 of the European Convention on Nationality, which 
will be discussed below. 422   A third example is Article 9(1) of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, stating that States Parties shall 
ensure that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during 
marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force 
upon her the nationality of the husband.423   
 
The foregoing makes clear that there is some room for arguing the existence of a fundamental 
right to nationality.  A different matter, however, is whether this right is protected in the 
Union legal order.  It will be recalled that in protecting fundamental rights the ECJ will take 
as a guideline the constitutional traditions of the Member States and international treaties for 
the protection of fundamental rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of 
which they are signatories.  However, there is no indication that the right to nationality is part 
                                                 
417  Article 20 of that Convention states: “1. Every person has the right to a nationality. 2. Every person has 
the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born if he does not have the right to any 
other nationality. 3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it”. 
418  RE Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion 
OC-4/84, January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984). 
419  Italics added. A similar principle can be found in Principle 3 of the UN Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child. 
420  Chan, "The Right to Nationality as a Human Right: the Current Trend Towards Recognition" (1991) 12 
HRLJ, 4. 
421  989 UNTS 175. 13 Member States have ratified the Convention, whereas France has only signed it: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterV/treaty4.asp. This is deemed 
sufficient by the ECJ in order to take it into account as a guideline (see ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 52). 
422  See under V.C.2.c., infra. 
423  Italics added. 
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of the constitutional traditions of the Member States.  Besides, one cannot fail to notice that 
far from all Member States are party to the conventions just mentioned (and obviously none 
of them is party to the Inter-American Convention), and that the obligation to reduce 
statelessness is often subject to sweeping qualifications.  Still it must not be forgotten that, in 
accordance with the case law referred to above,424 the fact that not all Member States are 
party to a convention does not preclude the ECJ from taking into account as a guideline.  
Accordingly, the ECJ in Rottmann explicitly relied on both Article 15 UDHR and Article 8 on 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.425  However, the ECJ was not concerned with 
enforcing the right to nationality.  Rather conversely, it found confirmation in the said articles 
of the right for the Member States to deprive a person of his or her nationality under certain 
circumstances.426  Finally, it must be pointed out that  
 
The bottom-line is probably that at present the right to nationality is not as such protected by 
Union law as a fundamental right, at least not in the sense that stateless persons must be given 
the right to acquire the nationality of a Member State.  At the same time, it appears that Union 
law does limit the cases in which a Member State may withdraw its nationality.  This is 
confirmed by the explicit reference by the ECJ in its Rottmann judgment to Article 15 UDHR 
and Article 8 on Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.  The European Convention on 
Nationality is of particular importance in this regard (see the discussion below).  In this sense, 
the duty to reduce or avoid statelessness does arguably function as a limitation sanctioned by 
Union law to the Member States’ competence concerning nationality.   
 
c) European Convention on Nationality427  
 
One could wonder what the role of the European Convention on Nationality (“ECN”) may be 
in this context.  The ECN is very important in that it not only proclaims a general right to 
nationality (Article 4(a) ECN), but at the same time endows this right with substance as a 
conventional norm giving rise to specific obligations on State parties.428  More specifically, 
with regard to loss of nationality, the ECN provides for an exhaustive list of grounds for loss 
of nationality.429  In this regard the Convention goes further than previous conventions.  Any 
withdrawal done for a reason not specifically mentioned will violate the ECN (Article 7 
ECN)).  That Article provides as follows: 
 
1. A State Party may not provide in its internal law for the loss of its nationality ex lege or at the initiative of 
the State Party except in the following cases: 
a. voluntary acquisition of another nationality; 
b. acquisition of the nationality of the State Party by means of fraudulent conduct, false information or 
concealment of any relevant fact attributable to the applicant; 
c. voluntary service in a foreign military force; 
d. conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State Party; 
                                                 
424  See the case law referred to in n. 382 and 383, supra. 
425  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, paras 52 and 53. 
426  The ECJ referred to Article 15(2) UDHR and Article 8 of the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. 
427  The European Convention on Nationality was adopted by the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers on 15 May 1997, and opened for signature on 7 November 1997. It entered into force on 1 
March 2000. 
428  Hall, "The European Convention on Nationality and the Right to Have Rights" (1999) 24 E.L. Rev., 595. 
429  For a detailed overview and discussion of these grounds, see De Groot, "The European Convention on 
Nationality: A Step Towards a Ius Commune in the Field of Nationality Law" (2000) 7 MJ, 139 et seq.; 
Schärer, "The European Convention on nationality" (1997) 40 German Yearbook of International Law, 
438-460. 
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e. lack of a genuine link between the State Party and a national habitually residing abroad; 
f. where it is established during the minority of a child that the preconditions laid down by internal law 
which led to the ex lege acquisition of the nationality of the State Party are no longer fulfilled; 
g. adoption of a child if the child acquires or possesses the foreign nationality of one or both of the adopting 
parents. 
2. A State Party may provide for the loss of its nationality by children whose parents lose that nationality 
except in cases covered by sub-paragraphs c and d of paragraph 1. However, children shall not lose that 
nationality if one of their parents retains it. 
3. A State Party may not provide in its internal law for the loss of its nationality under paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
this article if the person concerned would thereby become stateless, with the exception of the cases 
mentioned in paragraph 1, sub-paragraph b, of this article. 
 
The same is true where withdrawal of nationality is discriminatory (Articles 4c and 5(1)) or 
where it results in statelessness, albeit subject to certain exceptions (Articles 4b, 7 and 8).430  
 
Obviously, the Convention is not the product of the EU, as it was adopted within the Council 
of Europe.  It is not self-evident therefore how it could play a role within the framework of 
Union law.  A number of options can be envisaged in this connection.  First of all, it is 
possible to regard the ECN as an international convention on fundamental rights, more 
precisely on the fundamental right to nationality.  It is clear, moreover, that many Member 
States contributed to its drafting (EU Member States make up for the majority of the Members 
of the Council of Europe431), and a relatively large number of EU Member States have ratified 
or at least signed the ECN.432  Accordingly, in accordance with the Nold433 case law, the ECJ 
could use its provisions as guidelines when applying Union law.434  The ECJ did refer to the 
provisions of the ECN for the first time in Rottmann.435  However, the ECJ did not refer to the 
Nold case law.436  Rather, the Court considered that the ECN, at least Article 4(c) thereof, lays 
down a general principle of international law.  Those provisions of the ECN which can be 
considered as expressing a general principle of international law should indeed, on that 
ground, be taken into account in the context of interpretation of Union law.  This is most 
probably not the case for all provisions of the ECN.437  This limitation is not an issue under 
the first option, namely when the ECN is treated as a fundamental rights convention and its 
provisions are taken into account on that ground. That option would allow the ECJ to take 
them into account not only with regard to Member States who have ratified the ECN and not 
only for those provisions that could be considered as embodying general principles of 
international law.  This should not be taken to mean that those Member States which did not 
                                                 
430  States parties may withdraw their nationality when the person affected is thereby rendered stateless if that 
person’s nationality was acquired by fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant 
fact attributable to the applicant (Arts. 7(1)b and 7(3)). 
431  For the complete list of the Council of Europe’s Member States, see 
http://www.coe.int/T/e/com/about_coe/member_states/default.asp.   
432  As of 6 October 2011, 12 EU Member States had ratified the Convention, and another 6 had signed it 
without yet ratifying it. See 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=166&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG. 
433  See n. 382, supra. 
434  Hall, "The European Convention on Nationality and the Right to Have Rights" (1999) 24 E.L. Rev., 598. 
435  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, paras 18-21 and 52-53. 
436  Besides, the ECJ appeared to attach some importance to the fact that the ECN had entered into force in 
both the Member States whose nationality legislation was under scrutiny in the case (ECJ, Case C-135/08 
Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 18), something which is not required under that case law in order 
for provisions of a fundamental rights convention to be taken into account. 
437  See the doubts expressed by AG Poiares Maduro regarding the possibility of qualifying the provisions of 
the ECN as general principles of international law in the absence of ratification by all the Member States 
(Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 29). 
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ratify the ECN are nevertheless bound by it.  The ECJ is not competent to enforce the ECN as 
such.  It is only competent to use its provisions as interpretative guidelines.   
 
Besides, it must be pointed out that in the future the ECN could play a similar role in the 
ECJ’s case law if the latter were to consider the provisions of the ECN as expressions of 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.  Indeed, the ECJ has recognised 
principles common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States as general principles 
of Union law,438 and it has had regard in this context inter alia to treaties which the Member 
States have signed.439  At present this argument stands no real chance of success, as only a 
limited number of Member States have actually ratified and implemented the ECN. 440  
Moreover, a number of them have issued quite a number of reservations and interpretative 
declarations,441 which somehow undermines the common character of the rules even in those 
Member States which adopted them.  All the same, the possibility cannot be excluded that in 
the future a broader adoption and implementation of the ECN may well lead to the result that 
some of its provisions will become something akin to a ius commune in the nationality laws of 
the Member States. 442   This will allow the ECJ to treat them as common constitutional 
principles, and enforce them as such in its case law.   
 
In any event, since the Rottmann case it can no longer be disputed that the provisions of the 
ECN can be taken into account by the ECJ when assessing the validity of a Member State’s 
nationality legislation under Union law.  The provisions relied on by the ECJ in the Rottmann 
case did not serve to invalidate the nationality legislation under dispute, but rather confirmed 
its validity.  All the same, in cases with a different fact setting the provisions of the ECN may 
act as limitation to the competence of the Member States in this field.  It seems opportune 
therefore to have a closer look at the provisions of the ECN on loss of nationality and see how 
they could serve as a limitation to the competence of the Member States that can be enforced 
by the ECJ.   
 
First of all, Article 4(c) ECN provides that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her 
nationality”.  This provision was explicitly referred to by the ECJ in Rottmann.  On the 
specific facts of the case, the ECJ considered that this provision was not violated as the 
withdrawal of nationality in question was based on fraud.  In other circumstances it could be 
violated, however, namely if a Member State were to withdraw its nationality in the absence 
of fraud or any other acceptable ground, like the ones mentioned in Article 7 ECN.443  Article 
4(c) ECN would in such a case be an important additional argument to hold such a decision to 
infringe Union law.  Second, Article 5 ECN elaborates the principle of discrimination in 
matters of nationality by explicitly enlisting different grounds of prohibited discrimination.  It 
states that a State Party’s nationality laws must not “contain distinctions or include any practice 
                                                 
438  See, in general, Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 720 et seq. 
439  See e.g. ECJ, Joined Cases 97-99/87 Dow Chemical Ibérica v Commission [1989] E.C.R. 3165, paras 14-
16. 
440  See n. 25, supra. 
441  This is the case for Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=166&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG&VL
=1.  
442  As is forcefully argued by De Groot (De Groot, "The European Convention on Nationality: A Step 
Towards a Ius Commune in the Field of Nationality Law" (2000) 7 MJ, 117-157). 
443  See already Greenwood, "Nationality and the Limits of the Free Movement of Persons in Community 
Law" (1987) YbEL, 193 (stating that arbitrary deprivation of nationality would violate Union law). 
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which amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour or national or 
ethnic origin”.  This could well provide the ECJ with an extra argument444 to find Member State 
rules which make loss of nationality dependent on one of the grounds mentioned in Article 5 
ECN to be in violation of Union law.   
 
A third important provision is Article 7 ECN.  As was stated above, Article 7 lists a limited 
number of grounds which may be provided for in a State Party’s internal law as grounds for 
the loss of its nationality ex lege or at the initiative of the State Party.  This provision can 
assist the ECJ in assessing compliance with the principle of proportionality in the sense that 
the State’s interest in withdrawing nationality will carry more weight when its decision is 
based on one of the grounds of Article 7 ECN than when it is not the case.445  It is probably 
not the case, however, that a Member State’s nationality law providing for loss of nationality 
on grounds not enlisted in Article 7 will automatically infringe Union law, since not all 
provisions of the ECN can be considered as principles of general international law or 
constitutional principles common to the Member States.  The bottom-line is that Article 7 
cannot act in its entirety as a limitation enforced by Union law to the competence of the 
Member States regarding nationality, although it can be a useful guideline for the ECJ in 
assessing those limitations.  Special mention deserves Article 7(3) ECN, which provides that 
States may not withdraw their nationality where it would result in the person concerned 
becoming stateless,446 except in cases of fraud.  This provides another ground for considering 
the duty to reduce statelessness as a limitation under Union law to the Member States’ 
competence regarding nationality.447   
 
In view of the Rottmann case, it seems appropriate to consider more in detail the exception in 
Article 7(3) relating to acquisition of nationality by means of fraud.  Where nationality was 
acquired by fraud, the duty to avoid statelessness does not apply.  In that event, a State may 
withdraw its nationality even if the person concerned thereby becomes stateless.  In Rottmann, 
the ECJ affirmed that this exception also applies within the context of Union law.  Member 
States may, in other words withdraw their nationality if it was obtained by fraud, even if the 
person concerned thereby becomes stateless.  Kochenov has fiercely criticized this holding of 
the Court in Rottmann.  He argues that the Court should have refused to apply the said 
exception and should have focused instead on the fundamental principle underlying it, namely 
the limitation of cases of statelessness.  He sees the Courts judgment as a step backwards from 
the Micheletti decision where the Court refused to apply the international law doctrine of a 
“genuine connection” and thereby preserved “both common sense and the common market”.448  
In other words, Kochenov seems to argue that the exception based on fraud should not apply 
where the withdrawal of nationality leads to loss of Union citizenship, at least with regard to a 
person who had previously validly held the nationality of a Member State and hence Union 
citizenship.449   
 
                                                 
444  In addition to the general argument based on the fundamental right to equal treatment (see under V.C.2.a., 
supra). 
445  See the discussion under V.C.3., infra. 
446  See also Article 4(b) (“statelessness shall be avoided) and Article 8(1) (expressing the principle with 
regard to renunciation of nationality). 
447  See the discussion under V.C.2.b., supra. 
448  Kochenov, "Two Sovereign States vs. A Human Being: ECJ as a Guardian of Arbitrariness in Citizenship 
Matters" (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593220.  
449  See also Kochenov, "Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 2 March 2010, not yet reported" (2010) 47 CML Rev.,1842-1845. 
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I do not agree with this criticism.  Rules of international law do apply within the Union legal 
order and the Court should enforce them.  This means that the Court should enforce both the 
duty to avoid statelessness and the exceptions accepted thereto under international law.  This 
position applies with full force in the field of nationality, given the existing political sensitivity 
and implications for the sovereignty of the Member States.  It is only exceptionally that rules of 
international law should be left unapplied, namely where they conflict with principles of 
primary Union law, such as general principles of Union law and fundamental rights.450  This 
does not imply that the exception related to fraud should be left unapplied entirely.451  It should 
only be left unapplied when the withdrawal of nationality would conflict with one of the 
principles of primary Union law discussed in this chapter.  This explains the Court’s holding in 
Rottmann that even where Article 7(3) ECN is complied with, the principle of proportionality 
can still be infringed.  Besides, the parallel drawn with the Micheletti case is mistaken.  As 
explained above, the rationale for the Court’s holding is that the Member States retain 
competence to regulate nationality, they must unconditionally respect the same competence 
with other Member States.  Not applying the international law doctrine of the “genuine 
connection” in the context of Union law serves to respect the competence of the Member States 
to regulate their nationality, while at the same time guaranteeing the uniform application of the 
citizenship provisions throughout the Union.  No such considerations apply in favour of leaving 
the fraud-based exception unapplied, since that would not allow Member States to apply their 
nationality law and since in this case there is no danger of the person concerned enjoying 
different citizenship rights in different Member States. 
 
Lastly, it seems important to consider Article 9 ECN, which provides that: 
 
“Each State Party shall facilitate, in the cases and under the conditions provided for by its internal 
law, the recovery of its nationality by former nationals who are lawfully and habitually resident on 
its territory.” 
 
This could serve as a limitation in cases such as the Rottmann case, where the legislation of a 
Member State makes it very difficult for former nationals to recover their old nationality.  In 
Rottmann, Article 9 ECN is referred to among the “relevant provisions of international law”, 
under the heading “Legal context”.452  The ECJ did not, however, refer to this provision for the 
assessment of the validity of the Austrian legislation at issue.  The reason was, as explained 
above, that the Austrian authorities had not yet taken a decision regarding the possible recovery 
of Mr. Rottmann’s Austrian nationality.453  Suppose, however, that the Austrian authorities 
finally do not give Mr. Rottmann reasonable opportunities to recover his Austrian nationality.454  
Such would seem to infringe Article 9 ECN, which, as I have argued, can be taken into account 
by the ECJ.  Below I will argue that a Member State making it too difficult for former nationals 
to recover their nationality could hurt the principles of proportionality and of sincere 
                                                 
450  For a possible example, see ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi [2008] E.C.R. I-6351. 
451  In particular, in the case of third country nationals who obtain the nationality of a Member State by fraud, 
it seems defensible that withdrawal of nationality should be held permissible under Union law. Where this 
withdrawal works retroactively, such a person could even be said to have never had the status of Union 
citizen. 
452  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 21. 
453  For criticism of the ECJ’s timid position, see Oosterom-Staples, "Het internationale recht als 
beschermengel van de exclusieve bevoegdheden van lidstaten inzake verlies van nationaliteit?" (2010) 
N.T.E.R., 190 (who finds the Court’s judgment on this point unsatisfactory because it does not make 
explicit what duties Union law imposes on Austria in this connection). 
454  It seems rather likely that this is the case applied to the facts of the case: as explained higher, Mr. 
Rottmann does not seem to be satisfying the conditions for reacquisition of his Austrian nationality (see n. 
263, supra and accompanying text). 
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cooperation.455  Article 9 ECN would seem to be an additional argument for holding such 
legislation to be in violation of Union law.  The only problem with this argument could be the 
requirement of being “lawfully and habitually resident” on the territory of the Member State 
concerned.  The person who has lost his nationality will not always be resident in his “old” 
Member State and, given that he is no longer a national of that State, he will not always be 
legally entitled to reside in that State.  In this sense, Article 9 ECN is probably less stringent a 
limitation to the Member States’ competence than the principle of sincere cooperation.   
 
d) Fundamental right to respect for family life 
 
The fundamental right to respect for family life, laid down in Article 8 ECHR456 and Article 7 
of the Charter,457 has played an important role in a vast number of ECJ cases.458  It is clear 
from this case law that it is among the fundamental rights protected in Union law459 and that, 
where Member States act within the scope of Union law, respect for Article 8 ECHR is 
always required.  On this ground it can be argued that a Member State may not, without due 
justification, provide for loss of nationality where this would lead for the person concerned in 
the loss of the right to live with his family members.  An example may illustrate this point.  
Suppose that a Union citizen, living with his (EU) family members in his home Member 
State, were to lose his only Member State nationality.  This could have as a consequence that 
he would no longer be entitled to reside in his own right in the Member State concerned, nor 
as a family member of Union citizens under Union law, since that right is not applicable to 
one’s home Member State.460  Suppose that the person in question was living, instead, in 
another Member State than his home Member State.  Even then he might not have the right to 
reside with his family members in that State, namely where the conditions surrounding the 
residence rights of family members of a Union citizen laid down in Directive 2004/38 were 
not fulfilled.  The loss of the right to reside with one’s family members is, in both cases, the 
pure result of the withdrawal of Member State nationality,461 which could on that ground run 
                                                 
455  See infra under V.C.3. and V.C.4., respectively. 
456  Article 8 ECHR provides: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.” 
457  Article 7 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and Communications”. 
458  E.g. ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279; ECJ, Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] E.C.R. I-
6591; ECJ, Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] E.C.R. I-2911; ECJ, Case 441/02 Commission v 
Germany [2006] E.C.R. I-3449; ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719; ECJ, Case C-127/08 
Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241 
459  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, para. 41; ECJ, Case C-540/03 European 
Parliament v Council [2006] E.C.R. I-5769, para. 52; ECJ, Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, 
paras 58-59; Metock and Others, Order of 17 April 2008, para. 14. 
460  This results from the fact that Directive 2004/38 does not apply in “purely internal situations”; see ECJ, 
Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 76-78. This would be different in 
exceptional circumstances only (see ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr and the 
detailed discussion in Chapter 4, infra). 
461  Before the withdrawal of Member State nationality the person concerned would have the right to join his 
EU family in their Member State of residence. He would derive this right from Directive 2004/38 (for 
Member States other than the one of which he was a national) or from international law (for the Member 
State of which he was a national; this right cannot be made conditional, see ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind 
[2007] E.C.R. I-10719, para. 31). 
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counter to Article 8 ECHR.462  An implicit endorsement of this reasoning can be seen in 
Rottmann, where the Court instructed the national courts, when assessing the validity of a 
withdrawal measure, to consider the consequences thereof “for the person concerned and, if 
relevant, for the members of his family”.463  
 
It must be emphasised, however, that infringements of the right to respect for family life can 
be justified under Article 8(2) ECHR, which allows the Member States a considerable scope 
of discretion.464  In fact, the ECtHR has consistently held that Article 8 ECHR will only be 
violated in the most exceptional circumstances.465  The assessment of justifications under 
Article 8(2) ECHR will require a delicate balancing act between the interests of the individual 
in having his family life protected against the interest of the State in protecting the special 
bond of allegiance with its nationals.  As such, the assessment of the compliance with Article 
8 ECHR is a special instance of assessing compliance of the principle of proportionality, 
which I will discuss in detail below.  Below I will argue that the loss of the right to reside in 
one of the Member States together with one’s family members is one of the elements to be 
taken into account under the principle of proportionality and which may tilt the balance in 
favour of the individual concerned by the disputed nationality measure. 
 
3. Principle of proportionality 
 
The only principle of Union law that has ever been explicitly treated by the Court as a 
limitation to the competence of the Member States regarding nationality is the principle of 
proportionality.  In Rottmann, the ECJ confirmed that a withdrawal of Member State 
nationality, where it entails the loss of Union citizenship, will only be valid under Union law 
if it respects the principle of proportionality.466  The principle of proportionality is a general 
principle of Union law467 and it also figures in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.468  The Court is right, therefore, to apply it in cases concerning loss of 
Member State nationality which entail the loss of Union citizenship.469   
 
One of the essential functions of the principle is to safeguard the individual against national 
measures which impose excessive burdens on him.470  Consequently, we are concerned here 
                                                 
462  As was implicitly acknowledged by the ECJ in ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-
6241, para. 79. 
463  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 56 (emphasis added). See the discussion on 
the principle of proportionality, infra, under V.C.3. 
464  See the detailed discussion in Chapter 5, infra. 
465  See, inter alia, ECtHR, Judgment of 24 November 1998 in Case No. 40447/98 Mitchell v. the United 
Kingdom; ECtHR, Judgment of 22 June 1999 in Case No. 27663/95 Ajayi and Others v. the United 
Kingdom. 
466  The Court referred to both the Union law principle of proportionality and, where available, the principle 
of proportionality under the national law of the Member State (ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] 
E.C.R. I-1449, para. 55). I will only be concerned with the former in this Chapter. 
467  See the discussion in Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 141 et seq. 
468  Article 52(1) of the Charter states: “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised 
by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject 
to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others” (italics added). 
469  See the discussion on the scope of Union law under V.B., supra. 
470  Tridimas The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 137. 
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with the principle of proportionality as a mechanism to review rules or measures of the 
Member States. 471   The principle of proportionality requires that the contested national 
measure is both suitable to achieve the aim pursued (test of suitability) and does not go 
beyond what it is necessary in order to attain it (test of necessity).472  The aim pursued must, 
moreover, be a legitimate one. 473   A third test often described in the literature on 
proportionality and sometimes found in the case law of the Union Courts, is the test of 
“proportionality sensu stricto”, according to which a measure will be disproportionate if it has 
excessive effects on the applicant’s interests.474  Accordingly, the principle of proportionality 
requires a balancing exercise between the objectives pursued by a measure and its adverse 
effects on individual freedom.475  Specifically with regard to a national measure withdrawing 
nationality, this implies that the interests of a Member State in withdrawing nationality must 
be balanced against the interests of the individual concerned.   
 
The loss of Member State nationality may occur for different reasons.  Waldrauch 
distinguishes between fifteen “modes” of loss of Member State nationality, which he divides 
into two groups, namely renunciation of nationality, on the one hand, and loss of nationality 
without an explicit declaration of intent by the person concerned, on the other hand.476  These 
different reasons are grounded on different concerns.477  Some of them relate to the fact that 
the person concerned has acted in a disloyal way against his State or has committed a criminal 
offence or an act of fraud.  Others relate rather to the fact that the person concerned has 
established links with a foreign country, for instance due to long-term residence abroad or 
service in a foreign army.  In my view, in all the different cases just mentioned, the loss of 
nationality occurs because the “special relationship of solidarity and good faith”478 between 
the State and its national has faded (or has never truly existed479).  This can be the case either 
because the individual no longer has sufficient ties with the State in question480 or because the 
individual has committed an act which disproves his loyalty or allegiance to the State.481  The 
interest protected, in other words, is the special bond of allegiance between the individual and 
                                                 
471  For a detailed discussion, see Tridimas The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006), Chapter 5. 
472  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] E.C.R. I-6947, para. 42. 
473  E.g. ECJ, Case C-499/06 Nerkowska [2008] E.C.R. I-3993, para. 34. 
474  See e.g. Jans, de Lange, Prechal and Widdershoven Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen, Europa 
Law Publishing, 2007), 148 et seq.; Jans, “proportionality revisited” (2000) L.I.E.I., 240-241; de Búrca, 
“The principle of proportionality and its application in EC law” (1993) YbEL, 113. In these contributions 
the “necessity test” is sometimes referred to as the “least restrictive alternative test”. See also the 
discussion in Craig EU Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 655-658. 
475  Tridimas The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 139. 
476  Waldrauch, "Methodology for Comparing Acquisition and Loss of Nationality", in Bauböck, Ersbøll, 
Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality (Volume 1: Comparative 
Analyses) (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 111 et seq.  
477  See also the detailed report by De Groot and Vink, “Loss of Citizenship. Trends and Regulations in 
Europe”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory Comparative Report, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/comparative-analyses.  
478  As the Court put it in Rottmann (ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 51). 
479  Where a conferral of nationality is annulled. This is not strictly speaking a loss of nationality (because the 
person concerned will, legally speaking, never have had the nationality in question), but I do consider it 
relevant here as the person will for a certain time have enjoyed the rights associated with Union 
citizenship. 
480  For instance, where the individual has resided abroad for a long time. 
481  For instance, where the individual has joined a foreign army or has acquired his nationality by fraud. 
Chapter 2: Determination of the Personal Scope of Union Citizenship 
 87
his or her Member State, a bond which is in some Member States defined in exclusive 
terms.482  Protecting this bond is a legitimate aim, as was recognised by the ECJ in Rottmann.   
 
Withdrawal of nationality is no doubt an effective and suitable (though drastic) means for this 
purpose where an individual is perceived by a Member State to no longer meet the described 
“special relationship”.  The necessity of the loss of nationality – in the sense of the least 
restrictive alternative test – is more difficult to evaluate.  It would seem that, generally 
speaking, no other measure is as effective for severing the legal bond between a State and its 
nationals as a withdrawal or loss of nationality.  If that is accepted, the least restrictive 
alternative test is satisfied, because it does not require taking into account other measures 
which would not achieve the aim pursued to the same extent, even if they would be less 
damaging to other interests, in casu the interests of the individual concerned.483 
 
In any event, I submit that, in cases concerning nationality, the application of the principle of 
proportionality should focus on proportionality sensu stricto, i.e. weighing of the interests of 
the Member State against that of the individual concerned.  This clearly appears from the 
Court’s judgment in Rottmann.  It should be clear that the principle of proportionality cannot 
function in abstracto, but must be “fed”, so to say.  The Court in Rottmann provided specific 
guidance in this regard.  As the Court explained, Member States have to balance the 
consequences of the withdrawal decision for the person concerned and his or her family 
members with regard to the loss of the rights enjoyed by every Union citizen against 1) the 
gravity of the offence committed by that person, 2) the lapse of time between the 
naturalisation decision and the withdrawal decision and 3) the possibilities for that person to 
recover his original nationality.  I will argue below that these three criteria are useful, but not 
exhaustive or always applicable. 
 
As far as the interests of a Member State are concerned in providing for the loss of 
nationality, I already pointed out that there are many considerations which may prompt the 
Member States’ rules or measures to this effect.  However, all of them are, as I have 
explained, grounded in the interest of the Member State in protecting the special bond of 
allegiance with its nationals.  Of course, the interest a Member State may have in doing so 
will not always be equally strong, but will vary from case to case.  For instance, a Member 
State will have a stronger case to withdraw nationality from a person who has continuously 
resided abroad for more than twenty years and has acquired the nationality of a third country 
than from a person who has lived abroad for only a few years and has not acquired the 
nationality of a third country.  Similarly, in the case of withdrawal based on the offence of an 
individual, the Member State will have a stronger case where the offence committed is more 
significant or harmful to the interests of that State compared to minor offences.  In Rottmann, 
the Court was concerned with withdrawal based on the offence committed by Mr. Rottmann, 
namely fraud.  That explains why the Court required the balancing of, amongst others the 
“gravity of the offence committed”, the first criterion the Court announced.  More broadly, I 
submit that the balancing exercise under the principle proportionality requires taking into 
account “the ground for loss of nationality” and the stake of the interests it protects.   
 
                                                 
482  This explains, for instance, why the acquisition of the nationality of another State can be considered a 
ground for loss of nationality. For criticism on the exclusivity views on nationality, see Kochenov, 
"Double nationality in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance" (2011) 17 E.L.J., 323-343. 
483  Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011), 143. 
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As far as the individual’s interests are concerned, account must be taken of the loss of the 
rights associated with Union citizenship.  This can, as the Court in Rottmann rightly states, 
have consequences not only for the person concerned, but also for his or her family members.  
Indeed, one of the rights enjoyed by Union citizens is the right to be joined or accompanied 
by close family members.484  Loss of Union citizenship may have as a consequence, therefore, 
that the person concerned will no longer be able to live with his or her family members in the 
Member State where they used to live.  In the latter case, the interest of the individual may 
amount to a fundamental right, namely the right to family life, which warrants special 
protection in the Union legal order.485  Such obviously enhances the case of the individual 
concerned and may justify the conclusion that the withdrawal was disproportionate.486  It 
would seem that individuals similarly have a stronger case when other fundamental rights are 
violated, for instance the right to nationality in the case of an individual who became stateless.   
 
The second criterion announced by the Court in Rottmann obliges Member States to take 
account of the length of time between naturalisation and withdrawal of nationality.  Just like 
the first criterion, this criterion is relevant in the circumstances of the Rottmann case, but not 
generally applicable.  It will not, at first sight, be relevant with regard to individuals who were 
never naturalised but possessed the nationality of a Member State since birth.  The second 
criterion seems to indicate two elements to be taken into account.  On the one hand, the longer 
the lapse of time between naturalisation and withdrawal, the stronger the presumed links 
between the individual and the Member State concerned.  This will enhance the case of the 
individual and make it more difficult to justify withdrawal.487  On the other hand, the longer 
the said period, the more likely it is that the individual can invoke legitimate expectations as 
regards the possession of a nationality.  The principle of legitimate expectations is a general 
principle of Union law.  Consequently, this is also an element that must be taken into 
account.488 
 
The third criterion announced by the Court refers to the possibilities for the recovery of an 
individual’s initial nationality.  Again, this criterion is not generally applicable.  It will only 
apply where the individual concerned initially possessed the nationality of another Member 
State.  The possibilities for recovery in such a case are relevant because, where it is easy to 
reacquire one’s original Member State nationality, the individual concerned will eventually 
not have to suffer the loss of Union citizenship.  More generally, one could say that an 
individual will be less deserving of protection where he or she can limit the harsh 
consequences of the loss of his nationality.  For instance, an individual who could have 
prevented the loss of nationality from happening by making a simple declaration seems less 
worthy of protection.489  His interests will carry less weight when assessing whether the 
principle of proportionality was complied with.   
 
                                                 
484  See Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
485  See the discussion under V.C.2, supra. 
486  ECJ, Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer [1979] E.C.R. 3727, paras 23 and 30 (a measure is disproportionate if it 
impinges upon the “substance” of fundamental rights). 
487  In this connection a parallel with the case law of the ECJ can be made. In recent cases the ECJ has stated 
that a Member State may not without due justification deny certain benefits to nationals from other 
Member States who are sufficiently integrated (see, in particular, ECJ, Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] 
E.C.R. I-2119). Drawing an analogy, one could say that, similarly, Member States cannot without due 
justification deny individuals who are sufficiently integrated the very status that gives access to claims to 
these benefits, namely Union citizenship. 
488  See the discussion under V.C.5., infra. 
489  See n. 374, supra.   
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The third criterion seems also to refer to the “procedural dimension” of proportionality.490  In 
this sense, the principle of proportionality requires that a measure which restricts an 
individual’s rights is surrounded by sufficient procedural guarantees, such as administrative 
procedures that allow the individual to effectively assert his rights or the availability of 
judicial review.  In this connection, a withdrawal measure would probably be disproportionate 
if it did not leave a person a reasonable period of time in order to try to recover the nationality 
of his Member State of origin. 491   Accordingly, a Member State may be obliged to 
temporarily suspend its withdrawal decision. 492   The bottom-line is that the principle of 
proportionality requires a review not only of the substance of a national withdrawal measure, 
but also of the procedural conditions surrounding it, in particular its time-frame. 
 
Balancing the different interests and elements just discussed makes it possible to consider 
whether a national measure resulting in a person’s loss of nationality respects the principle of 
proportionality.  The question remains, however, what the standard and insensitivity of review 
will be.  It is submitted that it is probably only in extreme cases, i.e. where the interests of the 
individual manifestly outweigh those of the Member State concerned, that the principle of 
proportionality can be considered to be violated.  Such would seem necessary in order to 
safeguard the Member States’ principled competence in the field of nationality.  Safeguarding 
that competence may be argued to be necessary to protect the national identities of the 
Member States,493 given that nationality is without any doubt one of the elements central to 
that identity.  
 
Striking in this regard is that the ECJ in Rottmann left the proportionality assessment entirely 
to the national court, while providing it with guidance.  This is not without importance.  As 
Lord Hoffmann has stated494: 
 
“The real problem about applying the principle of proportionality, or for that matter any other test 
of rationality, in hard cases is not whether the principle should be observed but who should decide 
whether it has been observed or not.” 
 
The Court’s stance shows a reticence to carry out a full assessment of the validity of national 
rules on nationality itself.  This should be no surprise: in sensitive matters, the ECJ will 
normally abstain from carrying out the assessment of compliance with the principle of 
proportionality itself.495  Such is understandable, since the direct intervention of the Court in 
issues which are closely linked to State sovereignty may raise concerns of legitimacy.496  This 
stance is justified, moreover, since national courts will in general be better placed to evaluate 
                                                 
490  See, in particular, Prechal, “Free Movement and Procedural Requirements: Proportionality reconsidered” 
(2008) L.I.E.I, 201-216. 
491  See the Court’s hint to this regard (ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 58). 
492  Oosterom-Staples, "Het internationale recht als beschermengel van de exclusieve bevoegdheden van 
lidstaten inzake verlies van nationaliteit?" (2010) N.T.E.R., 192. 
493  See Article 4(2) TEU, which provides that the “Union shall respect the equality of Member States before 
the Treaties as well as their national identities”.   
494  Hoffmann, “The influence of the European Principle of Proportionality upon UK Law”, in Ellis (ed.), The 
Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe” (Oxford, Hart, 1999), 109 (quoted by Jans, de Lange, 
Prechal and Widdershoven Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2007), 
143). 
495  Jans, "Proportionality Revisited" (2000) 27 LIEI, 256. For an example of a case on Union citizenship in 
which the Court left the assessment under the proportionality principle to the national court, presumably 
because it involved an assessment of the validity of a restriction based on reasons of public policy or 
public security (which are closely connected to State sovereignty): ECJ, Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] E.C.R. 
I-5157, para. 29 in particular. 
496  Tridimas The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 226. 
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the proportionality of national measures.497  In this regard it must be remembered that the 
Court has consistently held that its role in the preliminary ruling procedure is limited to 
providing the national court with the guidance on interpretation necessary to resolve the case 
before it, while it is for the national court to apply these rules, as interpreted by the Court, to 
the facts of the case under consideration.498  Of course, the Court might be prepared to go 
further in infringement proceedings, but even there it should tread carefully and only hold that 
the principle of proportionality is violated in clear-cut cases, in order not to encroach upon the 
principled competence of the Member States in nationality matters. 
 
Interesting to point out is that the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the German court which made 
the preliminary reference in the Rottmann case, ruled, a few months after the ECJ judgment in 
the case, that the withdrawal of Mr. Rottmann’s German nationality was in accordance with 
German law and valid under Union law.499  It judged that the public interest in withdrawing 
the German nationality outweighed Mr. Rottmann’s individual interest in maintaining it, 
considering inter alia the serious character of the fraud committed and the relatively short 
period of time between the acquisition and withdrawal of German nationality.500  In this 
connection, the court considered that there was no need to further suspend the effects of the 
withdrawal decision, since Mr. Rottmann had already been given a considerable amount of 
time in order to try to reacquire the Austrian nationality and had not made diligent use of that 
time and of these possibilities.501  It further pointed that the negative consequences of the 
withdrawal decision for Mr. Rottmann and his family members in terms of the loss of Union 
citizenship rights are to some extent limited.  The reason is that Mr. Rottmann is married to a 
German spouse and enjoys in this capacity in any event a relatively well protected right of 
residence in Germany and a right to move to other Member States and back.502   
 
Two interesting observations can be made in this regard.  First, it proves the point that the 
ECJ’s judgment leaves considerable scope to the Member States to apply their nationality 
laws.  Even though the Bundesverwaltungsgericht diligently followed the guidance given by 
                                                 
497  Jans, "Proportionality Revisited" (2000) 27 LIEI, 255. See also the insightful discussion of the intensity of 
the scrutiny in the case law of the Union Courts in Craig EU Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 704-710. Accordingly, I do not agree with Kochenov’s view that allowing the 
Member States to apply the test of proportionality is a “dead-end, unlikely to bring about clarity” and 
which “cannot result in anything other than fragmenting and obscuring the law even further” (Kochenov, 
"Two Sovereign States vs. A Human Being: ECJ as a Guardian of Arbitrariness in Citizenship Matters" 
(2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593220; see, in the same vein, Konstadinides, "La fraternite 
europeene? The extent of national competence to condition the acquisition and loss of nationality from the 
perspective of EU citizenship" (2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 409 et seq.). Rather to the contrary, I believe the 
Court’s judgment, with the guidance it provides on the application of the principle of proportionality, 
shapes more clarity as regards the limitations flowing from Union law in the field of rules governing 
nationality. Admittedly, leaving the assessment of proportionality to the national courts can give rise to 
different standards of application, with possibly different outcomes in similar situations. However, it 
should be clear that that would be no different had the Court been prepared to assess proportionality itself 
in the Rottmann case. Moreover, in the present legal framework, where Member States remain competent 
to regulate nationality, diversity is inevitable (see the interesting observations in this regard in Mouton, 
"Réflexions sur la nature de l'Union européenne à partir de l'arrêt Rottmann" (2010) Revue Générale de 
Droit International Public, 275-279). 
498  E.g. ECJ, Case C-253/99 Bacardi [2001] E.C.R. I-6493, para. 58. 
499  BVerwG 5 C 12.10 of 11 November 2010. 
500  Ibid., para. 36. 
501  Ibid., paras 24-32. 
502  Ibid., para. 35. The court points out that on 26 September 2010 only, Mr. Rottmann requested the 
competent Austrian authorities to pronounce on his status under Austrian law (see BVerwG 5 C 12.10, 
para. 9). 
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the ECJ, the outcome of the case is that the German nationality rules find application without 
more.  Accordingly, claims that the Rottmann judgment takes away the competence of the 
Member States to adopt and apply rules concerning the loss and acquisition of nationality are, 
once more, refuted.  Second, it is clear that the fate of Mr. Rottmann’s Union citizenship will 
depend, at the end of the day, on the decision taken by the Austrian authorities.  As was 
already pointed out, it is somewhat regrettable in this regard that the ECJ in Rottmann did not 
address in more detail the obligations deriving for Austria from Union law.  The ensuing legal 
uncertainty may prompt fresh legal proceedings before the Austrian courts, with possibly a 
new preliminary reference to the ECJ, thereby extending Mr. Rottmann’s precarious situation.  
In particular, it may be wondered whether and to what extent the principle of sincere 
cooperation may require Austria to take into account the fact that Mr. Rottmann has now 
definitively lost his German nationality and, on that ground, be obliged to revive his Austrian 
nationality and his Union citizenship.  In other words, it is not sufficiently clear for the 
moment to what extent Union law obliges the Member State to coordinate their nationality 
policies and take each other’s nationality decisions and their effects on the Union citizenship 
status of the persons concerned into account.  This issue will be discussed in detail below (see 
under V.C.4.b, infra). 
 
4. Principle of sincere cooperation 
 
a) Acquisition of Member State nationality 
 
A further limitation to the competence of the Member States regarding nationality could be 
derived from the principle of sincere cooperation (sometimes also referred to as the principle 
or duty of loyal cooperation, loyalty or solidarity503) laid down in Article 4(3) TEU.504  De 
Groot505 argues that a Member State would act in breach of that principle if it were to grant its 
nationality to an important part of the population of a non-EU Member State without prior 
consultation with the Union institutions and the other Member States.506  One hypothetical 
example could be the conferral by a Member State of its nationality on all inhabitants of its 
former colonies.  He adds that the same holds true for the situation in which a Member State 
                                                 
503  See for instance, Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field 
of EU External Relations” (2010) 47 CML Rev., 323-359. 
504  Article 4(3) TEU, in its first subpara., explicitly refers to the “principle of sincere cooperation” (“Pursuant 
to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties”). For this reason, I will throughout 
the text refer to the principle under this name. For a discussion of the principle, see Lenaerts and Van 
Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 
147 et seq.  
505  De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 12; De Groot, "Naar een harmonisatie van het nationaliteitsrecht in 
Europa?", in X (ed.), Het plezier van de rechtsvergelijking: opstellen over unificatie en harmonisatie van 
het recht in Europa (Deventer, Kluwer, 2003), 78. See also De Groot, "The Relationship between the 
Nationality of the Member States of the European Union and European Citizenship", in La Torre (ed.), 
European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998), 135. See 
also Kotalakidis Von der nationalen Staatsangehörigkeit zur Unionsbürgerschaft: die Person und das 
Gemeinwesen (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2000), 298-299. 
506  AG Poiares Maduro approvingly refers to this argument in his Opinion in Rottmann (at para. 30), under 
reference to the article by De Groot. The AG further refers to Zimmermann, “Europaïsches 
Gemeinschaftsrecht und Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht der Mitgliedstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Probleme mehrfacher Staatsangehörigkeit” (1995) EuR, 54, specifically 62-63. 
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issues, without prior consultation, a declaration regarding the determination of nationals for 
Union purposes507 with the inclusion of an important part of the population of a non-EU 
Member State, because such a declaration would have the similar effect of suddenly 
increasing the number of Union citizens.508   
 
As I will explain, I agree with De Groot that in such a situation, under certain conditions, the 
principle of sincere cooperation could be violated.  However, the point of view must be 
further qualified and substantiated in order to overcome two possible problems.  First of all, it 
seems to be contradicted by historical precedents.  As De Groot himself points out, the recent 
history of UK nationality law offers three examples of extending British citizenship (and 
therefore Union citizenship) to (part of) the population of a non-European territory.509  In 
none of these instances did the European Commission or any other Member State voice 
protest.  The same remark applies to fairly recent amendments of the treaties on dual 
nationality, concluded between Spain and Latin American countries, which entitled persons of 
dual Spanish-Latin American nationality to apply for a Spanish passport.510  De Groot admits 
therefore that his argument can hold good only in what he labels “extreme circumstances”.511 
 
Jessurun d’Oliveira has replied that, even in “extreme circumstances”, Member States remain 
completely autonomous with regard to nationality matters.512  This is illustrated, the author 
submits, by the fact that the German reunification, which he points out led to an increase of 
approximately 18 million in the number of German nationals, was accepted without any 
objection by the other Member States and by the Union institutions.  He concludes from this 
that even national measures leading to an “extreme” increase in the number of Union 
nationals are permissible under Union law and cannot be considered as a violation of the 
Union principle of sincere cooperation.513  However, Jessurun d’Oliveira’s reply is not wholly 
accurate, as De Groot has pointed out.514  It is normally accepted that, because of the German 
declaration on nationality made in 1957,515 the entire population of the German Democratic 
Republic (hereinafter “GDR”516) already belonged to the group of persons that were German 
for Union purposes.  This was true even for Germans permanently resident in the GDR, even 
despite the fact the GDR was not part of the EEC at the time.517  It cannot be seen, in this light, 
                                                 
507  See the discussion under III.A.3., supra.  
508  See the references in n. 505, supra. 
509  De Groot refers to the British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983, granting British nationality to all 
British Dependent Territories Citizens living on the Falkland Islands; the British Nationality (Hong Kong) 
Act 1997, granting part of the population of Hong Kong the right to opt for British citizenship; British 
Overseas Territories Act 2002, granting British citizenship to most British Overseas Territories Citizens. 
See on these acts and their effect on British nationality law, in great detail Chapter 3, infra. 
510  See on this issue: IV.A.3, supra. See also, De Groot, "Latin-American European Citizens: Some 
Consequences of the Autonomy of the Member States of the European Union in Nationality Matters 
(editorial)" (2002) 9 MJ, 115-120.  
511  De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 13. 
512  Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam", in O’Keeffe and Twomey 
(eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999), 402. This 
view is shared by Kochenov (Kochenov, "Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment 
of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010, not yet reported" (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1840). 
513  Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam", in O’Keeffe and Twomey 
(eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999), , 409. 
514  De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 13. 
515  See n. 68, supra, and the accompanying text. 
516  Sometimes also referred to as “DDR” (Deutsche Demokratische Republik). 
517  See, e.g., ECJ, Case 14/74 Norddeutsches Vieh- und Fleischkontor GmbH [1974] E.C.R. 899, para. 6. 
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how the German reunification led to an increase in the number of Member States’ nationals.  
Neither can the original 1957 Declaration be seen as such: it was made by the German Federal 
Republic at the signing of the EEC Treaty, and can for this simple reason not be considered to 
change any previously existing situation under the Treaties.  On the other hand, there is some 
room to argue that the German reunification did lead to an increase in Member States’ 
nationals if one accepts, as some authors have argued,518 that the German 1957 declaration 
was to be understood as referring to Germans domiciled in the Federal Republic of Germany 
only.519  The German reunification had for a consequence that, from 3 October 1990 onwards, 
the Länder of former German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 520  Hence, at the moment of reunification, German nationals resident in these 
Länder became Union citizens, according to the view just set out.  From this point of view 
there is far more force to Jessurun d’Oliveira’s reply.   
 
In any event, there do not seem to be any historical precedents that could confirm De Groot’s 
argument based on the principle of sincere cooperation.  This, however, is not sufficient to 
reject the argument.  Indeed, the events just referred to occurred before the introduction of 
provisions on Union citizenship and the dynamic development of the citizenship acquis, in 
particular through progressive ECJ case law.  In fact, the possible influence of Union law on 
the nationality of the Member States is, even at present, still very much developing.  It cannot 
be excluded therefore that if, in the future, a Member State would significantly increase its 
population through a change in its nationality legislation, the Union institutions would object 
on grounds of Article 4(3) TEU and intervene.  A possible first test case could be a recent 
amendment to the Hungarian nationality legislation, which entered into force in January 
2011.521  Under the new legislation, which was passed in the Hungarian parliament on 26 
May 2010, 522  persons of Hungarian ancestry residing abroad are entitled to apply for 
Hungarian citizenship as from 1 January 2011.523  This might well result in a significant 
extension of Hungarian nationality to persons living in neighbouring countries, in particular 
                                                 
518  See the discussion in Bleckmann, "German Nationality Within the Meaning of the EEC Treaty" (1978) 15 
CML Rev., 442 et seq. 
519  Before the German reunification, Germans with a permanent residence in the GDR were considered 
“nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany”. For this reason, the German Federal Republic was able 
issue passports and claim as German citizens every citizen of the GDR who managed to legally or 
illegally leave the territory of the GDR and arrive at a consulate or embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. See: Hailbronner, "Germany", in Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), 
Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. Volume 2: Country 
Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 218, referring to Hailbronner, "Deutsche 
Staatsangehörigkeit und DDR-Staatsbürgerschaft" (1981) JuS, 712. 
520  At the same time these Länder “acceded” to the European Communities, without any amendment of the 
Treaties. See the conclusions of the Dublin European Council of 28 April 1990 [1990] 4 EC Bull., point 
I.5. 
521  See “Hungarians abroad apply for citizenship under new law”, available at 
http://www.politics.hu/20110104/hungarians-abroad-apply-for-citizenship-under-new-law. The Hungarian 
example is mentioned in this connection by Hailbronner (Hailbronner, "Nationality in Public International 
Law and European Law", in Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss 
of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses 
(Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 91), who refers to the Hungarian 2004 referendum on 
dual nationality. 
522  Act XLIV of 2010 amending Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Nationality. 
523  For more detailed information, see the reports on the website of the EUDO citizenship observatory: 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/. For a summary of the provisions of the new law in English, see http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/recentChanges/Hungary.pdf  
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Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine, where a significant number of ethnic Hungarians are living 
according to estimates.524  
 
Second, De Groot does not really explain how the principle of sincere cooperation could be 
violated in the suggested scenario.  He seems to consider such a violation to be self-evident.  
However, it is not immediately clear how that principle would be violated by a “surprising 
grant” of Member State nationality to large groups of persons who had previously not been 
nationals of a Member State.  We can safely assume that De Groot is concerned with the 
“negative side” to or the “derogatory function” of the principle of sincere cooperation,525 
which requires the Member States to “refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the 
attainment of the Union’s objectives” (Article 4(3), third subpara., TEU).526  Yet, De Groot 
does not explain which objectives of the Union could be threatened in the situation described.  
Much more elaborate reasoning on this point is found in a book by Hall.527  Hall explains that 
there can be three grounds for concluding that the principle of Article 4(3) TEU is violated by 
a Member State extending its nationality.  
 
In the first place, Hall submits that there can be a risk of “economic dislocation”.  Where a 
Member State extends its nationality en masse to large numbers of non-EU citizens, this could 
expose the Union’s labour market, its market for services and any markets affected by the 
right of establishment to serious disruption.  As such, the measure could jeopardise the 
Union’s aim of promoting a high level of employment and guaranteeing adequate social 
protection528 and, I would add, perhaps more importantly, that of establishing a functioning 
internal market.  Of course, this reasoning only holds good in the most extreme cases.  A 
serious disruption of the internal market would only occur if a) Member State nationality were 
extended to very large groups of persons, who b) would have a lower standard of living than 
that of EU nationals, because such would likely lead to mass emigration to EU Member 
States.  In less extreme cases, there is no reason to assume that a large increase in Member 
State nationals will automatically disrupt the Union’s internal market.  Two examples may 
further clarify the point.  De Groot’s example of the Netherlands extending its nationality to 
the entire population of Surinam, its former colony, would perhaps not be covered.  Surinam 
has a population of less than 500 000 people.529  Even if a substantial number of Surinamese 
would emigrate, such would presumably not seriously affect the internal market of the EU, 
with its population of more than 500 million people.530  By contrast, if the UK were to extend 
                                                 
524  See the figures cited in the “Hungary Country Report” by Kovács and Tóth, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/. Admittedly, only the extension of Hungarian nationality to persons residing in Ukraine 
would result in a significant increase in the number of Union citizens.  
525  See Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2011), 149. 
526  For an application of this duty, see a line of cases in the field of external relations, in which it is stated that 
it follows from Article 4(3) TEU that: “to the extent to which [Union] rules are promulgated for the 
attainment of the objectives of the [Union], the Member States cannot, outside the framework of the 
[Union] institutions, assume obligations which might affect those rules or alter their scope.” See e.g. ECJ, 
Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR case) [1971] E.C.R. 263, para. 22).  
527  Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 63 et seq. 
528  See now Article 9 TFEU. Hall refers to Article 2 TEC, which stated the Union’s task of promoting 
“throughout the [Union] a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities […] a high level 
of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life”. 
529  Surinam has a population of 481,267 according to a July 2010 estimate (taken from the CIA World Fact 
Book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).  
530  More precisely: 501,064,212 in 2010 according to Eurostat 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=
1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1).  
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British citizenship, including “for Union purposes”, to all nationals of India or if France were 
to extend French nationality to all nationals of its former African colonies such would in all 
likelihood lead to serious disruptions of the internal market.  The possibility of (and fear for) 
such disruptions caused by a significant increase is illustrated by the fact that upon accession 
of new Eastern European Member States the existing Member States were temporarily 
allowed to restrict access to their labour markets for nationals from these countries.531  
 
There is another good reason for limiting possible violations based of Article 4(3) TEU for 
risk of “economic dislocation” to the most extreme cases only.  If not, one could wonder 
whether, under the reasoning followed, Article 4(3) TEU would not impose on Member States 
with a rather flexible nationality law an obligation to make it as restrictive as possible.  Indeed, 
if the reasoning set out above were followed through, it could be argued that flexible 
nationality laws lead to an increase in the number of “Union citizens”, and thus to a disruption 
of the internal market.  It is clear that this reasoning cannot be sustained.  It would encroach 
on (and not just put a limit to) the principal competence of the Member States regarding 
nationality.532  
 
In the second place, Hall submits that a Member State may, when conferring its nationality on 
persons who possess no genuine link with it, act in a deceptive or misleading way towards the 
other Member States, at least when this is done without prior consultation with the other 
Member States or the Union institutions.  Such measures are said to put in peril the Union’s 
aim of promoting solidarity among the Member States (see Article 3(3), third para., TEU).  
What Hall is essentially arguing is that Member States conferring their nationality in the 
absence of a genuine link, in the sense of the Nottebohm case, effectively violate Article 4(3) 
TEU, unless they do so after prior consultation.  This point of view has the obvious difficulty 
of seemingly being in conflict with the Micheletti judgment, in which the ECJ ruled that 
Member States have to unconditionally accept any grant of nationality by another Member 
State, even in the absence of a genuine link.533  Hall argues that that in itself does not mean 
that a Member State which grants its nationality in the absence of such a link could not violate 
Article 4(3) TEU.  Hall is certainly right in pointing out that, as a matter of principle, the 
Micheletti judgment leaves room for the possibility that a nationality, even though it has to be 
unconditionally accepted by other Member States, was granted in violation of Union law.  
Indeed, as explained higher, the Micheletti case also stands for the dictum that Member States 
have to exercise their competence regarding nationality in accordance with Union law.  This 
all comes down to the divergence noted above between the Union law framework surrounding 
conferral and recognition of nationality.  
 
                                                 
531  See the Annexes on the transitional measures to the 2003 and 2005 Acts of accession ([2003] O.J. L236 
and [2005] O.J. L157). See further Cremona, "EU Enlargement: Solidarity and Conditionality” (2005) 30 
E.L. Rev., 3-22; Inglis, "The Union's Fifth Accession Treaty: New Means to Make Enlargement Possible” 
(2004) 41 CML Rev., 937-973. 
532  Hall rightly observes (Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 80) that “[g]iven that many measures 
which are not within the [Union’s] legislative competence, such as those relating to nationality…, could 
have a theoretically adverse impact to greater or lesser degrees on the Community’s basic economic 
objectives, the concept of ‘jeopardy’ in Article [4(3) TEU] would need to imply a ‘real and serious threat’ 
if Article [4(3) TEU] were not to operate as a vehicle for the complete destruction of national 
sovereignty”. 
533  Supra, under IV.A. 
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However, Hall probably takes things too far when he argues that Nottebohm534 is actually 
enforced by Union law as a limit to the Member States’ competence in conferring nationality.  
In my view, Micheletti is probably best understood as indicating that Nottebohm does not 
apply at all in the context of the Union, and this is how most scholars have interpreted the 
decision. 535   Noteworthy in this regard is that AG Tesauro in his opinion in Micheletti 
explicitly stated:  
 
“I do not believe that the case before the Court constitutes an appropriate setting in which to raise 
the problems relating to effective nationality, whose origin lies in a ‘romantic period’ of 
international relations and, in particular, in the concept of diplomatic protection; still less, in my 
view, is the well known (and, it is worth remembering, controversial) Nottebohm judgment of the 
International Court of Justice […] of any relevance.”   
 
Admittedly, the AG made this remark where he was considering possible limitations to the 
Member States’ duty to recognise nationality, and not limitations to their competence to 
determine nationality.  Still then, it is a strong indication that Nottebohm does not apply 
within the framework of Union law.  The simple reason is that Nottebohm is concerned with 
recognition of nationality at the international level.  It holds that, under certain circumstances, 
States may refuse to recognise, at the level of international law, the effects flowing from a 
nationality granted by another State.  It does not impose as such any limitation to the 
competence of States in determining nationality.  Consequently, if Nottebohm does not apply 
at the level of the duty to recognise nationality, as unambiguously results from Micheletti, it 
will simply not apply at all.  It is not conceptually right to try and bring it back in through the 
backdoor as a possible limitation to the competence of the Member States to determine 
nationality.  It follows that a Member State does not breach its duties under Article 4(3) TEU 
when it confers its nationality on a person who does not have a genuine link with it. 
 
In the third place, Hall argues that a Member State violates its duties under Article 4(3) TEU 
if it confers its nationality on individuals while at the same time denying them the right of 
abode in (all of) its territories to which Union law applies.  Such conferral is said to amount to 
a kind of “social dumping”, by forcing the other Member States to grant the newly created 
Member State nationals access to their territory while escaping the same consequence itself.  
Probably, this should be considered tantamount then to the Union’s aim of guaranteeing 
adequate social protection and the fight against social exclusion (Article 9 TEU).  However, 
the argument is obviously based on a false premise.  The right of abode of Member State 
nationals in the territory of the own Member State amounts to a purely internal situation, and 
in such a situation Union law does not apply and it cannot impose any restrictions 
therefore.536  A restriction of the right to abode within the territory of a Member State is not, 
moreover, an issue related to loss or acquisition of nationality for which, as I have argued 
above, Member State nationality itself could be considered a sufficient link with Union law.  
If, on the other hand, there is a link with Union law, for example because the person in 
question has legally resided in another Member State, that person derives from Union law the 
right to reside in his own Member State under the same conditions as nationals of another 
Member State.537  In that case, the scenario of “social dumping” simply does not arise. 
 
                                                 
534  ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] ICJ Reports 4. 
535  Jessurun d’Oliveira, "European Citizenship: Its Meaning, Its Potential", in Monar, Ungerer and Wessels 
(eds.), The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (Brussels, European University Press, 1993), 81. 
536  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 33.  
537  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] E.C.R. I-4265. 
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Building on the foregoing, I would conclude that the principle of sincere cooperation could be 
violated if a Member State were to extend its nationality to large numbers of previously non-
EU nationals without informing and consulting the other Member States and the Union 
institutions – under two circumstances.  A violation of Article 4(3) TEU is arguable, first of 
all, where the extension of nationality leads to serious disruptions of the internal market.  That 
could only be the case in extreme circumstances, as discussed higher.  Besides, I would argue 
that the extension of Member State nationality to nationals of a third country must be seen as 
an act of foreign policy which redefines the relations between the third country concerned and 
the EU Member States.  As such, it might touch upon issues for which the EU is also 
competent, such as development cooperation or even CFSP.  Accordingly, the extension of 
nationality may impact on the Union objectives in this field and in such case the principle of 
sincere cooperation requires the Member State to consult first.  Furthermore, the unilateral 
extension of Member State nationality to nationals of a third county may create significant 
political tension between the third country concerned, on the one hand, and the EU and its 
Member States, on the other hand.  In such a situation too, the principle of sincere cooperation 
would seem to require a priori consultations because the Union’s foreign policy objectives are 
at stake.538  In these extreme situations, just informing the Commission and the other Member 
States of an intended extension of nationality would probably not be enough.  The principle of 
sincere cooperation probably requires in such situations to hold consultations to come to an 
acceptable position for all parties involved. 
 
My conclusion would be that in a situation as described in the foregoing, the principle of 
sincere cooperation can probably serve as an effective Union law limitation to the competence 
of the Member States regarding acquisition of nationality.  Besides, the principle can serve as 
an additional argument where a Member State in question is alleged to have breached other 
provisions or principles of Union law, such as fundamental rights.539 
 
b) Loss of Member State nationality 
 
I just explained how the principle of sincere cooperation could, at least in extreme cases, 
function as a limit to the competence of the Member States regarding acquisition of 
nationality.  There is no a priori reason why it could not also limit their competences 
regarding loss of nationality.  Specifically, one could wonder whether the principle obliges 
Member States to coordinate their nationality rules in such a way as to avoid the loss of Union 
citizenship in cases where the loss results from the fact that the rules of one Member State do 
not duly take into account the status of the person concerned under the legislation of another 
Member State.   
 
The most relevant scenario that immediately comes to mind is the one present in Rottmann.  
Mr. Rottmann was risking to become stateless essentially because a) by acquiring the 
                                                 
538  On the duty to consult as derived from the principle of sincere cooperation, see the many examples cited 
in Temple-Lang, “The development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of National 
Authorities and Community Institution under Article 10 EC” (2007-2008) Fordham Int’l L.J., 1483, at 
1507 in particular and in Stroink and van der Linden (eds.), “Judicial Lawmaking and Administrative 
Law” (Antwerpen-Oxford, Intersentia, 2005), 29-33. See also Temple Lang, “Developments, issues and 
new remedies-the duties of national authorities and courts under Article 10 of the EC Treaty” (2004) 
Fordham I.L.J. 1904-1939. 
539 See Dauses, "Quelques réflexions sur la signification et la portée de l'article 5 du traité CEE", in Bieber and 
Ress (eds), Die Dynamik des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts/The Dynamics of EC-Law (Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 1987), 229, at 233-235. 
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nationality of Member State B (Germany), he lost the nationality of Member State A 
(Austria), but b) when the nationality of Member State B was withdrawn, such did not 
necessarily lead to him reacquiring the nationality of Member State A.540  In that case, Mr. 
Rottmann would end up losing his Union citizenship essentially on the ground that he did not 
disclose the existence of criminal persecution in another Member State for a criminal fact 
which would in itself never justify the loss of nationality or, even less, Union citizenship.  It 
may be wondered whether the principle of sincere cooperation does not oblige Member States 
to coordinate their action in order to prevent such cases of loss of Union citizenship from 
happening.541  As was already remarked, it is regrettable that the Court in Rottmann did not 
use the opportunity to clarify the exigencies deriving from this principle.  It is to be hoped that 
future case law will fill this gap. 
 
The principle of sincere cooperation certainly does entail positive obligations for the Member 
States.  It obliges them to “take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union” (Article 4(3), second subpara., TEU).  Such might, in certain 
circumstances oblige them to consult with each other and with the Union institutions before 
taking a certain course of action542 and to coordinate their action between themselves and, 
more importantly perhaps, with the Commission.543  The problem is that it is not clear which 
obligations deriving from the Treaties or other acts of Union law could serve as the basis for 
such obligation.  Important to remember in this regard is that it is often argued that the 
principle of sincere cooperation can only create duties together with some other rule of Union 
law, or some principle or objective of Union law which is to be facilitated or, at least, not 
jeopardised.544  One could of course, also focus on the “negative side” to or the “derogatory 
function” of the principle of sincere cooperation545 and argue that the absence of coordination 
between the Member States in the situation described would amount to jeopardising the 
Union’s objective of a Citizens’ Europe in which the free movement of persons is 
guaranteed.546  This reasoning seems far-fetched and has the danger of becoming a gateway to 
justifying wide Union law intrusions into the Member State’s nationality laws, since it is 
based on such a vague and open-ended objective.   
 
In my view it is better to treat the principle of sincere cooperation as reinforcing and 
complementing the principle of proportionality.  Striking in this regard is that the referring 
court in Rottmann explicitly wondered whether the principle of sincere cooperation obliged 
                                                 
540  Whether this second premise is true depends of course on how the Austrian nationality provisions will be 
interpreted and applied in the case by the Austrian authorities. Higher I explained that the possibility of an 
automatic reacquisition of the Austrian nationality seems unlikely. 
541  Ironically, it would seem that better coordination between the Austrian and German authorities would 
have prevented the Rottmann scenario, i.e. the possibility of becoming stateless and losing citizenship of 
the Union, from happening in the first place. If the Austrian authorities had been quicker to inform the 
German authorities about the pending criminal proceedings against Mr. Rottmann, the latter would 
presumably never have obtained the German nationality at all.  
542  See the references cited in n. 538, supra.  
543  See, for an example in the field of competition law: ECJ, Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] E.C.R. I-
9011, para. 90. 
544  Temple Lang, “The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10 E.C.: Two 
More Reflections” (2001) E.L. Rev., 84-93. 
545  Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011), 149. 
546  In this connection, one could point out that, if Member States may not without justification hinder the 
exercise of Union citizens, they should make sure that Union citizens do not, in the absence of the most 
convincing reasons, lose the status that gives entitlement to the right to free movement. 
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Austria, in the circumstances of that case, to permit Mr. Rottmann to reacquire the Austrian 
nationality.547  The Court in its judgment did not, however, refer to the principle of sincere 
cooperation, but only to the principle of proportionality.  It apparently saw that principle and 
the duties deriving therefrom as the perfect means to “prevent a lack of co-ordination between 
States leading to a Union citizen becoming unnecessarily stateless”.548  As argued above, the 
principle of proportionality requires both the Member State of naturalisation and the original 
Member State to duly take account of the interests of the individual concerned and of the 
consequences of the loss of Union citizenship for his situation.  It will, in cases where the 
interests of the individual manifestly outweigh that of the Member State oblige them to 
reinstate their nationality.  The principle of sincere cooperation might in such a case, 
moreover, oblige the Member States concerned to take each other’s nationality measures into 
account and, where necessary, consult with each other in order to prevent the possibly 
disproportionate consequences of the loss of Member State nationality from happening.  In 
this sense, the principle of sincere cooperation adds a dimension to the proportionality 
assessment, namely one of “connecting the dots”.  Indeed, taken separately, the decisions of 
the Member State of naturalisation and that of the original Member State may be 
proportionate to the aim pursued.549  However, when both decisions are considered together, 
the consequences deriving therefrom for the person concerned may be disproportionate to the 
aims pursued.550  The rule providing for loss of nationality on grounds of fraud, which aims at 
re-establishing the situation existing before the fraudulent nationality was obtained, could be 
said to have disproportionate consequences where it is impossible to re-establish that situation 
because the initial nationality was lost and cannot be reacquired.  Similarly, the application of 
the rule regarding loss of nationality for having acquired another nationality would arguably 
become disproportionate if the latter nationality was retroactively withdrawn and hence in fact 
never acquired. 551   In this sense one could agree with AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer that 
“Citizenship of the Union…must at least guarantee that it is possible to change nationality 
within the European Union without suffering any legal disadvantage”. 552   This broader 
                                                 
547  See ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 34 (“The national court considers that it is 
possible at least that the Republic of Austria, as the Member State of Dr Rottmann’s original nationality, 
might be bound, by virtue of the duty to cooperate with the Union in good faith […] to interpret and apply 
its national law or to adapt it so as to prevent the person concerned from becoming stateless when, as in 
the case in the main proceedings, that person has not been given the right to keep his nationality of origin 
following the acquisition of a foreign nationality.”). 
548  Davies, "The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of Union Citizenship and Rights" (2010) EUDO 
Citizenship Forum, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/254-has-the-european-court-
of-justice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-law?start=2. 
549  In Rottmann, for instance, the German decision (withdrawal for reason of fraud) and the Austrian initial 
decision (loss of nationality for reason of acquisition of another nationality) seem proportionate. The 
arguably disproportionate consequences seem to derive from the lack of coordination between these 
Member States, not from their decisions in their own right. 
550  An interesting parallel can be drawn with ECJ, Case C-165/91 van Munster [1994] E.C.R. I-4661, in 
which the ECJ held that the principle of sincere cooperation may require a Member State, when applying 
its legislation, to take into account the applicable legislative provisions of another Member State and to 
avoid applying its legislation in such a way as to create an outcome, on acoount of the combined 
application of the applicable provisions in both Member States which is liable to violate the aims of Union 
law. See the discussion in Verhoeven, The European Union in search of a Democratic and Constitutional 
Theory (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2011) 315-316. 
551  In this sense, Hailbronner, "Nationality in Public International Law and European Law", in Bauböck, 
Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 
15 European Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 
2006), 94. 
552  Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-386/02 Baldinger [2004] E.C.R. I-8411, para. 47. 
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perspective has the benefit that it obliges Member States to duly take into account Union 
citizenship and the consequences resulting from the loss thereof.   
 
The bottom-line is that the principle of sincere cooperation could serve as a principle 
reinforcing the proportionality assessment.  It will oblige the Member States, when applying 
their nationality rules to a certain person, to take into account the nationality rules applicable 
to that person in another Member State and to prevent situations which, if the application of 
all relevant rules are considered together, have disproportionate consequences for the person 
in question.  To this end, they may be obliged to consult with each other to coordinate their 
action.  However, in my view, it would be wrong to derive from the principle of sincere 
cooperation more far-reaching duties.  Accordingly, I think it cannot be considered that the 
principle of sincere cooperation, in the scenario described, imposes a blanco obligation553 on 
the original Member State to restore its nationality, for instance by retroactively interpreting 
its nationality rules as if the ground for loss of nationality had never occurred.554  As I already 
pointed out, there is no Union law rule or principle which could serve as the basis for such an 
interpretation of the principle of sincere cooperation, except perhaps, under limited 
circumstances, the principle of equivalence. 555   Rather than imposing a blanco duty or 
prohibition to offer reacquisition of nationality under certain circumstances, the principle of 
sincere cooperation requires Member States, considering the nationality status of the person 
concerned in all other Member States and, possibly after consultation, to consider whether 
such reacquisition would be the best solution to avoid disproportionate consequences for the 
person concerned.  It may also oblige Member States, more in general, to coordinate their 
nationality rules in order to avoid disproportionate consequences.  Consequently, it has 
consequences for all Member States whose nationality is in issue, where the loss of Union 
citizenship is at stake, and not just for the Member State of someone’s original nationality.  
After all it is a principle of cooperation.  However, as I remarked when dealing with the 
principle of proportionality, only in fairly extreme situations can the principle oblige a 
Member State to confer its nationality upon a person, invalidate a nationality decision or 
prohibit it from withdrawing its nationality.  As such, the principle of sincere cooperation 
respects the autonomous and principled competence of the Member State, while at the same 
time serving to protect the status of Union citizenship.   
 
5. Principle of legitimate expectations 
 
Another principle of Union law that could possibly serve as a limitation to the competence of 
the Member States regarding nationality, is the principle of legitimate expectations.556  The 
                                                 
553  I mean an obligation phrased in general terms such as: “The principle of sincere cooperation obliges a 
Member State to offer the possibility of (re)acquisition of its nationality to an individual who has lost it on 
grounds of the acquisition of the nationality of another Member State if the latter nationality is later 
annulled and has therefore, from the point of view of the legal order of the second Member State, never 
been acquired at all”. This obligation could be taken even one step further, namely not as an obligation to 
merely offer the possibility of reacquisition of nationality, but as an obligation to provide for the 
automatic reacquisition of nationality. 
554  This duty could, in a less imposing form, also be termed as a prohibition, namely for instance: “the 
principle of sincere cooperation prohibits a Member State from providing for the (definitive) loss on 
grounds of the acquisition of the nationality of another Member State if the latter nationality is later 
annulled and has therefore, from the point of view of the legal order of the second Member State, never 
been acquired at all”.   
555  See Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 34. 
556  See Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Rottmann, para. 31.  
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principle of legitimate expectations is a general principle of Union law.557  Consequently, 
Member State authorities have to comply with this principle when acting within the scope of 
Union law.558  Such is, as I have argued above, the case, inter alia, where nationality rules or 
decisions involve the loss of Union citizenship.   
 
The principle of legitimate expectations takes particular importance with regard to retroactive 
measures.  The ECJ has held in this regard that the retroactive withdrawal of a Union measure 
which has conferred individual rights or similar benefits would infringe the principle of 
legitimate expectations.559  By way of an analogy, it could be argued that, where a person had 
a legitimate expectation that he had obtained the nationality of a Member State, a retroactive 
withdrawal of that nationality would be in violation of the principle of legitimate 
expectations.  Indeed, the conferral of Member State nationality can certainly be viewed as a 
measure conferring important “individual rights or benefits” under Union law, namely Union 
citizenship and the rights associated therewith. 
 
A retroactive measure will only be legitimate if two conditions are fulfilled: 1) retroactivity is 
required by the objectives of the measure pursued and 2) the legitimate expectations of those 
affected are duly respected.560  As Tridimas notes, both conditions are inextricably linked.  
This requires the Union Courts to balance, on the one hand, the public interests which 
retroactivity is purported to serve and, on the other hand, the legitimate expectations of the 
person concerned and the extent to which these are affected.561  As such, the principle of 
legitimate expectations seems to function as a sub-function of the principle of 
proportionality, 562  namely one requiring that, when assessing the proportionality of a 
measure, the legitimate expectations of the individual concerned and the specific interests of 
the Member State in providing for retroactivity are taken into account.  
 
As far as the individual’s legitimate expectations are concerned, foreseeability will be a 
central element.  Accordingly, if the retroactive withdrawal was reasonably foreseeable, a 
breach of legitimate expectations cannot be claimed.563  On the facts of the Rottmann case, for 
instance, it would prima facie be difficult to argue that the German withdrawal was not 
foreseeable, given that Mr. Rottmann had knowingly provided false information in order to 
obtain the German nationality.  This links in to another element that will be taken into account 
when assessing whether or not legitimate interests are at stake, namely the good faith of the 
                                                 
557  There is a large body of case law of the ECJ mentioning the principle of legitimate expectations as a 
general principle of Union law. See e.g. ECJ, Joined Case C-181/04 to C-183/04 Elmeka [2006] E.C.R. I-
8167, para. 31. For an overview, see Tridimas The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 251 et seq.; Craig EU Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 607 et seq.; Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd 
ed.) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 851-852 and Temple Lang, "Legal Certainty and Legitimate 
Expectations as General Principles of Law", in U. Bernitz and J. Nergelius (eds.), General Principles of 
European Community Law (The Hague-London-Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000), 163-184. 
558  See, e.g., ECJ, Joined Case C-181/04 to C-183/04 Elmeka [2006] E.C.R. I-8167, para. 31; ECJ, Case C-
285/09 R [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 45. 
559  See ECJ, Joined Cases 7/56 and 3/57 to 7/57 Algera and Others v Common Assembly of the ECSC [1957] 
E.C.R. 81, 115; ECJ, Case 159/82 Verli-Wallace v Commission [1983] E.C.R. 2711, para. 8 (emphasis 
added). 
560  ECJ, Case 98/78 Racke [1979] E.C.R. 69, para. 20; ECJ, Case C-110/97 Netherlands v Council [2001] E.C.R. 
I-8763, paras 151-157. These conditions were first developed by the Court in relation to Union measures, 
but they equally apply vis-à-vis national measures (see, e.g., ECJ, Case C-459/02 Gerekens [2004] E.C.R. 
I-7315, para. 24). 
561  Tridimas The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 256. 
562  See the discussion in Craig EU Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 649-651. 
563  See ECJ, Case 108/81 Amylum [1982] E.C.R. 3107, para. 21. 
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person concerned.  A person who did not act in good faith, for example by fraudulently 
acquiring a Member State’s nationality, cannot normally rely on the principle of legitimate 
expectations in order to prevent that Member State from retroactively withdrawing its 
nationality.564  However, certain other elements may point in favour of the existence of a 
legitimate expectation that a nationality, once obtained, will not be retroactively withdrawn.  
One of the most important elements in this regard is, in my view, the lapse of time between 
the acquisition and the withdrawal of nationality.  Indeed, the longer a person has had a 
certain nationality, the more convincing it becomes to argue that he or she had a legitimate 
expectation that it would not at some point in time be retroactively withdrawn.  The Court in 
Rottmann seems to have implicitly confirmed this interpretation of the principle of legitimate 
expectations.  Admittedly, it did not refer to that principle explicitly, but it did instruct the 
national court to take account of “the lapse of time between the naturalisation decision and the 
withdrawal decision” when assessing whether a withdrawal was proportionate.565  Another 
element to be taken into account, which again links in to the previous one, is the reliance of 
the person concerned on the nationality which is the object of the withdrawal decision.566  
Accordingly, it could be argued that a person who has relied on his nationality, for example 
by making use of the rights associated with Union citizenship,567 will have a stronger claim 
on the basis of the principle of legitimate expectations. 
 
As far as the Member State’s interest in retroactively withdrawing its nationality is concerned, 
it must be pointed out that such measure will normally serve the protection of the special bond 
between the State and its nationals and the reciprocity of rights and duties.568  However, 
another objective pursued by retroactive withdrawal of a nationality obtained by fraud is to re-
establish the situation as it had been before the acquisition of that nationality.569  In situations 
such as the one in Rottmann such could arguably not be achieved.570  Hence, the need for 
retroactivity in such circumstances will carry less weight in balancing the Member State’s 
interest against that of the individual. 
 
We can conclude that, in a way similar to the principle of sincere cooperation, the principle of 
legitimate expectations can act as a limitation to the Member State’s competence regarding 
nationality, first and foremost, through the principle of proportionality.  Particularly with 
regard to retroactive withdrawal of Member State nationality, it will deepen the 
proportionality assessment by requiring certain specific elements regarding retroactivity and 
the protection of an individual’s legitimate expectations to be taken into account.  As was 
                                                 
564  Jans, de Lange, Prechal and Widdershoven Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen, Europa Law 
Publishing, 2007), 168 (referring in particular to ECJ, Case C-336/00 Huber [2002] E.C.R. I-76990). See 
also the examples cited in Craig EU Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 617 
(who remarks: “There is no moral rationale for allowing a person to claim a ‘legitimate’ expectation based 
on an initial decision that was obtained by fraud or deception.”). 
565  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 56. See also supra, under V.C.3., on the 
principle of proportionality. 
566  Jans, de Lange, Prechal and Widdershoven Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen, Europa Law 
Publishing, 2007), 168-169 (referring, inter alia, to ECJ, Case 508/03 Commission v UK [2006] E.C.R. I-
3969). 
567  For instance, by travelling to another Member State and working there as an employed person. 
568  See the detailed discussion of the principle of proportionality under V.C.3., supra. 
569  Hailbronner, "Nationality in Public International Law and European Law", in Bauböck, Ersbøll, 
Groenendijk and Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 
European Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 
94. 
570  See the discussion of the principle of sincere cooperation under V.C. 5., supra.  
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previously explained with regard to the principle of proportionality, it will only restrict the 
Member States discretionary competence regarding nationality in fairly extreme situations. 
 
D. Consequences 
 
Now that some possible limitations deriving from Union law have been established, it must be 
analysed what the consequences are under Union law where a Member State acts in disregard 
of these limitations.  This analysis must take into account the consequences, not only for the 
Member State concerned, but also for the other Member States.  Hence, the distinction 
explained above between conferral and withdrawal of nationality, on the one hand, and 
recognition of nationality, on the other hand will be relevant for this section.  Given that this 
distinction does not necessarily run along the same lines in cases of acquisition and loss of 
nationality, it seems necessary to analyse the consequences of acquisition and loss in 
disregard of Union law limitations separately.  The analysis must, moreover, take into account 
the consequences for the individual concerned.  Hence it seems useful to consider the 
consequences of a refusal of nationality separately too, since, while technically a refusal of 
nationality depends on the criteria for acquisition of nationality, the consequences for the 
individual concerned will in many ways be similar to that of a loss of nationality. 
 
1. Acquisition of Member State nationality 
 
My analysis so far has shown that the Member States’ competence regarding acquisition of 
nationality is subject to certain Union law limitations, such as the duty to respect fundamental 
rights or, in extreme cases, the principle of sincere cooperation.  Once we accept that these 
principles of Union law impose certain limitations to the competence of the Member States to 
confer nationality, the next question becomes: what are the consequences when a Member 
State exercises this competence in a way that does not respect some or all of these limitations?   
 
The situation occurs where a Member State enacts a piece of nationality legislation or amends 
its nationality legislation in a way that violates one or more of the limitations described above.  
One example would be a law by which a Member State confers its nationality on the 
inhabitants of its former colonies in a way that violates Article 4(3) TEU. 571   Another 
example would be an amendment of the criteria for acquisition of nationality in the sense of 
adding a criterion which is racist and thereby in violation of the fundamental right to equal 
treatment.  In view of the primacy of Union law, the Member State concerned would have to 
change its legislation to bring it in conformity with Union law and, as long as such has not 
happened, Member State authorities would have to leave the legislation or the legislative 
provision concerned unapplied. 572   Accordingly, the administration of the Member State 
concerned should not confer nationalities on the basis of the contested legislation, or, where a 
provision or a criterion contained in a provision of that legislation was in breach of Union 
law, not take this provision or criterion into account when conferring nationalities.  Suppose, 
however, that the Member State in question does not change the legislation concerned and 
that the national authorities refrain from dissaplying it.  A similar situation also occurs where 
the national authorities adopt a decision conferring nationality in breach of Union law on the 
                                                 
571  See the discussion of the principle of sincere cooperation under V.C.4., supra. 
572  This duty applies not only to national courts, but also to other national authorities, like administrative 
authorities (see, e.g., ECJ, Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] E.C.R. 1839, para. 31). 
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basis of nationality legislation which is, in itself, in accordance with Union law.  In the 
following I will try to determine the consequences of such situations under Union law, both 
with regard to the individual concerned and with regard to the Member States. 
 
On the one hand, there can be no doubt that other Member States will have to recognise the 
person concerned as a national of the Member State in question, and thus as a Union citizen.  
This follows without more from the Micheletti judgment.573  This means, for example, that 
they will have to allow the person concerned on their territory on condition only that he or she 
presents a valid identity card or passport (see Article 5 of Directive 2004/38).  Moreover, the 
person concerned will be entitled to reside in another Member State as long as he or she 
satisfies the conditions of the Residence Directive, and be entitled there to equal treatment 
compared to nationals of that Member State (Article 24 of the Directive).  He or she will also 
have the right, under certain conditions, to be joined by third country family members in that 
State.574 
 
On the other hand, the limitations imposed by Union law could be enforced before the ECJ in 
infringement proceedings brought against the Member State in breach by the Commission 
(Article 258 TFEU) or by any other Member State (Article 259 TFEU).  If the ECJ considers 
that the Member State acted in breach of Union law by enacting a specific piece of nationality 
legislation or by conferring its nationality upon a certain person, it will require the Member 
State in question to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment (Article 260(1) 
TFEU).  However, such a judgment is purely declaratory and does not operate to annul the 
national measure.575  Moreover, the ECJ does not have power to require specific measures in 
order to give effect to the judgment.576  As a consequence, the nationality law in question, or 
the specific decision conferring nationality, will remain in force.577  Obviously, the judgment 
finding an infringement of Union law puts the Member State under a duty to take the 
necessary measures to comply with the ECJ’s judgment (Article 260(1) TFEU).  If it fails to 
comply with the judgment, the Commission can initiate an action on the basis of Article 
260(2) TFEU578 and the ECJ can impose a lump sum, a penalty payment or even both.579  The 
incompatibility of a national nationality law with Union law, in particular of the criteria for 
acquisition of nationality contained therein, could also be determined by the ECJ more 
indirectly in a procedure on a preliminary ruling from a national court from the Member State 
concerned. 
 
Two scenarios must be distinguished.  In the first place, it is possible that the Court finds the 
nationality legislation (as opposed to an individual measure) of the Member State in question 
to infringe Union law.  Take the hypothetical example of a Member State modifying its 
nationality law so as to make it possible for all residents of its former colonies to claim its 
nationality by way of a simple declaration.  Suppose this were held by the ECJ to constitute a 
                                                 
573  See the discussion under IV.A., supra.   
574  On this right, see e.g. ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1; ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others 
[2008] E.C.R. I-6241. 
575  Lenaerts, Arts and Maselis (Bray (ed.)), Procedural Law of the European Union (2nd ed.) (London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2006), 167. 
576  Ibid. 
577  Consequently, the person in question will remain a national of that Member State, and hence a Union 
citizen (see Article 20(1) TFEU).   
578  See, in detail, Lenaerts, Arts and Maselis (Bray (ed.)), Procedural Law of the European Union (2nd ed.) 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 171-172. 
579  See ECJ, Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] E.C.R. I-6263, para. 82. 
Chapter 2: Determination of the Personal Scope of Union Citizenship 
 105
violation of Article 4(3) TEU, because it would lead to “economic dislocation”.580  As a 
consequence of that judgment, the Member State in question would be required to change its 
legislation to comply with the judgment, most probably by imposing stricter conditions in 
order to acquire its nationality.  In any case, the Member State authorities, including national 
courts, would have to refrain from applying the legislation in question any further.581 
 
In principle, a Member State found to be acting in breach of Union law will not only be 
required to change its legislation for the future, it will also be required to take away the past 
effects of the measure in breach of Union law.582  Applied to the facts of our example, this 
would imply that the Member State in question would be required to withdraw its nationality 
from those persons who acquired it under the contested nationality legislation.  However, such 
an imposed withdrawal of nationality is problematic, because it could result in a violation of 
the fundamental rights of the persons concerned,583 for example by rendering them stateless 
or depriving them of the right to reside in the same country as their family members.  By way 
of an example: if a family member of a Union citizen were to lose his Member State 
nationality he would, in a situation that has no link with Union law, lose the right to reside 
with his family members, at least as far as Union law is concerned.584  The loss of this right, 
which is the pure result of the withdrawal of Member State nationality,585 could run counter to 
Article 8 ECHR.586  Moreover, an imposed withdrawal of nationality could hurt the principle 
of legitimate expectations587 or the principle of proportionality.588 
 
It is inconceivable that Union law, through the requirements flowing from an ECJ judgment, 
would mandate a Member State to violate such fundamental principles of the Union legal 
order as fundamental rights, the principle of legitimate expectations or the principle of 
proportionality.  The better view is probably that, where retroactive withdrawal of nationality 
hurts one of these principles, the ECJ should limit the effects of its judgments holding a 
Member State’s nationality law to infringe Union law to the future.  Admittedly, the ECJ will 
take such a step in exceptional circumstances only.589  However, it is submitted that in the 
cases concerned here, such a limitation can perfectly be justified, given the far-reaching 
consequences a withdrawal of nationality may have for the legal position of the individual(s) 
concerned, namely the loss of the rights attached to the status of Union citizenship and the 
fact that the persons concerned will normally have acted in good faith when deciding to 
exercise these rights.  Moreover, should a Member State fail to change its legislation after a 
judgment declaring its failure to fulfil its obligations, and later be held by the ECJ to have 
failed to give effects to the original judgment (after a procedure on the basis of Article 260(2) 
TFEU), the same reasoning should again be applied and the effect of that second judgment 
should be limited in time.   
                                                 
580  It was argued higher that it is unlikely that such an argument could convincingly be used to argue a 
violation of Article 4(3) TEU. Nevertheless, such a violation will be presumed here by way of an example 
to better explain the possible consequences of a violation of Article 4(3) TEU. 
581  See, e.g., ECJ, Joined Cases 314-316/81 and 83/82 Waterkeyn [1982] E.C.R. 4337, para. 14. 
582  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-35/97 Commission v France [1998] E.C.R. I-5325, para. 50. 
583  See the detailed discussion under V.C.2., supra. 
584  This results from the fact that Directive 2004/38 does not apply in “purely internal situations”; see ECJ, 
Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 76-78. 
585  See also n. 461, supra and accompanying text.  
586  See on Article 8 EHRM, e.g., ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279; ECJ, Case C-109/01 
Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607. 
587  See the detailed discussion under V.C.5., supra. 
588  See the detailed discussion under V.C.3., supra. 
589  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-35/97 Commission v France [1998] E.C.R. I-5325, para. 49; ECJ, Case C-426/98 
Commission v Greece [2002] E.C.R., para. 42. 
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It must be remarked that in practice this situation might not arise at all.  If one of the Member 
States were to adopt a nationality law suddenly extending its nationality to large numbers of 
non-nationals, the Commission or one of the other Member States would likely respond 
immediately.  They could ask for interim measures on the basis of Article 279 TFEU in order 
to obtain the suspension of the contested nationality legislation.590  In order to obtain this, 
they would have to establish a prima facie case, and establish that the application is urgent.591  
The second criterion might be easily satisfied, because it is clear from what we said 
previously that it will often not be possible to annul all the effects of the contested legislation 
at a later stage.  If the application for interim measures succeeds, the issue of violations of 
fundamental rights or infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations or the principle 
of proportionality will obviously not arise. 
 
Besides, it must be pointed out that not every finding that a Member State’s provision 
regarding acquisition of nationality is in breach of Union law will necessitate a change which 
would have for a consequence that past acquisitions of nationality on the basis of this 
provision have become invalid.  It is well possible that the contested provisions employ a 
criterion which is in violation of Union law.  One example would be a racist criterion at odds 
with the fundamental right to equal treatment.  If this criterion is severable from the rest of the 
provision, the Member State would only have to delete the criterion from the provision.  The 
provision would not have to be abrogated in its entirety and, hence, nationality measures 
adopted on the basis of it in the past would not have become invalid. 
 
In the second place, the infringement action can be directed at an individual measure 
conferring the nationality of the Member State in question on a given person.  Suppose the 
ECJ were to find this conferral of nationality to be in violation of Article 4(3) TEU, because it 
was done in a way that deceived or misled other Member States.592  Such a judgment would 
again normally require the Member State in question to withdraw its nationality.  Again, 
however, such withdrawal might hurt some of the most fundamental principles of Union law 
such as the principle of proportionality.  It is submitted that in such a case an infringement 
action can generally only be directed against a general piece of nationality legislation and not 
against an individual measure conferring nationality.  At the same time, it must be stressed 
that the annulment of an individual measure conferring nationality will not automatically hurt 
one of these principles.  Such will not automatically be the case, for instance, where 
nationality was obtained by fraud or deceit.593  
 
2. Loss of Member State nationality 
 
                                                 
590  Compare: ECJ (order of the President of 25 October 1985), Case 293/85 R Commission v Austria [1985] 
E.C.R. 3521; ECJ (order of the President of 2 October 2003), Case C-320/03 R Commission v Austria 
[2003] E.C.R. I-11665. 
591  Lenaerts, Arts and Maselis (Bray (ed.)), Procedural Law of the European Union (2nd ed.) (London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2006), 433. 
592  Again, this scenario does probably not square with the actual meaning to be given to Article 4(3) TEU 
(see under V.B.3., supra), but again it is useful to consider this by way of an example.  
593  See the discussion of the Rottmann case, supra, and Article 7 of the European Convention on Nationality, 
stating that “A State Party may not provide in its internal law for the loss of its nationality ex lege or at the 
initiative of the State Party except in the following cases:…(b) acquisition of the nationality of the State 
Party by means of fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact attributable to 
the applicant…”.  
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Once we accept that the limitations described above can serve in one way or another to limit, 
under Union law, the competences of the Member States to lay down rules concerning loss of 
nationality and to withdraw their nationality, the next question becomes: what are the 
consequences if a Member State exercises this competence in disregard of the said 
limitations?   
 
The main consequence of the adoption of a measure in conflict with Union law is that the 
Member State concerned will have to change its legislation to bring it in conformity with 
Union law and, as long as such has not happened, Member State authorities, including 
national courts, are under a duty to refrain from applying the conflicting measure. 594  
Concretely this means that the competent authorities 595  should refrain from adopting a 
decision withdrawing nationality on the basis of the Member State’s nationality law where 
such a decision would infringe the limitations discussed above.  Under such circumstances, 
they should leave the Member State’s nationality law unapplied, with the result that the 
persons concerned keep their nationality, and hence the status of Union citizenship.  Should a 
decision withdrawing nationality in breach of Union law nevertheless be adopted, then the 
consequences under Union law are less straightforward. 
 
It could be argued that Member State authorities, including those from other Member States 
are under a duty to refuse to give effect to the withdrawal in breach of Union law and must 
continue to treat the person concerned as a national of the Member State concerned, and thus 
as a Union citizen (see Article 20(1) TFEU).  The consequence would be that the person 
concerned preserves his status of Union citizenship and the rights attached to this status, in all 
Member States, including his own Member State.  This point of view effectively makes a 
distinction between the effects of withdrawal of Member State nationality on the domestic 
level, on the one hand, and on the level of Union law, on the other hand.  Hall596 has pointed 
out that one could argue that the measure withdrawing nationality might, despite the 
limitations deriving from Union law, well be valid under the domestic law of the Member 
State concerned.  The consequence of this would be that the person in question no longer has 
the nationality of that Member State.  However, because the withdrawal does not produce any 
effects at the level of Union law, he or she should still be considered as having the nationality 
of the Member State in question for the purposes of Union citizenship.  Hence, he or she 
would keep this Union citizen status, and be entitled to all the rights attached to this status, 
even in his own (former) Member State.  Indeed, that Member State could not consider the 
situation in question as purely internal, because it involves the citizenship rights of a person 
who is no longer a national of that Member State. 
 
This point of view, holding that withdrawal of nationality may be effective without thereby 
affecting a person’s Union citizenship status, is in accordance with the outcome of the staff 
cases mentioned above.  In those cases, in Airola597 more specifically, the ECJ was prepared 
to refuse to give effect to a conferral of nationality at the level of Union law, i.e. for the 
purposes of the application of the Staff Regulation.  At the same time it did not seem to call 
into question the validity of that conferral under the domestic law of the Member State 
                                                 
594  See ECJ, Case 48/71 Commission v. Italy [1972] E.C.R. 529, paras 6-8; ECJ, Case 106/77 Simmenthal 
("Simmenthal II") [1978] E.C.R. 629, para. 21. See on this subject: Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and 
Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 753 et seq. 
595  Such as, for instance, administrative bodies, see e.g. ECJ, Case 103/88 Fratelli Constanzo [1989] E.C.R. 
1839, para. 31.  
596  Hall, "Loss of Union Citizenship in Breach of Fundamental Rights" (1996) 21 E.L. Rev., 141. 
597  ECJ, Case 21/74 Airola [1975] E.C.R. 221. 
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concerned.  Such corresponds, furthermore, to the traditional position under international law.  
As explained above, nationality in principle has two aspects, both a national and an 
international one, which should be distinguished.598  As a result, a loss or acquisition of 
nationality may be perfectly valid under the domestic law of a State without however 
producing the corresponding effects under international law.599  The point of view may find 
further support in a strand in the case law of the ECJ holding that national provisions 
conflicting with Union law continue to be effective for those aspects which the Union 
provisions have left unaffected.600  One could argue that the competence of the Member 
States regarding nationality has, because of the introduction of Union citizenship, come 
within the scope of Union law, but only insofar as it relates to Union citizenship.  This point 
of view admits that Union law attaches important consequences to a decision withdrawing 
Member State nationality, namely loss of the status of Union citizenship and of all the rights 
attached to it.  At the same time it stresses that Union law has never pretended to directly 
regulate Member State nationality.  Therefore it considers that a decision withdrawing 
nationality may be invalid under Union law only to the extent that it entails the loss of Union 
citizenship, and has to be disregarded only to that extent.  The end result is that the person 
concerned, despite losing his Member State nationality, should still be considered a Union 
citizen. 
 
However, the point of view just set out is problematic for a number of reasons.  First of all, it 
seems to be in conflict with the express wording of Article 20(1) TFEU, stating: “Every 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”.  As I argued 
higher, this provision should be interpreted that a person who does not have the nationality of 
a Member State, in accordance with the laws of that Member State, is not a Union citizen.  
Accordingly, the view set out above, holding that a person not holding the nationality of a 
Member Stat is a Union citizen seems to be contrary to primary Union law.  Secondly, it 
potentially causes enormous practical problems.  As Hall explains, 601  when someone’s 
nationality is withdrawn in violation of Union law, the denationalised Union citizen will, in 
his former Member State, effectively be assimilated to a Union citizen possessing the 
nationality of another Member State.  This means in turn that he will be liable to expulsion or 
exclusion in certain circumstances (for example, public policy, public security, public health, 
or failure to meet requirements as to financial self-sufficiency or health insurance 602 ).  
However, since this person potentially lacks the nationality of any of the Member States, 
every Member State could expel him or refuse him access to its territory on these grounds.  
This could lead to an absurd spectacle of an endless shuffle between Member States.  Such is 
clearly not in accordance with the aims and purposes of Union citizenship.  Thirdly, the point 
of view seems to conflict with the duty on part of the Member States to unconditionally 
recognise nationality measures adopted by another Member State.  Higher I argued that this 
duty, articulated by the ECJ in Micheletti in relation to acquisition of nationality, should also 
apply in cases of loss of nationality.  Accordingly, it would seem to be the case that where one 
                                                 
598  Supra, under II. 
599  See, in this connection, the examples cited by Grossman, "Birthright Citizenship as Nationality of 
Convenience" (2004) Proceedings, Council of Europe, Third Conference on Nationality, Strasbourg, 11-
12 Oct. 2004, 112. 
600  See e.g. ECJ, Case 40/69 Hauptzollamt Hamburg v. Bollmann [1970] E.C.R. 69, paras 4-5; ECJ, Case 
50/76 Amsterdam Bulb [1977] E.C.R. 137, paras 9-30; ECJ, Case 111/76 Van den Hazel [1977] E.C.R. 
901, paras 13-27; ECJ, Case 255/86 Commission v. Belgium [1988] E.C.R. 693, paras 8-11; ECJ, Case 
60/86 Commission v. United Kingdom [1988] E.C.R. 3921, para. 11; ECJ, Case 190/87 Moorman [1988] 
E.C.R. 4689, paras 11-13. 
601 Hall, "Loss of Union Citizenship in Breach of Fundamental Rights" (1996) 21 E.L. Rev., 141.  
602  See the relevant provisions of Directive 2004/38. 
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Member State withdraws its nationality from a person, even in breach of Union law, other 
Member States have to recognise this decision and can no longer treat the person concerned as 
a Union citizen, although they can to some extent accord him the rights associated with that 
status under their national law.  Admittedly, one could point out that the ratio decidendi for 
establishing a duty of unconditional recognition does not apply with full force here.  Indeed, 
as explained higher, that principle serves to safeguard at the Union level the principled 
competence of the Member States to regulate nationality.  However, one could argue that this 
competence should not be protected by Union law where it is exercised in breach of Union 
law.  Nevertheless, in these circumstances, part of the rationale for recognising a duty of 
unconditional recognition of withdrawal of nationality still holds good, namely the fact that, 
in the absence of such a duty, the rights of the individual concerned under Union law would 
vary from one Member State to another.  Indeed, in the absence of a duty of unconditional 
recognition, some Member State authorities might consider the withdrawal measure to be 
valid under Union law or refuse to act in accordance with their duty to refuse to give it effect, 
whereas other Member States would refuse to recognise the withdrawal measure as valid and 
continue to consider the person as a Union citizen.  Such a situation would run counter to the 
Union’s objectives of establishing an internal market and a Citizens’ Europe. 
 
It is submitted, therefore, that the correct view is that, where a Member State enacts 
nationality legislation in violation of Union law, this measure should be disregarded by all 
Member States’ authorities in its entirety.  As a consequence, the persons concerned will not 
lose their Member State nationality or their status of Union citizenship.  This result flows 
naturally from the primacy of Union law.  However, where this legislation is implemented by 
the national authorities and a person’s nationality is withdrawn in a way that violates Union 
law, the person can no longer be considered as a Union citizen and loses this status and the 
associated rights under Union law.  De lege ferenda there is much to be said for severing the 
status of Union citizenship and that of Member State nationality, certainly in case of loss of 
Member State nationality in a way that violates Union law.  That would probably necessitate 
an amendment of the Treaty framework surrounding Union citizenship.603   
 
Union law limitations to the Member States’ competence regarding loss of nationality can be 
enforced before the Union Courts in much the same way as Union law limitations to their 
competence regarding acquisition of nationality.  Here too, a Member State found to be acting 
in breach of Union law will be required to take away the past effects of the measure in breach 
of Union law. 604   Accordingly, the Member State in question should re-establish the 
nationality of persons whose nationality it had withdrawn in breach of Union law.  To the 
difference of the situation described above under “acquisition of nationality”, such will not 
normally have serious negative consequences for the individuals concerned.   
 
3. Refusal of Member State nationality 
 
The last issue to determine are the consequences under Union law where a Member State 
refuses its nationality to a person by applying criteria which violate Union law.  I refer to the 
                                                 
603  As was observed by by AG Poiares Maduro (Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 34, footnote 42). The AG referred to Kochenov, “A Glance at State 
Nationality/EU Citizenship Interaction (Using the Requirement to Renounce One’s Community 
Nationality upon Naturalising in the Member State of Residence as a Pretext)” (2009) 11th bi-annual 
EUSA Conference. See also the discussion under VI., infra. 
604  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-35/97 Commission v France [1998] E.C.R. I-5325, para. 50. 
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example given higher of  a certain Member State changing its existing nationality legislation 
by adding a criterion which is clearly racist in nature. 605   As explained higher, in such 
circumstances, the Member State concerned would be under a duty to change its legislation in 
order to bring it in accordance with Union law, and the competent national authorities should 
leave the contested provision or criterion unapplied.  If they do however apply the contested 
provision and, on the basis thereof, refuse to grant the nationality of the Member State 
concerned to an individual because he does not satisfy the criterion which is racist in nature, it 
is beyond doubt that the persons concerned would not acquire Union citizenship, except in 
those cases where they would acquire the nationality of another State.  The persons concerned 
would remain third country nationals and not be able to claim their citizenship rights in the 
different Member States.   
 
It could be argued that other Member States would be under a duty to refuse to recognise the 
refusal decision in breach of Union law, on grounds similar to the ones explained above in 
relation to loss or withdrawal of nationality in breach of Union law.  This would have as a 
result that the person who was refused the nationality of a Member State for reasons not 
compatible with Union law would in other Member States be considered as a Union citizen.  
This, however, would run counter to the same objections as stated higher with regard to loss 
of nationality.  In particular the situation described would be in contradiction with Article 
20(1) TFEU.  It would, moreover, lead to a different application of the Union citizenship 
provisions, with some Member States recognising the person concerned as a Union citizen but 
others not, and cause enormous practical difficulties, as described higher.  Besides, it would 
not be in accordance with the duty to unconditionally recognise nationality decisions taken by 
another Member State and thereby, arguably, undermine the Member State’s principled 
competence regarding nationality, although it could again be argued that Union law should 
not protect this competence where it is exercised in a way that violates Union law.  More 
fundamentally, the view set out would attribute Union citizenship even to persons who have 
never held the nationality of one of the Member States.  As such would pave the way for a 
concept of Union citizenship which is completely independent from Member State 
nationality.  This is, as I have explained higher, not compatible with the current Treaty 
framework, although future developments along these lines cannot be excluded. 
 
The contested legislation, containing criteria for acquisition of nationalities and measures 
adopted thereunder could, as explained higher, be challenged before the Union Courts and this 
could, eventually, oblige the Member State concerned to delete the contested criteria or 
condition from its legislation.  Furthermore, a Member State found to be acting in breach of 
Union law will not only be required to change its legislation for the future; it will also be 
required to take away the past effects of the measure in breach of Union law.606  This would 
seem to entail an obligation for that Member State to retroactively grant its nationality to 
those persons whom had been refused this nationality on grounds of the provision found to be 
in breach of Union law.  To the difference of the consequences described higher where a 
nationality was acquired on grounds of provisions or criteria in breach of Union law, such will 
not normally have serious negative consequences for the individuals concerned.   
                                                 
605  Take the hypothetical example of a nationality codes that requires that, in order to acquire the nationality 
of that State, one must, inter alia: “belong to the Caucasian race” or “be Christian”. Inspiration from 
historical precedents can be found in the early US statutes on naturalization (see on this legislation, for 
instance, the famous Supreme Court case United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) and 
the discussion thereof in Snow, “The Civilization of White Men: The Race of the Hindu in United States v. 
Bhagat Singh Thind, in H. Goldschmidt and E. McAlister Race (eds), Nation, and Religion in the 
Americas (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), 259-280). 
606  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-35/97 Commission v France [1998] E.C.R. I-5325, para. 50. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has analysed in some detail the legal regime surrounding determination of the 
personal scope of Union citizenship.  I have set out how, under general international law, 
States have the sovereign competence to regulate nationality, although the effects of the 
exercise of this competence on the international level may be limited by certain principles 
deriving from international law.  Furthermore, it was explained that the introduction in the 
Treaties of the chapter on Union citizenship did not change the principled competence of the 
Member States to regulate nationality.  The choice of the Member States to define Union 
citizenship with reference to Member State nationality, together with the clear affirmation in a 
declaration attached to the Treaties and a statement by the Heads of State or Government that 
Member State nationality is to be determined by the national law of each Member State only, 
is such as to ensure that Member States remain competent to regulate nationality and thereby 
determine the personal scope of Union citizenship.  This finds further confirmation in the 
practice of the Union institutions and the case law of the Union courts.  Member States may 
even establish a special type of nationality definition for the purposes of Union citizenship, by 
submitting a declaration to that effect. 
 
Despite the fact that the Member States are competent to regulate nationality, Union law will 
influence this competence in two ways.  In the first place, Union law may have a rather 
“indirect” influence on the competence of the Member States in the field of nationality.  The 
coupling of Member State nationality and Union citizenship, together with the duty for 
Member States to unconditionally recognize decisions regarding nationality taken by another 
Member State, sets in motion a subtle interplay between the Member States, whereby rules 
and practices regarding nationality in one Member State may have significant consequences 
for other Member States.  This may lead to political pressure on certain Member States to 
change their nationality rules with regard to loss or acquisition of nationality.  The clearest 
example of such change until now is the change of the Irish nationality legislation in 2004.  
Similar mechanisms of indirect pressure by the Member States and the Union institutions may 
well lead to changes in the near future in the nationality laws and practice of Spain, on the one 
hand, and Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand. 
 
In the second place, Union law, through the provisions on Union citizenship, also places 
direct limitations to the Member States’ competence regarding nationality.  The existence of 
such limitations has long been argued in legal literature and has now been confirmed by the 
ECJ in its seminal Rottmann judgment of March 2010.  The judgment confirms the principled 
competence of the Member States to regulate nationality, but clarifies at the same time that 
this competence must be exercised “having due regard to Union law” in situations falling 
within the field of Union law.  Accordingly, the competence regarding nationality is no 
different from other Member State competences in the sense that it cannot be exercised with 
entire disregard of Union law and that compliance with Union law can be tested by the courts 
to the extent that situations falling within the scope of application of Union law are 
concerned.  However, this chapter has put forward the view that that the competence 
regarding nationality is different from most other Member State competences as far as the 
required link with Union law is concerned in order for a situation to fall within the scope of 
Union law.  I have argued that the intrinsic link between Member State nationality and Union 
citizenship can in itself provide a sufficient link with Union law.  Accordingly, every rule or 
decision concerning acquisition, refusal or loss of nationality should arguably be considered 
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as presenting a sufficient link with Union law where it entails the acquisition, refusal or loss 
of Union citizenship – even in the absence of any further cross-border dimension.  In this 
sense, the competence regarding nationality can be said to be a “cas spécial”, which is 
warranted by the fact that the exercise of this competence determines the personal scope of 
Union citizenship.  All this in no way takes away the competence of the Member State to lay 
down rules on the acquisition and loss of nationality.  It only implies that Member States 
must, when exercising this competence, take into account certain rules or principles of Union 
law. 
 
This chapter has discussed five Union law rules or principles which could act as meaningful 
limitations to the competence of the Member States to regulate nationality.  The principle of 
proportionality is the only limitation until now which has as such been recognised by the ECJ.  
Other rules or principles of Union law that could be relevant in this regard are the right to free 
movement of Union citizens, the duty to respect fundamental rights – in particular the right to 
equal treatment, the right to nationality and the right to respect for family life –, the principle 
of sincere cooperation and the principle of legitimate expectations.  Some of these limitations 
are particularly relevant with regard to the Member States’ competence regarding acquisition 
of nationality, including refusal of nationality, whereas others will be more relevant to rules 
on loss of nationality, and still others to both of them.  The consequence of the existence of 
these limitations is that Member States will be required to take them into account when laying 
down rules on acquisition and loss of nationality and when implementing these rules.  Where 
a Member State adopts a measure that violates one or more of the said limitations, the 
measure concerned will be fully effective under Union law and any resulting acquisition, 
refusal or loss of Union citizenship will have to be fully accepted by the other Member States.  
At the same time, the Member State concerned will be under a duty to bring its legislation or 
practice in accordance with Union law and, where necessary, this duty can be enforced before 
the Union Courts. 
 
It is to be expected that future guidance concerning Union law limitations and their 
consequences will be provided first and foremost by the case law of the ECJ.  As in other 
fields where Union citizenship triggers a duty for the Member States to exercise their 
competence with due regard to Union law, the Court plays a pioneering role in determining 
the scope and meaning of this duty.  The other Union institutions would seem to have less of a 
role to play, since at present the Union is not competent to lay down rules concerning 
nationality.  However, future developments may changes this situation.  Given the growing 
importance of Union citizenship for the functioning of the Union legal order and given the 
progressive acceptance of the fact that Union law is applicable in the field of nationality to the 
extent that it determines the personal scope of Union citizenship, it could be argued that in the 
future the Union must be given direct competence to regulate Union citizenship.  Such 
development could be defended on grounds of the need for the Union to safeguard the effet 
utile of Union citizenship.  Such is, as I have explained in this chapter, not possible under the 
present Treaty framework and would require an amendment of the Treaties.  Two possible 
developments can be imagined which would increase the Union’s competence to determine 
the personal scope of Union citizenship. 
 
On the one hand, the Union legislator could be given competence to adopt minimum rules for 
the acquisition and loss of nationality.607  Such would lead to a (partial) harmonisation of the 
                                                 
607  This possibility is regularly flagged or discussed in legal literature. See, for instance, Margiotta and Vonk, 
"Nationality Law and European Citizenship: the Role of Dual Nationality" (2010) EUDO Citizenship 
Working Paper, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/RSCAS%202010_66.pdf, at p 16-20; De 
Chapter 2: Determination of the Personal Scope of Union Citizenship 
 113
Member States’ nationality laws.  In this connection, it is sometimes argued that the growing 
competences of the Union in the field of immigration should entail the competence of the 
Union to regulate aspects of nationality law.608  Nationality and (long-term) immigration are 
clearly interlinked because the right to nationality is typically conferred on third country 
nationals who have legally entered the Union and continue to legally reside there.  
Historically speaking, similar considerations relating to the need to pursue an effective 
immigration policy have led in the United State to a transfer of the competence to regulate the 
acquisition and loss of nationality from the individual States to the federal level. 609  
Accordingly, it is sometimes argued that the Union should be given competence to harmonise 
the conditions for acquisition of nationality by long term resident third country nationals.  
This would have for a logical consequence that the Union would become competent to 
directly regulate the personal scope of Union citizenship to some extent. 
 
It is clear that this suggestion would need an amendment of the Treaties.  Current Article 
79(2)a) TFEU, for instance, which grants the power to define “the rights of third-country 
nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of 
movement and of residence in other Member States”, does not amount to a right for the Union 
to regulate nationality.610  As I have explained above, nationality is not merely a right, but a 
status or a “right to have rights”611 and does not, therefore, fall under that provision.  The 
competence to regulate nationality can neither be based on Article 20(2)(a) TFEU in 
combination with Article 77(3) TFEU.  Those Treaty provisions, which allow the Union 
under certain conditions to adopt provisions concerning “passports, identity cards, residence 
permits or any other such document”, are limited to facilitating free movement.  Given the 
absence of any specific Treaty provision conferring the competence to regulate nationality, a 
possible legal basis would prima facie seem to be Article 352 TFEU (the so-called “flexibility 
clause”).  However, in my view, it is not possible to consider the (minimum) harmonisation of 
the Member States’ nationality laws as being “necessary, within the framework of the policies 
defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties”.612  Admittedly, 
the adoption of minimum rules concerning Member State nationality could enhance the 
Union’s migration policy and bolster the status of Union citizenship in certain circumstances, 
but can hardly be said to be necessary to attain the Union’s objectives in those fields.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF; Hansen and Weil, "Introduction: Citizenship, Immigration and 
Nationality: Towards a Convergence in Europe?", in Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, 
Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU, (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001); Nascimbene, “Towards a 
European Law on Citizenship and Nationality?”, in S. O’Leary and T. Tiilikainen, Citizenship and 
Nationality Status in the New Europe (London, Institute for Public Policy Research, 1998). 
608  See, among others, Kotalakidis Von der nationalen Staatsangehörigkeit zur Unionsbürgerschaft: die 
Person und das Gemeinwesen (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2000), 316. 
609  See De Groot, "The Relationship between the Nationality of the Member States of the European Union 
and European Citizenship", in La Torre (ed.), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998), 116.  
610  Hailbronner, "Nationality in public international law and European law", in R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. 
Groenendijk and H. Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and loss of nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 
European Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses, (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006) 
35, at 100. 
611  This conception of nationality as a “right to have rights” is often cited in legal literature and stems from 
Hanna Arendt’s work. See the discussion in Oman “Hannah Arendt's ‘Right to Have Rights’: A 
Philosophical Context for Human Security” (2010) Journal of Human Rights, 279-302. 
612  On this point I agree with Jessurun d’Oliveira (Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Case C-369/90 Micheletti and 
others" (1993) 30 CML Rev., 637). 
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In any event, the adoption of binding Union rules concerning Member State nationality, even 
minimum rules, does not seem a realistic option in the near future, given the fact that it would 
seem to be impossible to muster a sufficient majority in the Council in view of the fact that 
Member States are still very reluctant to concede any competence in that area to the Union.  A 
more realistic option would seem to be the adoption of non-binding rules or principles 
concerning nationality, by which the Member States would voluntarily bring their nationality 
legislation in accordance with certain Union standards.  This would have the benefit of 
clarifying certain Union principles that must be taken into account by the Member States and 
would thereby foster the effet utile of Union citizenship, without however resulting in a 
(perceived) impingement on the sovereign powers of the Member States.  Obviously, the 
effectiveness of non-binding rules would fully depend on the willingness of the Member 
States to comply with them.  The well-known “Open Method of Coordination” in particular 
could be a fruitful option for coordinating the Member States’ nationality laws to some 
extent. 613   Besides, the Union institutions could issue non-binding resolutions or 
recommendations concerning the Member States’ nationality legislation.614  
 
On the other hand, it would be possible to partially or entirely decouple Union citizenship and 
Member State nationality and establish an independent “citizenship of the Union”. 615  
Accordingly, a type of independent “European nationality” would be established.  Such would 
clearly require a substantial amendment of the Treaties, as the current Treaty framework is 
predicated on the fact the Union does not have a form of autonomous or self-standing 
citizenship.  More specifically, the definition of Union citizenship in Article 20(1) TFEU 
would have to be changed, and the reference to “the nationality of a Member State” would 
have to be replaced by a reference to criteria or conditions of Union law.  The most common 
suggestion for an alternative definition is that of making the acquisition of Union citizenship 
dependent on a certain period of residence.616  This would bring uniformity to the conditions 
for acquisition of Union citizenship and prevent Member States from hindering access to 
Union citizenship in a way that violates Union law.  For this reason, it would foster 
                                                 
613  See the discussion in Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship 
Policies" (2007) Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F., 104-113. On the Open Method of Coordination in general, see 
Senden and Tahtah, "Reguleringsintensiteit en regelgevingsinstrumentarium in het Europees 
Gemeenschapsrecht. Over de relatie tussen wetgeving, soft law en de open methode van coördinatie" 
(2008) SEW, 43-57; Benz, "Accountable multilevel governance by the open method of coordination?" 
(2007) 13 E.L.J., 505-522; Szyszczak, "Experimental governance: the open method of coordination" 
(2006) 12 E.L.J., 486-502.  
614  In the past, the European Parliament issued several resolutions concerning nationality law. See, for 
instance, Resolution of the European Parliament of 20 January 1984 in the matter of passing on 
nationality, [1984] O.J. C46/146.  
615  See the discussion in Kochenov, "Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States' Nationalities 
under Pressure from EU Citizenship" (2010) EUI RSCAS Paper 2010/23, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/13634/1/RSCAS_2010_23.pdf, 29 et seq. 
616  See, inter alia, Rostek and Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies" 
(2007) Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F., 141 et seq.; Garot, “A new basis for European citizenship: residence?’, in M. 
La Torre (ed.), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge, (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
1998), 235-258. See already the suggestions by Evans, "Nationality Law and European Integration" 
(1991) 16 E.L. Rev., 214-215. See also the interesting observations by Davies on the diminishing 
importance of Member State nationality and the growing importance of residence in the context of the 
EU: Davies, "‘Any Place I Hang My Hat?’ or: Residence is the New Nationality" (2005) 11 E.L.J., 43-56. 
Report drawn up by MEP Catania: Report on the Commission's Fourth report on Citizenship of the Union 
(1 May 2001 – 30 April 2004) (2005/2060(INI)). The Report “[t]akes the view that EU citizenship based 
on residence should be the ultimate goal of the dynamic process which will make the European Union a 
genuine political community”. The final Report did not, however, pass the vote in the Europea Parliament. 
See the discussion in Maas Creating European Citizens (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 98-100. 
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integration of third country nationals resident in the Union.  However, these advantages would 
come at a large cost for the Member States, since the said change would take away their 
power to determine the personal scope of Union citizenship and considerably reduce the 
importance of Member State nationality as a legal status.617  For this reason, it seems clear 
that such a far-reaching change is politically undesirable and is very unlikely to happen in the 
near future.  
 
A more limited decoupling of Union citizenship and Member State nationality is advocated by 
some legal scholars.  Kostakopoulou, in particular, has argued that the effects of Union 
citizenship should be preserved where the nationality of the person concerned is withdrawn in 
violation of Union law. 618   This approach would not change the definition of Union 
citizenship or change the fact that Member States autonomously regulate nationality, although 
subject to certain Union law limitations as far as situations falling within the sphere of Union 
law are concerned.  The crucial difference with the existing situation would lie in the 
consequences attached to these limitations.  If Kostakopoulou’s point of view were accepted, 
Union citizenship, once acquired, would not be lost by national decisions in breach of Union 
law.  Even though this view would be beneficial for safeguarding the full effectiveness of 
Union citizenship, I am of the opinion that it can not be adhered to, for reasons explained 
higher (see under IV.D., supra).  In particular, it would not be compatible with the meaning of 
Article 20(1) TFEU as it was intended by the masters of the Treaties and it could entail 
significant practical problems.  Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that it poses far less of 
threat to the Member States’ sovereign powers.  
 
At the end of the day, much depends on what conception of Union citizenship is desired.619  
More uniformity in the determination of the personal scope of Union citizenship might bolster 
its potential, but the Union must be cautious not to overemphasize uniformity to the 
disadvantage of diversity.620  The Union must, in line with new Article 4(2) TEU, be careful 
to give due respect to the Member States’ competence regarding nationality621 and be true to 
the Treaty definition of Union citizenship as a complementary status to Member State 
nationality rather than a self-standing legal status.  The Member States, for their part, must 
                                                 
617  See, in this conncection the analysis in Davies, "‘Any Place I Hang My Hat?’ or: Residence is the New 
Nationality" (2005) 11 E.L.J., 43-56. 
618  See, inter alia, Kostakopoulou, “European Union citizenship and Member State nationality: updating or 
upgrading the link?” (2010) EUDO citizenship forum, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-
forum/254-has-the-european-court-of-justice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-
law?start=5; Kostakopoulou, "The European Court of Justice, Member State Autonomy and European 
Union Citizenship: Conjunctions and Disjunctions", in de Witte and Micklitz (eds.), The European Court 
of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (2011), ; Kostakopoulou, "European Union 
Citizenship: the Journey goes on ", in Ott and Vos (eds.), Fifty Years of European Integration (The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), 271-290. 
619  See the very interesting discussion by Bauböck , who approaches the issue from three perspectives: a 
statist approach, a unionist approach and a pluralist approach (Bauböck, "Why European Citizenship? 
Normative Approaches to Supranational Union", (2007) Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 481-487). 
620  For this rather normative-philosophical issue, see the discussion in Barber, "Citizenship, Nationalism and 
the European Union" (2002) 27 E.L. Rev., 241-259; Verhoeven, The European Union in Search of a 
Democratic and Constitutional Theory (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002), 93 et seq.; Weiler, 
"To be a European Citizen- Eros and Civilization" (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy, 495-519.  
621  See Wollenschläger, "A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and 
its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration" (2011) 17 E.L.J., 33. An 
interesting parallel can be drawn with the Member States’ competence to lay down rules concerning 
names. In Sayn-Wittgenstein, the ECJ accepted that a rule concerning surnames which hindered the 
exercise of the free movement of Union citizens could be justified and thereby it referred inter alia to 
Article 4(2) TEU (ECJ, Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2011] E.C.R. nyr). 
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assume the consequences of their membership of the Union for the exercise of their 
competences and give full effect to the provisions on Union citizenship.  For the foreseeable 
future, the ECJ seems to have indicated the way forward in its Rottmann case.  The 
competence to regulate nationality rests firmly with the Member States, but in order to 
safeguard the potential of Union citizenship, they must take into account certain Union law 
limitations when exercising this competence.  It can be expected that the meaning and extent 
of these limitations will be further clarified in the near future.  The ECJ and, perhaps, non-
binding Union law instruments will play a pivotal role in this development.  
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CHAPTER 3 OCTS AND UNION CITIZENSHIP 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will look into the particular case of citizens of the so-called “Overseas 
Countries and Territories” associated with the Union (hereinafter: “OCTs”).1  OCTs are 
parts of the territories of Union Member States with a special status.  Without wanting to 
pre-empt the detailed discussion below, it is important to immediately stress two key 
points in relation to them.  On the one hand, they are not fully part of the EU, and the 
Treaties prima facie only apply to them in a limited way (see Article 355(2) TFEU).  On 
the other hand, they are far from being fully extraneous to the EU, since important parts of 
the Union acquis2 are applicable to them.  Indeed, a specific part of the Treaties is even 
devoted to them (“Part Four of the TFEU: “Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories”).  This chapter will inquire into what the legal consequences of this special 
status could be with regard to the concept of Union citizenship.  More specifically, I want 
to inquire into whether citizens of the OCTs are Union citizens and to what extent they 
enjoy the rights associated with that status.  This analysis will at the same time allow me to 
inquire into the extent to which the provisions on Union citizenship have a concrete impact 
on the policies of the Member States with regard to their nationals resident on or having a 
particular connection with one of their OCTs. 
 
When embarking on this analysis, one is immediately faced with an important hurdle: the 
different Member States having overseas possessions apply varying rules to the countries 
and regions in question.  As a consequence, they will have a different status, not just under 
domestic law, but also under international and Union law.  To analyse the specific status of 
OCTs, in the sense of Article 355(2) TFEU, it is important to first determine precisely 
which of the overseas possessions qualify for this status.  The said analysis can only start 
therefore with an overview of the constitutional structure of these Member States, 
focussing on their overseas possessions.  Moreover, such analysis will allow me to reach a 
first conclusion as to the applicability of Union law to these territories, an aspect that will 
turn out to be vital when discussing the citizenship rights of OCT citizens, as will be 
explained below. 
 
                                                 
1  See Part Four of the TFEU. The “Overseas Countries and Territories” are referred to as “landen en 
gebieden overzee (LGO)” in Dutch; “pays et territoires d'outre-mer (PTOM)” in French; 
“überseeischen Länder und Hoheitsgebiete” in German and “países y territorios de ultramar” in 
Spanish. For a list of OCTS, see the list in Annex II to the Treaties – Overseas countries and 
territories to which the provisions of Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union apply, [2010] C83/334 (see, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty: Annex II to the 
Treaty establishing the European Community - Overseas countries and territories to which the 
provisions of Part Four of the Treaty apply, [2006] O.J. C321E/186. 
2  I will, generally speaking, avoid using the well-known term “acquis communautaire”, since it is no 
longer accurate after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (which replaced the EC by the “new” 
EU, which is broader in scope) and, perhaps, no longer terminologically correct (since the EC has 
ceased to exist). The term should therefore only be used for references to the historical acquis as it 
existed before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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The finding of a diverse status applies not only to the overseas possessions themselves, but 
also to their population.  The Member States in question have vastly differing nationality 
legislation in place with regard to the citizens of their overseas possessions.  Some 
Member States have a system of one single nationality, held by both their citizens in 
mainland Europe and the citizens in their overseas possessions.  Other Member States, 
notably the UK, have different categories of nationality, and confer on the citizens of their 
overseas possession not necessarily the same status as on their citizens in mainland 
Europe.  It is of crucial importance for my analysis in this chapter to study these different 
nationality laws in some detail.  Indeed, as has become clear from the previous chapter, the 
personal scope of Union citizenship is determined first and foremost by the nationality 
laws of the Member States.  The status of citizens of the OCTs under Union law cannot be 
determined, therefore, without studying the nationality laws of the Member States 
concerned. 
 
The determination of the application of Union law and the provisions on Union citizenship 
in particular, to the OCTs and their inhabitants, will enable me to analyse to what extent 
citizens of the OCTs enjoy the rights associated with the status of Union citizenship.  The 
reason is that these rights always have a territorial scope and a personal scope of 
application, which need always be conceptually distinguished.  One could imagine –
merely to illustrate the point – that some citizenship rights can be exercised in the OCTS, 
but that OCT nationals do not belong to the beneficiaries of these rights.  Conversely, one 
could imagine a situation in which OCT nationals would be the beneficiaries of certain 
rights, but could only exercise these rights in the “European territory” of the EU Member 
States.  This distinction between personal and territorial scope of the citizenship provisions 
will be vital in the analysis of the rights of OCT nationals.  Below, I will concentrate my 
analysis on two of the rights associated with the status of Union citizenship: the right of 
free movement and residence, on the one hand, and the right to vote and stand as a 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament and municipal elections, on the other 
hand. 
 
The structure of this chapter will be as follows.  First, an overview will be given of the 
constitutional structure of the four Member States possessing OCTs and the applicability 
of the Treaties with regard to their OCTs (II.A.).  This will be followed by an analysis for 
each of these four Member States of the nationality provisions in place, in particular with 
regard to citizens of the OCTs (II.B.).  Next, a detailed analysis will be given of the precise 
relation between the provisions on Union citizenship and the OCTs, first in general (III.A.) 
and next more specifically with regard to the free movement rights (III.B) and electoral 
rights (III.C.) enjoyed by Union citizens. 
  
II OVERVIEW 
 
A. Constitutional structure and applicability of the Treaties  
 
The following overview will discuss the status under Union law of the different overseas 
possessions of four Member States: the Kingdom of the Netherlands, France, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom.  I will try to precisely determine to what extent Union law is 
applicable to them.  The focus thereby will be on those countries and territories qualifying 
for the status of “OCT”.   
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 119
 
As a general point, it must be noted that there is a significant degree of flexibility in the 
geographical scope of Union law, a phenomenon that has been termed “l’Europe à 
géométrie variable”.3  Contrary to what one may think,4 Union law does not invariably 
apply to all areas which are under the sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of the Member 
States.  Some of the overseas possessions fall fully outside the scope of Union law, 
whereas Union law is almost fully applicable to others.  The most important distinction in 
this regard is that between “outermost regions”, on the one hand, and OCTs, on the other 
hand.  
 
Union law applies in full to outermost regions,5 but derogations may apply to take account 
of their  
 
“structural social and economic situation […], which is compounded by their 
remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, economic 
dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of which severely 
restrain their development.”6 
 
The Treaties provide that the Council can adopt specific measures aimed, in particular, at 
laying down the conditions of application of the Treaties to those regions, including 
                                                 
3  Ziller, "Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and Differentiation in the 
Application of Substantive Law on Member States' Territories", in De Búrca and Scott (eds.), 
Constitutional Change in the EU - From Uniformity to Flexibility? (Oxford and Portland, Hart 
Publishing, 2000), 113. 
4  Article 52(1) TEU explicitly states that it applies to the different Member States, which it enlists. 
Article 52(2) TEU refers, however, to the specific arrangements laid down in Article 355 TFEU. For 
the EAEC Treaty, see Article 198 TEAEC. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the TEC 
explicitly declared that it was applicable to all the Member States (Article 299 TEC). The TEU 
contained no such express reference, but determined its territorial scope in a similar but implicit way 
by employing the expression “Member States”. 
5  “ultraperifere gebieden (UPG)” in Dutch; “régions ultrapériphériques (RUP)” in French; “Gebiete in 
äußerster Randlage” in German and “regiones ultraperiféricas” in Spanish. For a detailed discussion, 
see various chapters in Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated 
Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011), 492 pp., in particular Omarjee, "Specific Measures for the Outermost Regions 
after the Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty", in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. 
Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, (Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011), 121-136;  Kochenov, "Substantive and Procedural 
issues in the Application of European Law in the Overseas Possessions of European Union Member 
States" (2008-2009) 17 Mich. St. J. Int’l L., 28-245 and 268-288 and the references cited; Faberon 
and Ziller Droit des collectivités d'outre-mer (Paris, LGDJ, 2007), 111-150; Rubio, “Les régions 
ultrapériphériques de l’Union Européenne”, in L. Tesoka and J. Ziller (eds.), Union européenne et 
outre-mers: Unis dans leur diversité, (Aix-en-Provence, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marselle, 2008), 
121-138. On the future direction of the EU’s partnership with the outermost regions, see the “Council 
conclusions on the Outermost Regions”, 3023rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting (14 June 2010) and 
the Commission Communication “A stronger partnership for the outermost regions”, COM (2004) 
343 final. 
6  Article 349, first para, TFEU. The Treaty of Amsterdam significantly changed the wording of this 
provision. On the basis of the more restrictive wording of old Article 227(2) TEC, the ECJ had 
already judged that the French Overseas departments were an integral part of the French Republic 
and that they in consequence fell within the territorial scope of the Treaties, although it would always 
be possible to adopt specific measures in order to meet the needs of those territories. See ECJ, Case 
C-163/90 Legros [1992] E.C.R. I-4625, paras 7-8; ECJ, Case 91/78 Hansen GmbH & Co. v 
Hauptzollamt de Flensburg [1979] E.C.R. 935. 
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common policies (Article 349, first para., TFEU). 7  These measures must concern, in 
particular, areas such as customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture 
and fisheries policies, conditions for supply of raw materials and essential consumer 
goods, State aids and conditions of access to structural funds and to horizontal Union 
programmes (Article 349, second para., TFEU).  When adopting such measures, the 
Council has to take into account the special characteristics and constraints of the outermost 
regions without undermining the integrity and the coherence of the Union legal order, 
including the internal market and common policies (Article 349, third para., TFEU). 8  
Very important is that measures allowing derogations from the Treaties are only allowed if 
they are limited in time and do no derogate further than strictly necessary.9   
 
With regard to the OCTs, Article 355(2) TFEU states: “The special arrangements for 
association set out in Part Four shall apply to the overseas countries and territories listed in 
Annex II”.  Throughout my analysis it will be my basic assumption therefore that only 
limited parts of Union law apply to the OCTs, namely only Part Four of the TFEU 
(Articles 198-204 TFEU).  This basic assumption will be further nuanced in part III, when 
discussing some of the citizenship rights in detail.  Based on the said assumption, and for 
reasons of convenience, I will in the following generally use the expressions “Member 
State” and “Union” as referring to those territories of the Member States to which Union 
law applies in full,10 as opposed to the “OCTs”, to which it applies to a limited extent only.   
 
1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
 
a) Constitutional structure 
 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a union with federal characteristics comprising both 
territories in Europe and in the Caribbean. 11   Traditionally, it was made up of three 
constituent countries: the Netherlands (the country in Europe), the Netherlands Antilles 
(five islands in the Caribbean12) and Aruba (also in the Caribbean).  The Kingdom was 
established with the proclamation of the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
(“Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden”,13 hereinafter “Charter”) on October 28, 
                                                 
7  See, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 247/2006 of 30 January 2006 laying down specific measures 
for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union, [2006] O.J. L42/1. See also, concerning special 
rules on regional aid applicable to outermost regions, ECJ, Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission 
[2006] E.C.R. I-7115, paras 99-106, referring to the Commission Guidelines on national regional aid, 
[1998] O.J. C74/9. For a discussion of that judgment, see Lenaerts and Cambien, "Regions and the 
European Courts: Giving Shape to the Regional Dimension of Member States" (2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 
627-631 and the references cited. 
8  See also the Declaration on the outermost regions of the Community, annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union, [1992 ] O.J. C191/104. 
9  ECJ, Case C-212/96 Chevassus-Marche [1998] E.C.R I-743. 
10  This includes the outermost regions mentioned in Article 355(1) TFEU. 
11  See the discussion in Kortmann, Constitutioneel Recht (Deventer, Kluwer, 2008), 107-114; Borman, 
Het Statuut voor het Koninkrijk (Deventer, Kluwer, 2005), 231 pp.; Kraan, "The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands", in Prakke and Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional law of 15 EU member states (Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2004), 593.  
12  Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten.  
13  Rijkswet van 28 oktober 1954 (Stb. 503; PB 121) houdende aanvaarding van een Statuut voor het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, as modified by rijkswetten van 22 november 1975 (Stb. 617; PB 233), 
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1954.  The Charter enumerates the most important competences of the Kingdom 
(“Kingdom affairs”) (see Charter, Article 3), while at the same time adding that still other 
competences may be declared to be Kingdom affairs by Act of Parliament (Ibid.).  In all 
other matters, the constituent countries are almost completely autonomous (Charter, 
Article 41(1)).  As a consequence, all constituent countries have their own constitution. 
 
Since 10 October 2010, the structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has changed 
significantly.14  The Netherlands Antilles have been dissolved.  Two of the five islands, 
namely Curaçao and Sint Maarten have become constituent countries of the Kingdom in 
their own right.  Hence, the Kingdom consists of four constituent countries.  The other 
three islands formerly belonging to the Netherlands Antilles - collectively known as the 
“BES islands”15- have obtained the status of public body (“openbaar lichaam”), which is 
close to that of a Dutch municipality, although they do not belong to a Dutch province.16  
To implement these changes, the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has been 
modified.17  In the future, the changes will possibly also be incorporated in the Dutch 
Constitution.18 
 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a Member State of the European Union, but its 
constituent countries are not. 19   This is logical, as foreign relations are a “Kingdom 
matter”20 and as the sole subject of international law is the Kingdom of the Netherlands.21  
The Treaties are nevertheless only applicable in full to the Netherlands (the European part 
of the Kingdom).  This situation is possible because the Kingdom of the Netherlands can 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 januari 1985 (Stb. 148; PB 95), 22 juli 1985 (Stb. 452; PB 102; AB 35), 15 december 1994, Stb. 
(1995, 1; PB 1995, 34; AB 1995, 18) en 7 september 1998 (Stb. 597; PB 1999, 22, AB). 
14  For up to date information on the issue, including legislative proposals and recent legislative changes, 
see the website of the Dutch government: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/caribische-deel-
van-het-koninkrijk. For more in-depth discussions of the changes, see Croes, De herdefiniëring van 
het Koninkrijk (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006), 513 pp.; Croes, “De desintegratie van de 
Nederlandse Antillen” (2007) Ars Aequi, 316-322 and, from a more international law point of view, 
Hillebrink, The right to self-determination and post-colonial governance: the case of the Netherlands 
Antilles and Aruba (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 391 pp. 
15  Namely Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius. 
16  The possibility to create public bodies is laid down in Article 134 of the Dutch Constitution. This 
served as the legal basis for the act governing the specific status of the BES islands; see the Wet van 
17 mei 2010, houdende regels met betrekking tot de openbare lichamen Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en 
Saba (Wet openbare lichamen Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba) (Stb. 2010, 345). On the reasons for 
and consequences of these changes, see the interesting report of the “Tweede Kamer” of the Dutch 
Parliament “Regels met betrekking tot de openbare lichamen Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba (Wet 
openbare lichamen Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba)”, available at http://ikregeer.nl/document/kst-
31954-7.  
17  See the Rijkswet van 7 september 2010 tot wijziging van het Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden in verband met de wijziging van de staatkundige hoedanigheid van de eilandgebieden 
van de Nederlandse Antillen (Rijkswet wijziging Statuut in verband met de opheffing van de 
Nederlandse Antillen), which entered into force on 10 October 2010. 
18  See already the proposal for a constitutional amendment, available at 
http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/grondwetbeseilanden (see “Voorontwerp wijziging Grondwet over 
staatkundige positie BES-eilanden” (2010) N.J.B., 1391). 
19  See the list of Member States in Article 52(1) TEU. 
20  Charter, Article 3b and Articles. 24 et seq. See also Article 29 of the Vienna Convention of May 23, 
1969 on the Law of Treaties. 
21  Kortmann Constitutioneel recht (4th ed.) (Deventer, Kluwer, 2001), 179. See also Submission of the 
Netherlands Government in ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 24.  
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conclude treaties for each of the constituent countries separately,22 which is shown in 
practice by mentions such as “the Kingdom of the Netherlands (for the Netherlands)”, “the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (for Aruba)” or, historically, “the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands (for the Netherlands Antilles)”.  In the following, I will give a brief overview 
of the applicability of the Treaties to the different constituencies of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the historical developments on this point. 
 
b) Applicability of the Treaties 
 
The original version of the EEC Treaty was ratified exclusively for the European territory 
of the Kingdom and for New Guinea,23 which is apparent from the statement “for the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (for the Netherlands and New Guinea)”.  This ratification for 
limited parts of the Kingdom only was explicitly authorised by a Protocol added to the 
EEC Treaty,24 stating:  
 
“The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, by reason of the constitutional structure 
of the Kingdom resulting from the Statute of 29 December 1954, shall […] be entitled to ratify 
the Treaty on behalf of the Kingdom in Europe and Netherlands New Guinea only.”25   
 
On the occasion of the ratification of the EEC Treaty, the Kingdom of Netherlands had 
declared, in accordance with this Protocol, that the EEC Treaty was not applicable at all to 
Surinam – at that time a Dutch colony and constituent country of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands – and the Netherlands Antilles.  At the same time, however, the founding 
Member States of the EEC submitted a declaration indicating their readiness to open 
negotiations, at the request of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with a view to concluding 
conventions for the economic association of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles with the 
Community.26   
 
Surinam became independent on 25 November 1975.27  Consequently, the Treaties never 
became applicable to it.28  However, it should be remarked that, after its independence, 
                                                 
22  See the submissions of the Netherlands Government in ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger 
[2006] E.C.R. I-8055, paras 22 et seq.  
23  Netherlands New Guinea was a former colony of the Netherlands, and former part of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. The territory was placed under UN administration in October 1962, by virtue of an 
agreement signed on 15 August 1962. It was passed on from the UN to Indonesia on 1 May 1963 and 
formally annexed by Indonesia in 1969. As a consequence, from then onwards the EC Treaty was no 
longer applicable to it. See Hartley EEC Immigration Law (Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1978), 50. 
24  Protocol on the application of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community to the non-
European parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. See 
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/Rome/Annex%20and%20proto
cols%20EEC.pdf. This protocol was repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
25  New Guinea was included in Annex IV (the later Annex II) to the TEEC as a Dutch OCT. For a 
discussion of the original list in Annex IV, see Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (2nd 
ed.) (London, Edinburgh & Dublin, Butterworths, 1998), 63 et seq. 
26  Declaration of intent on the Association of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles with the European 
Economic Community, annexed to the Final Act to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (25/03/1957). 
27  See the Rijkswet of 22 November 1975, Stb. 617, PbNA 233, stipulating that Surinam will no longer 
be part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and modifying the Charter accordingly.  
28  The provisions of Part Four of the Treaty were applicable to Surinam, from 1 September 1962 to 16 
July 1976, by virtue of a Supplementary Act of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to complete its 
instrument of ratification. This Act was deposited on 14 August 1962 and came into force on 1 
September 1962. See the footnote under Protocol (No 13) annexed to the Treaty establishing the 
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 123
Surinam became a party to the ACP-EC Convention: first to the original Convention 
signed at Lomé on 28 February 197529 and later to the new ACP Convention concluded at 
Cotonou on 23 June 200030 for a twenty-year period.31  The scheme applicable under the 
ACP-EC convention is substantively almost identical to that of the association scheme under 
Part Four of the TFEU,32 the biggest difference being perhaps that the association scheme 
under Part Four of the TFEU does not require any institutions of its own.33  Consequently, the 
part of the Union acquis applicable to Surinam is substantively identical to that applicable to 
the Dutch OCTs.  However, as far as the provisions on Union citizenship are concerned, 
important differences exist between Surinam, on the one hand, and the Netherlands Antilles, 
on the other hand, as will be shown below. 
 
The Netherlands Antilles were added to the list in Annex II to the Treaties (then Annex IV to 
the TEEC) by virtue of the Convention of 13 November 1962 amending Part Four of the EEC 
Treaty.34  Hence, Part Four of the TEEC became applicable to these territories.  Aruba was 
originally part of the Netherlands Antilles, so Part Four of the TEEC became applicable to it 
with the aforementioned Convention of 1962 (which referred the Netherlands Antilles 
                                                                                                                                                   
European Community on goods originating in and coming from certain countries and enjoying 
special treatment when imported into a Member State, [2006] O.J. C321E/250. On the effects of this 
Supplementary Act: see Hartley EEC Immigration Law (Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1978), 50. 
29  ACP-EC Convention of 28 February 1975, [1976] O.J. L25. This Convention was to be renewed 
every 5 year. See: Second ACP-EC Convention of 31 October 1979, [1980] O.J. L347; Third ACP-
EC Convention of 8 December 1984, [1986] O.J. L86; Fourth ACP-EC Convention of 15 December 
1989, [1991] O.J. L229/3 (concluded for ten years and since revised by the Convention of 4 
November 1995 of Mauritius [1998] O.J. L156/3). 
30  Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), of the one 
part, and the European Community and its Members States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 
June 2000, [2000] O.J. L317/3, approved by Council Decision 2003/159/EC of 19 December 2002, 
[2003] O.J. L65/27. Under Article 95, amendments may be made at the end of each five-year period. See 
e.g. Agreement amending the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the 
other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, [2005] O.J. L209/27. For a discussion of the ACP-EC 
agreement, see Babarinde and Faber, “From Lomé to Cotonou: Business as Usual?” (2004) 
E.For.Aff.Rev., 27-47; Arts, "ACP-EU Relations in a New Era: The Cotonou Agreement" (2003) CML 
Rev., 95-116; Vincent, "L'entrée en vigueur de la convention de Cotonou" (2003) C.D.E., 157-176. The 
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement entered into force on 1 April 2003. 
31  Besides, Surinam has concluded other agreements with the EU, like e.g. the Agreement in the form of 
an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and Barbados, Belize, the Republic of the 
Congo, Fiji, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, the 
Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Madagascar, the Republic of Malawi, the Republic of Mauritius, 
the Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of Surinam, Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Kingdom of 
Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the Republic of 
Uganda, the Republic of Zambia and the Republic of Zimbabwe on the guaranteed prices for cane 
sugar for the 2005/2006 delivery period, [2006] O.J. L358/53. 
32  Ziller, "Champ d'application du droit communautaire" (Paris, Editions du Juris-Classeur) fasc. 470 
Juris-Classeur Europe, available at www.lexisnexis.com, nr. 76. This is also confirmed in the 
Commission Green Paper on Future relations between the EU and the Overseas Countries and 
Territories, COM(2008) 383 final, 2. 
33  Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2011), 974. 
34  There is no authentic English version of this document, the only authentic versions being the Dutch, 
French, German and Italian one. See for the official publication in French: Convention 64/533/CEE  
portant révision du traité instituant la Communauté économique européenne en vue de le régime 
spécial d' association défini dans la quatrième partie de ce traité, [1964] J.O. 2414/64. For the entry 
into force, see: Entrée en vigueur de la convention portant révision du traité instituant la 
Communauté économique européenne en vue de rendre applicable aux Antilles néerlandaises le 
régime spécial d'association défini dans la quatrième partie de ce traité, [1964] J.O. 2414/64.  
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without specifying the constituent islands).  On 1 January 1 1986, however, Aruba gained 
independence from the other Antilles 35  without becoming independent from the 
Netherlands.36  At the same time, it became a constituent country of the “Kingdom of the 
Netherlands” in its own right.37  The fact that Aruba became independent from the other 
Antilles meant that Annex IV had to be adapted in order to encompass Aruba.  The Treaty of 
Amsterdam brought Annex IV (which it renamed Annex II) up to date, by explicitly listing 
Aruba, on the one hand, and the Netherlands Antilles,38 on the other hand.  The bottom-line is 
that Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles are now recognised as OCTs and fall under the 
provisions of Part Four of the TFEU (see Article 355(2) TFEU).39  Interesting to note in this 
connection is that the Lisbon Treaty was approved for the Kingdom of the Netherlands in its 
entirety (“voor het gehele Koninkrijk”).40  Thus, the Treaties apply to the Dutch OCTs, to 
the limited extent foreseen by Article 355(2) TFEU.41 
 
The recent changes in the constitutional structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands did not 
immediately change anything as regards the status of the Dutch OCTS under Union law.  The 
fact that two of the Netherlands Antilles became independent constituent countries of the 
Kingdom, whereas the other three were transformed into public bodies, did not change their 
                                                 
35  This was agreed by the State of the Netherlands, the State of the Netherlands Antilles and the Island 
Governments during a conference held from 7 to 12 March 1983 at The Hague. Transitional 
measures were laid down in a law of 1985, see “Rijkswet van 20 juni 1985, houdende vaststelling van 
enige overgangsbepalingen in verband met het verkrijgen van de hoedanigheid van land in het 
Koninkrijk door Aruba”. Also in 1985, the maritime boundary between Aruba and the Antilles was 
determined, see “Rijkswet van 12 december 1985, tot vaststelling van een zeegrens tussen de 
Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba”. 
36  The 1983 conference envisaged that Aruba would first become an autonomous country and member 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and achieve full independence 10 years later, in 1996. However, 
in 1990, movement towards independence was postponed upon the request of Aruba's former Prime 
Minister, Nelson O. Oduber. The article scheduling Aruba’s complete independence was rescinded in 
1995, but the process for independence could start again after a referendum.  
37  See the Rijkswet van 22 juli 1985 tot wijziging van het Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 
houdende losmaking van Aruba uit het Staatsverband van de Nederlandse Antillen (Stb. 148; PB 95). 
The preamble to the Charter considers that “Aruba has expressed freely its will to accept the 
[constitutional order of the Kingdom of the Netherlands] as a Country”. 
38  The Annex refers to “the Netherlands Antilles”, and then explicitly names the five constituent islands 
(Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustatius and Stint Maarten). 
39  Furthermore, special rules apply by virtue of Protocol (No 31) concerning imports into the European 
Union of petroleum products refined in the Netherlands Antilles, [2010] O.J. C83/315. (Originally 
published in the Official Journal of 1964 as annex to the 1962 Convention: Protocole relatif aux 
importations dans la communauté économique européenne de produits pétroliers raffinés aux Antilles 
néerlandaises, [1964] J.O. 64/2416). See also: Recommandation de la Commission, du 3 avril 1968, 
adressée aux États membres, relative aux modalités administratives pour l'application de l'article 7 du 
protocole relatif aux importations dans la Communauté économique européenne de produits pétroliers 
raffinés aux Antilles néerlandaises [1968] J.O. L94/15  
40  Rijkswet van 10 juli 2008, houdende goedkeuring van het op 13 december 2007 te Lissabon 
totstandgekomen Verdrag van Lissabon tot wijziging van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie 
en het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap, met Protocollen en Bijlagen (Trb. 2008, 
11). 
41  By contrast, the Act of Ratification of the Treaty on European Union was approved by the Dutch 
Queen “for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (for the Netherlands)” (see the Rijkswet van 17 
december 1992, houdende goedkeuring van het op 7 februari 1992 te Maastricht tot stand gekomen 
Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie, met Protocollen, en een Overeenkomst betreffende de sociale 
politiek tussen de Lidstaten van de EG, met uitzondering van het Verenigd Koninkrijk (Stb. 692). As 
a result, the TEU only applied to the European part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. See also the 
submissions of the Netherlands Government in ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] 
E.C.R. I-8055, para. 24. 
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status as OCTs.  The changes did not even make it necessary to update Annex II to the 
Treaties, since all five islands were already explicitly mentioned therein.  Still, it cannot be 
ignored that the status of the different islands under Dutch constitutional law and the intensity 
of their relation with the Netherlands has been changed significantly.  Inevitably the question 
arises, therefore, whether the constitutional changes also necessitate or make desirable a 
change of their status under Union law.  This would seem most relevant with regard to the 
BES islands, since their transformation into public bodies has resulted in them becoming part 
of the territory of the Netherlands, as far as Dutch constitutional law is concerned.  Hence, 
Dutch law will gradually become fully applicable to them, including those aspects that derive 
from Union law – such as transposed Directives.  It could be wondered whether it would not 
be more appropriate then to change their status from that of an OCT to that of an outermost 
region.  The question of a possible change of status under Union law has been (and still is) 
the subject of a fierce debate in the Netherlands and the Dutch OCTs. 42   The Dutch 
government decided in 2008 not to change the EU status of the Dutch overseas possessions, 
at least not immediately.  At the same time it was agreed that the government will 
reconsider the EU status of the BES islands after five years of their integration into the 
Netherlands.43   
 
It remains to be seen, therefore, what the future status of the Dutch overseas possessions 
under Union law will be.  This is a matter to be decided by the Dutch government, as it 
concerns a matter of internal constitutional law.  The decision will have to be respected by 
the EU without more.  A change of status of one or more islands from OCT to outermost 
region does, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, no longer necessitate an 
amendment of the Treaties.  New Article 355(6) TFEU, which has no equivalent under the 
TEC, states:  
 
“The European Council may, on the initiative of the Member State concerned, adopt a decision 
amending the status, with regard to the Union, of a Danish, French or Netherlands country or 
                                                 
42  For a detailed analysis of the possible options for a change of status under Union law, see “Banden 
met Brussel. De betrekkingen van de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba met de Europese Unie”, report 
of 1 July 2004 of the Commissie ter bestudering van mogelijke toekomstige relaties van de 
Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba met de Europese Unie, available at 
http://www.eerstekamer.nl/eu/publicatie/20040701/betrekkingen_van_de_nederlandse. See also 
opinion of 18 September 2006 in case W04.06.0204/I/K/A of the Dutch Council of State (available at 
http://www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/zoeken_in_adviezen/zoekresultaat/?zoeken_veld=bonaire&advi
cepub_id=5866), which considers the change to the status of outermost region advisable. See also the 
very informative discussion in Kochenov, Bröring and Hoogers, "Staatsrechtelijke consequenties van 
de toekenning van een UPG-status aan Aruba en de Eilandgebieden van de huidige Nederlandse 
Antillen" (2010) 26 Tijdschrift voor Antilliaans Recht - Justicia, 10-24 (authors discuss a third 
intermediate option between the status of OCT and outermost region, namely that of “OCT plus”, 
which comes down to OCTs deliberately adopting parts of Union law and maximising the potential of 
their status for intensifying their links with the EU); Hoogers, “De herstructurering van het 
Koninkrijk als lakmoesproef. Kanttekeningen vanuit constitutioneel perspectief bij de opheffing van 
de Nederlandse Antillen” (2010) TvCR, 256-285; Hoogers, “De BES-eilanden, de Grondwet en het 
Europese recht. Over constitutionele en Europeesrechtelijke consequenties van de handhaving van de 
LGO-status van de BES-eilanden” (2009) RegelMaat, 5-23; and Bröring, Kochenov, Hoogers and 
Jans Schurende rechtsordes; Over de Europese Unie, het Koninkrijk en zijn Caribische gebieden 
(Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2008), 147-187.  
43  See the website of the Dutch government: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/persberichten/2008/10/01/bonaire-sint-eustatius-en-saba-behouden-lgo-status.html, in 
particular the links to the Letters of the Dutch Cabinet to the “Tweede Kamer” of the Dutch 
Parliament. 
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territory referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. The European Council shall act unanimously after 
consulting the Commission”.44 
 
This provision was inserted on the instigation of, inter alia, the Dutch government.45  This 
is confirmed by a declaration of the Dutch government annexed to the Treaties according 
to which the Netherlands will bring the initiative for a change in the status of the 
Netherlands Antilles (and Aruba) when a decision to that regard is taken, by the Dutch 
government, in accordance with the modified Charter for the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands.46  Another Member State which is expected to bring an initiative for using 
Article 355(6) TFEU in the near future is France (see the discussion on Mayotte under 
II.A.2., infra). 
 
2. France  
 
The second Member State with OCTs is the French Republic.  The French Republic 
comprises the areas of Metropolitan France (“France Métropolitaine”) and the French 
overseas territories (“France d'outre-mer”47).  The status of French overseas territories 
under French constitutional law is diverse and has been the subject of recent changes.48  
These different statuses have different consequences for the applicability of Union law and 
possibly also, therefore, with regard to Union citizenship.   
 
a) Overseas Departments and Regions 
 
In the first place, there are the French overseas departments and regions (“départements et 
régions d'outre-mer”, often referred to as “DOM-ROM”).  They have in principle the same 
status under French constitutional law as the departments and regions in the European part 
of France (see Article 73 of the French Constitution).  At present, five territories have this 
status: French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion and Mayotte.  With the 
exception of Mayotte, these territories are considered to be among the so-called 
“outermost regions” and, consequently, the Treaties are in principle fully applicable to 
                                                 
44  See the discussion in Ziller, "Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories Others after the 
Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty", in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost 
Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, (Alphen aan den 
Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011), 69-88. 
45  The provision was originally inserted in the (rejected) EU Constitution as Article IV-440(7). See the 
discussion in Ziller, "L’Union Européenne et l’Outre-Mer" (2005) 113 Pouvoirs, 145-158. 
46  Declaration by the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Article 355 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, [2010] O.J. C83/358 (“The Kingdom of the Netherlands declares that an 
initiative for a decision, as referred to in Article 355(6) aimed at amending the status of the 
Netherlands Antilles and/or Aruba with regard to the Union, will be submitted only on the basis of a 
decision taken in conformity with the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands”) 
47  Often the term DOM-TOMs is used to refer to these territories, but this terminology does no longer 
reflect the correct Constitutional status of these territories since the Constitutional amendments of 
2003. See the discussion in Jorda, “Les collectivités territoriales outre-mer et la révision de la 
Constitution” (2003) R.F.D. Const., 697-723.  
48  For more particulars, see Faberon and Ziller Droit des collectivités d'outre-mer (Paris, LGDJ, 2007), 
546 pp; Gautron, “Le statut communautaire des DOM et de PTOM” (2006) Rev. Aff. Eur., 385-393; 
Luchaire, “La France d’outre-mer et la République” (2007) R.F.D.A.P., 399-407 (dealing with the 
question of whether the overseas territories could decide to become independent from France). The 
following overview is loosely based on these sources.  
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them (Article 355(1) TFEU).49  As was explained above, Union law applies in full to these 
regions, but derogations may apply to take account of their specific situation.50   
 
Mayotte is a case apart.  Historically, it was an overseas collectivity, but in 2011 its status 
was changed to that of an overseas department.51  This explains why Mayotte is listed in 
Annex II to the Treaties and not in Article 355(1) TFEU.  In the near future, its status 
under Union law will however be changed from that of an OCT to that of an outermost 
region, in order to reflect its changed status under French constitutional law.  This change 
can be brought about by European Council Decision adopted on the basis of Article 355(6) 
TFEU, without amending the Treaties.52  The other Member States have, in a declaration 
annexed to the Treaties, already agreed to such a change of status.  Indeed, Declaration 
(No 43) on Article 355(6) TFEU states53: 
 
“The High Contracting Parties agree that the European Council, pursuant to Article 355(6), 
will take a decision leading to the modification of the status of Mayotte with regard to the 
Union in order to make this territory an outermost region within the meaning of Article 355(1) 
and Article 349, when the French authorities notify the European Council and the Commission 
that the evolution currently under way in the internal status of the island so allows.” 
 
b) Overseas Collectivities 
 
In the second place, there are the French overseas collectivities (“collectivités d'outre-
mer”, often referred to as “COM”).  These territories have varying legal statuses and 
different levels of autonomy.  Article 74 of the French Constitution specifically provides 
that the status, competences and institutional organisation of the overseas Collectivities are 
to be determined for each of them by a specific law (loi organique).  At present, they are 
five in number: French Polynesia,54 Saint Pierre and Miquelon,55 Wallis and Futuna, Saint 
Barthélemy and Saint-Martin.56   
                                                 
49  Article 355(1) refers expressis verbis to Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion. 
Article 299(1) TEC referred to the French overseas departments (départements d’outre-mer). Since 
the constitutional reforms of 2003, each of these overseas departments constitutes an overseas region 
on its own (a région mono-départementale). As a result, Article 299(1) TEC in fact came to refer to 
the exact territories that are now termed overseas departments and regions (départements et régions 
d'outre-mer). 
50  See Article 349, third para., TFEU and the Declaration on the outermost regions of the Community, 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union, [1992 ] O.J. C191/104.  
51  See Busson, “Mayotte, 101e département français: un modèle pour une République renouvelée?” 
(2010) R.D.P., 711-728. 
52  See also under II.A.1., supra. 
53  Declaration (No 43), annexed to the Treaties, on Article 355(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, [2010] O.J. C83/351. 
54  Until 2003 French Polynesia had the status of overseas territory (territoire d’outre mer). For a 
discussion, see Arlettaz, “L'autonomie polynésienne dans la République décentralisée” (2005) Rev. b. 
dr. const., 19-41. 
55  Between 1976 and 1985 Saint Pierre and Miquelon held the status of a DOM, but the effects of this 
change as regards Union law form the object of a debate in legal literature. See the discussion in 
Kochenov, "Substantive and Procedural issues in the Application of European Law in the Overseas 
Possessions of European Union Member States" (2008-2009) 17 Mich. St. J. Int’l L., 263-265. 
56  Saint-Martin and Saint-Barthélemy were formerly part of Guadeloupe, a French Overseas 
department. In 2003 the population of Saint-Martin and Saint-Barthélemy voted in favour of 
secession from Guadeloupe in order to form separate overseas collectivities of France. On 7 February 
2007, the French Parliament passed a bill granting COM status to both Saint-Barthélemy and 
neighbouring Saint-Martin. The new status took effect on 22 February 2007 when the law was 
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The overseas collectivities are true OCTs in the sense of Article 355(2) TFEU and are 
mentioned in Annex II to the Treaties.  Consequently, only limited parts of the Treaties are 
applicable to them. 57  This is true for all overseas collectivities, but for the last two 
mentioned above: Saint Barthélemy and Saint-Martin.  These territories are not mentioned 
in Annex II, and the Treaties apply in full to them.  The reason is that before February 
2007 these two territories were part of a French overseas department, 58 to which the 
Treaties are fully applicable.  Contrary to what one might have expected, the Lisbon 
Treaty did not update the list in Annex II so as to include Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-
Martin.  Quite to the contrary, the notion "the French overseas departments" in Article 
299(2) TEC was replaced by "Guadeloupe, French, Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-
Barthélemy, Saint-Martin" (Article 349, first para. and 355(1) TFEU.  As a result, Saint-
Barthélemy and Saint-Martin have kept their status of outermost regions under Union law. 
 
The status of Saint-Barthélemy under Union law will change, however, in the near future.  
By virtue of a European Council Decision adopted under Article 355(6) TFEU, Saint-
Barthélemy will cease to be an outermost region and become an OCT with effect from 1 
January 2012.59  The wording of Articles 349, first para., and Article 355(1) TFEU will be 
changed accordingly and Saint-Barthélemy will be added to the list in Annex II to the 
Treaties.60  French law already took this possible change of status into account.61 
 
c) French Southern and Antarctic Territories 
 
The French Southern and Antarctic Territories (Terres australes et antarctiques 
françaises; TAAF) comprises a group of volcanic islands in the southern Indian Ocean,62 
Adélie Land63 and the Scattered islands in the Indian Ocean.  They are not, technically 
speaking, overseas collectivities and their status under French constitutional law is given 
shape in a different way, due to the particularities of these regions. 64   The French 
Constitution mentions them separately from the other territories and provides that their 
status and organisation should be determined by legislative act (Article 72-3).  Their status 
does however closely resemble that of overseas collectivities.  From the perspective of 
                                                                                                                                                   
published in the Journal Officiel: Loi organique n° 2007- 223 du 21 février 2007 portant dispositions 
statutaires et institutionnelles relatives à l'outre-mer, [2007] JORFLoi organique n° 2007- 223 du 21 
février 2007 portant dispositions statutaires et institutionnelles relatives à l'outre-mer, [2007] JORF . 
See Oraison, “Le statut nouveau de collectivité d'outre-mer des îles de Saint-Barthélemy et de Saint-
Martin” (2007) R.D.P., 153-183; Diémert, “La création de deux nouvelles collectivités d'outre-mer 
régies par l'article 74 de la Constitution: Saint-Barthélemy et Saint-Martin” (2007) R.F.D.A., 669-
680. 
57  For a brief analysis, see Blot, “L'application du traité CE aux territoires d'outre-mer” (2003) A.J.D.A., 
1426-1429. 
58  See n. 56, supra. 
59  European Council Decision of 29 October 2010 amending the status with regard to the European 
Union of the island of Saint-Barthélemy [2010] O.J. L325/4, Article 1. 
60  Ibid., Article 2. 
61  See Article LO6214-3 (II) of the Code général des collectivités territoriales. 
62  Divided into three districts: Kerguelen, Crozet and Saint-Paul-et-Amsterdam. 
63  The French claim on the Antarctica continent under the Antarctic Treaty System. 
64  See Eveillard, “Le statut des Terres Australes et Antarctiques Françaises après la loi du 21 février 
2007” (2008) R.D.P., 103-138; Garde, “L’Antarctique, ultime frontière de l’Europe”, in L. Tesoka 
and J. Ziller (eds.), Union européenne et outre-mers: Unis dans leur diversité, (Aix-en-Provence, 
Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marselle, 2008), 411-426. 
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Union law, they have the same status as overseas collectivities, given the fact that they are 
mentioned in Annex II to the Treaties.65   
 
d) New Caledonia and Dependencies 
 
New Caledonia, formerly a French “overseas territory” (“territoire d'outre-mer”), has had a 
sui generis status under French Constitutional law since 1999.66  Its status is different from 
that of other French overseas territories in that it has greater autonomy than other 
territories and this autonomy will, moreover, increase over time.  Indeed, the relationship 
between France and New Caledonia is regulated by the so-called “Nouméa Agreement of 
1998”, which provides for a step by step transfer of competences to New Caledonia until 
full independence is achieved. 67   The Agreement states that, until then, France will 
continue to be competent for certain policy areas, which will at least include defence, 
foreign affairs, immigration, justice and monetary policy (the so-called “compétences 
régaliennes”).  The French Constitution provides, in a separate title on transitional 
provisions concerning New Caledonia, that an organic law (loi organique) is to lay down 
the arrangements for putting the Nouméa Agreement into place.  These arrangements are 
laid down in an organic law of 1999.68 
 
As far as Union law is concerned, New Caledonia has exactly the same legal status as the 
French overseas collectivities.  New Caledonia and Dependencies are listed in Annex II to 
the Treaties, which means that the Treaties apply to a limited extent only, as was explained 
higher. 
 
e) Clipperton Island 
 
A particular case is Clipperton Island (Île de Clipperton or Île de la Passion in French), an 
uninhabited and extremely small island in the eastern Pacific Ocean, southwest of Mexico. 
Since the constitutional reform of 2003, Clipperton Island is explicitly mentioned in the 
French Constitution.  As is the case for the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, the 
Constitution states that the status and the organisation of the island is to be determined by 
legislative act (Article 72-3).  Consequently, it does not have the status of an overseas 
collectivity, but a status that can only be qualified as sui generis.69  
                                                 
65  Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the only question concerning the applicability of 
Union law could arise with regard to the scattered Islands, as they were only added to the TAAF in 
2007 and were not part of the TAAF when the latter were included in Annex II to the Treaties. 
However, since the Lisbon Treaty did not change the list of territories in Annex II, it can be assumed 
that the scattered islands are part of the TAAF for the purposes of the application of Union law. 
66  For a detailed discussion, see Faberon, “La Nouvelle-Calédonie et l’Union Européenne: le 
volontarisme d’un PTOM en situation de souveraineté partagée”, in L. Tesoka and J. Ziller (eds.), 
Union européenne et outre-mers: Unis dans leur diversité, (Aix-en-Provence, Presses Universitaires 
d'Aix-Marselle, 2008), 285-302; Custos, “New Caledonia, a Case of Shared Sovereignty within the 
French Republic: Appearance or Reality?” (2007) 13 E.P.L., 97-132; Clinchamps, “Les collectivités 
d’Outre-Mer et la Nouvelle-Calédonie: le fédéralisme en question” (2005) Pouvoirs, 73-93. 
67  Accord sur la Nouvelle-Calédonie signé à Nouméa le 5 mai 1998 [1998] JORF. 
68  Loi organique no 99-209 du 19 mars 1999 relative à la Nouvelle-Calédonie, [1999] JORF, 4197. 
69  For more details, see Verpeaux, “Les innovations intéressant l'Outre-mer: modifications des articles 
72-3, 73 et 74-1 de la Constitution” (2008) Les Petites Affiches, 120-122; Oraison, “A propos du 
nouveau statut interne du récif de Clipperton fixé par la loi ordinaire du 21 février 2007, ‘portant 
dispositions statutaires et institutionnelles relatives à l'outre-mer’: radioscopie du dernier ‘territoire 
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Curiously, in contrast to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Clipperton Island 
is not mentioned in Annex II to the Treaties.  Its status under Union law is somewhat 
enigmatic, therefore.  Probably, the island has the same status under Union law as 
mainland France, since it does not have any administrative organisation, unlike other 
French overseas possessions.  Clipperton Island is directly administered by the French 
government and the French laws and regulations are directly applicable in its territory.70  
This would, in the absence of an explicit conferral of the status of OCT or outermost 
region, seem to imply that the Treaties are fully applicable.71  In any event, the uncertainty 
regarding the status of Clipperton Island under Union law does not matter much for my 
analysis of the legal status of OCT nationals in the light of Union citizenship, since the 
island is uninhabited.     
 
3. Denmark  
 
The next Member State which possesses OCTs is the Kingdom of Denmark. 72   The 
Kingdom of Denmark comprises the territories of Denmark proper, the Faeroe Islands and 
Greenland.  Both Greenland and the Faeroe Islands are self-governing Danish provinces.  
The Faeroe Islands were granted home rule in 1948 73 and Greenland in 1978.74  The 
Danish Constitution (Danmarks Riges Grundlov) applies to all three regions, but the home 
rule arrangements are set out in separate acts.75  Both the Faeroe Islands and Greenland 
manage most of their internal affairs.76  It is mostly foreign relations, defence and the legal 
system which are Kingdom matters.77  These competences are in large part exercised by 
Denmark proper, on behalf of all three regions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
résiduel de la République française’” (2007) Revue de la recherche juridique. Droit prospectif, 729-
740; Thiellay, “Les lois organique et ordinaire portant dispositions statutaires et institutionnelles 
relatives à l'outre-mer du 21 février 2007” (2007) A.J.D.A., 631-635. 
70  See Article 9 of Loi n°55-1052 du 6 août 1955 portant statut des Terres australes et antarctiques 
françaises et de l'île de Clipperton, as modified by Loi n°2007-224 du 21 février 2007 portant 
dispositions statutaires et institutionnelles relatives à l'outre-mer. 
71  This is the opinion of Faberon and Ziller, who cite a 1985 Commission answer to the contrary and 
concludes that it is mistaken (Faberon and Ziller Droit des collectivités d'outre-mer (Paris, LGDJ, 
2007), 447). 
72  I will limit myself to a brief exposition of the Danish Constitutional structure, and its status under 
Union law. For more in-depth resources on Danish law, see the references listed in Wandall, 
"Researching Danish Law" (2006) NYU Hauser Global Law School Program, available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Denmark.htm and in Steenbeek and Gilhuis, "The Kingdom 
of Denmark", in Prakke and Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional Law of 15 EU Member States (Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2004), 179-180. 
73  The Faeroe Islands Home Rule Arrangement was established by Act no. 137 of 23 March 1948 
relating to Faeroe Islands Home Rule. 
74  See Act no. 577 of 29 November 1978 relating to Greenland Home Rule.  
75  See the Acts mentioned in the foregoing footnotes. For a more detailed discussion, see Jensen, "The 
Position of Greenland and the Faroe Islands Within the Danish Realm" (2003) 9 E.P.L., 170-178. 
76  As a result of a non-binding referendum on Greenland's autonomy, held on 25 November 2008, 
which was passed with a 75 % approval rate, the areas in which Greenland has autonomous 
competences were significantly expanded as from 21 June 2009 onwards. For a detailed discussion, 
see Dyrendom Graugaard, "National Identity in Greenland in the Age of Self-Government " (2009) 
Centre for the Study of Global Power & Politics Working Paper 09/5 available at 
http://www.trentuniversity.ca/globalpolitics/documents/Graugaard095.pdf. 
77  See § 19 of the Danish Constitution. 
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The Treaties apply in full only to Denmark proper.  Both Greenland and the Faeroe Islands 
have opted to remain outside the EU.  The Faeroe Islands were excluded from the outset 
from the scope of application of the Treaties.78  As a consequence, relations between the 
Faeroe Islands and the EU are to be regulated by bilateral agreements concluded between 
the EU and the Faeroe Islands.79  Originally, when Denmark acceded to the EEC, the 
Treaties applied to Greenland in full.  However, after Greenland was granted self-rule, it 
voted to leave the European Communities.  After a consultative referendum in 1982 on 
membership of the European Community, it chose to leave the EC with effect from 1 
February 1985.80  From then onwards Greenland has been included in the list of OCTs in 
Annex II to the Treaties. 81  As a consequence, only limited parts of the Treaties are 
applicable to it.  Article 204 TFEU provides that the provisions of Part Four only apply to 
Greenland, subject to the specific provisions for Greenland set out in a Protocol annexed to 
the Treaties.82 
 
4. The United Kingdom  
 
                                                 
78 Article 355(5)(a) TFEU and Article 198 EAECT fourth para., indent (a); Upon Accession of 
Denmark in 1973, Denmark was given the option to declare, by 31 December 1975 at the latest, the 
Treaties applicable to the Faeroe Islands (see Articles 25 and 26 of the Act concerning the conditions 
of accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties, [1972] O.J. L73/19). This option was never 
exercised. The Treaty on Euopean Union removed it from the aforementioned articles. 
79  E.g. Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark 
and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part, [1997] O.J. L53/2; Agreement on 
fisheries between the European Economic Community, of the one part, and the Government of 
Denmark and the Home Government of the Faeroe Islands, of the other part, [1980] O.J. L226/12. 
See in more detail: Fagerlund, "Autonomous European Island regions Enjoying a Special 
Relationship with the European Union", in Lyck (ed.), Constitutional and Economic Space of the 
small Nordic Jurisdictions: The Aaland Islands, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland (Stockholm, 
Nordiska Institutet för Regionalpolitisk Forskning, 1997), 90-121. 
80  See on this decision: Harhoff, "Greenland's Withdrawal From the European Communities" (1983) 20 
CML Rev., 13-33; Krämer, "Greenland's European Community (EC) referendum: Background and 
consequences" (1982) 25 German Yearbook of International Law, 273-289; Mason, "EC Commission 
Draft Approves Withdrawal of Greenland from the European Community and Proposes Terms for 
Economic Reassociation" (1983) 13 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L., 865-876; Weiss, "Greenland’s 
withdrawal from the European Communities" (1985) 10 E.L. Rev., 173-185; Hjalte Rasmussen (ed.) 
Greenland in the Process of Leaving the European Communities (Copenhagen, Forlaget Europa, 
1983), 95 pp. 
81  Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, 
[1985] O.J. L29/3, Article 4.   
82  Protocol (No 34), annexed to the Treaties, on special arrangements for Greenland, [2010] O.J. 
C83/320 (replacing Protocol (No 15) annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community on 
special arrangements for Greenland, [2006] O.J. C321E/254. The protocol concerns the common 
organisation of the market in fishery products. These arrangements are further specified in a Fishing 
Agreement and its implementing protocols: Agreement on fisheries between the European Economic 
Community, on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark and the local Government of 
Greenland, on the other, [1985] O.J. L29/9, now replaced by a new Fisheries Partnership Agreement: 
see Council Decision of 21 December 2006 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an 
Exchange of Letters relating to the provisional application of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement 
between the European Community, on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark and the Home 
Rule Government of Greenland, on the other, [2006] O.J. C321E/1. The new Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement was approved on behalf of the EC by Council Regulation (EC) No 753/2007 of 28 June 
2007, [2007] O.J. L172/1. 
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a) Overseas Territories 
 
The British Overseas Territories are fourteen territories which the United Kingdom has 
under its sovereignty.83  The name "British Overseas Territory" was introduced by the 
British Overseas Territories Act 2002, and replaced the name “British dependent 
territory”, which was introduced by the British Nationality Act 1981.  Before that, the 
territories were known as “colonies” or “Crown colonies”.   
 
Article 355(2), second subpara., TFEU states that the Treaties do not apply to “those 
overseas countries and territories having special relations with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland which are not included in [Annex II to the Treaties]”.  
Annex II lists the following British Overseas Territories: Anguilla, Cayman Islands, 
Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, 
Saint Helena and Dependencies, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean 
Territory, Turks and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda.  These territories are 
OCTs in the sense of Article 355(2), first subpara., TFEU.  In principle, Part Four of the 
TFEU applies to them, therefore.  This is different only for Bermuda, to which the 
provisions of Part Four of the TFEU and the measures adopted thereunder are not 
applicable upon request of the Government of Bermuda.84  Hence, Bermuda is an OCT, 
but Union law is not applicable in its territory.  For this reason, in the following, references 
to “OCTs” do no not cover Bermuda. 
 
At present, only two British overseas territories are not listed in Annex II.85  The first 
overseas territory not included in Annex II is Gibraltar.  Article 355(3) TFEU states that the 
Treaties apply to European territories for whose external relations a Member State is 
responsible.  This boils down in practice to Gibraltar.86  The 1972 Act of Accession provided 
                                                 
83  For the list of British overseas territories, the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 (Article 1) refers 
to Schedule 6 to the British Nationality Act 1981 The territories listed in schedule 6 are (taking later 
modifications into account): Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean 
Territory, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands & Dependencies, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn, 
Henderson, Ducie & Oeno Islands, the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri & Dhekelia, St Helena & 
Dependencies, Turks & Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands. For more detailed discussions, see “Overseas 
Territories”, (2007-2008) House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Seventh Report of Session 
2007-2008, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/147/147i.pdf. 
84  See the website of the Commission on EU relations with Bermuda: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/country_profile.cfm?cid=b
m&type=short&lng=en. See also recital (22) in the preamble to Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 
November 2001 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European 
Community, [2001] O.J. L314/5 (“The arrangements for association laid down in this Decision 
should not be applied to Bermuda in accordance with the wishes of the Government of Bermuda”). 
85  The British territories which are not considered to be OCTs used to be more important, as old Article 
299(4) TEC used to exclude the application of the Treaties to Hong Kong (another former British 
Dependent Territory which has never been included in the list in Annex II). 
86 See Declaration (No 55), annexed to the Treaties, by the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, [2010] O.J. C83/356. See Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and 
Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 437. The 
Treaties expressly exclude other territories, which could qualify (e.g. the Channel Islands and the Isle 
of Man; see the discussion infra). Nor are they considered to apply to Andorra (see, nonetheless, the 
commercial agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the EEC and Andorra O.J. 1990 L 
374/13).  
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that some major areas of Union law should not apply to Gibraltar, 87  in particular free 
movement of goods and harmonisation measures adopted for that purpose by the Union under 
Articles 114 and 115 TFEU.88  The other provisions of the Treaties do apply in full.89  Before 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Treaty was not expressly stated to be 
applicable to territories for the foreign relations of which a Member State is responsible.  
Acts adopted pursuant to the EU Treaty were, therefore, where appropriate, expressly 
declared to be applicable to Gibraltar.90   
 
The second overseas territories not mentioned in Annex II are the two sovereign bases on 
Cyprus, known as Akrotiri and Dhekelia.91  Prior to accession of Cyprus to the Union in 
2004,92 Union law did not apply to the sovereign bases (see old Article 299(6)(b) TEC).  
This was changed when Cyprus joined the Union.93  Article 355(5) TFEU now states that 
the Treaties;  
 
“shall not apply to the United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in 
Cyprus except to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of the arrangements set out 
in the Protocol on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland in Cyprus […]and in accordance with the terms of that Protocol”.   
 
The protocol referred to94 provides for the applicability of inter alia the Treaty provisions 
on agriculture and relating to the customs union.  Substantial areas of Union law do 
therefore apply to these sovereign bases. 
                                                 
87  See Article 28 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties, 
[1972] O.J. L73/14, and Annex I(I) to this Act, [1972] O.J. L73/47. 
88  See ECJ, Case C-30/01 Commission v UK [2003] E.C.R. I-9481.  
89  ECJ, Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission of the European 
Communities [2002] E.C.R. II-2309, para. 12. 
90  E.g. Council Decision 2003/642/JHA of 22 July 2003 concerning the application to Gibraltar of the 
Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or 
officials of Member States of the European Union, [2003] O.J. L226/27. 
91  For a detailed discussion, see Laulhé Shaelou, “The Principle of Territorial Exclusion in the EU: 
SBAs in Cyprus – A Special Case of Sui Generis Territories in the EU”, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU 
Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories 
Sui Generis, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011), 153-175. 
92  Cyprus became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004. See Article 2(2) of the Treaty between the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic 
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, 
the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, 
concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, [2003] 
O.J. L236/17. 
93  On the legal relations between the EU and Cyprus, see extensively Laulhé Shaelou, The EU and 
Cyprus (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010), 410 pp. 
94  Protocol (No 3) on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland in Cyprus, annexed to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, 
the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia 
and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded, [2003] O.J. L236/940. See also Protocol (No 10) on Cyprus, annexed to the Act concerning 
the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, 
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, 
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b) Crown Dependencies 
 
The territories of the Channel bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey and the Isle of Man, 
though also under the sovereignty of the British Crown, have a slightly different 
constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom.  They are classed as Crown 
dependencies rather than Overseas Territories.  This has important consequences with 
regard to British nationality law, as they are considered part of the UK, 95 unlike the 
overseas territories (cf. infra).  However, as they are possessions of the British Crown they 
are not sovereign nations in their own right, and the power to pass legislation affecting the 
islands rests ultimately with the British Parliament.  As far as Union law is concerned, it 
must be pointed out that the crown dependencies are not considered to be OCTs.  They 
have a somewhat particular status under Union law.  Article 355(5)(c) TFEU provides that 
the Treaties 
 
“shall apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary to ensure 
the implementation of the arrangements for those islands set out in the Treaty concerning the 
accession of new Member States to the European Economic Community and to the European 
Atomic Energy Community signed on 22 January 1972” 
 
These special arrangements can be found in Protocol (No 3) annexed to the Accession 
Treaty.96  In short,97 the islands take part in the EU freedom of movement of goods but not 
persons, services or capital.98  However, the authorities of these territories are under a duty 
not to discriminate between nationals of Member States (see Article 4 of Protocol (No 3)), 
and this duty is not limited to the areas of Union law that are applicable to these islands.99  
The former second and third pillar of Union law are not applicable to them.100  The Lisbon 
Treaty did not change the position of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands under Union 
law.101 
                                                                                                                                                   
the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the 
Treaties on which the European Union is founded, [2003] O.J. L236/955. 
95  See s 50(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981, stipulating that, for the purposes of that act, the 
“United Kingdom” means Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Islands, taken together. 
96  Protocol (No 3) on the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, annexed to the Treaty between the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic the Italian Republic, 
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands ( Member States of the European 
Communities), The Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, 
the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, [1972] O.J. 
L73/164. 
97  This oversimplifies the issue, but this will in no way affect the following analysis. 
98  This is confirmed in case law of the ECJ. See e.g. ECJ, Case C-355/89 Barr and Montrose Holdings 
[1991] E.C.R. I-3479; ECJ, Case C-171/96 Pereira Roque [1998] E.C.R. I-4607; ECJ, Case C-293/02 
Jersey Produce Marketing Organisation [2005] E.C.R. I-9543. 
99  ECJ, Case C-355/89 Barr and Montrose Holdings [1991] E.C.R. I-3479, para. 17. 
100  Sutton, "Jersey's Changing Constitutional Relationship With Europe" (2005) The Jersey Law Review, 
available at http://www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/contents05.aspx, available at 
http://www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/default.aspx .  
101  This is confirmed by a report from the Constitutional and External Relations Committee of the Isle of 
Man Council of Ministers, see https://www.gov.im/lib/news/cso/lisbontreatywoul.xml . Sutton adds 
however cautiously that “only time will tell whether the abolition of the Community and its 
replacement by the Union (with legal personality) will have an indirect political or legal effect on the 
Islands” (Sutton, “The evolving legal status of the Crown Dependencies under UK, European and 
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B. Nationality laws and personal scope of the citizenship provisions 
 
In the following I will give a short overview of the nationality laws of the four Member 
States considered in the foregoing, in particular in relation to nationals resident in or 
having a particular connection with one of their OCTs.  It will be shown how the different 
Member States have vastly different policies in this regard.  This, in turn, will entail vastly 
different consequences under Union law for the nationals concerned, in particular given 
the fact that the status of Union citizenship is determined with regard to the nationality 
laws of the Member States.  For each of the four Member States previously discussed, I 
will set out, first, the most important features of the nationality legislation in place in 
relation to citizens of the OCTs.  Second, I will try to determine what the consequences are 
in view of the provisions on Union citizenship.  More in particular, I will try to determine 
for each Member State whether nationals of the OCTs are to be considered Union citizens.  
It is important to stress that in this context I will only determine whether the nationals 
concerned formally posses the status of Union citizenship.  The question to what extent 
they enjoy the rights attached to Union citizenship, and hence can be put on the same level 
with Union citizens from mainland Europe, will be answered below (see the discussion 
under III., infra). 
 
1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
 
a) One single nationality 
 
Notwithstanding its division into different constituent State entities, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands has one single nationality, the Dutch nationality (Dutch: 
“Nederlandschap”). 102   Indeed, nationality is one of the “Kingdom matters” (Charter, 
Article 3c) and is accordingly regulated uniformly for all constituent states.  Unlike for 
example the United Kingdom,103 the Netherlands does not distinguish between different 
categories of citizens depending on their link with the Dutch territory.  There is so to speak 
only one category of Dutch citizens, namely those having the Dutch nationality.  The 
Netherlands could of course have specified who is to be regarded as a Dutch national for 
Union purposes (i.e. without changing the internal constitutional arrangements of 
                                                                                                                                                   
International Law”, paper presented at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of 
Cambridge, 25 April 2008, available at 
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/Sutton%20lecture%20notes.pdf). 
102  The rules concerning Dutch nationality are laid down in a recent Act which entered into force on 1 
April 2004: Rijkswet van 19 december 1984, houdende vaststelling van nieuwe, algemene bepalingen 
omtrent het Nederlanderschap ter vervanging van de Wet van 12 december 1892, Stb. 1892, 268, op 
het Nederlanderschap en het ingezetenschap. See in detail: De Groot and Tratnik, Nederlands 
nationaliteitsrecht (Deventer, Kluwer, 2010), 239 pp; Van Oers, De Hart and Groenendijk, "Country 
Report: The Netherlands" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Netherlands.pdf; De Groot Handboek nieuw nationaliteitsrecht 
(Deventer, Kluwer, 2003), 588 pp. 
103  The British Nationality Act distinguishes between different categories of citizens. See the discussion, 
infra. 
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nationality).104  This has never happened, but the possibility cannot be excluded that at 
some point in the future the Netherlands will lay down such a declaration.105   
 
For the sake of completeness, it must be added that citizens settled in one of the former 
colonies of the Netherlands, namely in Indonesia and Surinam, are not normally Dutch 
nationals, even though before their independence, Dutch citizenship was held by many 
persons settled there.  Most Dutch citizens living in these territories, upon their 
independence, acquired the citizenship of these countries and thereby lost their Dutch 
citizenship, although a small group of Dutch citizens were allowed to retain their Dutch 
citizenship.106  In the following I will only analyse the consequences under Union law with 
regard to those individuals that are Dutch nationals.   
 
b) Consequences with regard to Union citizenship 
 
Article 20(1) TFEU clearly states: “every person holding the nationality of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union”.  In consequence, as explained higher, the only requirement 
for being a Union citizen is having the nationality of a Member State.  As a result, all 
Dutch nationals are Union citizens, including those resident in the Dutch overseas 
possessions.  This has been explicitly confirmed by the ECJ.107  As a matter of principle 
(and without pre-empting the detailed discussion below) they should enjoy, therefore, the 
rights conferred by the Treaties and be subject to the duties imposed thereby (Article 20(2) 
TFEU).  This issue will be discussed in much detail below, under Title III. 
 
2. France 
 
French nationality legislation is fairly straightforward: there is only one single French 
nationality.  Nationality is a policy area which is regulated for all overseas territories by 
Metropolitan France. 108   Citizens of the French overseas territories have the French 
nationality, which means they have the same rights under French law as French nationals 
settled in France.  For example, citizens of overseas territories have the same voting rights 
in French presidential elections.  As a consequence of Article 20(1) TFEU, all French 
                                                 
104  See Declaration (No 2) on nationality of a Member State, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, 
[1992] O.J. C191/98 and the discussion in Chapter 2, infra (under II.A.3). 
105  See on this topic De Groot, "Visumplicht Antillianen/Arubanen en het Europese burgerschap" (2000) 
Migrantenrecht, 51.  
106  See the discussion in Van Oers, De Hart and Groenendijk, "Country Report: The Netherlands" (2010) 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Netherlands.pdf, 10-11; Heijs, “Nederlandschap in de 
Nederlandse Koloniën: Regulering van immigratie vanuit de koloniën door nationaliteitsbeleid in 
Nederland” (1991) 12 Recht der werkelijkheid, 21-42. 
107  See explicitly ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055. See similarly: Opinion 
of AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-145/04 and C-300/04 Spain v United Kingdom; Eman and Sevinger 
[2006] E.C.R. I-7917, para. 144.  
108  See Article 73 of the French Constitution, which states that the competence to regulate nationality is 
one that cannot be transferred to the overseas collectivities. For a detailed discussion, see Weil, Spire 
and Bertossi, "Country Report: France" (2010) EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/France.pdf. For a historical overview and analysis of 
French nationality law, see Weil, How to be French: nationality in the making since 1789 (Durham, 
Duke University Press, 2008), 438 pp.  
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nationals, including those settled in the OCTs, are Union citizens.109  This has the same 
consequences under Union law as with regard to Dutch nationals.110 
 
Interestingly, on the basis of the explicit authorisation in Article 77 of the French 
Constitution “New Caledonia Citizenship” was established.  This status is complementary 
to French citizenship111 and can only be acquired by French nationals who fulfil certain 
conditions, mainly that of having resided for ten years in New Caledonia. 112   New 
Caledonia may restrict certain rights to New Caledonian citizens, in particular the right to 
vote in local elections. 113   It can be wondered whether such arrangements, which 
effectively exclude non-Caledonian French citizens and other Union citizens from 
enjoying these rights, are permissible under the provisions on Union citizenship and 
Article 18 TFEU in particular.114  This is certainly an interesting issue that will need to be 
examined more closely by the Union institutions in the near future.  Be that as it may, the 
existence of a regional New Caledonian citizenship and the validity of the accompanying 
arrangements are not relevant for the analysis in this chapter since all New Caledonian 
citizens necessarily hold the French nationality and are, therefore, prima facie, Union 
citizens.  
 
3. Denmark 
 
Like the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the French Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark 
has a system of one single nationality, which is acquired by having a sufficiently close 
connection with any part of Denmark, including Greenland and the Faeroe Islands.115  
Applying Article 20(1) TFEU, this should have as a consequence that all Danish nationals, 
including those settled in Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, are to be considered Union 
citizens.116  However, a protocol to the treaty of accession of Denmark to the European 
                                                 
109  Ziller, "L'association des pays et territoires d'outre-mer à la communauté européenne" (2002) RFAP, 
131.  
110  See under II.B.1., supra. 
111  See the discussion in Custos, “New Caledonia, a Case of Shared Sovereignty within the French 
Republic: Appearance or Reality?” (2007) 13 E.P.L., 97-132; Gohin, "La citoyennete dans l'outre-
mer français" (2002) R.F.D.A.P., 69-82. 
112  See Articles 4 and 188 of Loi organique n°99-209 du 19 mars 1999 relative à la Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
113  Under Article 24 of the organic law of 19 March 1999 (see previous footnote), New Caledonia may, 
furthermore, restrict access to certain professions to New Caledonia citizens. So far, it appears, no 
such arrangements are in place. See Faberon, “La Nouvelle-Calédonie et l'Union européenne”, in 
Tesoka and Ziller (eds), Union européenne et outre-mers: Unis dans leur diversiré (Aix-en-Provence, 
Presses universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 2008), 286 (cited by Kochenov (see following footnote), at 
318). 
114  See on that issue the very interesting article by Kochenov: Kochenov, "Regional Citizenships and EU 
Law: the Case of the Aland Islands and New Caledonia" (2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 307-325 (the author 
concludes that the present nationality requirements in place in New Caledonia, in particular the fact 
that only French nationals can become New Caledonian citizens, are illegal under the principle of 
non-discrimination of Union citizens). 
115  For a discussion of Danish nationality law, see Ersbøll, “Denmark”, in R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. 
Groenendijk and H. Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and loss of nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 
European Countries. Volume 2: Country Analyses, (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 
105-147. 
116  See the discussion in Ziller, "The European Union and the Territorial scope of European Territories" 
(2007) 38 Vict. U. Wellington L. Rev., 55; Ziller, "Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: 
Diversity and Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States' Territories", 
in De Búrca and Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU - From Uniformity to Flexibility? 
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Communities117 stipulates that Danish nationals residing in the Faeroe Islands are not to be 
considered as Danish nationals within the meaning of the treaties. 118   Hence, Danish 
people living in the Faeroe Islands are not Union citizens (see Article 20(1) TFEU).119  
The Protocol does not affect the status of other Member State nationals resident on the 
Faeroe Islands: they remain Union citizens.  In conclusion, all Danish nationals are to be 
considered Union citizens, except those resident in the Faeroe Islands.  For example: a 
Danish national resident in the Faeroe Islands who moves his residence to Greenland, is to 
be considered a Union citizen. 
 
4. The United Kingdom 
 
a) Different categories of British nationals: overview 
 
British nationality laws are probably the most complex of any Member State.  Unlike what 
is the case in most other Member States, different categories of British nationality exist, to 
which different sets of rights and duties are attached.  These laws have, moreover, been 
changed substantially over time.120  The current legislation can only be understood in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
(Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), 118 et seq.; Fransman Fransman's British Nationality 
Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 1455. 
117  Protocol (No 2) on the Faroe Islands, annexed to the Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic the Italian Republic, The Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands ( Member States of the European Communities), The 
Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of 
Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic 
Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, [1972] O.J. L73/163, Article 4. 
118  The protocol states that Danish nationals resident in the Faeroe Islands shall be considered to be 
nationals of a Member State within the meaning of the original Treaties only from the date on which 
those original Treaties become applicable to those Islands. The Treaties never became applicable to 
the Faeroe Islands, which has for a consequence that Danish nationals resident on the Faeroe Islands 
are not to be considered as Danish nationals for EU purposes. The same idea was reiterated in respect 
of the (rejected) EU Constitution: Article 7 of Protocol (No 8) annexed to the EU Constitution on the 
Treaties and Acts of Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Hellenic Republic, of the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Portuguese Republic, and of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of 
Sweden, [2004] O.J. C310/267). 
119  De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 9. This is different only for those Danish nationals resident in 
the Faeroe Islands which possess the nationality of another Member State. They will, by virtue of this 
latter nationality, have the status of Union citizen. Kochenov has argued, in the light of the ECJ’s 
holding in Eman and Sevinger that Union citizenship does not have a territorial logic (see the 
discussion, infra), that restrictions of Union citizenship based on residence are not valid under Part 
Two of the TFEU (Kochenov, "The Puzzle of Citizenship and Territory in the EU: On European 
Rights Overseas" (2010) 17 MJ, 236). I submit that, while Kochenov is right on the fact that the 
protocol diverges from Part Two of the TFEU, such is not necessarily enough to question its validity, 
given that protocols have the same legal force as the treaty to which they are appended. 
120  See also the discussion in Sawyer, "Country Report: United Kingdom" (2010) EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/United%20Kingdom.pdf; 
Dumett, “United Kingdom”, in . Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk and H. Waldrauch (eds.), 
Acquisition and loss of nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. Volume 2: 
Country Analyses, (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 551-580; Hansen, “From 
Subjects to Citizens: Immigration and Nationality Law in the United Kingdom”, in Hansen and Weil 
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light of past legislation.  It is important therefore to give a brief overview of the historical 
evolution of British nationality law, in particular with regard to the legal status of nationals 
of the overseas territories.  
 
i) British Nationality Act 1948 
 
Before 1948, all Commonwealth countries 121  had a single nationality status: “British 
subject” status.  This was changed with the introduction of the British Nationality Act 
1948 122 , which introduced the new status of “citizen of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies”, consisting of all those British subjects who had a close relationship (either 
through birth or descent) with the United Kingdom and its remaining colonies.  Each other 
Commonwealth country 123 also established its own citizenship laws.  As a result, the 
concept of “British subject”124 covered three categories of citizens: “citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies”, in addition to “citizens of the independent Commonwealth 
countries” and “British subjects without citizenship”, the latter category consisting of 
persons liable to become citizens of an emerging independent Commonwealth country on 
the coming into force of that country's citizenship law.125  If that did not occur, such 
persons would then acquire citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies. 
 
ii) Immigration Act 1971 
 
The Immigration Act 1971126 introduced the concept of “partiality” or “right of abode in 
the UK”.  Persons with the right of abode in the UK were defined as “patrials” (s 2(6)).  
Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and other Commonwealth citizens had the 
right of abode in the UK only if they, their husband (for women), their parents or their 
grandparents were sufficiently connected to the United Kingdom and Islands. 127  The 
                                                                                                                                                   
(eds) Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001), 138-139. 
121  With the exception of the Irish Free State. Irish nationality was created with the 1922 Constitution of 
the Irish Free State (Article 3) and further regulated in the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 
1935. 
122  For a discussion of this Act in great detail, see Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd 
ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 169 et seq. 
123  The Original Commonwealth countries were the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Canada, the 
Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish 
Free State and Newfoundland (see the original text of the Statue of Westminster of 11 December 
1931). See the Canadian Citizenship Act 1946; British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 
1948; Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (No 83 of 1948) (for Australia); South African 
Citizenship Act 1949. Newfoundland never adopted the Westminster Statute but became a province 
of Canada in 1949. As a result, Newfoundlanders became Canadian citizens.  
124  The Act provided that British subjects could also be known by the alternative title Commonwealth 
citizen and that the expression "British subject" and the expression "Commonwealth citizen" were to 
have the same meaning (Article 1(2) of the British Nationality Act 1948). 
125  Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-192/99 Kaur [2000] E.C.R. I-1237, para. 8. 
126  For a discussion of this Act in great detail, see Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd 
ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 255 et seq. 
127  Immigration Act 1971, s 2. With regard to “Citizens of the UK and Colonies”, this connection mostly 
meant that they, or one of their parents or grandparents, were either born, adopted, registered or 
naturalised in either the UK or a colony. Residence in the UK, or – in the case of women – marriage 
to a partial, could in certain instances also qualify. With regard to other Commonwealth citizens, the 
connection with the UK had to be in one generation. Further, patrialty could only be claimed if the 
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consequence of having a right of abode in the UK was stated in the Act as being that one 
was “…free to live in, and to come and go into and from, the UK without let or hindrance, 
except such as may be required under and in accordance with this Act to enable their right 
to be established…”.  A non-patrial by contrast could only enter, and “…live, work and 
settle in the UK by permission and subject to such regulation and control…as is imposed 
by this Act…”. 
 
At the time of signing the Documents concerning the Accession to the European 
Communities, the United Kingdom Government made the following declaration on the 
definition of the term “nationals”128:  
 
“As to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the terms nationals, 
nationals of Member States or nationals of Member States and overseas countries and 
territories, wherever used in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community or the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community or in any of the Community acts deriving from those 
Treaties, are to be understood to refer to: 
(a) persons who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or British subjects not 
possessing that citizenship or the citizenship of any other Commonwealth country or 
territory, who, in either case, have the right of abode in the United Kingdom, and are 
therefore exempt from United Kingdom immigration control;  
(b) persons who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies by birth or by registration 
or naturalization in Gibraltar, or whose father was so born, registered or naturalized”. 
 
It is obvious that this definition of “UK nationals” was centred on having a sufficient 
connection with either the UK and Islands (entailing the right of abode) or with Gibraltar.  
As a result, only a very limited number of Commonwealth citizens were to be considered 
Union citizens. 
 
iii) British Nationality Act 1981 
 
UK Nationality laws were radically changed again with the introduction of the British 
Nationality Act 1981. 129   The Act abolished the status of “citizenship of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies” and divided those who held that status into three categories: 
(a) “British citizens”, comprising those former citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies with the right of abode in the United Kingdom (s 11(1)130).  
(b) “British Dependent Territories citizens”, comprising those former citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies who did not have the right of abode but satisfied 
certain conditions concerning their connection with a British Dependent Territory 
deemed to confer on them immigration rights to that territory (s 23).  
                                                                                                                                                   
parent was actually born in the UK – the other methods of acquisition were insufficient. Residence in 
the UK could not, on its own, confer patrialty but, in the case of women, marriage to a partial could. 
See Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury 
Professional, 2011), 257. 
128  Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the 
definition of the term "nationals", [1972] O.J. L73/196. For a discussion of the possibility for the 
Member States to issue a declaration on the definition of national for Union purposes, and the 
consequences of such a declaration, see Chapter 2, under II.A.3., supra. 
129  For a discussion of this Act in great detail, see Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd 
ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 279 et seq. 
130  Special cases are regulated by s 11 (2) and (3). 
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(c) “British overseas citizens”, comprising all those former citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies who did not become British citizens or British Dependent 
Territories citizens (s 26).  
 
The Hong Kong Act 1985 added still another category of British nationality, known as 
“British National (Overseas)”.  This new category was available to Hong Kong British 
Dependent Territories citizens to apply for, in principle between 1 July 1987 and 1 July 
1997.131  This change was introduced because Hong Kong British Dependent Territories 
citizens would lose this status automatically on 1 July 1997, upon handover of Hong Kong 
to China.132  British Nationals (Overseas) are Commonwealth citizens, but do not normally 
have a right of abode in the UK.   
 
In 1982 the United Kingdom Government lodged a new declaration on the definition of the 
term “nationals”,133 in view of the entry into force of the British Nationality Act 1981.  
This new declaration, which was to replace the 1972 declaration as from 1 January 1983, 
was worded as follows:  
 
“As to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the terms 'nationals’, 
'nationals of Member States or 'nationals of Member States and overseas countries and 
territories, wherever used in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community or the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community or in any of the Community acts deriving from those 
Treaties, are to be understood to refer to:  
(a) British citizens;  
(b) Persons who are British subjects by virtue of Part IV of the British Nationality Act 1981 
and who have the right of abode in the United Kingdom and are therefore exempt from 
United Kingdom immigration control;  
(c) British Dependent Territories citizens who acquire their citizenship from a connection 
with Gibraltar.  
The reference in Article 6 of the third Protocol to the Act of Accession of 22 January 1972, on 
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, to ‘any citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies` 
is to be understood as referring to ‘any British citizen’.” 
 
This declaration will discussed in more detail below.134 
 
iv) British Overseas Territories Act 2002 
 
The regime introduced by the British Nationality Act 1981 underwent important changes 
with the introduction of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002.135  The latter Act first 
of all changed the terminology of the 1981 Act: from British Dependent Territories to 
“British overseas territories” (s 1), and from British Dependent Territories citizenship to 
“British overseas territories citizenship” (s 2).  The Act also extended British citizenship to 
                                                 
131  See Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury 
Professional, 2011), 964 et seq. 
132  On the international status of Hong Kong, see Johnson, "Hong Kong after 1997: a Free City?" (1997) 
40 German Yearbook of International Law, 383-404. 
133  New Declaration by the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 
the definition of the term "nationals", [1983] O.J. C23/1. 
134  See under II.B.4.b., infra. 
135  For a discussion of this Act in great detail, see Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd 
ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 322 et seq. 
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all persons who were British overseas territories citizens before the commencement of the 
Act (21 May 2002), 136 except for those persons who were British overseas territories 
citizens by virtue only of a connection with the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus (s. 3).  
Furthermore, British overseas territories citizens were given the right to register as British 
citizens, with the same exception for persons who were British overseas territories citizens 
by virtue only of a connection with the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus (s. 4, inserting a 
new s. 4A in the British Nationality Act 1981).  This right was introduced to allow a 
conversion also for those persons who acquired British overseas territories citizenship after 
21 May 2002.  
 
On the occasion of the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the United Kingdom reiterated its 
1982 declaration on the definition of the term “nationals”, while bringing its terminology 
in accordance with the changes introduced by the British Overseas Territories Act 2002.  
The declaration of the United Kingdom annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon states137:  
 
“In respect of the Treaties and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, and in any of the acts deriving from those Treaties or continued in force by those 
Treaties, the United Kingdom reiterates the Declaration it made on 31 December 1982 on the 
definition of the term ‘nationals’ with the exception that the reference to ‘British Dependent 
Territories Citizens’ shall be read as meaning ‘British overseas territories citizens’.”   
 
b) Consequences with regard to Union citizenship 
 
The foregoing briefly sets out the relevant British nationality rules, together with the 
British declarations on the definition of nationals for the purposes of Union law.  In the 
following I will try to determine with as much precision as possible which groups of 
British nationals should, on the basis of these Acts and declarations, be considered to be 
Union citizens.  The analysis will focus on the status of British nationals settled in the 
different British overseas territories.  For the sake of clarity, I will also try to determine 
with as much precision as possible which groups of British nationals should, conversely, 
not be considered to be Union citizens. 
 
i) Union citizens 
 
It appears from the UK declaration quoted above that three groups of British nationals are 
to be considered to be Union citizens.  A first group is formed by the category of “British 
citizens”.  This group at present comprises (at least potentially) almost all British overseas 
territories citizens, as they either automatically became British citizens or have the right to 
register for British citizenship (cf. supra on s 3 and 4 of the British Overseas Territories 
Act 2002).  As a consequence, almost all British nationals settled in British OCTs are 
nowadays to be considered as Union citizens.  This is in sharp contrast with the period 
before the commencement of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, when most British 
nationals settled in OCTs were excluded from the personal scope of Union citizenship.138 
 
                                                 
136  See British Overseas Territories Act 2002 (Commencement) Order 2002, s 2(a). 
137  Declaration (No 63) by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the definition 
of the term 'nationals', annexed to the Final Act to the Treaty of Lisbon, [2010] O.J. C83/358. 
138  See Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (2nd ed.) (London, Edinburgh & Dublin, 
Butterworths, 1998), 36 et seq.  
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Special rules apply with regard to Channel Islanders and Manxmen.  Channel Islanders 
and Manxmen are without any doubt British citizens, 139  and therefore Union citizens 
(Article 20(1) TFEU).  However, they do not enjoy all the rights conferred by the Treaties 
on Union citizens.  Most importantly, Protocol 3 to the Accession Treaty provides that 
they “shall not benefit from [Union] provisions relating to the free movement of persons 
and services”.140  At the time of the UK’s accession, this was a reference to the provisions 
on the free movement of workers, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services.  However, since the introduction of the provisions on Union citizenship, 
it must most probably be read as a reference to the free movement rights laid down in 
Article 21 TFEU, of which the aforementioned rights are specific expressions.141  As a 
consequence, Channel Islanders and Manxmen do not derive from the Treaties the right to 
go to another Member State in order to take up an economic activity there, nor for non-
economic purposes, such as in order to study142 in that other Member State.143  Naturally, 
they may derive such rights under more flexible rules of national law.  For instance, under 
UK law,144 they enjoy the right of free movement within the UK, which enables them to 
study there, for example. 
 
The definition of Manxmen or Channel Islander for the purposes of Union law can be 
found in the aforementioned Protocol No. 3.  Article 6 provides that “in this protocol, 
Channel Islander or Manxman shall mean any citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies 
who holds that citizenship by virtue of the fact that he, a parent or grandparent was born, 
adopted, naturalized or registered in the island in question…”.  However, the Article 6 of 
                                                 
139  See s 50(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981, stipulating that, for the purposes of that act, the 
“United Kingdom” means Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Islands, taken together. See also 
Protocol (No 3) on the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, annexed to the Treaty between the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic the Italian Republic, 
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands ( Member States of the European 
Communities), The Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, 
the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, [1972] O.J. 
L73/164, Article 6: “in this protocol, Channel Islander or Manxman shall mean any citizen of the 
United Kingdom and colonies who holds that citizenship by virtue of the fact that he, a parent or 
grandparent was born, adopted, naturalized or registered in the island in question…”. “Any citizen of 
the United Kingdom and colonies” should now be understood as referring to “any British citizen”, as 
a consequence of the United Kingdom Declaration 1982 in fine. In a protocol to the (rejected) EU 
Constitution the wording was changed accordingly (see Article 13 of Protocol (No 8) annexed to the 
EU Constitution on the Treaties and Acts of Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Hellenic Republic, of the Kingdom of 
Spain and the Portuguese Republic, and of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the 
Kingdom of Sweden, [2004] O.J. C310/267). 
140  See, Article 2 of Protocol (No 3) (n. 96, supra). On this issue, see Fransman Fransman's British 
Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 97-98.  
141  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-193/94 Skanavi [1996] E.C.R. I-929, § 22 (on the freedom of establishment); 
ECJ, Case C-100/01 Oteiza Olazabal [2002] E.C.R. I-10981, § 26 (on the free movement of 
workers); ECJ, Case C-208/05 ITC [2007] E.C.R. I-181, § 64 (on the freedom to provide services). 
142  According to the ECJ, studying in another Member State is an exercise of the right to free movement 
for citizens of the Union. See e.g. ECJ, Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher 
[2007] E.C.R. I-9161.  
143  This is confirmed in a recent report from the States of Jersey on the “Status of Channel Islanders in 
the European Union”, available at http://www.statesassembly.gov.je/documents/reports/45051-
30164-1222008.htm.  
144  See the Immigration Act 1971. More broadly, Manxmen and Channel islanders enjoy the right of free 
movement in the Common Travel Area between the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, the 
Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey. 
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Protocol No 3 specifies that “such a person shall not be regarded, for the purposes of that 
protocol, as a Channel Islander or Manxman if he, a parent or a grandparent was born, 
adopted, naturalized or registered in the United Kingdom, nor if he has at any time been 
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom for five years”.  It follows that only a limited 
number of the British citizens resident in the Channel Islands or Island of Man will be 
considered Manxmen or Channel Islanders for EU purposes, and thus not be entitled to 
certain citizenship rights under Union law.  The latter form a particular category of British 
citizens.  For practical purposes, this group of British citizens is set apart by a special 
mention in their passport, stating: “Holder is not entitled to benefit from European [Union] 
provisions relating to employment or establishment”.  However, as is clear from the 
foregoing, they could “convert” to become a “regular” British citizen after an ordinary 
residence of 5 years in the UK.145  An interesting question is whether they can also convert 
themselves by residing in the territory of another Member State, including Ireland in 
particular.  In respect of any other UK citizen of the Union, a similar rule could be said to 
amount to an obstacle to the exercise of free movement rights and could be considered to 
infringe Union law for this reason.  Indeed, the rule would deter UK citizens from 
travelling to another Member State.  However, this reasoning does not hold good, since the 
said group of Manxmen and Channel Islander does not enjoy the right to free movement in 
the first place.  In principle, it is a matter for the UK, therefore, to decide whether 
residence in another Member State could also give entitlement to the status of full-blown 
Union citizen, through the British nationality rules.  Such would in any event be advisable 
in the context of the EU, since, as the ECJ has consistently held, exceptions to the 
fundamental freedoms must be interpreted narrowly.  The exclusion from the right to free 
movement could be seen as such an exception. 
 
A second group is formed by those “persons who are British subjects by virtue of Part IV 
of the British Nationality Act 1981 and who have the right of abode in the United 
Kingdom and are therefore exempt from United Kingdom immigration control”.  “British 
subjects”, as used in part IV of the 1981 Act, 146  comprises different categories of 
persons.147  First of all, it includes a category that prior to the commencement of the Act 
was known as “British subjects without citizenship status”148 (s 30(a)).  It also includes 
women registered as British subjects under the British Nationality Act 1965 (s 30(b)) and 
citizens of the Republic of Ireland who were British subjects before the 1948 Act came 
into force and who express (or have expressed) the wish to remain so (s 31).  Only British 
subjects with the right of abode qualify as Union citizens.  This does not concern a large 
number of individuals, because most British subjects appear not to enjoy this right.149  
Consequently, the second group is not of considerable numerical importance and its 
                                                 
145  Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 
2011), 97-98, who adds that the words “at any time have been” indicate that an Islander once 
converted stays converted. 
146  Prior to the commencement of the British Nationality Act 1981, “British Subject” was used as a 
synonym for “Commonwealth Citizen” (cf. Article 1(2) of the British Nationality Act 1948 and n. 
124, supra). It has to be understood as such in Acts dating from prior to the commencement of the 
1981 Act. 
147  Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 
2011), 646. 
148  This category includes persons that never acquired the citizenship of a commonwealth country, nor 
became a “citizen of the UK and colonies” as foreseen by s 13(2) of the BNA 1948 (as explained 
supra, under the heading “British Nationality Act 1948”). See in detail: Fransman Fransman's British 
Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 236 et seq. 
149  Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 
2011), 308-309. 
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importance will in any event further decline as the British subject status is destined to 
disappear.150  Besides, it is important to note that any British subject, other than the last 
category mentioned, immediately loses this status once he acquires any other citizenship or 
nationality whatever (s 35).  Moreover, British subjects can under certain circumstances 
register for British citizenship (s 4B BNA 1981).  In that case they fall under the first 
group described above. 
 
The last group consists of British overseas territories citizens who acquire their citizenship 
from a connection with Gibraltar.  Persons belonging to this group will be Union citizens, 
even if they do not possess British citizenship.  This is important, for instance, for persons 
who on or after 21 May 2002 register or naturalise in Gibraltar as a British overseas 
territories citizen.151  
 
ii) Not Union citizens 
 
It clearly appears from the foregoing that almost all British nationals living in the OCTs 
are at present Union citizens.  This is in sharp contrast with the period before the 
commencement of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, when most British nationals 
settled in OCTs were excluded from the personal scope of Union citizenship.  Still, it must 
be pointed out that the situation in the UK differs from that in the three other Member 
States discussed above (the Kingdom of the Netherlands, France and Denmark152) in that 
not all British OCT nationals will possess Union citizenship.  This is related to the fact that 
British nationality law recognises different categories of British nationals.  Persons 
belonging to some of these categories will, under certain circumstances, still fall outside 
the three groups mentioned above and will in consequence not be considered Union 
citizens. 
 
This is the case, in principle, for certain categories of “British overseas territories citizens”, 
“British Overseas citizens”, “British protected persons” 153  and “British Nationals 
(Overseas)”.154  Persons belonging to the last three groups are not automatically British 
citizens, although they have the possibility to register for British citizenship.155  Only those 
individuals who do not so register do not enjoy Union citizenship status.  In practice, this 
concerns only a limited number of persons.  As far as the first group is concerned, it is 
important to stress in this context that the status of “British overseas territories citizens” 
                                                 
150  Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 
2011), 646. 
151  Given that such a registration or naturalisation does not automatically entail Union citizenship (see 
Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 
2011), 1472). 
152  Leaving aside the special situation of Danish nationals resident in the Faeroe Islands. 
153  See s 38 of the British Nationality Act 1981. 
154  The existence of historic categories of citizenship, such as “British Overseas Citizenship”, which do 
not give entitlement to British or Union citizenship remains a source of controversy. This is perfectly 
illustrated by recent reports about Malaysian nationals residing in the UK who gave up their 
Malaysian nationality in order to obtain a British Overseas Citizens passport and consequently found 
themselves to be stateless. See Dugan, “Immigration rules leave stateless Malaysians in limbo” (13 
March 2011) The Independent, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/immigration-rules-leave-stateless-malaysians-in-
limbo-2240532.html. 
155  See, in detail, the relevant sections of Fransman Fransman's British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) 
(Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), Chapter 17. 
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was not abolished.  The great majority of British overseas territories citizens will have 
become British citizens indeed, but this does not make the former category redundant.  
First of all, persons who are “British overseas territories citizens” by virtue only of a 
connection with the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus will not have become British 
citizens156 and, as a consequence, are not Union citizens.  Furthermore, it should be borne 
in mind that British citizenship is conferred on the other British overseas territories 
citizens in addition to the status they possess.  The consequence of this is that the persons 
in question may issue a declaration of renunciation in order to divest themselves of British 
citizenship.  If this happens, they are exclusively British overseas territories citizens, not 
possessing Union citizenship.157  Lastly, as set out above, persons who acquired British 
overseas territories citizenship after 21 May 2002 will not automatically have become 
British citizens.  They can only apply to be registered as British citizens.  Registration is at 
the discretion of the Secretary of State (s. 4, inserting a new s. 4A in the British Nationality 
Act 1981).158 
 
III CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS 
 
A. Introduction: Union citizenship and the particular legal status of the OCTs 
 
An interesting aspect about any analysis of the rights associated with Union citizenship in 
relation to OCT nationals159 is that they involve a rather complicated interplay between the 
territorial scope of application and the personal scope of application of Union law.160  On 
the one hand, OCT nationals, as Union citizens, fall squarely within the personal scope of 
application of Union citizenship.  On the other hand, the OCTs do not seem to fall within 
the territorial scope of the Treaties as a whole, since only limited parts of the Treaties are 
applicable to the OCTs.  I will analyse these two propositions in some more detail before 
embarking upon an analysis of how these different scopes play out in relation to the 
exercise by OCT nationals of two of their most fundamental rights, namely the right to free 
movement and electoral rights.  
 
1. OCT nationals are Union citizens 
 
It clearly follows from the discussion above that most citizens resident in the OCTs have 
the nationality of their Member State.  This is the case for all Danish, Dutch and French 
                                                 
156  Cf. supra on s 3 and 4 of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002. 
157  See s 4 (2) of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002; De Groot, "Towards a European Nationality 
Law" (2004) 8.3 EJCL, available at http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF, 7.  
158  For the sake of completeness I also mention a last category of British overseas territories citizens 
potentially not possessing British citizenship: the Ilois, covered by s 6(3) of the British Overseas 
Territories Act 2002. Given that “Ilois” is a term which some consider to be offensive, the terms 
“Chagossians” or “Chagos Islanders” are often used. See the discussion in Fransman Fransman's 
British Nationality Law (3rd ed.) (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 325-326.  
159  Throughout my analysis, I will use the expression “OCT nationals” as referring to “those persons 
who are nationals of Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK or France through a connection with an OCT 
of one of these Member States and who are Union citizens because they have the nationality of that 
Member State”.   
160  On the personal application of Union law, see already the “classic” article of Bleckmann, "The 
Personal Jurisdiction of the European Community" (1980) 17 CML Rev., 467-485.  
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overseas nationals and, since 2002, for most British nationals living in the British overseas 
territories.  As I have already stated higher, this has for a logical consequence under 
Article 20(1) TFEU that these nationals are Union citizens and, hence, enjoy the rights 
associated with that status.161  This has been explicitly confirmed by the ECJ in the Eman 
and Sevinger case, which I will discuss in more detail below.162  In that case, the ECJ 
famously stated:  
 
“…persons who possess the nationality of a Member State and who reside or live in a territory 
which is one of the OCTs referred to in [Article 355(2) TFEU] may rely on the rights conferred 
on citizens of the Union in Part Two of the [TFEU]”. 
 
This point of view is confirmed in the 2008 Commission Green Paper163 and was already 
articulated in a Communication of the Commission of 1999, which states:  
 
“…nationals of the OCTs also posses the nationality of the Member States to which they are 
linked and are therefore citizens of the Union. As such, other provisions of the [Treaties] apply 
to them as individual citizens, notably those concerning the free movement of persons on the 
[Union] territory.”164   
 
The view that OCT nationals are Union citizens is widely accepted nowadays, especially 
after the explicit endorsement of this view by the ECJ.  It must be remarked, however, that 
this issue has long been unclear.165  In the past, some authors have put forward various 
arguments in support of the view that OCT nationals, despite having the nationality of a 
Member State, do not enjoy all of the rights associated with Union citizenship, such as the 
right of free movement in particular.166  This brought the said authors to submit that OCT 
                                                 
161  They are also subject to the duties associated with that status (Article 20(2) TFEU states that 
“Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties). 
This is only important from the theoretical point of view, since at present Union citizenship does not 
seem to be accompanied by any concrete duties. See Nic Shuibhne, "The Resilience of EU Market 
Citizenship " (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1627. 
162  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 29. See similarly: Opinion of 
AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-145/04 and C-300/04 Spain v United Kingdom; Eman and Sevinger 
[2006] E.C.R. I-7917, para. 144. For a discussion, see the case notes by Shaw in (2008) 4 EuConst, 
162-186; Besselink in (2008) 45 CML Rev., 787-813 en in (2007) N.T.E.R., 64-71; Claes in (2007) 
SEW, 216-221, Dawes in (2006) 3 R.D.U.E, 707-712 and Hervouët in (2006) R.A.E.-L.A.E., 565-570. 
163  Commission Green Paper on Future relations between the EU and the Overseas Countries and 
Territories, COM(2008) 383 final, at 6 (the Green Paper does, however, make an exception for the 
right to free movement for workers, which is stated to be not applicable to OCT nationals; see the 
discussion, infra, under III.B). 
164  Communication from the Commission of 20 May 1999 on the status of OCTs associated with the EC 
and options for ‘OCT2000', COM(1999)163 final, 40.  
165  The existence of this uncertainty perhaps explains the rather confused phrasing of the questions by 
the referring court in the Eman and Sevinger case. The AG explicitly denounced this bad phrasing in 
his opinion: Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-145/04 and C-300/04 Spain v United 
Kingdom; Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-7917, paras 38 et seq. 
166  See, e.g., Staples, "Wie is burger van de Unie?" (2001) N.T.E.R., 11-12; Hall Nationality, Migration 
Rights and Citizenship of the Union (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 
25 et seq.; Mortelmans and Temmink, “Het vrije personenverkeer tussen de Nederlandse Antillen en 
Aruba”, in Met het oog op Europa; De Europese Gemeenschap (Willemstad, Stichting Tijdschrift 
voor Antilliaans Recht – Justicia, 1991), 62-64. See also the discussion in De Groot, "The 
Relationship between the Nationality of the Member States of the European Union and European 
Citizenship", in La Torre (ed.), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1998), 129-134 (the author explains and rejects the different arguments in 
favour of an exclusion of OCT nationals from the benefits of Union citizenship). 
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nationals are not Union citizens.167  Some authors even went as far as stating that OCT 
nationals are to be considered third country nationals.168  In this connection, different 
criteria were proposed to distinguish OCT nationals from other Member State nationals, 
such as for instance the criterion of habitual residence in the OCTs or the criterion of 
having acquired Member State nationality through a particular connection with one of the 
OCTs.  
 
I believe that much of the argument for the exclusion of OCT nationals from the benefit of 
the rights associated with Union citizenship can be traced back to a failure to make the 
conceptual distinction between the territorial scope and personal scope of the citizenship 
provisions.  OCT nationals do have the nationality of a Member State and this is, under 
Article 20(1) TFEU, the only condition for having Union citizenship.  Accordingly, they 
must necessarily enjoy the rights associated with this status.  It cannot be objected that, 
since Part Two on Non-discrimination and Citizenship of the Union does not apply ratione 
loci to the OCTs, Member State nationals resident in the OCTs or having a particular 
connection with the OCTs cannot be considered as Union citizens.  As Kochenov has put 
it, Union citizenship does not know any “territorial logic”.169  Union law simply leaves no 
room for making the enjoyment of the status of Union citizen dependent on an additional 
condition besides the possession of Member State nationality, for instance a condition of 
“not having one’s habitual residence in one of the OCTs”.170  Given the dependence of 
Union citizenship on Member State nationality, a denial of Union citizenship to nationals 
resident in the OCTs or having a particular connection with the OCTs would be possible 
only if they would be denied the nationality of a Member State or if the associated 
Member State171 would make a declaration to this effect.172  This is the only point of view 
which, in my view, is in accordance with Article 20(1) TFEU.  For this reason, the 
judgment in Eman and Sevinger can be much welcomed for the clarification it has brought 
on this issue of longstanding uncertainty.  
 
2. The Treaties are not fully applicable to the OCTs 
 
As explained above, Article 355(2) TFEU provides that the special arrangements set out in 
Part Four of the TFEU apply to the OCTs mentioned in Annex II to the Treaties.  This 
provision is traditionally understood as saying that only the provisions of Part Four of the 
                                                 
167  It must be pointed out, however, that much of the argumentation was already developed before the 
introduction of Union citizenship, namely in relation to the view that OCT nationals did not enjoy 
free movement rights unlike other Member State nationals (See, e.g., Greenwood, "Nationality and 
the Limits of the Free Movement of Persons in Community Law" (1987) YbEL, 189; Hartley, EEC 
immigration law (Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1978), 60; Edens and Patijn, “The Scope of the EEC 
System of Free Movement of Workers” (1972) CML Rev., 322. 
168  Staples, "Wie is burger van de Unie?" (2001) N.T.E.R., 112. As pointed out, this article was, of 
course, written years before the judgment in Eman and Sevinger.  
169  Kochenov, “The Impact of European Citizenship on the Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories with the European Community” (2009) L.I.E.I., 240.  
170  See, in this regard, the discussion of the Micheletti judgment (ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] 
E.C.R. I-4239) and its consequences in Chapter 2, under III.A. 
171  I will use the expression “associated Member State” to refer to the Member State to which a 
particular OCT belongs. For instance, in relation to Greenland, Denmark is the associated Member 
State. 
172  As pointed out above, the United Kingdom is the only Member State possessing OCTs that has made 
such a declaration. This declaration is without consequences for OCT nationals, as defined for the 
purposes of this analysis.  
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Treaties apply to the OCTs.  This “orthodox” approach finds strong support in the case law 
of the Union Courts.  In Leplat the ECJ famously stated that, failing express reference, the 
general provisions of the Treaties do not apply to the OCTs.173  It has consistently repeated 
this in later case law, including in the Eman and Sevinger case.174  The ECJ has also held 
that OCTs, since they remain outside the sphere of (full) application of the Treaties, are, as 
regards the Union, “in the same situation as non-member Countries”.175  On this line of 
reasoning it was held for example that the free movement of goods between the OCTs and 
the Union does not exist without restriction, 176  and that certain aspects of the WTO 
agreement and its annexes fall outside the scope of Union law insofar as it applies to the 
OCTs.177  Further support for this approach can be found in the preamble to the OCT 
decision178 and in some Commission documents.  The Commission’s 2008 Green Paper, 
for instance, states that: “…the provisions of the [Treaties] in principle do not apply to the 
OCTs, except Part Four of the [TFEU], which deals exclusively with the OCT-EC 
association.”179 
 
Below I will explain, specifically in relation to the rights associated with Union 
citizenship, that there are good arguments to consider this orthodox approach to be 
outdated.  At this point of my analysis it seems useful to look at the provisions of Part Four 
of the TFEU in some more detail first.180   
 
Part Four of the TFEU on “the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories” 
consists of seven Treaty provisions (Articles 198-204 TFEU).  The basic principles and 
objectives of the association of the OCTs are stated in Articles 198 and 199 TFEU.  The 
main purpose stated is to “promote the economic and social development of the [OCTs] 
and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole” (Article 
198, second para., TFEU).181  One of the specific objectives of the association is the 
freedom of establishment between the Member States and the OCTs (Article 199(5) 
TFEU; see the discussion, infra).  Articles 200 and 201 TFEU lay down provisions on the 
                                                 
173  ECJ, Case C-260/90 Leplat [1992] E.C.R. I-643, para. 10. 
174  ECJ, Case C-181/97 van der Kooy [1999] E.C.R. I-483, para. 37; ECJ, Case C-106/97 Dutch 
Antillian Dairy Industry [1999] E.C.R. I-5983, paras 40 and 42; ECJ, Case C-110/97 Netherlands v 
Council [2001] E.C.R. I-8763, para. 49; ECJ, Case C-110/97 Netherlands v Council [2001] E.C.R. I-
8763, para. 61; ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 46; ECJ, Case 
C-384/09 Prunus [2011] E.C.R. nyr., para. 29. 
175  ECJ, Opinion 1/78 International Agreement on Natural Rubber [1979] E.C.R. 2871, para. 62. 
Repeated in ECJ, Opinion 1/94 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation [1994] E.C.R. 
I-5267, para. 17; ECJ, Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] E.C.R. I-675, para. 29. 
176  ECJ, Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills [1999] E.C.R. I-769, para. 36; ECJ, Case C-17/98 Emesa 
Sugar [2000] E.C.R. I-675, para. 29. 
177  ECJ, Opinion 1/94 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation [1994] E.C.R. I-5267, 
paras 16-17. 
178  Recital 16 in the preamble to Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 on the 
association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Community, [2001] O.J. 
L314/5 provides: “The general provisions of the Treaty and legislation derived thereunder do not 
automatically apply to the OCTs, barring express provisions to the contrary”. 
179  Commission Green Paper on Future relations between the EU and the Overseas Countries and 
Territories, COM(2008) 383 final, 3. 
180  For more detailed discussions, see Kochenov, "Substantive and Procedural issues in the Application 
of European Law in the Overseas Possessions of European Union Member States" (2008-2009) 17 
Mich. St. J. Int’l L., 245-247 and the references cited; Faberon and Ziller Droit des collectivités 
d'outre-mer (Paris, LGDJ, 2007), 239-281. 
181  This is also confirmed by Declaration (No 36) on the Overseas Countries and Territories, annexed to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, [1997] O.J. C340/138. 
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free movement of goods between the OCTs and the Member States. 182   The most 
important principle is that Member States may not levy customs duties on imports from the 
OCTS, whereas, conversely, the OCTs may, under certain conditions, levy custom duties 
on imports from the Member States as long as they do not discriminate between Member 
States.  A key provision to my analysis will be Article 202 TFEU, which provides for the 
adoption of rules on the free movement of workers (see the discussion, infra).  Article 203 
TFEU provides for the adoption by the Council of provisions regarding the detailed rules 
and the procedure for the association of the OCTs with the Union.  They can be found in 
the consecutive OCT-decisions (see infra).  Finally, Article 204 TFEU refers to the 
specific legal regime for Greenland, as set out in the Protocol on special arrangements for 
Greenland (see the discussion under II.A.3., supra). 
 
More detailed rules can be found in Council Decision 2001/822, which is also known as 
the “Overseas Association Decision” or the “OCT Decision”, 183  and the provisions 
adopted thereunder.184  The Decision contains general provisions on the association, but 
also sets out detailed provisions on the areas of OCT-EU cooperation and the instruments 
for that cooperation.  The two main instruments of cooperation are development finance 
cooperation and economic and trade cooperation.  Council Decision 2001/822 will be 
applicable until 31 December 2013, two years longer than originally foreseen. 185  Its 
duration was extended in order to make it coincide with the duration of the 10th European 
Development Fund (EDF).186   
                                                 
182  For more details, see Tryfonidou, “The Overseas Application of the Customs Duties Provisions of the 
TFEU”, in in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas 
Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2011), 221-244; Tryfonidou, "The Free Movement of Goods, the Overseas Countries and Territories 
and the EU's Outermost Regions: Some Problematic Aspects" (2010) 37 LIEI, 317-338; Dekker, 
“The Ambit of the Free Movement of Goods Under the Association of Overseas Countries and 
Territories (Case Comment)” (1998) E.L. Rev., 272-278; Dekker, “Vrijwaringsmaatregelen in het 
goederenverkeer tussen de LGO en de Europese Gemeenschap” (1996) Tijdschrift voor Antilliaans 
Recht, 148-161; Martha, “Toepassing van het gemeenschappelijk origine begrip op het 
goederenverkeer met de landen en gebieden overzee” (1991) S.E.W, 298-319. See also the special 
rules laid down in Protocol (No 31) concerning imports into the European Union of petroleum 
products refined in the Netherlands Antilles, [2010] O.J. C83/315. 
183  Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 on the association of the overseas countries 
and territories with the European Community, [2001] O.J. L314/5, as amended by Council Decision 
2007/249/EC of 19 March 2007 amending Decision 2001/822/EC on the association of the overseas 
countries and territories with the European Community, [2007] O.J. L109/33. For a discussion, see 
Ziller, "L'association des pays et territoires d'outre-mer à la communauté européenne" (2002) RFAP, 
127-136. For the previous Council decision, see Council Decision 91/482/EEC of 25 July 1991 on the 
association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Economic Community, [1991] 
O.J. L263/1. 
184  In particular, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2304/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing 
Council Decision 2001/822/EC on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the 
European Community, [2002] O.J. L348/82, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1424/2007 of 4 December 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 2304/2002  implementing Council 
Decision 2001/822/EC on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European 
Community and allocating the indicative amounts under the 10th European Development Fund, 
[2007] O.J. L317/38. 
185  See Article 63 of the OCT Decision, as amended by Council Decision 2007/249. 
186  See the Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council, on the financing of Community aid under the multiannual financial 
framework for the period 2008 to 2013 in accordance with the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and 
on the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four 
of the EC Treaty applies, [2006] O.J. L247/32 and Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008 of 18 
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 151
 
In order to prepare its proposal for a new OCT Decision, the Commission has launched a 
Green Paper187 to consult with interested parties.  On the basis of those consultations, the 
Commission has set out its standpoints on the essential elements to be included in the new 
OCT decision.188  It is clear from these documents that the Commission proposes a new 
approach to the OCT-EU association, moving away from classic “development” approach 
and focusing instead on the OCTs’ competitiveness and resilience.189  Very important in 
this connection is that the Commission proposes that the future association should 
encourage and assist all OCTs to “upgrade” local legislation in relevant areas to the level 
of Union acquis.190  In this sense, we see a trend towards further integration of the OCTs 
in the European construction, by strengthening the reciprocity of the OCT-EU partnership 
and encouraging wider application of Union law in the OCTs.191 
 
3. Interaction between provisions on Union citizenship and provisions on OCTs 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, two approaches can be distinguished with regard to the 
possibility for OCT nationals to exercise their citizenship rights in the OCTs.  A first, 
traditional approach, holds that this exercise is not possible, since only the provisions of 
Part Four of the TFEU apply to the OCTs and since the provisions on Union citizenship 
are not amongst these.  A second, more dynamic approach holds that the traditional 
assumption that only the provisions of Part Four of the TFEU apply to the OCTs is no 
longer valid, in particular in view of the fact that OCT nationals are Union citizens.  In this 
connection, different arguments are presented in favour of the possibility of exercising 
citizenship rights also in the territory of the OCTs and between OCTs an.  I will now 
briefly analyse both approaches in general, before considering them in relation to the two 
citizenship rights considered below in detail. 
 
a) Traditional approach 
 
This approach starts from the observation that, while OCT nationals indisputably have the 
status of Union citizen, the provisions of Part Two of the TFEU on Union citizenship are 
not amongst the Treaty provisions applicable ratione loci in the OCTs.  The provisions of 
Part Four of the TFEU, which are indubitably applicable in the OCTs, do not refer to part 
Two of the TFEU and only confer limited rights on individuals, namely in relation to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
February 2008 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th European Development Fund, 
[2008] O.J. L78/1. 
187  Commission Green Paper on Future relations between the EU and the Overseas Countries and 
Territories, COM(2008) 383 final. 
188  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 6 November 2009 - Elements 
for a new partnership between the EU and the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) COM(2009) 
623 final. 
189  For a discussion, see Custos, "Implications of the European Integration for the Overseas", in 
Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and 
Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011), 112 et 
seq. 
190  Ibid, at 7. 
191  See on this point also Kochenov, Bröring and Hoogers, "Staatsrechtelijke consequenties van de 
toekenning van een UPG-status aan Aruba en de Eilandgebieden van de huidige Nederlandse 
Antillen" (2010) 26 Tijdschrift voor Antilliaans Recht - Justicia, 20-22. 
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free movement of workers and the freedom of establishment.  Prima facie it can be 
inferred from this that OCT nationals cannot exercise the rights associated with Union 
citizenship in the OCTs.  In this connection, it is submitted that the references to “Member 
States” in the provisions on Union citizenship do not cover the territories of the OCTs.192  
Accordingly, the citizenship rights laid down in Article 21 TFEU (right to free movement), 
Article 22 TFEU (right to participate in municipal and European Parliamentary elections) 
and Article 24, second and third para., TFEU (right to petition the European Parliament 
and to apply to the Ombudsman193) can, on the basis of that reading of Treaties, not be 
exercised in the OCTs.  A particular case is the right to diplomatic protection, which is 
applicable in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which the Union 
citizen is a national is not represented (Article 23 TFEU).  This right could be applicable in 
the OCTs if they could be considered as “third countries” for the application of this 
provision.  However, it would be rather absurd to consider OCTs to be a third country as 
far as diplomatic protection is concerned.  After all, they fall under the jurisdiction of one 
of the Member States. 
 
b) Dynamic approach 
 
The second approach rests on the view that the traditional assumption that only Part Four 
of the TFEU applies to the OCTs must be rejected.  This view has been most strongly 
advocated by Ziller (sometimes writing together with Faberon)194 and has, more recently, 
been taken up by Kochenov.195  Both authors have advanced several arguments in support 
of the wider applicability of the Treaties in the OCTs.  Some of these arguments relate to 
the applicability of Treaty provisions in general to the OCTs; others relate more 
                                                 
192  Remark in this regard that the ECJ has very clearly stated that OCTs cannot be considered to be 
“Member States” for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU (see ECJ, Case C-142/00 P, Commission v 
Nederlandse Antillen,[2003] E.C.R. I-3483. For an analysis, see Lenaerts and Cambien, "Regions and 
the European Courts: Giving Shape to the Regional Dimension of Member States" (2010) 35 E.L. 
Rev.610-620.  
193  Article 23, second and third para, TFEU refer to Articles 227 and 228 TFEU which, in turn embody a 
condition of residence in one of the Member States. 
194  See Ziller, "Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories Others after the Entry into Force 
of the Lisbon Treaty", in Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated 
Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011), 76-78; Ziller, "Champ d'application du droit communautaire" (Paris, Editions du 
Juris-Classeur) fasc. 470 Juris-Classeur Europe, available at www.lexisnexis.com; Ziller, "The 
European Union and the Territorial scope of European Territories" (2007) 38 Vict. U. Wellington L. 
Rev., 51-62; Faberon and Ziller Droit des collectivités d'outre-mer (Paris, LGDJ, 2007), 256 et seq.; 
Ziller, "L'association des pays et territoires d'outre-mer à la communauté européenne" (2002) RFAP, 
127-136; Ziller, "Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and Differentiation in 
the Application of Substantive Law on Member States' Territories", in De Búrca and Scott (eds.), 
Constitutional Change in the EU - From Uniformity to Flexibility? (Oxford and Portland, Hart 
Publishing, 2000), 113-131. 
195  Kochenov, "The impact of European Citizenship on the Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories with the European Community" (2009) 36 LIEI, 239-256; Kochenov, "Substantive and 
Procedural issues in the Application of European Law in the Overseas Possessions of European 
Union Member States" (2008-2009) 17 Mich. St. J. Int’l L., 248-256. The point is also made in 
Kochenov, Bröring and Hoogers, "Staatsrechtelijke consequenties van de toekenning van een UPG-
status aan Aruba en de Eilandgebieden van de huidige Nederlandse Antillen" (2010) 26 Tijdschrift 
voor Antilliaans Recht - Justicia, 17-18 and Bröring, Kochenov, Hoogers and Jans Schurende 
rechtsordes; Over de Europese Unie, het Koninkrijk en zijn Caribische gebieden (Groningen, Europa 
Law Publishing, 2008), 109-119.  
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specifically to the applicability of the provisions on Union citizenship to the OCTs.  In the 
following I will set out the different arguments, and consider their merits.   
 
i) General Treaty provisions 
 
Ziller has forcefully argued that the majority of the Treaty provisions are applicable to the 
OCTs. 196  He maintains that only the provisions of Part Three of the TFEU (“Union 
Policies and Internal Actions”), and the provisions relating to the Internal Market in 
particular, are not applicable to the OCTs.197  The other Treaty provisions, by contrast, do 
apply to the OCTs, in particular those of Parts One (“Principles”), Two (“Non-
discrimination and Citizenship of the Union”), Six (“Institutional and Financial 
Provisions”) and Seven (“General and Final Provisions”),198 unless Part Four of the TFEU 
provides for exceptions in this regard.199  Ziller has put forward three arguments to support 
his view.   
 
A first argument is that the practice of the Union legislator has not always been 
consistent. 200   Some legislative acts expressly exclude the OCTs from their scope of 
application, while for other acts the Union legislator apparently does not find it necessary 
to do so.  For the latter category of acts, this is probably based on the assumption that it is 
clear from the structure of the Treaties already that Union law is not applicable to the 
OCTs, except in those special cases based on Part Four of the TFEU.  A good example of 
the first category is Regulation 2913/92, expressly excluding the French and Danish OCTs 
and impliedly the Dutch OCTs.201  A good example of the second category is the 6th VAT 
                                                 
196  In the following I will therefore present his argumentation accordingly, while also adapting the 
Treaty provisions he cites to the corresponding Treaty provisions after the amendments made by the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
197  The reason why the provisions of Part Three are excluded is that Part Four contains special 
provisions in this regard which can be seen as a lex specialis. 
198  Since Ziller was writing before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, his analysis logically 
focused on the provisions of the TEC, the majority of which he considered applicable to the OCTs. 
However, Ziller’s views should, in particular after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
presumably be read as covering also the provisions of the TEU. See the discussion in Kochenov, 
"The EU and the Overseas: Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories Associated with 
the Union, and Territories Sui Generis", in Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost 
Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Alphen aan den 
Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011), 23-26; Fletcher, “EU Crime and Policing and the OCTs”, in 
Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and 
Territories, Territories Sui Generis, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011), 293-
295.  
199  Ziller, "The European Union and the Territorial scope of European Territories" (2007) 38 Vict. U. 
Wellington L. Rev., 56; Ziller, "Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and 
Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States' Territories", in De Búrca 
and Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU - From Uniformity to Flexibility? (Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), 119. 
200  Ziller, "Champ d'application du droit communautaire" (Paris, Editions du Juris-Classeur) fasc. 470 
Juris-Classeur Europe, available at www.lexisnexis.com, nr. 78-85. 
201  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs 
Code, [1992] O.J. L302/1, Article 3(1). Now replaced by Regulation (EC) No 450/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 laying down the Community Customs 
Code (Modernised Customs Code), [2008] O.J. L145/1 (Article 39(5) of which specifies that “In the 
case of goods benefiting from preferential measures contained in preferential arrangements in favour 
of the overseas countries and territories associated with the [Union], the rules on preferential origin 
shall be adopted in accordance with [Article 203 TFEU]). 
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Directive.202  In its Article 3, that Directive explicitly excludes some territories from its 
scope, but the OCTs are not amongst these explicit exclusions.  While it is certainly true 
that the explicit exclusion of OCTs in some acts is, strictly speaking, unnecessary, the fact 
remains that nothing in the foregoing contradicts the assumption that only the provisions 
of Part Four of the TFEU apply to the OCTs.  It fails to convince, therefore, as an 
argument to the contrary.   
 
A second argument is derived from the wording of Article 355 TFEU.  Ziller points out 
that Article 355(2) TFEU only states that the OCTs are subject to the provisions of Part 
Four of the TFEU, without specifying that the other provisions of the Treaties are 
inapplicable.  Moreover, he argues, this provision precedes Article 355(3) TFEU, which 
extends the territorial scope of the Treaties to European territories for whose external 
relations a Member State is responsible, and Articles 355(4) and 355(5) TFEU, which lay 
down certain exceptions to the territorial scope of the Treaties.  The fact that Article 
355(2) TFEU is placed before these paragraphs and not at the end of Article 355 TFEU or 
even in a separate Treaty provision, is taken to indicate that not only Part Four of the 
TFEU, but also the other parts of the Treaties (except Part Three of the TFEU) are 
applicable to the OCTs.   
 
This argument is rather weak.  Article 355 TFEU could perhaps have been drafted in a 
neater way, but its different paragraphs just seem to regulate different cases, without trying 
to link them in any way.  It is probably wrong, therefore, to infer any conclusion regarding 
the intent of the masters of the Treaties from the position of Article 355(2) TFEU.  
Moreover, if the masters of the Treaties were of the opinion that other parts of the Treaties 
were fully applicable to the OCTs, they would probably have expressly stated this, like 
they did in Article 355(1) TFEU.  For the same reasons Ziller’s closely related argument 
that his view of a wider applicability of Union law to the OCTs finds support in the 
structure of the Treaties203 fails to convince.204  Ziller has pointed out that since the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the territorial scope of Union law is determined for both 
Treaties in Article 52 TEU and that the exceptions to that territorial scope listed in Article 
352 TFEU should be interpreted restrictively.  This is again taken to mean that Article 
352(2) TFEU must not be interpreted as stating that only the provisions of Part IV of the 
                                                 
202  Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, 
[1977] O.J. L145/1. Now replaced by Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the 
common system of value added tax, [2006] O.J. L112/1, which does not explicitly exclude the OCTs 
either. 
203  Ziller, "Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories Others after the Entry into Force of 
the Lisbon Treaty", in Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated 
Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011), 76-78. 
204  Ziller made a similar argument in relation to the structure of the rejected EU Constitution (Ziller, 
"Champ d'application du droit communautaire" (Paris, Editions du Juris-Classeur) fasc. 470 Juris-
Classeur Europe, available at www.lexisnexis.com, nr. 90). Ziller observed that in the EU 
Constitution the provisions on the association of the OCTs were found in Title IV of Part Three on the 
policies and functioning of the Union and deduced from this fact that the other Titles of Part Three, in 
particular Titles I on Provisions of general application, Title II on non-discrimination and citizenship 
and Title VI on the Functioning of the Union would have been applicable to the OCTs under the EU 
Constitution. Still according to the same author, the same would a fortiori have been true for the 
provisions of Part One (fundamental provisions), Two (Charter of Fundamental Rights) and Four 
(general and final provision), be it under the derogations provided for in respect of the four freedoms 
in the provisions on the OCTs. 
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TFEU are applicable to the OCTs.  Still, it cannot be denied that Article 352(2) TFEU 
explicitly provides a derogation to the general regime stated in Article 52 TEU.  The 
precise meaning of Article 352(2) TFEU cannot therefore be determined purely by looking 
at the structure of the Treaties, but only on more substantive grounds. 
 
A third argument is based on the case law of the Union Courts.  Indeed, some cases lend 
some support to the thesis of wider applicability of the Treaties.205  Two cases can be cited 
in this connection.  In Antillean Rice Mills, the ECJ held that the reference to the 
“principles set out in the Treaties” in Article 203 TFEU means that when the Council 
adopts OCT decisions under that article “it must take account not only of the principles in 
Part Four of the [Treaties] but also of the other principles of [Union] law, including those 
relating to the common agricultural policy”.206  Accordingly, the ECJ upheld the judgment 
of the CFI, which had stated that the reference to the principles set out in the Treaties “is 
not merely to the principles set out in Part Four of the [TFEU] but to all the principles set 
out in the [Treaties], in particular those listed in Part One, entitled 'Principles'”.207 This 
case makes very clear that strictly limiting the applicable Treaty provisions to those of Part 
Four of the TFEU is not tenable.  At least, the general principles in Part One of the TFEU 
must also apply.  Nevertheless, the scope of Antillean Rice Mills must not be 
overestimated.  Indeed, it must not be overlooked that the Court relied explicitly on the 
reference to “general principles” in one of the provisions of Part Four.  This is still 
consistent with the view that only the provisions of Part Four of the TFEU and the 
provisions to which they refer are applicable to the OCTs.   
 
Much more important, therefore, is Kaefer and Procacci.208  In that case, the reference for 
a preliminary ruling was made by the “Tribunal administratif de Papeete”, a court in 
French Polynesia.  The UK vividly contested the powers of that court to make such a 
reference.  Its main argument was that Part Four of the TFEU constitutes a lex specialis 
applicable to the OCTs, to the exclusion of the other provisions of the Treaties, including 
in particular (current) Article 267 TFEU.209  The ECJ disagreed.  To the argument stated it 
merely replied that Part Four of the TFEU, in particular (current) Article 203 TFEU, 
empowered the institutions of the Union to lay down provisions relating to the OCTs on 
the basis of the principles set out in the Treaties.  Therefore, according to the ECJ, it had 
jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the question raised. 210   Besides, the ECJ 
pointed out, in reply to the UK’s second argument, that the tribunal administratif de 
Papeete was (under French law 211) a French court, and therefore competent to make 
references under Article 267 TFEU.212   
                                                 
205  See also the interesting discussion in Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-384/09 Prunus [2011] 
E.C.R. nyr., paras 36-39. 
206  ECJ, Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills [1999] E.C.R. I-769, para. 37. 
207  CFI, Joined Cases T-480/93 and T-483/93 Antillean Rice Mills [1995] E.C.R. II-2305, para. 93. 
208  ECJ, Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-4647. For a more 
detailed discussion, see the case note by Oliver in (1991) CML Rev., 190-199. See also the discussion 
in Broberg, “Access to the European Court of Justice by Courts in Overseas Countries and 
Territories”, in Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas 
Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2011), 137-152. 
209  Ibid, para. 7. The case dealt, of course, with the Treaty provisions contained in the TEC. I have 
replaced them, for the purposes of my discussion, with the corresponding Treaty provisions contained 
in the TFEU. 
210  Ibid, paras 9-10. 
211  See the more detailed analysis of French law on this point by AG Mischo (Opinion of AG Mischo in 
Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-4647, para. 15). 
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The ECJ’s judgment in Kaefer and Procacci, again, provides support for the view that 
other provisions than those embodied in Part Four of the TFEU may be applicable to the 
OCTs, namely the institutional provisions laid down in Part Six of the TFEU.  Yet, it must 
be pointed out that the ECJ’s reasoning on this point is not particularly helpful.  It is clear 
that the Court avoided answering the real question at stake here: whether Part Four of the 
TFEU constitutes a lex specialis or whether other provisions of the TFEU also apply to the 
OCTs.  It found a smart way to base its jurisdiction on the provisions of Part Four, but, as 
has been noted,213 this reasoning is not wholly satisfactory.  Indeed, Part Four of the TFEU 
only expressly confers powers on the Commission and the Council, and does not refer to 
the “institutions of the Union”.214  It requires some imagination to interpret its provisions 
as conferring any powers on the ECJ.  More illuminating is AG Mischo’s opinion to the 
case.215  The AG’s opinion is refreshing in two regards.  First, the AG explicitly accepted 
that some other Treaty provisions than those of Part Four do apply to the OCTs, namely 
the provisions relating to the institutions.  He pointed out that, as Part Four confers powers 
on both the Council and the Commission, this necessarily implies that the provisions 
relating to these institutions apply.216  Otherwise, as the AG points out, the authors of the 
Treaties would have stipulated that the measures referred to in [Article 203 TFEU] were to 
be implemented by way of a new Treaty or protocol to be negotiated by the Member States 
and ratified by the national parliaments.217  This is a more flexible approach than that of 
the ECJ, which tried to base its jurisdiction exclusively on the provisions of Part Four of 
the TFEU.  Second, the AG held that the fact that the Tribunal Administratif was a French 
Court was not sufficient in itself to establish jurisdiction of the ECJ.  He argued that 
[Article 267 TFEU], in the light of its structure and purpose, “can only refer to a court 
deciding a case arising in a part of the territory of a Member State covered by the 
provisions of [Union] law”.218  The AG concluded from this that Courts of the OCTs can 
make references under Article 267 TFEU, but only insofar as they concern the specific 
Treaty provisions which are applicable to them.  It followed that the reference in Kaefer 
and Procacci was admissible, because it concerned the interpretation of provisions of the 
OCT decision, and (current) Articles 199 and 202 TFEU.219  
 
AG Mischo’s approach is rather pragmatic.  He acknowledges that other Treaty provisions 
besides those of Part Four of the TFEU apply to the OCTs, but confines their application 
                                                                                                                                                   
According to Arnull, courts and tribunals situated in these territories may invoke Article 267 TFEU 
even if they cannot be considered part of the domestic court system of a Member State, because of 
the need to ensure the proper application of the arrangements for association set out in Part Four of 
the TFEU (Arnull, “The evolution of the court's jurisdiction under Article 177 EEC” (1993) E.L. 
Rev., 129, at 133). 
212  ECJ, Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-4647, para. 8. 
Article 267 TFEU embodies the possibility to refer preliminary questions for “any court or tribunal of 
a Member State”. 
213  Ziller, "Champ d'application du droit communautaire" (Paris, Editions du Juris-Classeur) fasc. 470 
Juris-Classeur Europe, available at www.lexisnexis.com, nr. 82. 
214  This denominator would cover the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
Commission, the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors (Article 13 
TEU). 
215  Opinion of AG Mischo in Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. 
I-4647. 
216  Ibid., para. 11. 
217  Ibid., para. 12. 
218  Ibid., para. 16 
219  Ibid., paras 17-18. 
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to what is necessary to make the provisions of Part Four work.  The AG is probably correct 
in holding that if certain provisions of the Treaties are to apply to the OCTs it must also be 
possible for courts of the OCTs to make references for preliminary rulings with regard to 
these provisions, given the paramount importance of the preliminary rulings procedure in 
the [Union] legal order.220  This pragmatic approach can be endorsed.  Neither a strict 
insistence on limiting the applicable Treaty provisions to those contained in Part Four of 
the TFEU, nor an overly broad conception of the scope of the Treaty provisions are 
realistic.  Agreeing with Kochenov, Part Four of the TFEU can only become truly 
functional as part of the EU legal system if other vital elements of this system equally 
guide the legal position of the OCTs associated with the Union.221 
 
This pragmatic approach regarding the applicability of the Treaties can be applied, by 
analogy, to other Treaty provisions than the institutional provisions, in particular the 
Treaty provisions on Union citizenship.  Indeed, just as the applicability of the institutional 
provisions may be necessary in order to make the association with the OCTs work, it may 
be argued that the applicability of the provisions on Union citizenship is necessary for this 
reason.  As was explained above, OCT nationals are Union citizens.  This in itself does 
not, of course, entail the applicability of the provisions on citizenship ratione loci in the 
OCTs.  Yet, on the basis of the pragmatic approach to the applicability of the Treaties just 
outlined, it is arguable that at least some of the provisions conferring rights on Union 
citizens may apply ratione loci in the OCTs.  As has been explained above, a close 
association exists between the Union and the OCTs.  This association should not be seen in 
purely economic terms.  It also has the purpose inter alia of promoting the economic and 
social development of the OCTs and of furthering the interests and prosperity of the 
inhabitants of the OCTs “in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural 
development to which they aspire”. 222  In its 2009 Communication the Commission 
further states that the solidarity between the EU and OCTs should be based on the fact that 
all inhabitants of the OCTs are in principle Union citizens.223  Arguably, the purposes 
stated could only be achieved if OCT nationals could make use of the rights they enjoy as 
Union citizens, also in the OCTs.  This would, in turn, entail the applicability of other 
provisions such as institutional provisions224 or general principles, such as the principle of 
equal treatment.  As such, the provisions on Union citizenship could become a catalyst for 
wider application of Union law in the OCTs.  At the very least, the purposes stated should 
entail an obligation for OCT authorities not to hinder the possibility to exercise these rights 
in the Member States.225   
 
                                                 
220  See, e.g., ECJ, Case 26/62 van Gend & Loos [1963] E.C.R. 1. 
221  Kochenov, "The impact of European Citizenship on the Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories with the European Community" (2009) 36 LIEI, 248. See also the very insightful 
discussion in Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-384/09 Prunus [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 23-35 
(who points out inter alia that a strict insistence on the view that only the provisions of Part Four of 
the TFEU apply to the OCTs would entail practical difficulties such as third countries possibly 
benefitting from more advantageous arrangements than OCTs). 
222  See Article 198 TFEU and the preamble to the OCT decision. 
223  N. 188, supra, at 3.  
224  For instance the provisions on the European Parliament have to be applicable by implication if OCT 
nationals can participate in European Parliamentary elections. See the discussion, infra, of the Eman 
and Sevinger case. 
225  One example of such hindrance could occur where an OCT would impose very burdensome 
conditions on its nationals that want to leave the OCT in order to travel to one of the EU Member 
State, in exercise of their right to free movement. See the discussion infra. 
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Below I will examine in more detail the perspectives offered by the pragmatic approach 
just outlined and its tenability specifically in relation to the free movement rights and 
electoral rights enjoyed by Union citizens.  Before doing so, it is necessary to point from 
the outset at an obvious and significant counterargument to the pragmatic approach 
described, namely that it is in conflict with the case law of the ECJ.  As explained above, 
in Eman and Sevinger226 the ECJ explicitly confirmed the Leplat case law holding that 
“failing express reference, the general provisions of the [Treaties] do not apply to the 
OCTs”.227  This would seem to exclude the possibility of applying the Union citizenship 
provisions in the OCTs.  However, as was demonstrated in the foregoing, a strict reading 
of the Leplat case law can in any event no longer be sustained.  Moreover, in Eman and 
Sevinger, the ECJ itself acknowledged the applicability of other provisions of Union law, 
namely the general principle of equal treatment.  The better view therefore is perhaps to 
consider the Leplat case law, despite the reference in Eman and Sevinger, as having 
become obsolete.228  In future case law the ECJ will hopefully no longer refer to it. 
 
ii) Union citizenship provisions 
 
A second set of arguments made in favour of wider applicability of the Treaties is based, 
not so much on the need to make the association with the OCTs work, but rather on the 
need to preserve the effet utile of the provisions on Union citizenship.  Ziller has argued 
that the non-applicability of the provisions on Union citizenship to the OCTs could 
infringe the principle of non-discrimination.229  He observes the distinction pointed out 
higher between the personal scope of Union citizenship (“all OCT nationals are Union 
citizens)” and the territorial scope of the provisions on Union citizenship (they do not 
apply, under the traditional approach, to the OCTs).  In this connection, he points out that 
one could focus on the territorial scope of the citizenship provisions, such as the right to 
free movement, and conclude that they are not applicable to the OCTs.  At the same time, 
he argues, all Union citizens should have the same citizenship rights and the territorial 
origin of citizens of a Member State on the territory of the State should have no 
consequences in this regard.  This leads him to point at an apparent contradiction between 
the territorial scope and the personal scope of the free movement rights.  He adds that 
                                                 
226  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 46. Before Eman and Sevinger, 
Ziller had argued that no undue weight should be given to the Leplat case law because of the ECJ, not 
having had to solve an issue about citizenship or general principles, had had no opportunity to better 
formulate its position. In the meantime, Ziller has acknowledged that his interpretation of Leplat has 
been rejected by the ECJ (Faberon and Ziller Droit des collectivités d'outre-mer (Paris, LGDJ, 2007), 
261). Still, the ECJ’s confirmation of Leplat in Eman and Sevinger should not be given undue weight. 
As Ziller and other have argued, it should probably be considered to have become obsolete (see n. 
228, infra). 
227  ECJ, Case C-260/90 Leplat [1992] E.C.R. I-643, and confirmed in later cases. 
228  Ziller, "Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories Others after the Entry into Force of 
the Lisbon Treaty", in Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated 
Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011), 77-78; Kochenov, "The impact of European Citizenship on the Association of 
the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Community" (2009) 36 LIEI, 255. 
229  Ziller, "The European Union and the Territorial scope of European Territories" (2007) 38 Vict. U. 
Wellington L. Rev., 56; Ziller, "Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and 
Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States' Territories", in De Búrca 
and Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU - From Uniformity to Flexibility? (Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), 119. Ziller makes this argument specifically with the right to free 
movement. I will explain his reasoning applied to the provisions on Union citizenship, more broadly. 
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giving priority to the territorial scope would infringe upon the most basic principles of 
Member States’ constitutional law, namely the exclusion of discrimination between 
citizens according to their origin.   
 
That argument essentially suggests that, if more burdensome conditions apply to the free 
movement of persons between OCTS and Member States – for travels from one of the 
OCTs to one of the Member States – than between two Member States, this is to the 
disadvantage of OCT nationals and, therefore, discriminatory.  That cannot be accepted 
without more.  There is, legally speaking, no room for giving priority to either personal or 
territorial scope of the Union citizenship provisions.  Both scopes should always be taken 
into account.  The fact that Union citizens cannot exercise their rights in the OCTs, can 
prima facie not in itself constitute a violation of the principle of equal treatment as long as 
this is true for all Union citizens regardless of their origins.  Put differently, the non-
discrimination principle requires that the citizenship provisions equally apply to OCT 
nationals, but does not require as such that they also apply to the OCTs, geographically 
speaking.  Besides, it must be remarked that, in purely internal situations, Union law does 
not object to OCT nationals being treated less favourably than nationals from the 
mainland.   
 
Still, there is some value in the argument that fully excluding the OCTs from the scope of 
application ratione loci will de facto hurt OCT nationals more than other Union citizens, 
since they will mostly reside in the OCTs and not be able to exercise their citizenship 
rights there.  Consequently, OCT nationals would seem to be, prima facie again and 
despite formally having the status of Union citizenship, in a less beneficial position than 
other Union citizens, as far as the possibility to exercise their citizenship rights is 
concerned.  On the basis of these inferences it could be concluded that OCT nationals 
would, despite the conclusions reached under part II, more accurately have to be 
considered second-class citizens, enjoying an inferior status than other Union citizens.  
This would be an argument for a more inclusionary approach towards OCT nationals by 
extending the benefit of the citizenship provisions to the OCTs.  This is, of course, not a 
legal argument, since legally speaking the non-applicability ratione loci of the citizenship 
provisions to the OCTs does not constitute discrimination, as I have explained.  Still it is 
an important policy argument that could guide the Commission in its development of a 
new model for association, which will, as appears from the recent Commission documents, 
be characterised by a wider applicability of Union law in the OCTs. 
 
c) Outline of the analysis 
 
In the following I will examine to what extent the particular legal status of the OCTs has 
an impact on the exercise of citizenship rights by OCT nationals.  As stated above, I will 
concentrate on two types of citizenship rights, namely free movement rights, on the one 
hand, and electoral rights, on the other hand.  For both of them I will consider the 
possibilities and consequences under the two approaches outlined above.  Besides, I will 
examine to what extent the Union citizenship provisions may have acted as factor that 
prompted the Member States to change their policies and legislation with regard to their 
citizens resident in or having a particular connection with one of their OCTs. 
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B. Free Movement Rights 
 
Below I will analyse to what extent OCT nationals enjoy the right to free movement.  I 
will make a distinction between, on the one hand, economic free movement rights, i.e. the 
right to free movement for economic actors (workers, providers of services and self-
employed persons) and, on the other hand, the general right to free movement laid down in 
Article 21 TFEU, i.e. the right to free movement as Union citizens, regardless of economic 
activity.  The reason for making this distinction is the fact that Part Four of the TFEU, 
which indubitably applies to the OCTs, lays down provisions with regard to the first 
category of free movement rights, but not with regard to the second one.  
 
1. Economic free movement rights 
 
The most important provision in Part Four of the TFEU relating to the free movement 
rights of OCT nationals is without any doubt Article 202 TFEU [ex Article 186 TEC], 
which states:  
 
“Subject to the provisions relating to public health, public security or public policy, freedom of 
movement within Member States for workers from the countries and territories, and within the 
countries and territories for workers from Member States, shall be regulated by acts adopted in 
accordance with Article 203230”. 
 
This provision has been much discussed in legal literature.  Some authors have interpreted 
it as meaning that OCT nationals will only enjoy free movement rights within the Union 
once an act is adopted in accordance with Article 203 TFEU, laying down the specific 
rules and conditions for the exercise of these rights.  As has been rightly observed, no 
Council act has ever been adopted for that purpose. 231   Therefore, so the argument 
continues, OCT nationals do not at present have free movement rights within the Union.232   
 
I have already pointed out that this opinion is obviously wrong, since OCT nationals are 
Union citizens and enjoy, for that reason, the right laid down in Article 21 TFEU, as was 
confirmed by the Court in Eman and Sevinger (see the discussion, infra).  Moreover, it is 
wrong, even when Union citizenship is not taken into consideration.  The authors just 
referred to seem to overlook the fact that Article 202 TFEU deals with free movement of 
workers only.  The absence of specific Council acts in this connection means at most that 
Union law cannot be relied on in order to claim the right to enter and reside in the Union 
“in order to obtain and pursue salaried employment there”.233  By contrast, OCT nationals 
                                                 
230  Article 203 TFEU provides that the Council is to act unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and, where it acts in accordance with a special legislative procedure, after consulting the 
European Parliament. Old Article 186 TEC was slightly different in wording in that it provided for 
the free movement of workers to be governed by agreements to be concluded subsequently with the 
unanimous approval of Member States, rather than governed by Union acts adopted by the Council. 
231  And, one should add, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty no agreement to that purpose 
has ever been concluded. 
232  See the references in n. 166, supra, and the accompanying text. The same conclusion is reached by 
Evans, "Nationality Law and European Integration" (1991) 16 E.L. Rev., 190. 
233  ECJ, Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-4647, para. 13 
(dealing with the converse situation of nationals of Member States claiming the right to enter and 
reside in an overseas country or territory in order to obtain and pursue salaried employment there). 
See, also making this point, Custos, "Implications of the European Integration for the Overseas", in 
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do enjoy the right of establishment and the right to provide services in the Member States, 
although subject to certain special provisions laid down pursuant to Article 203 TFEU.234  
These rights necessarily encompass a right of entry and residence in the Member States, as 
was confirmed by the ECJ.235  It should be clear from this that OCT nationals in any event 
enjoy economic free movement rights, even at present, namely for the purposes of 
establishment and provision of services. 
 
As far as the free movement of workers is concerned, Article 203 TFEU prima facie seems 
to have for a consequence that OCT nationals can only enjoy this right once it is regulated 
by a Council act.  This is confirmed in the Commission’s 2008 Green Paper, which 
states236:  
 
“As European citizens, OCT nationals are in principle also entitled to the rights conferred by 
Union citizenship (as laid down in [Articles 21 to 25 TFEU]), such as the right to move and 
reside (but not work) freely within the territory of the Member States.”  
 
In this regard the Commission remarks that no arrangements have been agreed so far on 
the right to free movement of workers between the OCTs and the Member States because 
the procedure for agreeing such arrangements was, until the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, very cumbersome.  Indeed, old Article 186 EC required such arrangements to be 
determined by agreements with the unanimous approval of the Member States.  At the 
same time, the Commission notes that the new procedure of Article 203 TFEU will 
facilitate regulation of the issue.237  It is very likely, therefore, that the next OCT Decision, 
the first one to be adopted under Article 203 TFEU, will include provisions on the free 
movement of workers alongside provisions on the other freedoms.  If this happens, OCT 
nationals will in any event enjoy the benefit of the provisions on the free movement of 
workers, under the arrangements laid down in the OCT decision. 
 
However, it can seriously be questioned whether, in the absence of any Council acts 
adopted under Article 203 TFEU, OCT nationals do not have the right to take up salaried 
work.  Given my conclusion that OCT nationals cannot be distinguished from other Union 
citizens in terms of the rights they enjoy, it would seem that they can, in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                                   
Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and 
Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011), 109. 
234  See Article 199(5) TFEU and Articles 44-46 of Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 
on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Community, [2001] O.J. 
L314/5. Similar, though less elaborated provisions were included in earlier OCT Decisions. See 
Council Decision 91/482/EEC of 25 July 1991 on the association of the overseas countries and 
territories with the European Economic Community, [1991] O.J. L263/1, Articles 232-233; Council 
Decision 86/283/EEC of 30 June 1986 on the association of the overseas countries and territories 
with the European Economic Community, [1986] O.J. L175/1, Articles 176-177 (these provisions 
were discussed in ECJ, Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-
4647). For a more detailed discussion, see Goldner Lang and Perišin, “Free Movement of Services 
and Establishment in the Overseas”, in Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, 
Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, (Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2011), 179-198. 
235  ECJ, Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-4647, para. 14 
(again it must be remarked that this concerns the converse situation of a Member State national 
moving to one of the OCTs; in this respect both situations are arguably analogous). 
236  Commission Green Paper on Future relations between the EU and the Overseas Countries and 
Territories, COM(2008) 383 final, at 6 (emphasis added). 
237  See the Commission Staff Working Document (SEC(2008) 2067) accompanying the Commission 
Green Paper on Future relations between the EU and the Overseas Countries and Territories, 
COM(2008) 383 final, at p. 31. 
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 162
Directive 2004/38, travel from one Member State to another Member State in order to 
carry out employed work there. 238   The nationality laws of the four Member States 
discussed simply do not put any sort of “overseas” label on OCT nationals which would 
allow Member States to treat them differently from other Union citizens as far as the 
application of Directive 2004/38 is concerned.  This is implicitly confirmed by the current 
OCT Decision, which, for the purposes of regulating the right to establishment and the 
right to provide services, employs the concept “inhabitants of an OCT”, which it defines as 
“persons ordinarily resident in an OCT who are nationals of a Member State or who enjoy 
a legal status specific to an OCT” (see Article 45(1)(b)).  Article 45(1)(b) immediately 
adds, however, that that definition is without prejudice to the rights conferred by Union 
citizenship.  This confirms that the OCT Decision does not affect any rights OCT nationals 
may enjoy in their capacity of Union citizens.239  The better view is, therefore, probably 
that OCT nationals may rely on their status of Union citizen in order to enjoy the benefit of 
the provisions regarding the free movement of workers in the Member States, even in the 
absence of any OCT Decision regulating this right.  Accordingly, the Commission’s view 
quoted above should be rejected as being mistakenly based on a purely “territorial” 
reading of Article 202 and 203 TFEU, which does not square with the fact that OCT 
nationals are Union citizens.  For that reason, it has become outdated.240 
 
This is not to say that Article 203 TFEU is meaningless and that any Council act 
concluded on that basis for regulating the rights laid down in Article 202 TFEU would be 
without legal consequences.  In the first place, such a Council act is probably required in 
order to give non-OCT Union citizens the benefit of the provisions of the free movement 
of workers in the OCTs.241  Indeed, since the provisions on the free movement of workers 
and Directive 2004/38 do not apply ratione loci in the OCTs,242 they cannot be relied on 
by Union citizens wishing to establish themselves in one of the OCTs for the purposes of 
carrying out salaried work.243  Consequently, OCTs are not precluded by the provisions on 
Union citizenship from reserving the right to free movement of workers to their own 
nationals.  To this effect they may employ criteria such as residence in order to distinguish 
                                                 
238  See Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the right of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing 
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, [2004] O.J. L158/77. 
239  This point is also made by Omarjee, "Les statuts constitutionnels des ressortissants des outre-mers", 
in Tesoka and Ziller (eds.), Union européenne et outre-mers: Unis dans leur diversité (Aix-en-
Provence, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marselle, 2008), 59-60. 
240  This conclusion is also reached by Kochenov (Kochenov, "Regional Citizenships and EU Law: the 
Case of the Aland Islands and New Caledonia" (2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 319). The outdated “territorial” 
approach is found in Article 42(3) of Council Regulation 1612/68, which states that workers from the 
OCTs may not invoke the benefit of the provisions of this Regulation in the territory of the other 
Member States. This provision has, for the reasons explained, clearly become outdated. 
241  In this respect, ECJ, Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-
4647, para. 13 is still good law. It cannot, however, be seen as authority on the scope of the free 
movement provisions in the converse situation, namely movement from the OCTs to the Member 
States rather than from the Member States to the OCTs. 
242  Such is traditionally assumed, at least. See on this point my detailed analysis under III.B.2., infra. 
243  Faberon and Ziller Droit des collectivités d'outre-mer (Paris, LGDJ, 2007), 255. See also ECJ, Joined 
Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-4647, para. 19 (“the 
arrangements governing matters of establishment and provision of services in the overseas countries 
and territories […] do not, however, extend to the entry into and residence in those countries and 
territories of other nationals of Member States who do not carry on or seek to carry on an activity as a 
self-employed person”). 
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their own nationals from other Member State nationals.244  In the second place, such a 
Council act would allow “OCT inhabitants” who do not have the nationality of a Member 
State (see the definition in Article 45 of the OCT Decision) and hence are not Union 
citizens to invoke the provisions on the free movement of workers.   
 
The foregoing essentially concerns the free movement rights of OCT nationals for 
economic purposes within the territory of the Member States.  A question which has not 
been answered so far is whether the free movement provisions apply to travels between the 
territories of the OCTs and the Member States.  Put differently, it still needs to be 
determined whether the free movement provisions may be relied upon by OCT nationals in 
order to gain a right of entry in the territory of the Member States for the purposes of 
carrying out an economic activity there.  This question will be dealt with under the 
following heading, in relation to the general right to free movement laid down in Article 
21 TFEU.  I refer to that discussion, since, arguably, the same reasoning can on this point 
be adopted with regard to free movement for both economically active and non-
economically active OCT nationals 
 
2. General right to free movement 
 
The general right to free movement laid down in Article 21 TFEU is enjoyed by all Union 
citizens.  There can be no doubt, therefore, that it is also enjoyed by OCT nationals, who 
are, for our purposes, Union citizens.  Consequently, OCT nationals enjoy not only free 
movement rights as economic actors, but also a general right to free movement in their 
capacity as Union citizens.  The only difficult issue concerning this right is the 
determination of its territorial scope.  Article 21(1) TFEU provides:  
 
“Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by 
the measures adopted to give them effect.” (emphasis added) 
 
It is clear that Article 21(1) TFEU only applies “within the territory of the Member 
States”.245  This raises the interesting question whether the OCTs are covered by this 
wording.  If not, the free movement of Union citizens from the OCTs to the Member States 
is not regulated by Article 21 TFEU and that could entail the possibility of subjecting this 
right to more burdensome conditions than would be allowed in relation to free movement 
between Member States.   
 
                                                 
244  This is not in contradiction with my observation higher that criteria to distinguish OCT nationals 
from other Member State nationals are not valid in the light of the provisions on Union citizenship. 
That observation was made in relation to the personal scope of Union citizenship. Here I am 
concerned with the territorial scope of the (economic) free movement provisions. Since these 
provisions do not apply ratione loci in the OCTs, they can not be relied on in those territories by 
Union citizens in their capacity as Union citizen. Hence, it is possible for OCTs to employ certain 
criteria such as residence to deny these rights to certain groups of Union citizens.  
245  The same is clear from the title of the Residence Directive, adopted on the basis of, inter alia, Article 
18 TEC (now Article 21 TFEU): Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 29 April 2004 on the right of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and 
repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, [2004] O.J. L158/77. 
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Before analysing the legal regime surrounding the free movement between OCTs and the 
Member States, it is necessary to make one important point.  Since OCT nationals are 
Union citizens, they do enjoy within the Member States exactly the same free movement 
rights as all other Union citizens.  Indeed, free movement between two Member States is 
indubitably covered by the expression “within the territory of the Member States” 
contained in Article 21 TFEU.  Consequently, once an OCT national is legally resident in 
one Member State, he can travel to another Member State under the same conditions as 
any other Union citizen.  As explained higher, this logically follows from the fact that the 
nationality laws of the four Member States discussed higher do not make any distinction 
between nationals from mainland Europe or from overseas.  OCT nationals do not hold 
different passports than other nationals of their Member State.  Consequently, there is 
simply no legal basis for treating OCT nationals any different as far as the exercise of free 
movement rights in the Member States is concerned. 
 
Within the territories of the Member States, Article 21 TFEU in fact confers two rights.  
On the one hand, it confers a right to travel from the territory of one Member State to the 
territory of another one.246  This encompasses three situations.  First of all, a Union citizen 
may move from a Member State of which he is a national247 to a Member State of which 
he is not a national.  Secondly, a Union citizen may move between two Member States of 
which he is not a national.  These situations fall without doubt under Article 21 TFEU.  
Indeed, Article 3 of Directive 2004/38 provides: “This Directive shall apply to all Union 
citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a 
national…”.  Thirdly, a Union citizen may move from one Member State (of which he 
may or may not be a national) to a Member State of which he is a national.  This situation 
would not seem to fit in with the wording of Article 3, but it is clear from case law that this 
situation too should be considered to fall under Article 21 TFEU.248  On the other hand, 
Article 21 TFEU confers a right of residence within the territory of the Member States.  It 
applies where a Union citizen resides in a Member State of which he does not have the 
nationality.  Article 21 TFEU may even apply where a Union citizen resides in his own 
Member State, provided that he or she has exercised his or her right to free movement.249  
In some limited circumstances it would seem to be even applicable to Union citizens who 
have always resided in a Member State of which they are a national, provided that they are 
confronted with a national measure which has the effect of depriving them of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights or of impeding the exercise of their 
right of free movement and residence. 250   The bottom-line is that Article 21 TFEU 
encompasses, under certain conditions, both the right to move from one Member State to 
                                                 
246  There are a vast number of cases confirming this. Just to mention a few: ECJ, Case C-413/99 
Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, 
ECJ, Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-7573. 
247  In the case of OCT nationals this is the associated Member State.  
248  ECJ, Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek [1999] E.C.R. I-6207, para. 22. The Court pointed out specifically 
that such a situation cannot be considered as purely internal, because the citizen concerned will have 
exercised his right to free movement within the Union before entering his State of origin, Ibid. para. 
19. For a discussion: see Staples, "Een gemiste kans voor het Hof van Justitie?" (2000) N.T.E.R., 1-6. 
See also the discussion in Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr, 
paras 24-29. 
249  See, to illustrate this point, ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683; ECJ, Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul 
[2008] E.C.R. I-7639. 
250  See ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr. and ECJ, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] 
E.C.R. I-11613 (as interpreted by the ECJ in the former case). See also the detailed discussion in 
Chapter 4, infra. 
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another Member State and the right to reside in a Member State, provided one has a 
sufficient link with the Union legal order.251  Given the personal scope of Article 21 
TFEU, these rights are enjoyed by all Union citizens, including OCT nationals.  For 
example, a Dutch National born and raised in Aruba, but legally resident in Amsterdam, 
may claim the right to move to France under the conditions of Directive 2004/38.  Or, 
suppose the same person lives in Paris, and has never been in the Netherlands, he or she 
may still invoke Article 21 TFEU in combination with Article 18 TFEU when for example 
he is being discriminated against in comparison with French citizens.   
 
The aforementioned examples only occur once an OCT national is present in the territory 
of a Member State.  The more difficult question is whether Article 21 TFEU and the 
expression “within the territory of the Member States” also cover the right to move from 
the territory of an OCT to the territory of the Member States.  This issue has never been 
clearly outlined in secondary Union legislation or in the case law of the ECJ.  Two views 
are possible, in line with the two general approaches to the applicability of the Treaties to 
the OCTs outlined above.  Under the traditional approach, Article 21 TFEU does not apply 
in the OCTs, since only the provisions of Part Four of the TFEU and the provisions of the 
Treaties to which the latter refer are applicable to OCTs.  Accordingly, the phrase “within 
the territory of the Member States” should, according to this first view, not be held to 
include the territory of the OCTs.  Consequently, since the OCTs fall outside the scope of 
Article 21 TFEU, it cannot be relied upon by Union citizens in the OCTs, for instance in 
order to challenge restrictions to the exercise of this right.  However, it is also possible to 
argue, drawing on arguments developed under what I called higher a “dynamic approach”, 
that Article 21 TFEU does apply to movement between OCTs and Member States.  In my 
view, this is the approach that should be followed.  I will develop this line of the reasoning 
in the following point (a).  Next I will consider the legal consequences of this approach for 
the free movement rights of OCT nationals (b). 
 
a) Article 21 TFEU applies to movement between OCTs and the Member States 
 
This view holds that Article 21 TFEU, while perhaps not being fully applicable to the 
OCTs, should at least entail the right for OCT nationals to travel from the OCTs to the 
Member States.  Put differently, it should be possible for them to rely on Article 21 TFEU 
in order to challenge restrictions imposed by the OCTs on travels to one of the Member 
States.  Only restrictions on travels to the associated Member State in purely internal 
situations should be considered to fall outside the scope of Article 21 TFEU (see the 
discussion, infra).   
 
The reasons for holding this first view are convincing.  Higher I explained that all OCT 
nationals are Union citizens and do enjoy the rights associated with this status.  One of 
these rights is the right to move freely within the territories of the Member States.  It is 
clear that this right can only fruitfully be exercised if OCT nationals are entitled to freely 
leave their OCTs in order to enter the territory of the Member States.  If Article 21 TFEU 
could not be relied on by OCT nationals in order to challenge restrictions to this right (in 
situations presenting a link with Union law), this would, arguably, take away the effet utile 
                                                 
251  This link will normally consist in the fact that a Union citizen has exercised his right to free 
movement, but – as was pointed out – in exceptional circumstances the status of Union citizen with 
the associated rights may also provide a sufficient link. See the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, 
infra. 
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of their free movement rights.  This view can draw some inspiration from the ECJ’s 
reasoning on the substance in Kaefer and Procacci. 252  The case concerned two (non 
French) Union citizens who wished to settle in French Polynesia, a French OCT, but were 
refused this right by the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Polynesia.  The 
applicants claimed that this refusal was contrary to Article 176 of the (then applicable) 
OCT-decision, which granted nationals of the Member States the right of establishment 
and the right to provide services in the OCTs.  The ECJ noted in this regard that “[i]t is 
obvious that the exercise of the right of establishment and provision of services in the 
overseas countries and territories must require a right of entry and residence”.253  On a 
similar line of reasoning, one could argue that the exercise of the right to move and reside 
freely within the Member States contained in Article 21 TFEU must require a right of 
entry and residence in those territories.254 
 
Besides, this view is also supported by the need to preserve and further enhance the effet 
utile of the association with the OCTs.  As explained above, the provisions of Part Four of 
the TFEU do not operate in a legal vacuum.  Other Treaty provisions than those contained 
in Part Four of the TFEU must necessarily apply to the OCTs to some extent in order to 
make the association with the Member States work.  I submit that this is the case for 
Article 21 TFEU, at least to the extent that it entails a right of entry into the Member 
States.  As explained higher, the purposes of the association can, arguably, only be 
achieved if OCT nationals can fully make use of the rights they enjoy as Union citizens.  
Such would not be the case if the Article 21 TFEU did not entail a right to move from the 
OCTs to the territories of the Member States.  It is obvious that the right to move and 
reside freely in the territories of the Member States only has a substance to it if it entails an 
initial right to enter those territories.  Accordingly, I do not agree with the view put 
forward by Tryfonidou, who states that OCT nationals who wish to move from an OCT to 
a Member State cannot merely rely on Article 21 TFEU but “should rather rely on Article 
20(2) TFEU in conjunction with the relevant market freedom”.255  Accordingly, in the 
view of that author, OCT nationals only have the right to move to the territory of the 
Member States for the purpose of exercising an economic activity.256  In my opinion this 
view does not give sufficient weight to Union citizenship, which is the fundamental status 
of Member State nationals regardless of economic activity, and mistakenly views the 
purpose of the association with the OCTs in purely economic terms. 
 
                                                 
252  See also n. 208 and the accompanying text, supra.   
253  ECJ, Joined Cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 Kaefer and Procacci [1990] E.C.R. I-4647, para. 15. 
254  This view can draw some support from the judgments in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy. In those 
judgments the ECJ held that a national measure which had the effect of obliging a Union citizen to 
leave the territory of the Union would violate the provisions on Union citizenship, because this would 
deprive him of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of his citizenship rights (see the detailed 
discussion in Chapter 4, infra). On a similar line of reasoning one could argue that a national measure 
precluding a Union citizen from entering the territory of the Union would deprive the latter of the 
genuine enjoyment of his citizenship rights, and, more in particular, create an obstacle to his right to 
free movement. 
255  Tryfonidou, "The Free Movement of Goods, the Overseas Countries and Territories and the EU's 
Outermost Regions: Some Problematic Aspects" (2010) 37 LIEI, 334. 
256  Tryfonidou, "The Free Movement of Goods, the Overseas Countries and Territories and the EU's 
Outermost Regions: Some Problematic Aspects" (2010) 37 LIEI334-337 (admittedly, the author is in 
this contribution mainly concerned with economic free movement and the possibility for OCT 
nationals to rely on the free movement of goods in particular. 
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b) Legal consequences 
 
Accepting the view that Article 21 TFEU applies to travels by Union citizens from the 
OCTs to the Member States has for a consequence that exactly the same rules apply as to 
free movement between Member States.  The particular situation of the OCTs has, 
however, two consequences.  First, since OCTs are not part of the European territory, entry 
into the Member States will be subjected to the Schengen rules on border controls for 
crossing external borders, even if the associated Member State is part of the Schengen 
zone.  Second, since OCTs are not separate Member States but rather part of a Member 
State, domestic arrangements for travelling between the OCTs and the associated Member 
State may escape review under the Union rules applicable to free movement.  The 
applicable rules imposed by Union law and the possible rules that can be imposed by the 
associated Member States are discussed in the following. 
 
Another obvious consequence of holding Article 21 TFEU only applicable to travels from 
the OCTs to the Member States is that it cannot be relied on by Union citizens who want to 
travel from one of the Member States to an OCT or who want to travel between the 
different OCTs.  In this connection it is possible to speak of a “one-way freedom of 
movement”. 257   Similar to what was pointed out higher in relation to economic free 
movement of persons, the non-applicability of Article 21 TFEU to travels from the 
Member States to the OCTs allows the OCT authorities to impose additional conditions on 
the entry and free movement of non-OCT citizens of the Union.  In this connection they 
may validly employ criteria to distinguish between OCT nationals and non-OCT nationals.  
A good example is the new Law on the entry and expulsion of foreigners applicable in the 
BES Islands, which in its Article 1a distinguishes between “BES nationals” and “non-BES 
nationals”.258  Such criteria are not contrary to Article 18 TFEU, which is not, in the 
absence of another link with Union law, applicable ratione loci. 
 
i) Union law provisions 
 
Persons travelling from one of the OCTs to one of the Member States are subject to the 
rules laid down in the so-called Schengen acquis,259 which has been incorporated into 
Union law pursuant to a protocol annexed to the Treaties by the Treaty of Amsterdam.260  
As a consequence of the Schengen Agreement, in principle no formalities are to be 
                                                 
257  Kochenov, "Substantive and Procedural issues in the Application of European Law in the Overseas 
Possessions of European Union Member States" (2008-2009) 17 Mich. St. J. Int’l L., 251. 
258  Wet toelating en uitzetting BES of 30 September 2010, Stb. 2010, 364. 
259  For detailed discussions, see Karanja, Transparency and proportionality in the Schengen information 
system and border control co-operation (Nijmegen, Brill, 2008), 466 pp.; Wichmann, “The 
Participation of the Schengen Associates: Inside or Outside?” (2006) 11 E.For.Aff.Rev., 87-107; Den 
Boer, "Schengen III: The show must go on" (2006) SEW, 316-322; Kuijper, “Some Legal Problems 
Associated with the Communitarization of Policy on Visas, Asylum and Immigration under the 
Amsterdam Treaty and Incorporation of the Schengen Acquis” (2000) 37 CML Rev., 345-366; 
Schutte, "Schengen: its Meaning for the Free Movement of persons in Europe” (1991) CML Rev., 
549-570. 
260  Protocol (No 2) integrating the Schengen Acquis into the framework of the European Union, annexed 
to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, [2006] O.J. C321E/191, now replaced by Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen Aquis 
integrated into the framework of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and 
to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2010] O.J. C83/290. 
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 168
fulfilled when a person travels from one Member State to another Member State,261 with 
the obvious exception of travels to those Member States to which the Schengen acquis 
does not apply.262  This absence of internal borders is to be further enhanced by Union 
measures taken pursuant to Article 77 TFEU “with a view to ensuring the absence of any 
controls on persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing internal borders”.263  The 
OCTs, however, are not genuine EU territory, and the border between OCTs and Member 
States cannot, therefore, be considered internal borders.  This is confirmed by Article 138 
of the Schengen Convention,264 which provides that the Convention shall apply only to the 
European territory of the French Republic, and, as regards the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, only to the territory of the Kingdom in Europe.265  France has also stated, in 
an official declaration, that this scope of application would not be changed by the 
incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union. 266  
Similarly, on the occasion of the accession of Denmark to the Schengen Convention it was 
explicitly stated that the Convention would not apply to Greenland.267  This exclusion of 
                                                 
261  Schengen Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 
[2000] O.J. L239/19, Article 2. For the possibility of introducing temporary border checks, see 
Groenendijk, "Reinstatement of Controls at the Internal Borders of Europe; Why and Against 
Whom?" (2004) E.L.J. 150-170. 
262  This is and will remain the case in the foreseeable future for travels to the United Kingdom and 
Ireland. These two Member States retain the right to carry on checks on any person crossing their 
borders from another Member State. See Protocol (No 20), annexed to the TEU and TFEU, on the 
application of certain aspects of Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, [2010] O.J. C83/293 (replacing the Protocol on the application of 
certain aspects of Article 7a of the Treaty establishing the European Community to the United 
Kingdom and to Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam). They may, however, at their request take part in 
certain measures. See Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect 
of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, [2010] O.J. C83/295, Article 3. See also Council 
Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, [2000] 
O.J. L131/43. For further details, see Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European 
Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), Chapter 10. 
263  E.g. Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code), [2006] O.J. L105/1. 
264  Schengen Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 
[2000] O.J. L239/19. See also the Schengen Agreement between the Governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders Schengen, [2000] O.J. L239/13. See further the literature 
referred to in n. 259, supra. 
265  See, similarly, the Agreement on cooperation in proceedings for road traffic offences and the 
enforcement of financial penalties imposed in respect thereof, [2000] O.J. L239/429, Article 18. This 
Agreement was adopted by Decision of the Executive Committee of 28 April 1999 on the Agreement 
on Cooperation in Proceedings for Road Traffic Offences (SCH/Com-ex (99) 11, rev. 2), [2000] O.J. 
L239/428. 
266  Declaration by France concerning the situation of the overseas departments in the light of the 
Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union, annexed to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. On the legal value of this declaration, see Ziller, "The European Union and the 
Territorial scope of European Territories" (2007) 38 Vict. U. Wellington L. Rev., 54. 
267  Agreement on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark to the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders 
signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990, [2000] O.J. L239/97, Article 5(1). 
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the OCTs from the scope of application of the Schengen Convention268 means that the 
rules concerning the crossing of external borders apply when travelling from OCTs to one 
of the (Schengen) Member States.  OCT nationals will need travel documents and will be 
subject to checks, when travelling from an OCT to an EU Member State.269   
 
It follows that, as regards border controls, travels between OCTs and the Member States 
are subject to a different regime than travels between Member States which are part of the 
Schengen area.  This should not be taken to mean that OCT nationals enjoy more limited 
free movement rights than other Union citizens.  First of all, it must be pointed out that the 
exclusion from the Schengen Convention applies to all non-European territories of the 
French Republic.  This includes also the so-called overseas departments and regions, 
which are – with the exception of Mayotte – not OCTs, but outermost regions, to which 
the Treaties (almost) fully apply (Articles 349 and 355(1) TFEU).  The inhabitants of 
overseas departments and regions would also need travel documents when travelling to 
one of the Member States, even though they are not normally OCT nationals.  More 
importantly, one should not fail to distinguish between the personal and territorial scope of 
the Schengen Convention.  The Schengen Convention has essentially a territorial scope of 
application.  Checks will in principle only be carried out when entering the Schengen zone, 
but no longer once a person is inside the Schengen zone.  This is true irrespective of the 
nationality of this person.  An OCT national will need a valid passport when flying from 
Aruba to Amsterdam, but normally not when travelling from Amsterdam to Paris.  Exactly 
the same is true for, say, a Belgian national making the same trip.   
 
Substantively, travels by OCT nationals from one of the OCTs to the Member States are 
subject to exactly the same conditions as travels between the Member States, most 
importantly the ones laid down in Directive 2004/38,270 although Member States may 
always be less restrictive than what is allowed for by the Directive (see Article 37 of the 
Directive).271  Consequently, OCT nationals do not need a visa to enter the EU, unlike 
citizens from many other countries.272  Showing a passport or an identity card will suffice to 
enter the territory of another Member State, just like for all other Union citizens. 273  
Similarly, OCT nationals may only be refused entry into the territory of another Member 
State on certain grounds of public policy, public security and public health.274  These 
                                                 
268  This only happened of course with regard to the OCTs belonging to Denmark, the French Republic 
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. No similar exclusion exists for the British OCTs, as the United 
Kingdom is not a party to the Schengen Convention.  
269  Schengen Convention, Articles. 3-6; Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), [2006] O.J. L105/1, Article 6. 
270  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, [2004] O.J. L158/77. 
271  See also ECJ, Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-7573. 
272 See, most recently, Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement, [2001] O.J. L81/1(this regulation, however, does not apply to 
Ireland and the United Kingdom).   
273  Directive 2004/38, Article 5(1). 
274  Chapter VI of Directive 2004/38. 
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grounds have to be interpreted restrictively, 275  and are much more stringent than the 
grounds justifying a refusal of entry of third country nationals (which are not otherwise 
covered by Union law).  Indeed, an alert in the Schengen Information System, obliging 
other States to refuse a visa to the Schengen area to the third country national concerned, 
can be issued on grounds of public policy and security which are much more loosely 
defined than the same concepts in the Directive 2004/38.276  As a result, the existence of 
such an alert cannot be deemed sufficient in itself for refusing entry of Union citizens, 
which benefit of the more stringent conditions of Directive 2004/38.277 
 
More importantly, OCT nationals can rely on Directive 2004/38 in order to challenge 
possible restrictions on travels to the Member States imposed by the OCT to which they 
belong, i.e. exit restrictions rather than entry restrictions.  This is the main consequence of 
the application of Article 21 TFEU to travels between the OCTs and the Member States.  
As the Court held in Jipa: “the right of freedom of movement includes both the right for 
citizens of the European Union to enter a Member State other than the one of origin and 
the right to leave the State of origin”.278  Article 4 of Directive 2004/38, for its part, states 
that  
 
“1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border 
controls, all Union citizens with a valid identity card or passport and their family members 
who are not nationals of a Member State and who hold a valid passport shall have the right to 
leave the territory of a Member State to travel to another Member State. 
2. No exit visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on the persons to whom paragraph 1 
applies.” 
 
Consequently, Directive 2004/38 leaves very little scope for exit restrictions.  They may 
only be imposed if they are justified by one of the grounds mentioned in Chapter VI of the 
Directive, namely grounds of public policy, public security or public health.279  If an OCT 
were to impose exit requirements that made travels to another Member State excessively 
difficult this would, in the absence of due justification on one of the grounds just stated, be 
in violation of Article 21 TFEU, even if it applied without distinction to all Union 
citizens.280  Moreover, in this connection, there would be no need for the Union citizen 
                                                 
275  See e.g. ECJ, Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] E.C.R. I-5257, 
paras 64-65; ECJ, Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] E.C.R. I-11, para. 23; ECJ, Case 30/77 Bouchereau 
[1977] E.C.R. 1999, para. 33;ECJ, Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] E.C.R. 1219, para. 27. 
276  See Schengen Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 
[2000] O.J. L239/19, Articles. 5, 15 and 96. See also: Declaration by the Executive Committee 
established by the CISA of 18 April 1996 defining the concept of alien, [2000] O.J. L239/19, stating 
that in the context of the aforementioned Article 96, persons who are covered by Union law should 
not in principle be placed on the joint list of the persons to be refused entry. 
277  ECJ, Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain [2006] E.C.R. I-1097, paras 48-53.  
278  ECJ, Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] E.C.R. I-5157, para. 18. See the discussion in Oosterom-Staples, "Het 
fundamentele recht op vrij verkeer nader bepaald: het arrest Jipa onder de loep" (2009) N.T.E.R., 12-
17. 
279  See, with regard to these grounds, ECJ, Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] E.C.R. I-5157, paras 21-29 and the 
detailed discussion in Chapter 4, infra. 
280  Non-discriminatory obstacles have been held to infringe Article 21 TFEU on many occasions. For 
one example, see ECJ, Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul [2008] E.C.R. I-7639. See also the 
discussion in Van Nuffel and Cambien, "De vrijheid van economisch niet-actieve EU-burgers om 
binnen de EU te reizen, te verblijven en te studeren" (2009) 57 SEW, 144-154. 
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concerned to establish a further connection with Union law.281  One example could be the 
imposition of “departure taxes” by an OCT authority on persons travelling abroad.282  The 
same is true a fortiori where an OCT would prohibit its nationals to travel to one of the 
Member States as such would come down to an outright negation of the Article 21 TFEU 
rights to these nationals.  The foregoing reasoning does not apply, however, to restrictions 
on travels between the OCTs and the Member States in purely internal situations.  
Accordingly, a Member State could restrict the freedom of its nationals to travel from the 
OCT to the European territory of the Member State to a further extent than would be 
allowed under Article 21 TFEU, as long as any link with Union law is absent.  This will be 
discussed more in detail in the following.  
 
ii) Rules issued by the associated Member State 
 
In the foregoing I reached the conclusion that movement between the OCTs and the 
Member States for OCT nationals is subject to the same (substantive) rules as those 
applicable to Union citizens travelling between the Member States.  Still, OCT nationals 
could be made subject to more burdensome conditions than other Union citizens, at least 
when entering the Member State to which the OCT belongs (e.g. a Dutch national 
travelling between Aruba and the Kingdom of the Netherlands).  This is because the 
situation occurring constitutes, under certain circumstances at least,283 a purely internal 
situation, to which Union law, including Article 21 TFEU, does not apply.284  In such 
purely internal situations a Member State may adopt measures which treat its own 
nationals less favourably than nationals of other Member States.285  Moreover, in such 
situations, Union law does also not object to a differential treatment of two categories of a 
Member State’s own nationals, given the fact that Union law is simply not applicable.286  It 
would seem to follow that an associated Member State is allowed to subject the right of 
                                                 
281  This presumably follows from ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 48-56. The 
actual meaning of the judgment and its implications for the scope of Union law cannot, however be 
determined with certainty at present. Future case law must further clarify the matter. 
282  Example cited in Kochenov, "The impact of European Citizenship on the Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories with the European Community" (2009) 36 LIEI, 254 (footnote 84). Many 
countries around the globe employ a system of departure taxes. One example is Cuba: 
http://www.iatatravelcentre.com/CU-Cuba-customs-currency-airport-tax-regulations-details.htm.  
283  Namely: where any link with Union law is absent. Such a link would be present, for instance, where 
an OCT national had previously resided on the territory of another Member State (see the discussion, 
infra). The status of Union citizen would arguably not be sufficient in itself to provide a sufficient 
link with Union law in order to invoke Union law against a national measure restricting movement 
from an OCT to the associated Member State. Indeed, the McCarthy and Ruiz Zambrano case law 
(see the discussion in Chapter 4, infra) would arguably not apply to such a case because the national 
measure concerned would not have the effect of depriving the OCT nationals concerned of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights or of impeding the exercise of their 
right of free movement to another Member State. The reason is, arguably, that the national measure 
concerned would not restrict the possibilities to travel to other Member States. Against such 
restrictions, by contrast, reliance on Article 21 TFEU would be possible, as was discussed higher.  
284  See, e.g., ECJ, Case 175/78 Saunders [1979] E.C.R. 1129 (an internal restriction on a national’s 
freedom of movement within his Member State) cannot be challenged under Union law). This 
remains true after the introduction of the provisions on citizenship of the Union: ECJ, Joined Cases 
C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] E.C.R. I-3171, para. 23.  
285  See the discussion in Chapter 2, under IV.B.2 and the references cited there. For an illustration in the 
case law of the ECJ, see, e.g., ECJ, Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] E.C.R. I-3453, para. 27. 
286  See e.g. ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v 
Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683. 
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 172
entry of its OCT nationals to more burdensome conditions than it does for its non-OCT 
nationals and for other Union citizens, at least in situations in which no other link with 
Union law is present.   
 
This point of view was confirmed in the debates surrounding a number of legislative 
proposals that were put forward in the Netherlands in the context of its recently developed 
policy aim of integrating immigrants.  At present, third country nationals who wish to 
settle permanently in the (European part of the) Netherlands are subject to a “duty of civic 
integration” (“inburgeringsplicht”), 287  which takes the form of a civic integration test 
(“inburgeringstest”).288  Union citizens are exempt from this duty, and the same is true for 
nationals of certain third countries such as States party to the EEA Agreement, 289 
Switzerland, the USA, Australia, Canada, New-Zealand and Japan (see Article 5 of the 
civic Integration Act).290  An initial proposal for this law sought to subject Arubans and 
Antilleans to the “duty of civic integration”, unlike all other Union citizens. 291  This 
proposal did not make it into law after the Dutch Council of State had issued a negative 
advisory opinion. 292   All Dutch nationals are now in principle exempt from the said 
duty.293 
                                                 
287  The possibility of subjecting third country nationals to integration conditions is explicitly authorised 
under Union law by Article 5(2) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning 
the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, [2004] O.J. L16/44. 
288  Wet van 30 november 2006 houdende regels inzake inburgering in de Nederlandse samenleving (Wet 
inburgering), [2007] Stb. 444, Article 3 in particular (hereinafter: “Civic Integration Act”). Before 
obtaining a temporary residence permit in the Netherlands, another, more basic, integration test must 
be passed under the in verband met het stellen van een inburgeringsvereiste bij het toelaten van 
bepaalde categorieën vreemdelingen (Wet inburgering in het buitenland), [2006] Stb. 28 (hereinafter: 
Act on Civic Integration Abroad). See the discussion in Besselink, "Integration and Immigration: The 
Vicissitudes of Dutch 'Inburgering'", in Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera (eds.), Illiberal liberal 
states: immigration, citizenship, and integration in the EU (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 
241-258. For a detailed discussion in Dutch, see de Vries, PS-special: Wet inburgering, (Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2007), 319 pp. 
289  Agreement and on the European Economic Area, [1994] O.J. L1/3 concluded on the part of the EU 
by Decision of the Council and the Commission of 13 December 1993 on the conclusion of the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area between the European Communities, their Member 
States and the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality 
of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Swiss Confederation, 
[1994] O.J. L1/1. 
290  For an evaluation of the validity and desirability of these exemptions, see Carrera and Wiesbrock, 
“Civic Integration of Third Country Nationals: nationalism versus Europeanisation in the Common 
EU Immigration Policy”, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Series, available at 
www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/2179. 
291  See Besselink, "Expulsion and Integration: Erecting Internal Borders Within the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands" (2006), available at http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1096.html. See also the more 
concise version of the article published as Besselink, “De Binnengrenzen van het Koninkrijk, of: Het 
voorontwerp ‘Verbanning en Inburgering’” (2006) Tijdschrift voor Antilliaans Recht – Justicia, 70-
84; Jessurun d’Oliveira, “TweederangsNederlanders: de Antillianen” (2006) Migrantenrecht, 88-99.  
292  Advies van 1 juli 2005 bij Voorstel van wet houdende regels inzake de inburgering in de Nederlandse 
samenleving (Wet inburgering), met memorie van toelichting, Kamerstukken  II 2005/06, 30308, nr. 
4. See also Advies van 3 augustus 2006 bij Nieuwe adviesaanvraag inzake het wetsvoorstel houdende 
regels inzake inburgering in de Nederlandse samenleving (wet inburgering), Kamerstukken II 
2005/06, 30 308, nr. 106. 
293  Still, Article 4 of the Civic Integration Act kept open the possibility of subjecting certain categories 
of Dutch nationals to the “duty of civic integration” by a later decision until this possibility was 
deleted from the Act by a more recent law (Wet van 12 juni 2008 tot wijziging van de Wet 
inburgering en enkele andere wetten in verband met het vervallen van de mogelijkheid om 
Nederlandse onderdanen tot inburgering te verplichten en het aanbrengen van enkele technische 
verbeteringen, [2008] Stb. 229). 
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It is illuminating to look at the negative advisory opinion of the Dutch Council of State in 
a bit more detail, because it has a clear line of reasoning with regard to the possibility for 
associated Member States to impose burdens on the free movement rights of their own 
nationals.  Admittedly, the main arguments that led the Council of State to issue a negative 
opinion were based on considerations of national law 294  and international law. 295  
Interestingly, the Council of State also explicitly considered whether the proposal violated 
Union law.  It started by pointing out that the proposal would lead to subjecting only 
certain categories of Dutch nationals to the said integration duty, namely only Arubans and 
Antilleans.  These categories would be treated less favourably than other Dutch nationals 
and other Union citizens, who would be exempt from this duty.  Next, the Council of State 
pointed out that Union law does not object to such differential treatment in purely internal 
situations.  It distinguished between two situations.  Some Arubans and Antilleans will 
never have exercised their free movement rights before they travel to the Netherlands.  
Their situation is that of a Dutch national travelling between two parts of his Member 
State, which is a purely internal situation.296  Union law does not apply to such a situation, 
so reverse discrimination is possible, as far as Union law is concerned.  Different is the 
situation of Arubans or Antilleans who have exercised their free movement rights under 
Union law before travelling to the Netherlands.  Take the example of an Antillean taking a 
flight from Willemstad to Paris, and then taking a train from Paris to Amsterdam.  This 
person has first exercised his right to enter the territory of another Member State, before 
entering a different part of his own Member State.  Through the sheer exercise of this right 
he has, according to the Council of State, brought himself within the scope of application 
of Union law.297  As a consequence Union law applies, including the equal treatment 
clause of Article 18 TFEU.  This means that the differential treatment in question will 
constitute a violation of Union law, unless it can be objectively justified.  This was not the 
case according to the Council of State.  Moreover, it can be added, it also entails the 
applicability of Directive 2004/38, which does not allow the imposition of integration 
requirements, in contrast with Directive 2003/109.298 
 
The Council of State had the opportunity to elaborate this reasoning further in relation to 
another controversial legislative proposal.  Indeed, next to and apart from its proposal to 
subject Antilleans and Arubans to the duty of civic integration, the Dutch government 
proposed another set of measures targeted explicitly at Antilleans and Arubans wishing to 
settle in the European part of the Netherlands.299  The proposal provided for the possibility 
of sending back to their home country certain groups of Antillean and Aruban youngsters 
who had proven to be a burden for the Dutch society.300  Again, this measure would only 
                                                 
294  A violation of the equal treatment clause in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution. 
295  A violation of Article 14 of the ECHR. 
296  ECJ, Case 175/78 Saunders [1979] E.C.R. 1129. 
297  This is consistent with the case law of the European Courts. See e.g. ECJ, Case C-224/98 D'Hoop 
[2002] E.C.R. I-6191. 
298  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, [2004] O.J. L16/44. 
299  Voorstel van wet van 30 januari 2006 houdende aanvullende maatregelen inzake onder meer de 
terugzending van Antilliaanse en Arubaanse risicojongeren, met memorie van toelichting; Gewijzigd 
voorstel van wet houdende aanvullende maatregelen inzake onder meer de terugzending van 
Antilliaanse en Arubaanse risicojongeren, met memorie van toelichting.  
300  For a detailed exposition and analysis of its provisions, see Besselink, "Expulsion and Integration: 
Erecting Internal Borders Within the Kingdom of the Netherlands" (2006), available at 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1096.html. The issue of dealing with problems caused by young 
Antillean immigrants has been on the political agenda in the Netherlands since the nineties. Earlier 
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apply to (certain groups of) Antilleans and Arubans, but not to other Dutch nationals and 
other Union citizens.301  
 
The Council of State again issued a negative opinion,302 after explicitly considering inter 
alia whether the proposal violated Union law.  It distinguished basically between the same 
two situations set out above.  It held that Union law does not apply to (and cannot be 
violated therefore in) the situation of Arubans and Antilleans travelling directly from the 
Dutch OCTs to the Netherlands, because this constitutes a purely internal situation.  
However, Arubans and Antilleans travelling to the Netherlands via another Member State, 
bring themselves within the ambit of Union law.  Applying the special expulsion measure 
laid down in the proposal to them would infringe Union law, as that measure was not 
conform Directive 2004/38, which sums up the permissible conditions for expelling Union 
citizens from the territory of one of the Member States (Article 27 et seq.).303  Moreover, 
the measure was discriminatory, given the fact that it could not be applied to other Union 
citizens, and this discrimination could not be justified.  This proposal did not make it into 
law either, but plans for reintroducing it exist, in particular after the formation of a right-
wing government in October 2010.304 
 
The foregoing discussion probably illustrates one key point: an associated Member State 
may subject OCT nationals belonging to that Member State to more burdensome entry 
conditions than other Union citizens as long as any connection with Union law is absent.  
Such a connection will be present if an OCT national has travelled to another Member 
State before entering his associated Member State.  The reasoning of the Dutch Council of 
State is probably correct, as it is consistent with a whole body of case law concerning 
purely internal situations.305  It finds perhaps the most explicit approval in the Kaur case, 
dealing with a British Overseas citizen who wanted to secure a right of residence in the 
UK.  In his opinion to the case AG Léger remarked that:  
 
“from the strictly legal point of view, Mrs Kaur's application does not seek recognition of a right 
to move freely within [Union] territory but seeks rather to secure the right to reside within the 
                                                                                                                                                   
proposals to remedy these problems included the idea of introducing visa requirements for Antilleans 
and Arubans wishing to travel to the Netherlands. This proposal was abandoned, especially because it 
would not be feasible to implement it under current Dutch nationality legislation, which does not 
distinguish between Dutch citizens from the Netherlands and Dutch citizens from overseas (see the 
discussion in De Groot, "Visumplicht Antillianen/Arubanen en het Europese burgerschap" (2000) 
Migrantenrecht, 51-52). 
301  And, in contrast to the proposal on the civic duty, not even to third country nationals. 
302  Advies van 26 januari 2007 bij Gewijzigd voorstel van wet houdende aanvullende maatregelen 
inzake onder meer de terugzending van Antilliaanse en Arubaanse risicojongeren, met memorie van 
toelichting, Kamerstukken II 2006/2007, 30 962, nr. 4 en Advies van 1 september 2006 bij Voorstel 
van wet houdende aanvullende maatregelen inzake onder meer de terugzending van Antilliaanse en 
Arubaanse risicojongeren, met memorie van toelichting, Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30 962, nr 4. 
303  Besselink further clarifies the point: the proposed expulsion measures would violate Article 27(2) of 
the Residence Directive for two reasons: they would rest on considerations of general preventions 
and moreover not be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned: 
Besselink, "Expulsion and Integration: Erecting Internal Borders Within the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands" (2006), available at http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1096.html. 
304  See Nieuwenhuis, “Mogen we Antillianen terugsturen?”, (17 September 2010) De Pers, available at 
http://www.depers.nl/binnenland/510038/Mogen-we-Antillianen-terugsturen.html. 
305  See, among numerous examples, e.g. ECJ, Case 175/78 Saunders [1979] E.C.R. 1129; ECJ, Joined 
Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan [1982] E.C.R. 3723; ECJ, Case 44/84 Hurd v Jones 
[1986] E.C.R. 29; ECJ, Case 180/83 Moser v Land Baden-Württemberg [1984] E.C.R. 2539; ECJ, 
Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] E.C.R. I-3171. 
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territory of the Member State of which, according to that Member State's domestic law, she 
possesses a form of nationality.”306   
 
He therefore concluded that any connection with Union law was lacking.307  This case law 
remains good law, and has, despite the strong objections sometimes raised against it,308 
been confirmed by the Union Courts.309   
 
The end result seems to be that OCT nationals may, in certain circumstances, be treated 
less beneficially than all other Union citizens.  Obviously, this conclusion is reached 
considering Union law only and can, therefore, only be partially true.  It is important to 
stress that we are not only dealing here with a situation of reverse discrimination, i.e. 
nationals being treated less favourably by their Member State than other Union citizens.  
Another important aspect of the situation at hand is that one group of Member State 
nationals (OCT nationals) is being treated less favourably than other nationals of the same 
Member State.  This has two important consequences.  
 
In the first place, this differential treatment could potentially violate domestic law, e.g. a 
non discrimination principle written into the national constitution.310  Interesting to note in 
this regard is that the ECJ has explicitly remarked that:  
 
“interpretation of provisions of [Union] law might possibly be of use to the national court, 
having regard too to situations classed as purely internal, in particular if the law of the Member 
State concerned were to require every national of that State to be allowed to enjoy the same 
rights as those which a national of another Member State would derive from [Union] law in a 
situation considered to be comparable by that court”.311   
 
The ECJ is hinting here at the fact that national courts could, as regards purely internal 
situations, use a reasoning analogous to the one employed at the Union level and find an 
infringement of the principle of equal treatement.312  This view is probably inspired by the 
fact that any other solution might be such as to allow erecting “internal borders” within a 
Member State, something which according to some, sits uneasily with the whole idea of an 
                                                 
306  Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-192/99 Kaur [2000] E.C.R. I-1237, para. 29. 
307  Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-192/99 Kaur [2000] E.C.R. I-1237, para. 30. 
308  See, e.g., Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and 
Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, paras 121 et seq. 
309  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v 
Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683. See also the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, infra. 
310  The first opinion of the Dutch Council of State discussed above illustrates the point: the Council held 
that the legislative proposal violated the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 10 of the 
Dutch Constitution. In other words: it found a forbidden discrimination even in those situations to 
which Union law did not apply. Jessurun d’Oliveira, by contrast, has argued that the Dutch 
Constitution does not oppose subjecting Antilleans and Arubans to different requirements when 
travelling to the Netherlands (Jessurun d’Oliveira, "TweederangsNederlanders: de Antillianen" 
(2006) Migrantenrecht, 90-91). See also the discussion in Besselink, "Inburgering, gelijke 
behandeling en verblijfsrecht van vreemdelingen in Nederland " (2004), available at 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/Inburgering_voorstudie.pdf. 
311  ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 40. See the discussion in Van Elsuwege and Adam, 
"Situations purement internes, discriminations à rebours et collectivités autonomes après l'arrêt sur 
l'assurance flamande" (2008) C.D.E., 655-711. 
312  The Belgian Constitutional Court did not follow this suggestion and only declared the disputed 
national rule to be invalid in as far as it concerned situations having a link with Union law. See the 
discussion in Van Elsuwege and Adam, “The Limits of Constitutional Dialogue for the Prevention of 
Reverse Discrimination. Constitutional Court of Belgium, Judgment 11/2009 of 21 January 2009” 
(2009) EuConst., 327-339. 
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internal market, defined as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured” (Article 26(2) TFEU) or the objective of 
construing a Citizens’ Europe.313  Applied to the situation under discussion here, this 
means that OCT nationals should preferably not be made subject to more burdensome 
conditions than other nationals of the Member State concerned.   
 
In the second place, such differential treatment may violate international obligations 
stemming from fundamental rights treaties.  I will mention them only briefly here, as I am 
principally concerned with the validity of such treatment under Union law.  As far as 
international law is concerned, the situation described could violate the equality principle 
laid down in Article 14 ECHR314 and Article 26 of the ICCPR or the right to respect for 
family life.315  Besides, on a wholly different line of reasoning, one could argue that the 
situation described violates the right to enter one’s own State, which is a fundamental 
right.  Article 3(2) of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR provides: “No one shall be 
deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national”.316  
Furthermore, Article 2(1) of the Fourth Protocol provides that: “Everyone lawfully within 
the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose his residence”.  One could argue that the differential treatment 
discussed here could potentially make it excessively difficult for OCT nationals to enter 
the European territory of their associated Member State, which is the State of their 
nationality.  However, the argument faces two major flaws.  First of all, the fourth protocol 
has not been ratified by certain EU Member States, including the UK.317  Consequently, 
the article finds no application to possible differential treatment of UK OCT nationals.  
Moreover, in the situation at hand, OCT nationals are (potentially) only prevented from 
entering part of the territory of their State.  It is not clear whether such a situation violates 
the fundamental right mentioned.  This doubt is confirmed by the declaration submitted by 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands at the moment of ratification of the Fourth Protocol to the 
ECHR318:  
 
“…the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles are regarded as separate territories for the 
application of Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 4.  
Under Article 3, no one may be expelled from or deprived of the right to enter the territory of 
the State of which he is a national. There is, however, only one nationality (Netherlands) for 
the whole of the Kingdom. Accordingly, nationality cannot be used as a criterion in making a 
distinction between the "citizens" of the Netherlands and those of the Netherlands Antilles, a 
distinction which is unavoidable since Article 3 applies separately to each of the parts of the 
Kingdom. This being so, the Netherlands reserve the right to make a distinction in law, for 
purpose of the application of Article 3 of the Protocol, between Netherlands nationals residing 
in the Netherlands and Netherlands nationals residing in the Netherlands Antilles”.   
 
                                                 
313  Again, I refer to the discussion in Chapter 2, under IV.B.2 and the references cited there. 
314  This was precisely one of the arguments of the Dutch Council of State in the first opinion discussed 
above. 
315  See ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 79. 
316  This principle must also be respected in the context of the Union. See the explicit reference by the 
ECJ in ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., para. 29. 
317  For a list of declarations, reservations and other communications, see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=046&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG
&VL=1.  
318  Declaration contained in a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 9 June 1982, handed to 
the Secretary General at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification, on 23 June 1982, Or. Fr. 
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A similar line of argument has been based on Article 12 of the ICCPR, which also 
provides for a right of entry into one’s country.319  However, in this connection too the 
Netherlands has made a declaration specifying that the Netherlands and the Netherlands 
Antilles are to be regarded as separate territories for the application of that Article.320  
Admittedly, the validity of such declarations can be called into question, in particular 
because they are outdated, since they refer to the Netherlands Antilles as the only Dutch 
overseas possession.  Probably, however, the said declarations should be recognised as 
proof of a clear intention on part of the Netherlands when ratifying both international 
conventions to limit the right to enter one’s country for Arubans and Antilleans to the 
Dutch overseas territories.  For that reason, they could probably not be relied upon by 
Dutch OCT nationals to challenge restrictions such as expulsion measures against 
Antilleans or Arubans.321   
 
An analogous interpretation can probably be put forward in relation to other Member 
States, like France and Denmark, even in the absence of a similar declaration.  Indeed, the 
very reason why the above declaration was put forward is the existence of a single 
nationality for the whole Kingdom of the Netherlands, something which equally applies in 
the case of France and Denmark.  On the other hand, one might reason that, in the absence 
of a similar declaration, the right concerned necessarily applies to the whole territory of 
the State in question, because otherwise the said declaration of the Netherlands would be 
superfluous.  If this reasoning is correct, applying restrictions to OCT nationals wishing to 
enter the associated Member State could constitute a violation of the right to enter the 
home State.  This argument has, to my knowledge, never been tested in court so far.  In 
any event, both Article (3) of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR and Article 12(3) of the 
ICCPR allow States to restrict the free movement rights of their nationals, if this provided 
for by law and necessary to achieve a legitimate objective. 
 
One last remark seems useful here.  One could be led to think that the above mentioned 
exclusion of OCTs from the scope of the Schengen agreement is an example of the 
associated Member State imposing more burdensome conditions on its OCT nationals.  
This is not the case however.  First of all, it must be pointed out that we are not faced here 
with a purely internal situation, in which reverse discrimination is allowed.  The exclusion 
from the Schengen Convention has for a consequence that different conditions apply for 
all Union citizens when travelling from OCTs to the European territory and this applies to 
all Member States, not just to the associated Member State.  Moreover, the apparent 
exclusion of OCT nationals is not brought about by a unilateral decision of the associated 
Member State.  Indeed, it results from clauses in the Schengen Convention (for France and 
the Netherlands) and in one of the accession agreements to this convention (for 
Denmark).322  
 
                                                 
319  See Besselink, "Inburgering, gelijke behandeling en verblijfsrecht van vreemdelingen in Nederland " 
(2004), available at http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/Inburgering_voorstudie.pdf.  
320  Declaration and reservations of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec.  
321  This conclusion is also reached by Jessurun d’Oliveira on the basis of a persuasive argumentation 
(see Jessurun d’Oliveira, "TweederangsNederlanders: de Antillianen" (2006) Migrantenrecht, 91-93). 
322  See n. 264 and 267, supra and the accompanying text. 
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 178
3. Conclusion 
 
As Union citizens, OCT nationals enjoy within the territory of the Member States both the 
benefit of the economic free movement provisions and the general right to free movement 
laid down in Article 21 TFEU.  Contrary to what has been argued in legal literature and 
even submitted, to some extent by the Commission, there is no need for a prior Council act 
adopted in accordance with Article 203 TFEU in order for these provisions to become 
applicable to OCT nationals.  That view is at odds with the fact that OCT nationals are 
Union citizens enjoying within the territory of the Member States exactly the same rights 
as other Member State nationals and must, therefore, be rejected. 
 
OCT nationals can, moreover, rely on the said provisions in order to obtain a right of entry 
into the territory of the Member States.  Put differently, the free movement provisions can 
be relied upon to challenge restrictions on the right to travel from the OCTs to the territory 
of the Member States, with the exception of restrictions on the right to travel from an OCT 
to the associated Member State in purely internal situations.  Consequently, the free 
movement provisions must be interpreted as guaranteeing a “one-way freedom of 
movement” from the OCTs to the Member States.  This limited applicability of the free 
movement provisions to travels between the OCTs and the Member States is necessary in 
order to safeguard the effet utile of the provisions on Union citizenship and of the 
provisions on the association with the OCTs.  
 
C. Electoral Rights 
 
A second question to ask is what electoral rights OCT nationals enjoy.  It will be recalled 
that Union citizens enjoy important electoral rights in both municipal elections and 
elections to the European Parliament.  Article 22(1), first sentence, TFEU states that:  
 
“Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in 
which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State”.   
 
Article 22(2), first sentence, TFEU, for its part, states that:  
 
“Without prejudice to Article 223(1)323 and to the provisions adopted for its implementation, 
every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the 
Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State”. 
 
This right to vote and stand in municipal and European elections has to be exercised 
subject tot the conditions laid down in Council directives adopted for this purpose.324  
                                                 
323  Article 223(1) TFEU provides that the European Parliament is to draw up a proposal to lay down the 
provisions necessary for the election of its Members. The necessary provisions are then to be adopted 
by the Council, acting unanimously and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
These provisions can only enter into force after approval by the Member States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements.  
324  See Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the 
exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for 
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1993] O.J. 
L329/34; Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994 laying down detailed arrangements for 
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Again, the difficult question is to what extent and under what conditions, OCT nationals 
enjoy the said electoral rights in municipal and European elections.  It is clear that OCT 
nationals can invoke the rights laid down in Article 22 TFEU when they reside in (the 
European territory of) a Member State of which they are not a national.  The question is, 
however, whether these rights also apply ratione loci in the OCTs, i.e. when they reside in 
the OCT of a Member State of which they are not a national. 
 
A first intuitive reflex might be to remark that a similar analysis has just been carried out 
with regard to Article 21 TFEU, and that there should be no need to do it all over again 
with regard to Article 22 TFEU.  It may seem at first sight that, given the similarities 
between Articles 21 and 22 TFEU, largely the same reasoning can apply for both Treaty 
provisions.  Indeed, just as Article 21 TFEU, Article 22 TFEU confers rights on “every 
citizen of the Union”, which indubitably includes OCT nationals as defined above.  And, 
just like Article 21 TFEU, Article 22 TFEU is not traditionally considered to be amongst 
the provisions (fully) applicable to the OCTs.  However, one should not fail to observe one 
fundamental difference between Article 21 TFEU and Article 22 TFEU.  Article 21 TFEU, 
on the one hand, confers on every Union citizen an independent right, namely the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to certain 
conditions.  Article 22 TFEU, on the other hand, does not confer any independent right in 
its own right.  It merely proclaims that Union citizens residing in a Member State of which 
they are not a national have the right to participate in municipal and European elections 
“under the same conditions as nationals of that Member State”.  In this sense, Article 22 
TFEU, far from conferring an independent right on Union citizens, should rather be 
viewed as applying the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality to the 
exercise of the right to vote in municipal and European elections.325 
 
It follows that the scope of Article 22 TFEU can only be determined by way of a “phased” 
reasoning.  One must start from the observation above: Article 22 TFEU merely applies 
the principle of non-discrimination to pre-existing electoral rights, regulated independently 
from Article 22 TFEU.  The scope of Article 22 TFEU is first and foremost determined, 
therefore, by the (national and EU) provisions that determine the electoral rights in 
question (phase 1).  Article 22 TFEU only produces its effect in a second phase: once the 
scope of the pre-existing right is determined, it will enlarge it in order to guarantee, under 
certain conditions, equal treatment for all Union citizens, irrespective of their nationality 
(phase 2).  In the following I will, in that order, consider these two “phases”.  It will 
become clear that both are highly relevant with regard to determination of the electoral 
rights of OCT nationals.  I will do this exercise first with regard to Article 22(2) TFEU and 
next with regard to Article 22 (1) TFEU. 
 
1. Elections to the European Parliament 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the 
Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1994] O.J. L368/38. 
325  See ECJ, Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] E.C.R. I-7917, para. 66. For a detailed 
discussion of Article 22 TFEU, see Shaw The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: 
Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of Political Space (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2007), Chapter 5 in particular. 
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a) Phase 1: national and EU provisions 
 
i) General situation 
 
The procedure surrounding the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament is partly regulated by Union law itself and partly by the national 
provisions of each Member State.  As far as Union law is concerned, the most important 
provisions are Articles 14 and 223 TFEU326 and the Act of 1976 concerning the election of 
the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage,327 adopted 
using the procedure of Article 190(4) TEC (now Article 223(1) TFEU).328  Originally, 
Article 190(4) TEC329 provided for the adoption of a uniform election procedure in all 
Member States, but since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty there is also the 
option to provide for an election procedure “in accordance with principles common to all 
Member States”.  The 1976 Act, as modified in 2002, essentially implements the latter 
option.  Article 1 of the Act provides that members of the European Parliament are to be 
elected on the basis of proportional representation and that elections are to be by direct 
universal suffrage and free and secret.  Article 8 specifies that, subject to the provisions of 
the Act, the electoral procedure is to be governed in each Member State by its national 
provisions.  It is added that those provisions, which may if appropriate take account of the 
specific situation in the Member States, must not affect the essentially proportional nature 
of the voting system.  
 
It is already clear from this that the EU provisions relating to the European Parliamentary 
election procedure are characterised by a great degree of deference to the Member States.  
Union law itself does not determine in any great detail the personal and territorial scope of 
European Parliamentary elections.  As far as the personal scope is concerned, Article 14(2) 
TEU merely states that the European Parliament is to be composed of “representatives 
of the Union’s citizens”.  Previously, Article 189 TEC stated that the European 
Parliament was to consist of “representatives of peoples of the States brought together in 
the [Union]”.330  The precise meaning of this expression was the subject of the dispute in 
Spain v United Kingdom.331  Spain argued that the expression had to be understood as 
                                                 
326  These articles correspond more or les to former Articles 189 and 190 TEC. 
327  Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal 
suffrage annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976, [1976] 
O.J. L278/1, as amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June 2002 and 23 
September 2002, [2002] O.J. L283/1. See the recent Commission report dealing with possible 
problems in the implementation of the act: Commission Report on the election of Members of the 
European Parliament (1976 Act as amended by Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom) and on the 
participation of European Union citizens in elections for the European Parliament in the Member 
State of residence (Directive 93/109/EC), COM(2010) 605/2. 
328  Article 223(1) TFEU requires the European Parliament to draw up a proposal for elections by direct 
universal suffrage, after which the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, is to lay down the 
appropriate provisions, which then have to be adopted by the Member States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
329  Old Article 138(3) TEEC. 
330  Similar references could be found in Articles 190(1) and (2) TEC and in Article 1 of the annex to the 
1976 decision. 
331  ECJ, Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] E.C.R. I-7917. To support this argument, Spain 
submitted that Articles 189 and 190 TEC had to be read together with Article 17 and Article 19 TEC. 
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referring to Union citizens only.332  The ECJ disagreed.  It started its analysis by observing 
that neither Article 190 TEC nor the 1976 Act expressly and precisely defined who were to 
be entitled to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament.333  Furthermore, it refused to accept Spain’s argument of an inextricable link 
between Union citizenship and the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for the 
European Parliament.334  This brought the ECJ to a simple and straightforward conclusion: 
in the current state of Union law the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand 
as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament fell within the competence of each 
Member State, in compliance with Union law.335  The ECJ came to a similar conclusion in 
Eman and Sevinger, which was pronounced the very same day. 336   In line with this 
statement the ECJ considered that it was lawful for Member States to extend the right to 
vote in European Parliamentary elections to certain groups of third country nationals (the 
contentious issue in Spain v United Kingdom) or to exclude certain groups of Union 
citizens from the right to participate in European Parliamentary elections, such as certain 
groups of OCT nationals (the contentious issue in Eman and Sevinger).337  The ECJ added, 
however, that such arrangements needed to be in accordance with Union law.  However, as 
was already remarked, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaties no 
longer make reference to “representatives of peoples of the States”, but instead state that 
the European Parliament is composed of “representatives of the Union’s citizens” (Article 
14(2) TEU).  The possible consequences of this changed wording will be discussed below. 
 
As far as the territorial scope of European Parliamentary elections is concerned, Article 1 
of the 1976 Act merely notes that MEPs are elected “in each Member State”.  Before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this was also stated in Article 190(2) TEC.338  Under 
the traditional reading of the Treaties, this is to be understood as referring to the territories 
of the Member States, excluding the OCTs.339  Indeed, Articles 189 and 190 TEC are, in 
accordance with the Leplat case law, not among the provisions applicable to the OCTs and 
this was explicitly confirmed by the ECJ in Eman and Sevinger.340  The consequence is 
that, as far as Union law is concerned, Member States are not required to hold elections to 
the European Parliament in the OCTs.  On the other hand, it would seem that Union law 
does not bar the Member States from doing so either.  The bottom-line is that, just like the 
personal scope, the territorial scope is to be determined largely by the Member States, on 
condition that they respect Union law.   
 
It is clear from the foregoing that the scope of European Parliamentary elections is 
determined first and foremost by the Member States.  However, in exercising this 
                                                 
332  Ibid., paras 37-45. 
333  Ibid., para. 70. 
334  Ibid., para. 76. 
335  Ibid., para. 78.  
336  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, paras 40-45. 
337  See the discussion in Shaw, "The Political Representation of Europe's Citizens" (2008) 4 EuConst, 
162-186. 
338  The Treaties no longer contain this statement, since the exact composition is now to be determined by 
the European Council with the consent of the European Parliament (Article 14, second subpara., 
TEU). It is clear, however, that in any event elections will continue to be held in each Member State 
since for each Member State minimum six members need to be elected (Article 14(2), first subpara., 
TEU). In this connection it must be remarked that the composition laid down in Article 190(2) TEC 
remained provisionally in place even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (see Protocol (no 
36) on Transitional Provisions, [2010] O.J. C83/322, Article 2, second para.). 
339  See under III.A.3.a., supra. 
340  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 46. 
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 182
competence, the Member States must comply with Union law, a point which I will 
elaborate below when studying the recent changes in the Netherlands electoral law.341  All 
this is extremely relevant with regard to the electoral rights of OCT nationals.  The large 
discretion left to the Member States in this context means that a Member State could opt, 
for instance, to restrict the right to participate in European Parliamentary elections to those 
of its nationals having a sufficient connection with the mainland and exclude, on that basis, 
persons having their residence in a third country or one of the OCTs.342   
 
Accordingly, nationals resident in the Danish343 and UK OCTs are not generally speaking 
entitled to vote in European Parliamentary elections.  To illustrate this exclusion, I will 
elaborate the example of the UK in some more detail.  In the UK, elections to the 
European Parliament are organized in the UK only and not in the British OCTs.  This 
follows from the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 which, for the election of 
MEPs, divides the UK in nine electoral regions, all of which are located in England, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.344  The British legislator345 intentionally excluded 
the British OCTs and Gibraltar, to comply with annex I (original annex II) to the 1976 Act 
which stated “The United Kingdom will apply the provisions of this Act only in respect of 
the United Kingdom".  However, in 1999, the ECtHR ruled that the exclusion of Gibraltar 
from enfranchisement in European Parliamentary elections was a breach of human 
rights.346  In reaction to this judgment, and in order to honour its obligations under the 
ECHR, the UK authorities combined Gibraltar with the South West region of England,347 
so as to create a new “combined” electoral region for European Parliamentary Elections.348  
As a consequence, the entirety of UK electoral law as it applies to European Parliamentary 
elections is to be applied to Gibraltar for those purposes, modified as necessary to ensure 
practical application.  Besides, only British nationals (including British citizens and 
“Qualified Commonwealth Citizens (QCCs)”349) and Irish citizens350 resident in the UK 
                                                 
341  See under III.C.1.a.ii., infra. The point is also made clear in the Commission Report on the election 
of Members of the European Parliament (1976 Act as amended by Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom) 
and on the participation of European Union citizens in elections for the European Parliament in the 
Member State of residence (Directive 93/109/EC), COM(2010) 605/2, at 3.4. 
342  This was explicitly confirmed by the ECJ in Eman and Sevinger (see the discussion, infra). 
Conversely, Member States may choose to grant that right to certain persons who have close links to 
them, other than their own nationals or Union citizens resident in their territory (See ECJ, Case C-
145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] E.C.R. I-7917, para. 78). See the discussion in Mehdi, "La 
Citoyenneté européenne", in Tesoka and Ziller (eds.), Union européenne et outre-mers: Unis dans 
leur diversité (Aix-en-Provence, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marselle, 2008), 40-47. 
343  Greenland was a constituency for elections to the European Parliament in 1984. However, since it 
became an OCT (in 1985; see under II.A.3., supra), elections to the European Parliament are no 
longer organized in Greenland and permanent residents in Greenland  are not entitled to vote in 
elections to the European Parliament. See the “Members of the European Parliament Elections Act 
(Consolidated Act No. 143 of 24 February 2009)”, Articles 2(3) and 3(2), available in English at 
http://elections.sm.dk/european-parliament-elections/Documents/EPL2009uk.pdf.  
344  European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 (c.24), Article 1. 
345  By the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978, consolidated in 2002 by the European 
Parliamentary Elections Act 2002. 
346  Matthews v UK (28 EHRR 361). 
347  In accordance with section 9 of the European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003 (“the EPRA 
2003”), which provided that Gibraltar was to be combined with an existing electoral region in 
England and Wales to form a new electoral region for the purposes of European Parliamentary 
elections taking place after 1 April 2004. 
348  See the European Parliamentary Elections (Combined Region and Campaign Expenditure) (United 
Kingdom and Gibraltar) Order 2004. 
349  Commonwealth citizens satisfying certain special conditions (see e.g. EPRA 2003, Article 16(5). 
QCCs may vote in European Parliamentary elections if they are resident in Gibraltar, which, for this 
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(or formerly resident in the UK351) are entitled to vote in European Parliamentary elections 
in the UK.352  Nationals resident in the British OCTs, by contrast, will not normally be so 
entitled. 
 
Traditionally, France was the only Member State with OCTs which conferred on its 
nationals resident in the OCTs a full-blown right to participate in European Parliamentary 
elections.  The French law on the election of representatives to the European Parliament is 
applicable to the French overseas territories, which include territories qualifying for OCT 
status and territories qualifying for outermost region status (see the discussion under 
II.A.2., supra).353  In fact, the French overseas territories are one of the currently eight 
electoral departments for the elections of the European Parliament in France, which are all 
allocated a certain share of the total number of representatives to elect.  Consequently, not 
only are elections to the European Parliament organised in the OCTs, the French OCTs are 
also guaranteed a fixed number of representatives in the European Parliament. 354  
Accordingly, of the current 72355 representatives of France in the European Parliament, 
three were elected in the French Overseas Departments.356  From the point of view of 
Union law, this can be seen as an extension of the scope of the election procedure in 
European Parliamentary elections.  Indeed, as I remarked higher, France is not required to 
organize elections in its OCTs.  From the point of view of French law however, the French 
overseas territories form an entire part of the French Republic, in accordance with the 
constitutional principle of the “indivisibilité de la République”.  French citizens resident in 
these territories participate in elections of the National assembly357 and the Senate358 in 
                                                                                                                                                   
purpose, forms part of the UK. See, on this issue, ECJ, Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom 
[2006] E.C.R. I-7917 and the discussion in Shaw, "The Political Representation of Europe's Citizens" 
(2008) 4 EuConst, 162-186  
350  See the Representation of the People Act 1983, as modified by the Representation of the People Act 
2000, Article 1. See, in great detail: Jackson, Leopold and Phillips Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (8th ed.) (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2001), 213 et seq. 
351  See the Representation of the People Act 1985, ss. 1-3. 
352  European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 (c.24), Article 8(1)-(4). 
353  See Article 26 of Loi n°77-729 du 7 juillet 1977 relative à l’élection des représentants au Parlement 
européen, which in turn refers to various articles of book V of the code électoral. See further: Décret 
n°79-160 du 28 février 1979 portant application de la loi n°77-729 du 7 juillet 1977 relative à 
l’élection des représentants au Parlement européen, Chapitre V: ‘Dispositions relatives à l’outre-mer’. 
354  Article 3-1 of of Loi n°77-729 du 7 juillet 1977 divides the electoral department constituted by the 
French overseas territories into three sections, namely the “Atlantic section” (which consists of 
Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin and Saint-Pierre and 
Miquelon), the “Indian ocean section” (which consists of Mayotte and Réunion) and the “pacific 
section” (which consists of New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna). The 
distribution of seats among these sections is regulated by decree. 
355  See old Article 190(2) TEC. 
356  See the website of the French Ministry of the interior 
(http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/resultats-elections/eur2004/008/index.html) 
and, for the 2004 elections, Décret n°2004-396 du 6 mai 2004 fixant le nombre de sièges et le nombre 
de candidats par circonscription et portant convocation des électeurs pour l’élection des représentants 
au Parlement européen. 
357  Every French overseas territory gets to elect a certain number of deputies to the Assemblée nationale. 
The precise number and conditions for each territory can be found in the Code électoral, which has 
been significantly changed in this regard by Loi organique n° 2007-223 du 21 février 2007 portant 
dispositions statutaires et institutionnelles relatives à l'outre-mer, [2007] JORF. For example, Article 
L 394 of the Code électoral proclaims that two deputies will be elected in New Caledonia, two in 
French Polynesia and one in Wallis and Futuna. 
358  Again, and similar to what is stated in the previous footnote with regard to the National Assembly, 
every French overseas territory is attributed a certain share of the total senators to elected. The 
precise numbers and conditions can again be found in the Code électoral, as modified by Loi 
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their own right.  From the point of view of French constitutional law it is only normal then 
that they should also participate in elections to the European Parliament.   
 
The Netherlands, until recently, excluded nationals resident in the OCTs from the right to 
vote in European Parliamentary elections.  Since 2008 this is no longer the case.  It is 
useful for my analysis to study the recent changes of the Netherlands electoral law in some 
detail, as it is a clear example of a policy change directly caused by an ECJ judgment on 
Union citizenship, namely the Eman and Sevinger case.  In this respect, the recent changes 
can be compared to the changes in Irish legislation in the aftermath of the Zhu and Chen 
case.  Besides, the case of the Netherlands perfectly illustrates that the discretion of the 
Member States in determining the procedures for European Parliamentary elections is 
limited by Union law and it provides some insight into the extent of these limitations. 
 
ii) Case study: the Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands Electoral Law (“Kieswet”)359 was the subject of the dispute in the already 
quoted Eman and Sevinger case.360  At the time the case was brought, Article Y3a) of the 
Kieswet provided, with regard to elections to the European Parliament, that were entitled 
to vote361: “those who are entitled to vote in elections of members of the Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal (the Lower House of the Netherlands Parliament)362”.  Article Y3a) 
effectively referred to Article B1, which provided that363: 
 
“1. The members of the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal shall be elected by persons who 
are Netherlands nationals on the date on which candidates are nominated and have attained the 
age of 18 on the date of the election, with the exception of those who, on the date on which 
candidates are nominated, are actually resident in the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba. 
2. This exception shall not apply to: 
(a) Netherlands nationals who have been resident for at least 10 years in the 
Netherlands; 
(b) Netherlands nationals who work in the Netherlands public service in the 
Netherlands Antilles or Aruba, and their spouses, registered partners or cohabitants 
and children, provided that they live together with them.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
organique n° 2007-223 du 21 février 2007 portant dispositions statutaires et institutionnelles relatives 
à l'outre-mer, [2007] JORF. 
359  Wet van 28 september 1989, houdende nieuwe bepalingen inzake het kiesrecht en de verkiezingen. 
360  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055. For more details, see the case notes 
by Besselink in (2008) 45 CML Rev., 787-813 en in (2007) N.T.E.R., 64-71; Shaw in (2008) 4 
EuConst, 162-186; Claes in (2007) SEW, 216-221, Dawes in (2006) 3 R.D.U.E, 707-712 and 
Hervouët in (2006) R.A.E.-L.A.E., 565-570. 
361  I limit myself here to discussing the entitlement of Dutch nationals to vote in elections to the 
European Parliament, leaving aside for a moment the entitlement of other Union citizens to do so. 
The latter will be discussed under “phase 2”, infra. 
362  In the ECJ’s judgment in Eman and Sevinger (ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. 
I-8055, para. 15) this part of the Kieswet was translated as “those who are not Netherlands nationals 
and are who are entitled to vote in elections of members of the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal”. 
That translation is plainly wrong. The original sentence in Dutch reads: “degenen die kiesgerechtigd 
zijn voor de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal”, and this actually 
refers to “Dutch nationals”, rather than excluding them. Other language versions of the judgment 
provide a more accurate translation. The French version, for instance, reads: “ceux qui ont le droit de 
voter à l’élection des membres de la Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal”. 
363  Translation taken from ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 14. 
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It followed from these articles that Dutch nationals were generally speaking not entitled to 
vote in elections to the European Parliament if they were actually resident in the Dutch 
OCTs and had not previously been living in the Netherlands for at least ten years.  This 
meant in practice that Dutch OCT nationals were generally speaking not entitled to vote as 
long as they were resident in one of the OCTs, but became so entitled once they moved 
their residence to the Netherlands or to a third country.   
 
The applicants in Eman and Sevinger were two Dutch OCT nationals resident in Aruba, 
one of the Dutch OCTs.364  They submitted that their exclusion from the entitlement to 
vote in elections to the European Parliament infringed their rights under Article 22(2) 
TFEU.  The ECJ started its analysis by pointing out that the Treaty provisions relating to 
European Parliamentary elections365 do not, in accordance with the Leplat case law, apply 
to the OCTs and that the Member States are not required to hold elections to the European 
Parliament there.366  Article 22(2) TFEU and Directive 93/109 could not change anything 
with regard to this conclusion as they are not relevant to the issue of voting rights of Dutch 
OCT nationals in the Netherlands.367  Prima facie at least it was legitimate therefore to 
exclude Dutch nationals resident in the OCTs from participating in elections to the 
European Parliament.  Still the ECJ came to the conclusion that the Kieswet, in the version 
set out above, violated the principle of equal treatment.  The reason was not, it must be 
stressed, the choice of the Dutch legislator to exclude OCT nationals from elections to the 
European Parliament.  In this regard, the ECJ confirmed that it is fully legitimate to 
exclude certain categories of nationals on the basis of their residence.  The problem lay 
with the fact that the Kieswet conferred the right to vote in elections to the European 
Parliament on all Dutch nationals resident in a non-member country, but not on Dutch 
nationals resident in the Dutch OCTs.  This differential treatment could not be justified by 
the Netherlands,368 and therefore constituted a prohibited form of discrimination.369  
 
The foregoing illustrates one key point.  Union law does allow the Member States to 
exclude OCT nationals from the elections to the European Parliament, but not in a 
discriminatory way.  In the case of the Netherlands, different options were discussed in 
order to remedy the observed violation of Union law.370  One radical option would have 
                                                 
364  Both applicants are prominent Aruban politicians. Michiel Godfried Eman became in 2009 Aruba’s 
fifth Prime Minister, while Oslin Benito Sevinger became Minister of Integration, Infrastructure and 
Environment. See also: Eman, “Defending the Democratic Rights of EU Citizens Overseas: a 
Personal Story”, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated 
Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011), 433-437. 
365  Then Articles 189 TEC and 190 TEC. 
366  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 47. 
367  Ibid, para. 53 (Article 22(2) TFEU and Directive 93/109 concern only the voting rights of non-Dutch 
citizens of the Union residing in the Netherlands). 
368  It was not apt to ensure that only Dutch nationals who had or had had links with the Netherlands were 
entitled to  right to vote in and stand for elections to the European Parliament (ECJ, Case C-300/04 
Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, paras 59-60). 
369  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 61. 
370  Claes, "Zaak C-300/04, M.G. Eman en O.B. Sevinger t. College van burgemeester en wethouders van 
Den Haag en Zaak C-145/04 Koninkrijk Spanje t. Verenigd Koninkrijk van Groot-Brittanië en 
Noord-Ierland" (2007) SEW, 218; Besselink, "Nederlands postkoloniaal kiesrecht: het Europees 
Parlement en de Tweede Kamer" (2007) N.T.E.R., 70. See also the preparatory documents to the 
legislative proposal eventually adopted (Memorie van toelichting - Wijziging van de Kieswet in 
verband met het verlenen van het kiesrecht voor de verkiezing van de leden van het Europees 
Parlement aan alle Nederlanders die in de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba woonachtig zijn, Tweede 
Kamer, 2007-2008, 31 392, nr. 3).  
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been to change, through a declaration, the rules on Dutch nationality law for the purposes 
of Union law.371  This was never seriously considered.  That basically left the Dutch 
legislator with three options.  First of all, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament could be extended to Dutch nationals resident in the 
Dutch OCTs.  As a consequence, Dutch OCT nationals would no longer be excluded from 
participation in European Parliamentary elections.  Second, the right to vote and stand as a 
candidate could be restricted to Dutch nationals resident in the European Union.  That 
would come down to excluding Dutch nationals resident in the OCTs and in third 
countries.  A third option would be to grant the right to vote and stand as a candidate to all 
Dutch nationals who have been resident in the Netherlands for at least 10 years, 
irrespective of their place of residence, whether that is in Aruba, the Netherlands Antilles 
or a third country.  Such would exclude all Dutch nationals who have never lived in the 
Netherlands for a substantial period of time. 
 
The Dutch legislator has opted for the first possibility, by removing the residence based 
restrictions with regard to the right to vote in European Parliamentary elections.  After the 
amendments of the Kieswet in 2008,372 new Article Y3.a. provides that members of the 
European Parliament are elected by373: 
 
“persons who are Dutch nationals on the date on which candidates are nominated and have 
attained the age of 18 on the date of the election, with the exception of those who, have been 
deprived of their right to vote”. 
 
The consequence of this amendment is that Dutch nationals may now vote in European 
Parliamentary elections regardless of their place of residence. 374   However, to the 
difference of the French overseas territories, no voting takes place in the Dutch OCTs.  
Dutch OCT nationals who wish to vote are subject to the procedure for Dutch nationals 
voting from abroad which was already in place.  Accordingly, they have to register first 
and then vote per letter or via proxy or go to the Netherlands if they want to vote in 
person.375  This is different only in the BES islands, because they are, from the point of 
view of Dutch constitutional law, part of mainland Netherlands (see the discussion under 
II.A.1., supra).  Accordingly, European Parliamentary elections are organised there as in 
the rest of the Netherlands, which means that voting takes place in polling stations in the 
Islands.376 
 
The Dutch OCTs do not form a separate electoral constituency with separate candidate 
lists.  Consequently, unlike French OCT nationals, Dutch OCT nationals are not 
guaranteed a fixed number of representatives in the European Parliament.  In fact, given 
the small number of inhabitants in the Dutch OCTs, only a very high turnout of voters, 
                                                 
371  See the discussion in Chapter 2, under II.A.3, supra. 
372  Wet van 30 oktober 2008 tot wijziging van de Kieswet in verband met het verlenen van het kiesrecht 
voor de verkiezing van de leden van het Europees Parlement aan alle Nederlanders die in de 
Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba woonachtig zijn, [2008] Stb., 475. 
373  My own translation as far as Y.3.a. is concerned. Translation of Y.3.b., which was not modified in 
2008, taken over from ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 15. 
374  The possibility to stand as a candidate for European Parliamentary elections existed already before 
2008. 
375  Registration is possible in Aruba, Curaçao or Sint Maarten or directly with the burgemeester en 
wethouders (“mayor and municipal executive”) of The Hague (Articles D.3 and Y.5a of the Kieswet).  
376  See the amendments of the Kieswet by Wet van 17 mei 2010 tot wijziging van de Kieswet in verband 
met de nieuwe staatsrechtelijke positie van Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba als openbaar lichaam 
binnen Nederland, [2010] Stb. 347. 
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who would moreover all vote for the same political party, would guarantee them one of the 
currently 25 seats for the Netherlands in the European Parliament. 377   It seems very 
unlikely that this situation will ever occur, given the lack of interest for European affairs in 
the OCTs,378 which is perfectly illustrated by the low turnout in the Dutch OCTs in the 
2009 elections for the European Parliament.379  All the same, this does not take away the 
fact that the votes cast in the OCTs can have a determinate influence on the candidates 
eventually elected, now that voting is done on the basis of one list of candidates for 
Netherlands MEP positions. 
 
The bottom-line is that, in line with my findings above, Member States like the 
Netherlands are competent to determine the scope and definition of the persons entitled to 
vote and to stand for elections to the European Parliament, on condition that this 
competence is exercised in compliance with Union law.  In particular, Member States must 
respect the “general principles of Union law”, such as the principle of equal treatment, as 
is neatly illustrated by the Eman and Sevinger case, and fundamental rights. 380   To 
illustrate the last point: one could wonder whether the Kieswet, in the version contested in 
Eman and Sevinger, which excluded certain categories of Dutch nationals from 
participating in European Parliamentary elections on the basis of their residence, was 
compatible with fundamental rights.  The ECJ in Eman and Sevinger concluded that it 
was.  It pointed out, under reference to a recent case of the ECtHR,381 that a criterion of 
residence in relation to the right to vote was not contrary to the ECHR.382  However, as 
was remarked by AG Tizzano, 383  the ECtHR had explained that residence may be a 
legitimate criterion, because it allows to grant the right to vote only to “those with 
sufficiently continuous or close links to […] the country concerned”, i.e. those “directly 
affected by the acts of the political bodies” to be elected.  Accordingly, the exclusion of 
OCT nationals would be in accordance with this case law if Dutch OCT nationals were not 
directly affected by the measures adopted by the European Parliament, to the difference of 
Dutch nationals resident in Europe.  The ECJ was of the opinion that this was the case.384  
                                                 
377  Memorie van toelichting - Wijziging van de Kieswet in verband met het verlenen van het kiesrecht 
voor de verkiezing van de leden van het Europees Parlement aan alle Nederlanders die in de 
Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba woonachtig zijn, Tweede Kamer, 2007-2008, 31 392, nr. 3, 4 
(estimating the turnout needed at 85% of the persons entitled to vote). 
378  On the ambivalent attitude of OCT inhabitants towards the EU, see Muller, “Europe as a Pacific 
Power”, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas. Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas 
Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2011), 341-361; Muller, “Problems of European Union Citizenship Rights at the Periphery” (1999) 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 48; Muller, “European Union Citizenship Rights Divisible 
and Indivisible: The dissonance between nationality laws and regional identity” (1998) Current 
Politics and Economics of Europe, 4.  
379  According to the figures available form the Kiesraad (“Election Council”), of the circa 210.000 
persons entitled to vote, only 20.944 validly registered. See “Uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden 
van het Europees Parlement van 4 juni 2009. Deel 1. Kerngegevens”, available at 
http://www.kiesraad.nl/nl/Overige_Content/Bestanden/pdf_thema/Kerngegevens_2009.pdf.  
380  Fundamental rights are general principles of Union law, protected by the Union Courts. See already 
e.g. ECJ, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] E.C.R. 419, para. 7. 
381  ECtHR, Judgment of 19 October 2004 in Case No. 17707/02, Melnychenko v. Ukraine, para. 56. 
382  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 54. 
383  Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-145/04 and C-300/04 Spain v United Kingdom; Eman and 
Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-7917, paras 156 et seq. 
384  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 48. The ECJ, referring to 
Matthews (ECtHR, Judgment of 18 February 1999 in Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v. United 
Kingdom), pointed out that it was not sufficient in this context that Union measures have an indirect 
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This point of view can however be questioned on good grounds (see the discussion under 
III.C.1.c., infra). 
 
b) Phase 2: enlarging the personal scope 
 
It was explained above that the scope of the election procedure to the European Parliament 
organised in each Member State is largely determined by national law, which has to be in 
accordance with (the general principles of) Union law.  Moreover, and this is what I called 
higher the “second phase”, it has to be in accordance with Article 22(2) TFEU.  That 
Article, and Directive 93/109385 adopted on the basis thereof, oblige the Member States to 
enlarge the scope of the election procedure, as determined in accordance with the 
provisions of “phase 1”,386 so as to include “every citizen of the Union residing in that 
Member State, but who is not a national of that Member State”.387  These Union citizens 
“shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European 
Parliament in that Member State, under the same conditions as nationals of that State”.388 
 
This is, of course, a significant enlargement of the group of persons entitled to participate 
in European Parliamentary elections.  At the same time it should be stressed that Article 
22(2) TFEU does not confer rights on every Union citizen, unlike for example Article 21 
TFEU.  First of all, it cannot be invoked by citizens who reside in a Member State of 
which they are a national.  As AG Tizzano remarked in Eman and Sevinger:  
 
“In the present case, however, those claiming voting rights are Netherlands citizens who reside 
in the Kingdom of the Netherlands (or, rather, in one of the territorial divisions of that 
Kingdom), that is to say persons who reside in the State of which they are citizens. Those 
people therefore have no right to invoke [Article 22(2) TFEU]...” 389 
 
Secondly, it would seem to be the case that Article 22(2) TFEU cannot be invoked by 
Union citizens who are resident in a third country, i.e. not in a Member State of which they 
are a national nor in any other Member State.  For example, under the Kieswet, Dutch 
nationals have the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament even when resident in a third country.  It is quite clear that the Dutch legislator 
                                                                                                                                                   
impact in the OCTs, and that it is necessary for such measures affect the population there in the same 
way as measures adopted by the local legislative assembly. 
385  Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the 
exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for 
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1993] O.J. 
L329/34. 
386  It must be remarked in this regard that Article 22(2) TFEU explicitly states that it is “without 
prejudice to Article 223(1) and to the provisions adopted for its implementation”, confirming that it 
produces its effects only in a “second phase”. 
387  See, on the implementation in the different Member States during the 2009 elections, Commission 
Report on the election of Members of the European Parliament (1976 Act as amended by Decision 
2002/772/EC, Euratom) and on the participation of European Union citizens in elections for the 
European Parliament in the Member State of residence (Directive 93/109/EC), COM(2010) 605/2. 
388  See further Article 3 of Directive 93/109, which states that any person who, on the reference date: (a) 
is a Union citizen and (b) is not a national of the Member State of residence, but satisfies the same 
conditions in respect of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate as that State imposes by law on 
its own nationals, shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament. 
389  Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-145/04 and C-300/04 Spain v United Kingdom; Eman and 
Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-7917, para. 143. 
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cannot be forced to extend the same right to other Union citizens resident in a third 
country.  The Netherlands electoral law quite rightly therefore does not extend this right to 
Union citizens of other Member States resident in third countries.390 
 
The difficulty with regard to the OCTS is that it is not immediately clear whether they 
should be considered in this context as Member States, meaning that Article 22(2) TFEU 
applies, or as third countries, meaning that Article 22(2) TFEU is inapplicable to them.  
Obviously this issue is only relevant where nationals of the associated Member State 
resident in the OCTs enjoy the right to participate in European Parliamentary elections.  
Indeed, where Member States exclude nationals resident in the OCTs from the franchise of 
European Parliamentary elections, the status of OCTs for the purposes of Article 22 TFEU 
is of purely theoretical interest.  In such a case, even if Article 22(2) TFEU applied, it 
would not have any effect with regard to Union citizens from other Member States resident 
in the OCTs in question.  They would in any event not be entitled to participate in 
elections to the European Parliament.391  Such logically follows from the principle of equal 
treatment, of which Article 22(2) TFEU is a particular expression.   
 
Higher I explained that, at present, two Member States confer the right to participate in 
European Parliamentary elections on their nationals resident in the OCTs which are part of 
their territory, namely France and the Netherlands.  For this reason, the question regarding 
the status of OCTs for the purposes of Article 22(2) TFEU is not of a purely theoretical 
interest.  If Article 22(2) TFEU applies to the OCTs, then it requires that non-French 
citizens of the Union residing in one of the French OCTs get the right to vote and stand in 
elections to the European Parliament under the same conditions as French citizens resident 
in the OCTs.  Likewise, non-Dutch citizens of the Union residing in one of the Dutch 
OCTs should in that case be entitled to vote and stand in elections to the European 
Parliament under the same conditions as Dutch citizens resident in the OCTs.   
 
The question as to the applicability of Article 22(2) TFEU can, again, be answered in two 
ways.  Under the traditional approach outlined above it has to be answered in the negative, 
since Article 22(2) TFEU is, in accordance with the Leplat case law, not among the 
provisions applicable to the OCTs.392  Accordingly, a Union citizen resident in an OCT 
cannot be considered to be “residing in a Member State of which he is not a national” 
under Article 22(2) TFEU.  It follows that Member States like France or the Netherlands 
are not obliged under Union law to extend the right to participate in elections to the 
European Parliament to nationals from other Member States residing in the OCTs, even 
though they are in any event allowed to do so.   
 
                                                 
390  Articles Y.3 (right to vote) and Y.4 (right to stand as a candidate) only cover citizens from other 
Member States who are actually resident in the Netherlands. 
391  The example of the UK illustrates this point. Since British nationals resident in the British overseas 
may generally speaking not vote for European Parliamentary elections, the same is true for other 
Union citizens resident in the British OCTs (see the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 
(c.24), Article 8(5), referring to the European Parliamentary Elections (Franchise of Relevant 
Citizens of the Union) Regulations). By contrast, Union citizens in Gibraltar may participate in 
European Parliamentary elections, just as British nationals (and QCCs) resident there: see s 16(1) of 
the European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003.  
392  See Kochenov, "The Puzzle of Citizenship and Territory in the EU: On European Rights Overseas" 
(2010) 17 MJ, 249. 
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The Netherlands electoral law is fully in line with this first view.  Article Y3.b. provides 
that the Members of the European Parliament are to be elected by393: 
 
“persons who are not Netherlands nationals and are nationals of other Member States of the 
European Union, provided that they: 
1°. are actually resident in the European part of the Netherlands on the date on which 
candidates are nominated, 
2°. have attained the age of 18 on the date of the election, and  
3°. have not been deprived of their right to vote in the Netherlands or in the Member State 
of which they are nationals.” 
 
Accordingly, Union citizens from other Member States can only vote in European 
Parliamentary elections if they are actually resident in the Netherlands, i.e. the European 
territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  They do not have this right if they are 
actually resident in one of the Dutch OCTs, unlike Dutch citizens resident in one of the 
Dutch OCTs, who do enjoy this right since the 2008 amendments (see the discussion under 
III.C.1.a., supra).  In fact, the 2008 amendments did not change anything with regard to 
the voting rights of Union citizens from other Member States resident in the OCTs.  This is 
not wholly surprising.  After all, the 2008 amendments were introduced in order to remedy 
the infringement of Union law exposed in Eman and Sevinger and, as I remarked higher, 
that case was only concerned with the voting rights of different categories of Dutch 
nationals and not with alleged violations of Article 22(2) TFEU.  Moreover, it must be 
remarked that the solution chosen was to extend the pre-existing arrangements for voting 
in third countries to Dutch nationals resident in the OCTs.  These arrangements have never 
been applicable to Union citizens from other Member States.  Apparently, the Netherlands 
legislator did not feel compelled by Article 22(2) TFEU to extend the newly granted 
voting rights for Dutch nationals resident in the Dutch OCTs to other citizens of the Union 
resident there.  It was most likely of the view that Article 22(2) TFEU simply did not apply 
ratione loci to the OCTs, in line with the Leplat case law, although any discussion of this 
issue in the preparatory acts to the 2008 amending legislation is lacking.  This is again 
confirmed by the recent replacement of the expression “the Netherlands” by “the European 
part of the Netherlands” in Article Y.3, sub 1° of the Netherlands electoral law. 394  
Without this change, Union citizens from other Member States resident in the BES Islands 
would now also have the right to vote in European Parliamentary elections, since the BES 
Islands are now part of the territory of the Netherlands.  Accordingly, the Netherlands 
legislator continues to exclude Union citizens resident in the Dutch OCTs from the right to 
vote in European Parliamentary elections.  The preparatory documents to the recent 
amendment explain in regard that Article 22(2) TFEU does not entail any obligations with 
regard to non-Dutch citizens of the Union resident in the OCTs.395 
 
A second possible answer to the question asked above would be that Article 22(2) TFEU is 
applicable to the OCTs.  A number of arguments can be adduced in support of this view.  
As a preliminary observation one could point out that it has never been confirmed in the 
                                                 
393  Translation of Article Y.3.b. in most part taken over from ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger 
[2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 15, with the exception of the recent amendments explained below (my 
own translation). 
394  Wet van 17 mei 2010 tot wijziging van de Kieswet in verband met de nieuwe staatsrechtelijke positie 
van Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba als openbaar lichaam binnen Nederland, [2010] Stb. 347, Article 
H. 
395  Memorie van toelichting bij Wijziging van de Kieswet in verband met de nieuwe staatsrechtelijke 
positie van Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba als openbaar lichaam binnen Nederland, Tweede Kamer, 
2008-2009, 31 956, nr. 3, at 7.5. 
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case law of the Union Courts that Article 22(2) TFEU is not applicable to the OCTS.  
True, the Leplat case law was recently confirmed in Eman and Sevinger, a case concerning 
precisely the right of OCT nationals to participate in elections to the European Parliament.  
However, in that case Article 22(2) TFEU was not applicable.396  The ECJ only confirmed 
Leplat with regard to Articles 189 and 190 TEC.  Those articles, however, concern the 
“first phase” in the determination of the scope of Article 22(2) TFEU.  One could go 
further, and argue that the Leplat reasoning does not hold good with regard to Article 22(2) 
TFEU.  The reason is that, as explained at length above, the territorial scope of Article 
22(2) TFEU is determined essentially by national law.  Therefore, the expression “residing 
in a Member State…” should be interpreted with reference to national law, and not with 
regard to Union law.  This seems to be confirmed by Directive 93/109.397  That directive 
specifies that Union citizens, in order to be entitled to vote in their Member State of 
residence, have to reside in the “electoral territory” of that Member State (Article 9(2)a)).  
The “electoral territory” is defined as “the territory of a Member State in which, in 
accordance with the 1976 Act and, within that framework, in accordance with the electoral 
law of that Member State, members of the European Parliament are elected by the people 
of that Member State” (Article 2(2)).  As pointed out above, the 1976 Act does not in fact 
define its territorial scope of application with any specificity, leaving this largely to the 
Member States.  It follows that the “electoral territory” must be defined in accordance with 
the electoral law of the Member States.   
 
In the case of France, the “electoral territory” indubitably includes the French OCTs (see 
under III.C.1.a., supra).  Following the foregoing reasoning, this means that Article 22(2) 
TFEU and Directive 93/109 are applicable to Union citizens resident in the French OCTs.  
The French legislator apparently adheres to this view.  In order to implement Directive 
93/109/EC, the French law of 1977 on the elections to the European Parliament398 was 
changed significantly by a law of 1994.399  The most important provision of the latter law 
is without any doubt Article 1, which provides that nationals from other Member States 
residing on the French territory can vote in elections to the European Parliament under the 
same conditions as French citizens.  Similarly, in its Article 3 the law provides that 
nationals from other Member States resident in France can stand as a candidate under the 
same conditions as French citizens.  “Resident in France/residing on the French territory” 
in these provisions has to be understood as including the French OCTS because of the 
constitutional principle of the indivisibility of the Republic.  This is moreover explicitly 
confirmed by Article 9 of the 1994 law, which states that its provisions are applicable to 
the French OCTs. 
 
In the case of the Netherlands, the case is less clear-cut because it is not immediately clear 
whether the Dutch OCTs form part of the “electoral territory”.  In this regard, a distinction 
must be made between the BES islands, on the one hand, and the other Dutch OCTs, 
namely Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten, on the other hand.  As I explained higher, no 
voting for European Parliamentary elections takes place in the second group of OCTs and 
                                                 
396  See the discussion, supra.   
397  Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the 
exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for 
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1993] O.J. 
L329/34. 
398  Loi n°77-729 du 7 juillet 1977 relative à l’élection des représentants au Parlement européen. 
399  Loi n° 94-104 du 5 février 1994 relative à l'exercice par les citoyens de l'Union européenne résidant 
en France du droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux élections au Parlement européen [1994] JORF, 2154. 
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Dutch nationals resident there who wish to cast their vote must register with the authorities 
from mainland Netherlands and cast their vote in the Netherlands, either by physically 
going to the Netherlands (in person or via proxy) or by having their ballot sent to the 
Netherlands.  Consequently, it is arguable that these OCTs are not part of the territory in 
which “members of the European Parliament are elected by the people of that Member 
State”.  Not unimportant in this regard is that the new voting arrangements are laid down 
in an ordinary law (wet), enacted by the Netherlands, rather than in a rijkswet, enacted by 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands.400  This would seem to confirm that these arrangements 
concern the European territory of the Netherlands only.  Moreover, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands does not have a constitutional principle of indivisibility.  This is clearly 
illustrated by the fact that Dutch nationals resident in the second group of OCTs cannot 
participate in elections to the Lower House of the Netherlands Parliament. 401   These 
arguments do not hold good, however, for the BES islands.  In these islands, voting for the 
European Parliament is organised like in the rest of the Netherlands and, hence, they 
should be considered part of the territory in which “members of the European Parliament 
are elected”.  Moreover, they are indisputably a full part of the territory of the Netherlands, 
as is illustrated by the fact that Dutch citizens resident in the BES Islands have full voting 
rights in elections to the Netherlands Parliament.  In my view, the reference to national law 
for the definition of the electoral territory can in the case of the Netherlands only lead to 
one conclusion, namely that the BES Islands should be considered part of that territory.   
 
Another strong argument for taking the view that the territorial scope of Article 22(2) 
TFEU includes the territory of the OCTs is that such is fully in line with the aim pursued 
by that Treaty provision, namely to eliminate discrimination between nationals and non-
nationals in elections to the European Parliament.  Indeed, taking this view leads to the 
conclusion that if, for instance, French citizens can vote in the French OCTs, other Union 
citizens should also be allowed to do so, under the same conditions.  At the end of the day 
Union citizenship is intended to enable Union citizens to integrate better in the host 
Member State. 402   This aim could not be achieved if they were precluded from 
participating in European elections under the same conditions as nationals of the host 
Member State.  Against this second argument, it could be argued that, since only very 
limited parts of Union law are applicable to the OCTs, voting rights for the European 
Parliament do not have a large impact on the possibilities for integration in the OCTs.  
This is precisely one of the reasons why Member States may exclude nationals resident in 
the OCTs from the franchise of elections to the European Parliament.  Yet, as I will argue 
                                                 
400  This is a contentious issue that has given rise to a heated debate in the Netherlands parliament, in 
particular after a notable Dutch constitutional scholar defended the view that the amendments 
adopted by ordinary law were unconstitutional. See Hoogers, “Waartoe is de Nederlandse wetgever 
bevoegd? De wijziging van de Kieswet in verband met de zaak Eman-Sevinger” (2008) 83 N.J.b., 
1934. 
401  See Article B1 of the Netherlands electoral law, which is set out supra. This exclusion was 
unsuccessfully challenged by Mr. Eman and Mr. Sevinger before the Netherlands Council of State 
and the ECtHR. See the discussion in Besselink, "Case C-145/04, Spain v United Kingdom, judgment 
of the Grand Chamber of 12 September 2006; Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger, judgment of the 
Grand Chamber of 12 September 2006; ECtHR (Third Section), 6 September 2007, Applications 
Nos. 17173/07 and 17180/07, Oslin Benito Sevinger and Michiel Godfried Eman v. the Netherlands 
(Sevinger and Eman)"" (2008) 45 CML Rev., 797 et seq. 
402  See the preamble to Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed 
arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not 
nationals, [1993] O.J. L329/34. 
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below,403 the influence of Union law on the OCTs and, hence, the role played by the 
European Parliament with regard to the situation of the OCTs is increasing and can be 
expected to further increase.  Besides, the fact that Member States like the Netherlands and 
France have accorded their OCT nationals the right to vote in European Parliamentary 
elections, implies that the European Parliament does indeed have a real influence on their 
position.  Accordingly, the exclusion of other Union citizens from this right does, 
arguably, hamper their integration in the OCT of their residence to some extent.  On this 
basis too it could be argued that the exclusion of non-Dutch citizens of the Union resident 
in the BES Islands from the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament is not in 
accordance with Article 22(2) TFEU. 
 
Of course, one could point out that even if Article 22(2) TFEU is held to apply to the 
OCTs, certain forms of discriminatory treatment of Union citizens would remain in place.  
First of all, Union citizens resident in the British or Danish OCTs would not be entitled to 
participate in European Parliamentary elections, in contrast to Union citizens residing in 
the Dutch or French OCTs.404  However, this differential treatment results purely from 
different choices made by the British and Danish legislator regarding their respective 
OCTs, choices which Union law currently accommodates.405  It does not constitute a form 
of discrimination based on nationality, because in all OCTs all Union citizens are given the 
same treatment: they can either vote or they cannot, irrespective of their nationality.  This 
contrasts sharply with the situation set out above in which only Dutch citizens can vote in 
the elections to the European Parliament organised in the Dutch OCTs and not other Union 
citizens residing there.  Another form of discriminatory treatment which would continue to 
exist relates to the possibilities for participating in European Parliamentary elections for 
Member State nationals resident in third countries.  As was explained above, a Member 
State may choose to grant these rights to its own nationals, but is not obliged under Article 
22(2) TFEU to extend it to nationals of other Member States.  However, with regard to 
third countries the aim to allow integration in the host Member State obviously does not 
apply.  Furthermore, as was remarked by the Commission in Eman and Sevinger, there is a 
particularly strong reason to apply the principle of non-discrimination to citizens resident 
in the OCTs, given the “particular connection between the OCTs and the [Union]”.406  In 
conclusion, the fact that even if Article 22(2) TFEU is applied to the OCTs certain forms 
of discrimination between Union citizens will continue to exist, is not such as to call into 
question the second view set out above. 
 
                                                 
403  See under III.C.1.c., infra. 
404  See the observations of the appellants in the main proceedings in ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and 
Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 33 (pointing out that in the then applicable legal framework the 
right to participate in European Parliamentary elections for Dutch Antilleans differed according to 
whether they lived in the French part of Saint-Martin or the Dutch part (Sint Maarten). That example 
is not completely a case in point, as Saint-Martin is an outermost region and not an OCT. 
405  As was explicitly acknowledged by the ECJ in ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] 
E.C.R. I-8055, para. 50. According to settled case law, the prohibition on discrimination is not 
concerned with any disparities in treatment which may result, between the Member States, from 
divergences existing between the legislation of the various Member States so long as that legislation 
affects equally all persons subject to it (see, e.g., ECJ, Case C-177/94 Perfilli [1996] E.C.R. I-161, 
para. 17; ECJ, Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] E.C.R. I-6421, para. 34; ECJ, Case C-428/07 Horvath 
[2009] E.C.R. I-06355, para. 55. 
406  ECJ, Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, para. 39.  
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c) Towards more inclusion of OCT nationals? 
 
The foregoing makes clear that, in the present state of Union law, the extent to which OCT 
nationals enjoy the right to participate in elections to the European Parliament to a very 
large degree depends on choices made by the Member States.  Member States seem free to 
decide whether they allow their nationals resident in the OCTs to participate in these 
elections and, if so, to decide whether to extend this entitlement to nationals from other 
Member States resident in their OCTs or not.  Admittedly, this choice is limited by certain 
limitations deriving from Union law, but these limitations do not really “bite” in the sense 
that they would oblige Member States to extend voting rights to OCT nationals.  It is 
universally accepted that the four Member States possessing OCTs can legitimately 
exclude Union citizens resident in the OCTs from the right to participate in European 
Parliamentary elections.  Two of them, namely the UK en Denmark continue to do so.  
Moreover, there is a widespread view that Article 22(2) TFEU does not apply to the OCTs 
and that, consequently, Member States may reserve the right to participate in European 
Parliamentary elections to their own nationals resident in the OCTs, to the exclusion of 
Union citizens from other Member States.  
 
Yet there are good arguments to question the tenability of the conclusions reached in the 
previous paragraph.  First of all, the possibility to exclude OCT nationals from the 
franchise of elections to the European Parliament is in large part based on the assumption 
that Union law only very partially applies to the OCTs and that the European Parliament 
therefore has only a very limited influence on the lives of OCT inhabitants.  This brought 
the ECJ in Eman and Sevinger to conclude that the European Parliament cannot be 
regarded as a “legislature” within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR in 
relation to the OCTs.407  The ECJ observed in this regard that only limited provisions of 
Union law directly apply to the OCTs and that any indirect impact of Union law, for 
instance through voluntary adoption by the OCT authorities, is not sufficient for them to 
be regarded as affecting the population of the OCTs in the same way as measures 
emanating from a local legislative assembly.408  Accordingly, the exclusion of nationals 
resident in the OCTs from the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament does 
not, according to the ECJ, pose problems under the ECHR.   
 
Yet, it cannot be ignored that the European Parliament does play a role in adopting the 
laws applicable to the OCTs.  Very significant in this connection is that, since the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 203 TFEU, which sets out the decision-making 
procedure for adopting OCT Decisions, provides for the consultation of the European 
Parliament. 409  Besides, it must be acknowledged that there is a trend towards wider 
applicability of the Union acquis in the OCTs and this trend will most likely be enforced 
under the new OCT decision, as is clear from recent Commission documents.410  It is clear 
that many of the rules falling under that acquis are adopted by the European Parliament, 
which is a full-blown co-legislator under the “ordinary legislative procedure”.   
                                                 
407  Article 3 of Protocol No 1 provides: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the 
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. 
408  ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, paras 48-49. 
409  A point also made by Omarjee, "Les statuts constitutionnels des ressortissants des outre-mers", in 
Tesoka and Ziller (eds.), Union européenne et outre-mers: Unis dans leur diversité (Aix-en-
Provence, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marselle, 2008), 66. 
410  See n. 187 and 188 and the accompanying text.  
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On the basis of these observations, it can be questioned whether the assumption of only a 
very limited and indirect influence of the European Parliament on the OCTs is still valid.  
Once this assumption falls through, significant doubts are shed on the tenability of 
excluding OCT nationals from the franchise of European Parliamentary elections.  Not 
without significance in this regard is the recent choice of the Netherlands to extend voting 
rights to Dutch nationals resident in the OCTs.  In the preparatory act to the 2008 
amendment the Dutch legislator noted that it could remedy the discrimination exposed also 
by limiting voting rights, for instance to those nationals resident in the Netherlands.  It 
chose, however, conversely, to extend voting rights to all its nationals, regardless of their 
place of residence, thereby stating that such extension does justice to the fact that most 
inhabitants of the Dutch OCTs are “not just Dutch citizens, but also citizens of the 
Union”.411  As a result, Member State nationals resident in the OCTs are now entitled to 
vote in elections to the European Parliament in two of the four Member States possessing 
OCTs. 
 
Second, I have argued higher that there are good reasons for considering that Article 22(2) 
TFEU does apply to the OCTs ratione loci.  Accordingly if a Member State decides to 
grant its nationals resident in the OCTs the right to participate in elections to the European 
Parliament – and there are compelling arguments in favour of doing so, as I just explained 
– then it should also extend this right to all other Union citizens there resident.  Put 
differently, the OCTs by that act become part of the “electoral territory” in which the non-
discrimination principle of Article 22(2) TFEU applies.  Only under this reading can the 
provision achieve its purpose, namely facilitating integration of Union citizens in the host 
Member State.  In this connection too, the growing influence of the European Parliament 
on the lives of Union citizens resident in the OCTs (also those who are not nationals of the 
associated Member State) makes it ever more difficult to justify their exclusion from the 
right to participate in European Parliamentary elections.  Viewed in this light, the choice of 
the Netherlands legislator not to extend the voting rights recently conferred on Dutch 
nationals resident in the OCTs to nationals from other Member States is regrettable.  It 
became even more regrettable after the recent change of status of the BES Islands to that 
of a public body.  Since Dutch law applies in full to the BES Islands, with some 
exceptions, Union law applies – through the intermediary of Dutch law – to a much wider 
extent than in other OCTs.  In my view, it is clear that the arrangements in place in the 
Dutch OCTs surrounding the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament are not 
in accordance with Article 22(2) TFEU.412 
 
My conclusion is that the right to participate in European Parliamentary elections should 
ideally be extended to the fullest extent possible to Union citizens resident in the OCTs.  In 
my view such is necessary in order to attain the full potential of the provisions on Union 
citizenship.  The right to participate in European Parliamentary elections is beyond dispute 
                                                 
411  Memorie van toelichting - Wijziging van de Kieswet in verband met het verlenen van het kiesrecht 
voor de verkiezing van de leden van het Europees Parlement aan alle Nederlanders die in de 
Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba woonachtig zijn, Tweede Kamer, 2007-2008, 31 392, nr. 3). 
412  This opinion is apparently shared by Mito Croes, former Minister Plenipotentiary of Aruba and noted 
scholar in the field of Dutch constitutional law in relation to the overseas territories (see, in particular, 
Croes, De herdefiniëring van het Koninkrijk (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006), 513 pp). See 
“CDA wil stemmen van Belgen op Antillen en Aruba” (NRC Handelsblad, 2 April 2009), available 
at 
http://www.nrc.nl/europa/article2201568.ece/CDA_wil_stemmen_van_Belgen_op_Antillen_en_Arub
a.  
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one of the core rights associated with Union citizenship and should be enjoyed by all 
Union citizens regardless of their place of residence.  This is true even though this right is 
not expressly laid down in the Treaties413 or the Charter.414  Indeed, it can be inferred from 
these provisions and from the essential democratic principles on which the Union is based, 
that all Union citizens should enjoy this right.415  The inherent link between the right to 
participate in European Parliamentary elections and Union citizenship is further 
exemplified by the new wording of Article 14(2) TEU, which no longer makes reference 
to “representatives of peoples of the States”, but instead to “representatives of the 
Union’s citizens”.416  Given the importance of enjoying the right, its exercise can only 
be made subject to conditions that are strictly necessary and duly justified.  A condition 
of not being actually and ordinary resident in the OCTs can, for reasons explained higher, 
not be duly justified.   
 
Accordingly I come to the conclusion that the correct reading of the citizenship provisions 
argues for a more inclusionary approach towards OCT nationals.  It can only be hoped that 
in the near future, this may induce the Member States concerned to further extend electoral 
rights to Union citizens, both nationals and non-nationals, resident in the OCTs.  The 
implementation of a new and closer association with the OCTs, currently envisaged by the 
Commission, might give them an impetus to do so. 
 
2. Municipal elections 
 
The above analysis focuses on Article 22(2) TFEU and the right of OCT nationals to 
participate in European Parliamentary elections.  The next question is whether the same 
reasoning can be applied with regard to municipal elections, in relation to Article 22(1) 
TFEU.  With regard to elections to the European Parliament, I observed that the conditions 
and procedure are mostly regulated by the Member States, which must respect (general 
principles of) Union law.  It was also shown that Article 22(2) TFEU produces its effect 
essentially in a “second phase”: it enlarges the scope of the European Parliamentary 
                                                 
413  As noted higher, Article 22(2) does not embody any right to vote or stand as a candidate in itself, but 
is rather a particular expression of the principle of non-discrimination in relation to these rights.  
414  Article 39(1) of the Charter states “Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate at elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, 
under the same conditions as nationals of that State”. In my view this has to be interpreted in very 
much the same way as Article 22(2) TFEU. 
415  Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-145/04 and C-300/04 Spain v United Kingdom; Eman and 
Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-7917, para. 69. This opinion is shared by legal scholars: see, e.g., Mehdi, 
"La Citoyenneté européenne", in Tesoka and Ziller (eds.), Union européenne et outre-mers: Unis 
dans leur diversité (Aix-en-Provence, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marselle, 2008), 38-40. See also 
the discussion in Nic Shuibhne, "The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship " (2010) 47 CML Rev., 
1621-1622. 
416  This cannot in my view be interpreted as meaning that only Union citizens may participate in 
elections to the European Parliament, but it does confirm that in principle all Union citizens should be 
entitled to do so. See in this connection Declaration (no 64), annexed to the Treaties, by the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the franchise for elections to the European 
Parliament, [2010] O.J. C83/358, in which the UK notes that Article 14 TFEU and other provisions 
of the Treaties are not intended to change the basis for the franchise for elections to the European 
Parliament. Obviously, such a declaration has a limited legal value (see the discussion in Chapter 2 
under III.A.3., supra). See also the discussion in Shaw, "Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the 
Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism", in Craig and De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU 
Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 600-603. 
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elections in each Member State, so as to include, under application of the same procedure 
and conditions, all Union citizens who reside in that Member State but who are not a 
national of that Member State. 
 
Prima facie at least, it would seem that much of that reasoning holds good with regard to 
Article 22(1) TFEU.  The idea behind Article 22(1) TFEU is the same as for Article 22(2) 
TFEU: it is an expression of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality 
with regard to the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal 
elections.417  In other words: it takes the conditions and procedures surrounding these 
elections as a given, and then comes “in second order”, and enlarges the scope of 
beneficiaries so as to include, under certain conditions, citizens from other Member States.  
It follows that, in order to determine the rights of OCT nationals under Article 22(1) 
TFEU, one must adopt an analysis consisting of two phases, just like under Article 22(2) 
TFEU.  However, for reasons discussed below, the reasoning cannot be completely 
analogous. 
 
a) Phase 1: national and EU provisions 
 
The procedure and conditions for municipal elections are determined in each Member 
State by national law.  To the difference of elections to the European Parliament, there are 
no Treaty provisions which directly regulate aspects of municipal elections.  Of course, 
this does not necessarily mean that Union law in no way influences the matter.  Quite to 
the contrary, one could assume that general principles of Union law will have to be 
respected by national legislators when regulating municipal elections, just like it is the case 
with regard to elections to the European Parliament (see supra, on Eman and Sevinger).  
 
However, there might be one relevant difference which casts doubts on that assumption.  It 
is certainly worth noting that in Eman and Sevinger the ECJ seems to have started from an 
implicit assumption that Union law was applicable to the situation at hand.  It was not 
completely obvious, however, that the situation fell within the scope of Union law.  One 
could have argued that the situation in that case, an alleged discrimination by the Dutch 
government between two groups of Dutch nationals which did not necessarily have any 
link with other Member States, constituted a purely internal situation.  Contrarily to certain 
other cases dealing with Union citizenship,418 the ECJ did not devote any attention to this 
issue and did not explain why Union law was applicable to the circumstances of the case.  
The reason for this is probably that the judgment concerned elections to the European 
Parliament, a fact which in itself most probably provides a sufficient link with Union 
law. 419   However, if the “linking factor” with regard to elections to the European 
                                                 
417 See the preamble to Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994 laying down detailed 
arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by 
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1994] O.J. 
L368/38. 
418  E.g. ECJ, Case C-224/98 D'Hoop [2002] E.C.R. I-6191; ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] 
E.C.R. I-9925; ECJ, Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] E.C.R. I-6947. See the discussion in Van 
Nuffel and Cambien, "De vrijheid van economisch niet-actieve EU-burgers om binnen de EU te 
reizen, te verblijven en te studeren" (2009) 57 SEW, 144-154. 
419  Shaw, "The Political Representation of Europe's Citizens" (2008) 4 EuConst, 184; Besselink, 
"Nederlands postkoloniaal kiesrecht: het Europees Parlement en de Tweede Kamer" (2007) N.T.E.R., 
68; Claes, "Zaak C-300/04, M.G. Eman en O.B. Sevinger t. College van burgemeester en wethouders 
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Parliament is to be found solely in the fact that it concerns elections to a European 
assembly, the analogy with municipal elections breaks down.  As a result, the participation 
in municipal elections in a given Member State by nationals of that Member State 
probably constitutes, in the absence of any other link with Union law, a purely internal 
situation.  It follows that the national legislator will probably not have to take general 
principles of Union law into account when laying down the conditions and procedures for 
such elections.  For example, a Dutch law that would confer the right to vote in municipal 
elections in the Netherlands on all Dutch nationals temporarily resident in a non-member 
country, but not on Dutch nationals temporarily resident in one of the OCTs would 
probably not violate Union law.420  Of course, all this does not detract from the fact that 
other, constitutional or international, general principles may well apply, restricting the 
legitimate choices of national legislator.  I refer to my discussion of purely internal 
situations under Article 21 TFEU.421 
 
Another relevant difference with elections to the European Parliament is that nationals of 
the associated Member State resident in the OCTs can normally participate in municipal 
elections there.  They are, so to say, the natural “vestees” of that right.422  Accordingly, the 
issue of whether an associated Member States should confer the right to participate in 
municipal elections on its nationals resident in the OCTs does simply not arise.  
Consequently, the “first stage” of the analysis takes much less importance than with regard 
to European Parliamentary elections. 
 
b) Phase 2: enlarging the personal scope 
 
The effect of Article 22(1) TFEU is very similar to that of Article 22(2) TFEU.  It obliges 
the Member States to enlarge the scope of the election procedure for municipal elections, 
as determined in accordance with the provisions of “phase 1”, so as to include “every 
citizen of the Union residing in that Member State, but who is not a national of that 
Member State”.  These citizens “shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at 
municipal elections in that Member State, under the same conditions as nationals of that 
State”.  Member States achieve this by implementing Directive 94/80.423 
 
Again, the question arises what consequences this has with regard to the rights of OCT 
nationals to participate in municipal elections.  Just like for Article 22(2) TFEU, it must be 
remarked that Article 22(1) TFEU does not confer rights on every Union citizen.  First of 
all, Union citizens resident in the Member State of which they are a national cannot invoke 
                                                                                                                                                   
van Den Haag en Zaak C-145/04 Koninkrijk Spanje t. Verenigd Koninkrijk van Groot-Brittanië en 
Noord-Ierland" (2007) SEW, 216.  
420  I take this hypothetical example to make a parallel with the facts that gave rise to the Eman and 
Sevinger case. This parallel does not hold completely, since one can assume that Dutch nationals 
resident in the OCTs could obtain the right to vote in municipal elections in the OCTs and would be 
in a different position, therefore, than Dutch nationals resident in a third country. For this reason, I 
refer to temporary residence in order to make the hypothetical example about non-OCT Dutch 
nationals that have supposedly no right to vote in OCT municipal elections. 
421  See under III.B.2.b.ii., supra. 
422  Compare with Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-145/04 and C-300/04 Spain v United 
Kingdom; Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-7917, para. 71. 
423  Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994 laying down detailed arrangements for the 
exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the 
Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1994] O.J. L368/38. 
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Article 22(1) TFEU.  This is important, because it means that that article does not have the 
effect of changing the conclusion reached above that the participation of nationals of a 
given Member State in municipal elections in that Member State constitutes a “purely 
internal situation”.  Article 22(1) TFEU does not apply to this situation, and cannot 
therefore be seen as a “linking factor” that brings this situation within the scope of Union 
law.  Secondly, Article 22(1) TFEU cannot be invoked by Union citizens who are not 
resident in any Member State.  The position with regard to third countries is very clear.  
Article 1(2) of Directive 94/80 states that “nothing in this Directive shall affect each 
Member State’s provisions concerning the right to vote or to stand as a candidate of its 
nationals who reside outside its territory”. 
 
However, the situation is less clear with regard to the OCTs.  As remarked above, it is not 
clear from the outset whether OCTs should be considered to be covered by the expression 
“Member State” for the purposes of Article 22 TFEU or not.  Again, two points of view 
are possible.  A first, straightforward point of view is to point out that Article 22(1) TFEU 
is, when applying the Leplat case law, not among the provisions applicable to the OCTs.424  
It follows that a non-national citizen of the Union resident in an OCT cannot be considered 
to be “residing in a Member State of which he is not a national”, and cannot therefore 
invoke the right under Union law to participate in the municipal elections in that OCT 
under the same conditions as nationals of the associated Member State.  Of course, this 
does not preclude Member States from extending the right to participate in municipal 
elections in the OCTs to citizens from other Member States residing there.  However, such 
extension then purely rests on a national decision and nationals from other Member States 
could not in that case invoke Union law in order to have it enforced.  
 
The first view finds confirmation, as far as the UK is concerned, in Directive 94/80 itself.  
The Annex to the Directive, which defines the entities to which the Directive applies, lists 
the following entities for the UK:  
 
“counties in England; counties, county boroughs and communities in Wales: regions and 
Islands in Scotland; districts in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland; London boroughs; 
parishes in England; the City of London in relation to ward elections for common councilmen” 
 
This clearly excludes municipal elections in the British OCTs.  The Netherlands legislator 
also adheres to the first view, as was confirmed in connection with the recent amendments 
of the Kieswet in relation to the recent change of status of the BES-islands.425  Before the 
changes, only Dutch nationals could vote in local council elections 
(“eilandsraadverkiezingen”) in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.  This remains the case 
in Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten.  In elections for the local councils (“eilandsraden”426) 
in the different BES Islands, by contrast, the Netherlands legislator has extended the right 
to vote to Union citizens after five years of residence in the BES islands.  This obviously 
goes some way towards guaranteeing non-discrimination between Union citizens.  At the 
same time, it is striking that Union citizens in the BES Islands are made subject to a five 
year residence condition, a condition which does not apply for Union citizens who want to 
                                                 
424  Kochenov, "The Puzzle of Citizenship and Territory in the EU: On European Rights Overseas" 
(2010) 17 MJ, 247. 
425  See the discussion under II.A.1., supra. 
426  Eilandsraden closely resemble gemeenteraden in the Netherlands. This is normal since the BES 
Islands now have the status of public body (“openbaar lichaam”), a status which is close to that of a 
Dutch municipality (”gemeente”).  
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vote in local council elections in mainland Netherlands.427  The Dutch legislator justifies 
this difference between voting rights for Union citizens in the Netherlands and in the BES 
Islands by stating that Article 22(1) TFEU and Directive 94/80 do not apply in the BES 
Islands, since they are OCTs for the purposes of Union law.428   
 
A second point of view is that Article 22(1) TFEU is applicable to the OCTs.  Largely the 
same arguments apply as the ones set out above.  First, the Leplat reasoning seems not to 
hold good with regard to Article 22(1) TFEU.  Just like in Article 22(2) TFEU, and for the 
same reasons as set out above, the expression “residing in a Member State…” should be 
interpreted with reference to national law.  This is, arguably, illustrated by the fact that 
Directive 94/80, for the definition of “basic local government unit” refers to the concepts 
as defined in the internal laws of the Member States.429  In some of the Member States, 
France in particular, this would seem to include the “basic local government units” in the 
OCTs.  In relation to France, this term is to be understood as referring to “commune” and 
“arrondissement dans les villes déterminées par la législation interne, section de 
commune”.430  It is clear, moreover, that a substantial number of the French communes are 
in the French overseas territories.431  As a consequence it would seem that Directive 94/80 
applies to the French Overseas territories.  In line with this expectation, the French law 
implementing Directive 94/80, which lays downs the conditions for the participation of 
Union citizens in French municipal elections, explicitly states that it applies to the French 
overseas territories.432   
 
Second, taking the view that the territorial scope of Article 22(1) TFEU must be held to 
cover the OCTs is fully in line with the aim pursued by that article: to eliminate 
discrimination between nationals and non-nationals in municipal elections.  The case for 
applying Article 22(1) TFEU to the OCTs is even stronger than the one for applying 
Article 22(2) TFEU.  Indeed, in relation to European Parliamentary elections it could be 
argued that, in view of the limited influence of the European Parliament on the lives of 
OCT inhabitants, excluding OCT nationals from elections to the European Parliament does 
not lead to factual discrimination with a tangible impact.  Above, I argued that there is 
some truth in this assumption, although I also argued that it is not tenable, certainly not in 
the long run given the increasing influence of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the OCTs 
                                                 
427  Compare Article B.3 and Article Y.a.14 of the Netherlands electoral law. The condition of five years 
residence applies for municipal elections only with regard to foreigners who are not Union citizens. 
428  Memorie van toelichting bij Wijziging van de Kieswet in verband met de nieuwe staatsrechtelijke 
positie van Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba als openbaar lichaam binnen Nederland, Tweede Kamer, 
2008-2009, 31 956, nr. 3, at 7.2. 
429  See Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 94/80 and the Annex to that directive. Article 2(1)(a) defines “basic 
local government unit” as “the administrative entities listed in the Annex which, in accordance with 
the laws of each Member State, contain bodies elected by direct universal suffrage and are 
empowered to administer, at the basic level of political and administrative organization, certain local 
affairs on their own responsibility”. 
430  See the Annex to Directive 94/80. 
431  See the Code des collectivités d'outre-mer (COM), Articles. 97-5 et seq. 
432  See Loi organique n°98-404 du 25 mai 1998 déterminant les conditions d'application de l'article 88-3 
de la Constitution relatif à l'exercice par les citoyens de l'Union européenne résidant en France, autres 
que les ressortissants français, du droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux élections municipales, et portant 
transposition de la directive 94/80/CE du 19 décembre 1994. See further Article 88-3 of the French 
Constitution providing: “Sous réserve de réciprocité et selon les modalités prévues par le Traité sur 
l'Union européenne signé le 7 février 1992, le droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux élections municipales 
peut être accordé aux seuls citoyens de l'Union résidant en France”. “Resident in France” is to be read 
as including the OCTs, for reasons explained above. 
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and their inhabitants.  As for municipal elections, there can be no doubt that municipal 
councils have a real impact on the daily lives of OCT inhabitants.  Hence, the exclusion of 
Union citizens from other Member States resident in the OCTs from the right to participate 
in municipal elections certainly leads to discrimination with a tangible impact which 
hampers their integration in the host society of the OCT.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Union citizens enjoy important electoral rights, namely the right to participate, under 
certain conditions, in European Parliamentary and municipal elections.  Yet, in relation to 
OCT nationals the enjoyment of this right appears to be subject to two important 
limitations.  First of all, the relevant Treaty provisions appear to leave it to the Member 
States to decide whether they grant these rights to Union citizens resident in the OCTs, as 
long as general principles of Union law are complied with.  Accordingly, both the UK and 
Denmark continue to exclude OCT nationals from the right to participate in European 
Parliamentary elections.  Second, there is a widely shared view that Member States may 
decide to grant these rights to their own OCT nationals only, to the exclusion of Union 
citizens from other Member States resident in the OCTs.  Accordingly, even after the 
recent amendments, the Netherlands electoral law reserves the right to participate in 
European Parliamentary elections to Dutch OCT nationals.  Similarly, only Dutch OCT 
nationals may participate in municipal elections in Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. 
 
In my view, the time has come to reject these traditional views and adopt a more 
inclusionary approach towards OCT nationals.  Given the tangible and increasing 
influence of the European Parliament on the lives of OCT nationals and the evolution 
towards greater application of Union law in the OCTs, it is no longer defensible to exclude 
OCT nationals from the right to participate in European Parliamentary elections.  
Moreover, there is no good justification for allowing Member States to reserve the 
enjoyment of electoral rights in the OCTs to their own nationals.  Article 22(1) and (2) 
TFEU, which embody the principal of equal treatment, can only achieve their purpose if 
they are held to be applicable ratione loci to the OCTs.  The application of Article 22 
TFEU in the OCTs is necessary in order to realise the full potential of the provisions on 
Union citizenship and of the association with the OCTs.  Higher I employed similar 
reasoning to conclude that Article 21 TFEU should be applicable, to a limited extent, to 
the OCTs.  One can conclude that large similarities exist between Article 21 and 22 TFEU, 
even in spite of the apparent big differences between them.  This conclusion is to be 
welcomed, because Article 22 TFEU is and should be seen as the corollary of the rights 
mentioned in Article 21 TFEU.433 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
433  See the preamble to Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed 
arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not 
nationals, [1993] O.J. L329/34 and the preamble to Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 
1994 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they 
are not nationals, [1994] O.J. L368/38. 
Chapter 3: OCTs and Union citizenship 
 202
Three important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis of the dynamics 
behind OCTs and the provisions on Union citizenship.  First, those citizens resident in the 
OCTs who have the nationality of one of the Member States are full-blown Union citizens, 
unless that Member State submits a declaration providing differently.  At present, all 
Danish, Dutch and French nationals and most British nationals living in the OCTs are 
Union citizens therefore.  Hence, they fully enjoy all rights and are subject to all duties 
attached to that status.  However, as far as the enjoyment of these rights is concerned, most 
OCT nationals find themselves in a somewhat peculiar situation.  The reason is that it is 
traditionally accepted that only limited parts of the Treaties apply to the OCTs and that the 
Union citizenship provisions are not in principle among them.  The consequence of this 
traditional view is that, while OCT nationals do enjoy citizenship rights, they cannot 
normally invoke them in the OCTs, because the latter are outside the geographical scope 
of the provisions embodying these rights.  However, as I have argued above, there are 
strong arguments for doing away with the said traditional assumption and holding that the 
provisions on Union citizenship apply to the OCTs, at least partially.  Such seems 
necessary to guarantee the full effectiveness of the provisions on Union citizenship, but 
also to protect and enhance the association between the Union and the OCTs (see also the 
third conclusion, below).  On these grounds I have argued that the free movement 
provisions, in particular Article 21 TFEU, should guarantee at least a right to travel from 
the OCTs to the (European) territory of the Member States.  On these grounds I have 
further argued that the Member States should extend the right to participate in European 
Parliamentary and municipal elections to the fullest extent possible to Union citizens 
resident in the OCTs, both nationals and non-nationals. 
 
A second, and immediately related conclusion is that the provisions on Union citizenship 
have had, and will most likely continue to have, a profound and significant impact on the 
policies of the Member States with regard to their OCTs.  This is clearly illustrated by the 
recent changes in the Netherlands electoral law, extending the right to vote in European 
Parliamentary elections to Dutch nationals resident in the Dutch OCTs.  This extension 
was explicitly motivated with reference to an important ECJ judgment on Union 
citizenship and to the fact that OCT nationals are full-blown Union citizens.  I refer to the 
detailed discussion above.  Another example of a change in legislation that, arguably, has 
been prompted by the provisions on Union citizenship is the British Overseas Territories 
Act 2002.  It was explained higher434 that this act has the effect of extending British 
citizenship, and hence Union citizenship, to most British nationals who were formerly 
British Overseas Territories Citizens (BOTCs), and hence not Union citizens.  It appears 
clearly from the preparatory acts and the debates before the Houses of Parliament435 that 
the provisions on Union citizenship were one of the key elements that were taken into 
account when drafting the new Bill.  On the one hand there was the insistence that the 
connection between Britain and BOTCs had to be strengthened and that BOTCs had to 
enjoy the same rights as British citizens.  Among the rights most prominently mentioned in 
this regard was the right to free movement within the European territory, a right associated 
with the status of Union citizen.  Interestingly, at one point in the debates before the House 
of Lords there was a proposed amendment phrased: “The rules governing Union 
citizenship and member states of the European [Union] shall not extend to British overseas 
                                                 
434  See under II.B.4.a.iv., supra. 
435  See, for the House of Lords: Hansard, Vol 626, Col 26; Vol 626, Cols 1014-1037; Vol 626, Cols 
1862-1895; Vol 627, Col 944; Vol 627, Cols 1299-1301; Vol 631, Cols 1319-1322. See, for the 
House of Commons, Hansard, Vol 375, Cols 477-546; Vol 380, Cols 270-283; Vol 380, Col 679. 
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territories citizens who claim British citizenship".436  Admittedly, this was only a probing 
amendment, but the discussion of it made clear how important considerations flowing 
from Union citizenship were in bringing about the proposed changes.  Baroness Amos, 
who had introduced the British Overseas Territories Bill,437 stated that the amendment  
 
“would in effect deny to British Overseas Territories citizens the rights to freedom of 
movement in Europe to which they would be entitled as British citizens, and therefore take 
away an important advantage of British citizenship. By granting British citizenship to British 
Dependent Territories citizens we would in effect be lifting the limitations that that status 
currently carries with it, especially with regard to freedom of movement […].”438   
 
Similarly, it was pointed out during the debates that it was important that citizens of the 
British Overseas territories were represented in the Union institutions, and that they should 
be entitled therefore to participate in European Parliamentary elections,439 another right 
associated with the status of Union citizen.  A last important right discussed was the right 
of equal treatment of Union citizens.  Some MPs pointed out that it would be unfair if 
BOTCs were consistently treated less favourably than other Union citizens, for example 
with regard to entitlement to obtain grants for higher education in Britain.  On the other 
hand, there were multiple references to the fact that other EU Member States did grant 
Union citizenship and the accompanying rights to their OCT nationals, and that there 
seemed to be little justification for denying these to British OCT nationals.440  As such it 
results that the provisions on Union citizenship may have acted as an important stimulus in 
the 2002 changes in the British nationality legislation. 
 
A last conclusion, which is again related to the previous one, is that the provisions on 
Union citizenship have a fundamental role to play in the functioning of the association of 
the Overseas Countries and Territories. 441   These provisions entitle OCT nationals to 
important rights which are apt to further the connection between them and the Union.  
Most importantly perhaps, they entitle OCT nationals to participate in elections to the 
European Parliament, a body with important decision-making powers in relation to 
them. 442  Other important rights in this regard are the right of free movement in the 
territory of the Member States (Article 21 TFEU), the right to protection by the diplomatic 
or consular authorities of any Member State in a third country (Article 23 TFEU)443 and 
                                                 
436  House of Lords, (Hansard Vol 626, Cols 1866). 
437  House of Lords, (Hansard Vol 626, Col 26). 
438  House of Lords, (Hansard Vol 626, Cols 1871). 
439  House of Commons (Hansard Vol. 375, Col. 532). 
440  See, e.g., the White Paper of the British Government of March 1999 entitled “Partnership for 
Progress and Prosperity: Britain and the Overseas Territories”, Chapter Three “Citizenship”, stating 
that: “Many people from the Overseas Territories have made it clear that they want British citizenship 
so that they can travel more freely. It is right that they should be able to do so. They should be able to 
enter Britain through our ports through the same channels as British citizens and other European 
Union (EU) nationals – who at present include inhabitants of French and Dutch territories, but not 
those of our own except Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands.”   
441  See Part Four of the TFEU. 
442  In the discussion of the Overseas Territories Bill before the House of Lords, Lord Naseby remarked 
in this regard: “There is a particular problem with Europe. The territories have to have access to the 
debates in Europe on an elected basis rather than an executive basis. One has only to look at the 
equivalent of Hansard for the European Parliament to notice how often the interests of those parts of 
the world are debated. It is fundamental that they should have a voice.” (House of Lords, Hansard, 
Vol. 626, Col. 1033).   
443  This right is by its nature to be exercised in third countries and not in the Member States. Yet, by 
allowing OCT nationals to seek in third countries diplomatic protection from the authorities of 
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the right to petition the European Parliament and to apply to the Ombudsman (Article 24 
TFEU).  These provisions have the beneficial effect of obliging the Member States to 
change their policy with regard to the OCTs to a more “inclusive one”, strengthening the 
ties with their distant overseas nationals and further integrating them in the European 
construction.  As such, the provisions on Union citizenship make a significant contribution 
to the close association that exists between the Union and the OCTs and to some of its 
most important purposes, namely to “promote the economic and social development of the 
OCTs” and to “further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of the OCTs in order 
to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire”.444  
This tendency towards more inclusion of OCT nationals and Union citizens resident in the 
OCTs can be expected to further increase in the light of the new partnership with the OCTs 
proposed by the Commission, a partnership characterised by increased reciprocity and 
greater applicability of the Union acquis. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
another Member State than their associated Member State, it is apt to further the connections between 
them and the former Member State. 
444  See Article 198 TFEU and the preamble to the OCT decision. 
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CHAPTER 4 APPLICABILITY OF THE PROVISIONS ON 
THE FREE MOVEMENT OF UNION CITIZENS 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Part II focuses on the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, which is perhaps the most important right associated with Union 
citizenship.  Secondary Union legislation – at present Directive 2004/38 – confers this 
right not only on Union citizens themselves, but also on their close family members, 
who may “accompany or join” the Union citizen in the Member States.  This first 
chapter of Part II focuses on the scope of the provisions conferring free movement 
rights on Union citizens.  More in particular, the question I will try to answer is what 
“triggers” the application of the free movement rights, and the rights concerning 
family reunification in particular.  To this purpose, I will divide the chapter into two 
parts, which correspond to two main questions.  In the first part (Title “II”) I examine 
whether it is sufficient that a Union citizen moves to another Member State in order to 
rely on the free movement rights for himself and his family members or whether it is, 
in addition, required that his family members move between Member States in order 
to “activate” these rights.  In the second part (Title “III”), I try to determine whether 
movement is required at all, i.e. whether and in what certain circumstances static 
Union citizens could also fall within the scope of the free movement provisions.  This 
will entail an analysis of a related question, namely how much “movement” is 
required in order for a Union citizen to be able to rely on the free movement 
provisions, in particular against his home Member State.  
 
Once the free movement provisions are applicable, a Union citizen has, under certain 
conditions, the right to be joined or accompanied by family members from other 
Member States or even third country.  The legal position of these family members is 
situated on an intersection between the provisions on the free movement of Union 
citizens and the provisions on immigration.  To the extent that their situation falls 
within the scope of the former, Union law applies to them.  To the extent that they fall 
outside, their situation will be principally regulated by the immigration laws of the 
Member States concerned.  Accordingly, it is clear that the determination of the scope 
of the free movement provisions has an impact for the immigration policies of the 
Member States.  In this connection, I will try to determine how big this impact is and 
how much scope Union law leaves to the Member States to pursue an effective 
immigration policy. 
 
II WHO NEEDS TO MOVE: THE CITIZEN OR THE FAMILY 
MEMBER? 
 
The situation I am concerned with under this heading is that of a non-EU family 
member of a Union citizen claiming a right of residence in one of the Member States.  
Union free movement law does unquestionably confer residence rights on family 
members of Union citizens.  The question I try to answer is under what circumstances, 
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these residence rights can be invoked.  In other words: what conditions need to be 
fulfilled in order for a family member of a Union citizen to be able to rely on the 
rights conferred on him or her by Union free movement law?  This issue has stirred up 
a lot of controversy, which can be explained by the fact that the determination of this 
issue has a direct impact on the scope of the competences of the Member States in the 
field of immigration.  The case law of the ECJ has long been unclear on this issue and 
has further added to the existing confusion.  It is only with the Metock and Others 
judgment of 25 July 2008 that the ECJ has finally restored clarity.   
 
In the following I will first briefly discuss the cases preceding Metock and Others and 
consider the underlying reasons for the apparently diverging judgments (A).  Next I 
will discus the Metock and Others judgment in some detail and consider its 
consequences for the scope of Union free movement law (B).  This will allow me to 
formulate an answer to the fundamental question of whether Union law achieves a 
proper balance between, on the one hand, guaranteeing the effet utile of the free 
movement provisions and, on the other hand, safeguarding the interests of the 
Member States in pursuing effective immigration policies (C.).  
 
A. Mixed signals in earlier case law 
 
The main reason why the issue of the scope of residence rights enjoyed by non-EU 
family members of Union citizens is a contentious one is that the issue is situated at 
an “intersection” of competence fields which belong to different competence levels, 
namely the Union, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other hand.1 
 
The Union, on the one hand, is competent to regulate the free movement of persons 
within the territory of the Member States.  This follows from the Treaty provisions on 
the free movement of Union citizens, 2  in conjunction with the instruments of 
secondary legislation adopted to give effect to these provisions.3  As a corollary to the 
free movement rights of Union citizens, these instruments also provide for rights of 
their family members, including third country nationals, to move and reside with 
them.4  The Member States, on the other hand, remain competent in respect of most 
aspects of immigration policy.  Admittedly, since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam the Union has become competent to enact measures inter alia with 
                                                 
1 As was very well explained by AG Geelhoed in his Opinions in two earlier cases: Opinion of 
AG Geelhoed in Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, paras 37-63 and Opinion of AG 
Geelhoed in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, paras 26-61. 
2 See Articles 21, 45, 49 and 56. It is settled case law that Article 21 TFEU, which lays down a 
general right for every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, finds specific expression in the provisions on the free movement of economic 
actors. See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-193/94 Skanavi [1996] E.C.R. I-929, para. 22 (on the freedom of 
establishment); ECJ, Case C-100/01 Oteiza Olazabal [2002] E.C.R. I-10981, para. 26 (on the 
free movement of workers); ECJ, Case C-208/05 ITC [2007] E.C.R. I-181, para. 64 (on the 
freedom to provide services).  
3 See now Directive 2004/38 which has replaced earlier legislation laying down the conditions of 
free movement rights for specific categories of persons (see the discussion in Chapter 5, infra). 
4 See the detailed discussion in Chapter 5, infra. The right of residence was extended to family 
members of Union citizens for perhaps two main reasons, namely 1) in the absence of such 
rights, Union citizens could be discouraged from exercising their free movement rights and 2) 
such is arguably necessary in order to comply with the fundamental right to respect for family 
life as laid down inter alia in Article 8 ECHR. 
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respect to immigration and controls at the external borders of the Union5 and since the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the Union has even become competent to develop a “common 
immigration policy”.6  However, this shared competence7 concerns mostly “flanking 
measures” and harmonization measures, and the level of harmonization achieved so 
far is rather limited.8  As a consequence, it is generally speaking the Member States 
that are competent to regulate the first admission of third country nationals to their 
territory, although they must thereby respect Union legislation enacted in the field.9  
Summarizing, one could say that the Union is competent for the “internal aspect” of 
the free movement of persons, whereas the “external aspect” remains largely within 
the ambit of Member State competences.10  In any event it is clear that the specific 
free movement rights conferred on Union citizens by the provisions on Union 
citizenship only apply within the territory of the Member States and not between 
Member States and third countries. 
 
As a result of this conjunction of competence areas, it is not immediately clear who is 
to have competence regarding non-EU family members of a Union citizen who have 
never legally resided in a Member State.  In theory, two points of view are possible.  
The first one starts from looking at the position of the non-EU family member of a 
Union citizen: since he or she has never entered the Union before, the conditions 
surrounding his or her entry into the territory of the Member States must be subject to 
the rules adopted in the field of immigration, for which the Member States remain 
principally competent.  The second point of view rather takes the situation of the 
Union citizen as a starting point.  He or she would be discouraged from exercising his 
or her freedom to move and reside in another Member State if he or she could not be 
joined in that Member State by his or her non-EU family members.  Consequently, the 
Union should be held competent to regulate the entry and residence rights of family 
                                                 
5 See former Title IV of Part Three of the TEC, in particular Articles 61(a)-(b), 62 and 63 TEC.  
6  For a discussion of this competence and its evolution, see Peers EU Justice and Home Affairs 
Law (3rd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 1100 pp. and Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 
(Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 
Chapter 10. 
7  See the explicit mention of the “area of freedom, security and justice” in Article 4(2)(j) TFEU. 
8 See Peers EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 
at 240 (noting that it has been difficult to agree on rules on migration at Union level, and that the 
rules which have been agreed have generally been “unambitious”). 
9 The two most important Union measures adopted in the field are Council Directive 2003/86/EC 
of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, [2003] O.J. L251/12 and Council 
Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents, [2004] O.J. L16/44. For more detailed information on the different 
Union measures adopted, see Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European 
Union Law (3rd ed.) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 323-326 and the literature referred to. 
10 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, paras 30-35. This distinction is 
exemplified by Article 3(2) TEU, which provides: “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of 
freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, 
asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”. See, in the same vein, Article 
67(2) TFEU: “[The Union] shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and 
shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on 
solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals”. See also 
former Article 62 TEC, which provided for a different competence of the EC with regard the 
crossing of internal borders on the one hand (Article 62(1)) and the crossing of external borders 
on the other hand (Article 62(2) TEC). 
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members, including non-EU family members, of Union citizens, at least in the case of 
“moving” Union citizens. 
 
The ECJ, in its case law until Metock and Others, had never clearly taken position.  In 
fact, earlier case law of the ECJ presents a somewhat ambiguous image, with the ECJ 
apparently shifting between these two points of view.11  On the one hand, there was 
the famous Akrich case,12 in which the ECJ notably held that the non-EU spouse of a 
Union citizen could only benefit from the rights she derived from Regulation 
1612/6813 once she was lawfully resident in a Member State, while her access to the 
territory of the Union remained subject to the conditions of national immigration 
law.14  The ECJ essentially came to this conclusion by stressing the limited scope of 
the Union’s competence regarding the free movement of persons.  It held that 
Regulation 1612/68 covered only freedom of movement within the Union and that it 
was “silent as to the rights of a national of a non-Member State, who is the spouse of 
a citizen of the Union, in regard to access to the territory of the Union”.15  It seemed 
to follow from Akrich that a Member State could refuse non-EU family members a 
right of residence on grounds of non-compliance with the conditions of national 
immigration law if they had not previously resided lawfully on the territory of another 
Member State,16 as long as this refusal would not infringe the right to respect for 
family life under Article 8 of the ECHR.17 
 
In another line of cases, the Court rather embraced the second point of view, stressing 
the importance of protecting family life in order to guarantee the full effect of the 
provisions on free movement of Union citizens18 and holding that, for non-EU family 
members of a Union citizen to enjoy the right of entry and residence in the Union, it 
was sufficient to demonstrate their family relationship with a Union citizen.  Notably, 
                                                 
11  See also the very informative discussion in Tryfonidou, "Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) 
Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal Approach" (2009) 15 E.L.J., 634-647. 
12 ECJ, Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, with case notes by Luby in (2004) Journal du 
droit international, 580-581; Oosterom-Staples in (2004) N.T.E.R., 77-83; Plender in (2004) 
C.D.E., 261-288; White in (2004) E.L. Rev., 385-396; Spaventa in (2005) CML Rev., 225-239; 
Schiltz in (2005) MJ, 241-252. 
13 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community, [1968] J.O. L257/2 (see now Directive 2004/38). 
14  Tryfonidou classifies the approach followed in Akrich as the “moderate approach”. Another case 
that was decided following this moderate approach, according to the author, is ECJ, Joined 
Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan [1982] E.C.R. 3723. See Tryfonidou, "Family 
Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal Approach" (2009) 
15 E.L.J., 636-637. 
15 ECJ, Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, para. 49. 
16 This is clearly illustrated by a decision of the Irish High Court. In H.Ct. Ir., S.K. and Anor. v. 
The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Others. [2007] I.E.H.C. 216, Justice 
Hanna decided that the prior lawful residence requirement of the 2006 Regulations was 
consistent with Directive 2004/38 and lawful, considering that the provision gave effect to 
Directive 2004/38 and to the judgment in Akrich. 
17 ECJ, Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, para. 58. 
18  The ECJ has observed in this regard that the Union legislature recognized the importance of 
ensuring the protection of the family life of nationals of the Member States in order to eliminate 
obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties. See ECJ, Case 
C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, para. 38; ECJ, Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] E.C.R. I-
6591, para. 53; ECJ, Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] E.C.R. I-2911, para. 41; ECJ, 
Case 441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] E.C.R. I-3449, para. 109; ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind 
[2007] E.C.R. I-10719, para. 44. 
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in MRAX, 19 the ECJ held that “the right of a third country national married to a 
Member State national to enter the territory of the Member States derives under 
Union law from the family ties alone”20 and that a Member State was not permitted to 
refuse to issue a residence permit to a third country national who is able to furnish 
proof of his identity and of his marriage to a national of a Member State on the sole 
ground that he has entered the territory of the Member State concerned unlawfully.21  
MRAX was decided before Akrich, but the ECJ confirmed the approach it had 
followed in MRAX in cases decided after Akrich.22  In one of these cases, the ECJ 
confirmed that Member States could only refuse to grant a visa to a non-EU family 
member within the limited scope of refusal tolerated by Union law, such as refusals 
on grounds of public policy or public security.23  From these judgments, it seemed to 
follow that Member States were precluded from making the right of entry conferred 
by Union law on non-EU family members of a Union citizen conditional upon a 
requirement of previous lawful residence in another Member State. 
 
In Jia24 the ECJ was presented with an ideal opportunity to explicitly address this 
apparent contradiction in its earlier case law. 25   The referring Swedish court 
essentially asked whether, in light of Akrich, non-EU family members of a Union 
citizen were to be refused a right of residence in a Member State if they had not 
previously been lawfully resident in another Member State. 26  However, the ECJ 
chose not to explicitly address the question of whether a condition of prior lawful 
residence was permitted under Union law.27  It chose to confine its ruling in Akrich to 
the specific facts of that case, which it distinguished from the factual circumstances in 
Jia.28  It explained that Akrich was not to be interpreted as holding that Union law 
                                                 
19 ECJ, Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] E.C.R. I-6591, with case notes by Denys in (2002) 
T.Vreemd., 388-391; Van Ooik and Staples in (2002) N.T.E.R., 269 -276; Luby in (2003) 
Journal du droit international, 593-596; Martin in (2003) Eur. J. Migration & L., 143-162.  
20 ECJ, Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] E.C.R. I-6591, para. 59. 
21 Ibid., para. 80.  
22 ECJ, Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] E.C.R. I-2911, para. 28; ECJ, Case C-503/03 
Commission v Spain [2006] E.C.R. I-1097, para. 42. In both cases, the ECJ confirmed its finding 
in MRAX that the right of a third country national married to a Member State national to enter 
the territory of the Member States derives under Union law from the family ties alone.  
23 ECJ, Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain [2006] E.C.R. I-1097, paras 43-47, with case notes by 
Martin in (2006) Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 568-582; Muir in (2006) R.D.U.E, 172-
177; Olesti Rayo in (2006) Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 989-1001; Oosterom-
Staples in (2006) N.T.E.R., 169-181; Brouwer in (2008) CML Rev., 1251-1267. 
24 ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, with case notes by Elsmore and Starup in (2007) CML 
Rev., 787-801; Martin in (2007) Eur. J. Migration & L., 457-471; Oosterom-Staples in (2007) 
N.T.E.R., 191-200; Tryfonidou in (2007) E.L.Rev., 908-918; Woltjer in (2007) SEW, 303-306. 
25 As was noted by AG Mengozzi: Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. 
I-10719, para. 46. 
26 ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 25. 
27 This position is in contrast to that of AG Geelhoed, who explicitly acknowledged that the ECJ’s 
case law in the field was not entirely free from ambiguity, observing that the ECJ “has adopted 
both a generous and a restrictive approach to the conditions under which the rights granted in 
secondary [Union] legislation to third-country-national family members of [Union] citizens can 
be invoked” (Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, para. 38). 
28  The Court emphasised in this regard that in the Jia case it was not alleged that “the family 
member in question was residing unlawfully in a Member State or that she was seeking to evade 
national immigration legislation illicitly” (ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 31). 
This has prompted some commentators to suggest that the ECJ was drawing a distinction 
between cases in which a non-EU family member had resided unlawfully in another Member 
State before moving to the host Member State and cases in which the non-EU family member 
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requires Member States to make the grant of a residence permit to non-EU family 
members of a Union citizen subject to a condition of prior lawful residence.29  As a 
result, even after Jia there remained a considerable degree of confusion regarding the 
scope of Member States’ competence in relation to admitting non-EU family 
members.30  In particular, it was unclear to what extent Member States were permitted 
to make the right of residence of non-EU family members of a Union citizen 
dependent on a condition of prior lawful residence in another Member State. 
 
Eind31 was the last case before Metock and Others in which the Court was faced with 
the question whether the first entry of non-EU family members of a Union citizen into 
the territory of the Union could be made subject to restrictive conditions of national 
immigration law.  Mr. Eind, a Netherlands national, had worked in the United 
Kingdom and had lived there with his Surinamese daughter, who had been given a 
residence permit by the UK authorities as family member of a Union worker.32  Upon 
his return to the Netherlands, Mr. Eind claimed that his daughter, Ms. Eind, was 
entitled to residence there under Union law as his family member.  The Court 
accepted this claim and stated that:  
 
“This finding is not affected by the fact that, before residing in the host Member State 
where her father was gainfully employed, Miss Eind did not have a right of residence, 
under national law, in the Member State of which Mr Eind is a national.”33 
 
Accordingly, the Eind judgment seemed to further confirm the Court’s holding in 
Jia34 that prior lawful residence under the national law of a Member State was not 
required for family members of Union citizens in order to derive residence rights from 
Union law.  Eind did not, however, completely clarify this issue, for a number of 
                                                                                                                                            
had not resided in any Member State before moving to the host Member State. Only in the 
second type of cases would the non-EU family member derive residence rights from Union law; 
the first type of cases would remain governed by Akrich and thus national restrictive conditions 
would apply to the residence rights of the family member in question. See, in this sense, Olivier 
and Reestman, "No Legal Residence Requirements for the Admission of Family Members with 
a Third-country Nationality of Migrated Union Citizens" (2007) 3 EuConst, 467; see also 
already Spaventa, “Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. H. Akrich”, 
42 (2005) CML Rev., 233. This interpretation is in any event no longer in accordance with the 
ECJ’s case law after the Metock and Others judgment (see the discussion under II.B., infra). 
29 ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, paras 30, 33. For a discussion of this narrow reading of 
the Akrich case, see Olivier and Reestman, "No Legal Residence Requirements for the 
Admission of Family Members with a Third-country Nationality of Migrated Union Citizens" 
(2007) 3 EuConst, 463-475. 
30 This is neatly illustrated by the fact that in the main proceedings in Metock and Others, the Jia 
case was cited both by the applicants and by the Minster for Justice in support of their positions. 
See H.Ct. Ir., Metock and Others v. MJELR [2008] I.E.H.C. 77, paras 51 and 58-60. See also 
Vermeulen, “Akrich, Commissie/Spanje, Jia: Nog steeds geen Eind aan de onduidelijkheid over 
eerste toelating van derdelanders/gezinsleden van EU-migranten”, in Migration Law and 
Sociology of Law, Collected Essays in honour of Kees Groenendijk (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2008), 495-502. 
31  ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719, with case notes by Bierbach in (2008) 
EuConst, 344-362; Coutts in (2008) R.D.U.E., 167-173; Martin in (2008) 10 Eur. J. Migration 
& L., 365-379; Venekamp in (2008) N.T.E.R., 130-136. 
32  There was some confusion as to whether Ms. Eind’s right of residence was based on national 
law or on Union law. The ECJ followed the national court in this regard and decided the case on 
the assumption that this right of residence was based on Union law.  
33  ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719, para. 41. 
34  Curiously, the Jia judgment was not referred to by the ECJ; it was, however, discussed by AG 
Mengozzi in his opinion to the case. 
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reasons.  First of all, the Court’s judgment is not clearly drafted and the reasoning 
followed does not always seem consistent, which makes it hard to derive any 
underlying principles from it. 35  Second, it is unclear to what extent the specific 
circumstances of the case - such as the fact that Mr. Eind had been a worker rather 
than a non-economically active migrant Union citizen, the fact that Ms. Eind had been 
given a residence permit by the UK authorities and the fact that a residence right was 
claimed in the Member State of which Mr. Eind was a national -, dictated the Court’s 
judgment.  Lastly, the Court did not mention the Akrich judgment and did not 
therefore shed light on its continued relevance.  Consequently, even after Eind, the 
problematic apparent contradiction between the two lines of cases outlined above 
remained in existence.36  It was only with the judgment in Metock and Others, which 
explicitly reversed the Akrich case, that this contradiction was resolved.  The Metock 
and Others judgment will be discussed in some detail in the following. 
 
B. Metock and Others and the emphasis on the Union citizen 
 
1. Case 
 
a) Facts 
 
Metock and Others in fact involved four cases lodged before the Irish High Court, 
which were joined for the purpose of convenience.37  In each of these cases,38 a non-
EU national had travelled to Ireland and had lodged an asylum application there, 
which was eventually refused.  However, after arriving in Ireland, each of them had 
married a national of another Member State who was living and working in Ireland.  
They subsequently applied for residence cards as the spouses of a Union citizen, but 
their applications were refused by the Irish Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (hereinafter “Minister for Justice”).   
 
The Minister for Justice based his refusal on the European Communities (Free 
Movement of Persons) Regulation 2006 (S.I. No. 2) (“2006 Regulations”), which 
transposed Directive 2004/38 into Irish law.  Under Regulation 3(2) of the 2006 
                                                 
35  As is poignantly explained by Martin (Martin, "Comments on Gouvernement de la Communauté 
française and Gouvernement wallon (Case C-212/06 of 1 April 2008) and Eind (Case C-291/05 
of 11 December 2007)" (2008) 10 Eur. J. Migration & L., 375-379). 
36  Admittedly, it was possible to reconcile both lines of cases by taking a narrow reading of the 
Akrich case and limiting its scope to cases of illegal residence in a Member State (see n. 28, 
supra). Still, this reconciliation was based on a rather tentative reading of the Akrich case, which 
did not have any firm foundation in the case law of the ECJ and was therefore surrounded by 
legal uncertainty.  
37 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, with case notes by Cambien in 
(2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 321-341; Costello in (2009) 46 CML Rev., 587-622; Currie in 
(2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 310-326; Dautricourt in (2008) R.D.U.E., 858-866; Fahey in (2009) L.I.E.I., 
83-89; Hammamoun and Neuwahl in (2009) Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 91-104; 
Martin in (2009) 11 Eur. J. Migration & L., 95-108; Venekamp in (2009) N.T.E.R., 84-89 and 
Groenendijk and Fernhout in (2010) Asiel en Migrantenrecht, 4-16. 
38 For a more detailed account of the facts of each of the cases (which were labelled the “Metock 
case,” the “Ikogho case,” the “Chinedu case,” and the “Igboanusi case” by the ECJ), see ECJ, 
Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 18-37.  
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Regulations, spouses of Union citizens were only entitled to a right of residence in 
Ireland if they had been lawfully resident in another Member State and if they were 
either entering Ireland in the company of their husbands or seeking to join their 
husbands who were already lawfully resident in Ireland.  These conditions were not 
present in three of the four cases, given that evidence of legal residence in another 
Member State prior to arrival in Ireland was lacking.39  In the remaining case, the 
refusal of the Minister for Justice was based on the fact that the husband was 
unlawfully resident in Ireland at the time of his marriage to a Union citizen. 40 
Nevertheless, the Irish High Court took the view that the conditions of Regulation 
3(2) of the 2006 Regulations were relevant to this case, too.41 
 
The main proceedings were brought by the non-EU nationals concerned, their 
spouses, and, in one case, their minor children.  The applicants essentially argued that 
the condition of prior lawful residence stated in Regulation 3(2) of the 2006 
Regulations was not compatible with Directive 2004/38.42  The Minister for Justice, 
the adversary in the main proceedings, replied essentially that Directive 2004/38 did 
not preclude this condition because the Directive only applied to the movement of 
Union citizens and their family members within the Union, whereas the Member 
States retained competence in relation to the admission into a Member State of non-
EU nationals coming from outside Union territory.43  
 
b) Judgment 
 
The ECJ firmly rejected the argument of the Minister for Justice and held that 
Directive 2004/38 precludes national legislation imposing a requirement of prior 
lawful residence such as the one contained in Regulation 3 of the 2006 Regulations.  
It based this finding on two main arguments. 
 
In the first place, the ECJ pointed out that none of the provisions of Directive 2004/38 
concerning family members of Union citizens makes the application of the Directive 
conditional on their having previously resided in a Member State.44  It added that 
some of these provisions would rather justify the conclusion that the Directive is 
capable of applying to family members who were not already lawfully resident in 
another Member State.45  In this regard, the ECJ pointed out that Article 5(2) of the 
Directive confers rights on family members who do not possess a “residence card” 
and cannot therefore provide evidence of residence for more than three months in a 
Member State46 and that Article 10(2) of the Directive, which lists exhaustively the 
documents which non-EU family members may have to present to the host Member 
                                                 
39 See ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 21, 30 and 35. 
40 Ibid., para. 26. 
41 See H.Ct. Ir., Metock and Others v. MJELR [2008] I.E.H.C. 77, paras 147-48. 
42 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 39-42.  
43 Ibid., paras 43-44. 
44 Ibid.,, para. 49. 
45 Ibid., para. 54. 
46 According to Article 10(1), the right of residence of family members of a Union citizen who are 
not nationals of a Member State shall be evidenced by the issuing of a document called 
“Residence card of a family member of a Union citizen”. A residence card evidences a right of 
residence for more than three months in a Member State (Article 9(1) of the Directive). 
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State in order to have a residence card issued, does not list any documents intended to 
demonstrate prior lawful residence in another Member State.47  
 
That interpretation of the Directive was further supported, according to the ECJ, by its 
earlier case law48 in which it had, on the basis of Union free movement legislation 
predating Directive 2004/38, struck down restrictions on the right of non-EU family 
members to join a national of a Member State, because they restricted the free 
movement rights of the latter.49  However, the ECJ also explicitly recognized that in 
Akrich it had itself viewed prior lawful residence in another Member State as a 
condition to be fulfilled by a non-EU spouse of a Union citizen in order to benefit 
from a right of entry and residence in a Member State.  In Metock and Others, the 
ECJ considered this finding no longer justified, and it decided to explicitly overturn it, 
holding that the benefit of the said rights could not depend on prior lawful residence 
in another Member State.50  
 
In the second place, the ECJ held this interpretation of Directive 2004/38 to be 
consistent with the division of competences between the Member States and the 
Union.51  It pointed out that the Union is competent to enact the necessary measures 
to bring about freedom of movement for Union citizens.52  This freedom would be 
obstructed if it were impossible for a Union citizen to be accompanied or joined by 
his family members in the host Member State, because such would be liable to 
discourage him from exercising his rights of entry into and residence in that Member 
State, and this irrespective of whether those family members had previously legally 
resided in another Member State or not.  Consequently, the Union legislature was 
competent to regulate in Directive 2004/38 the conditions of entry and residence of 
family members in the host Member State, including their first access to the territory 
of the Union. 
 
The Irish High Court had also referred a second question to the ECJ, 53  which 
concerned the interpretation of Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38.  That article reads: 
“This Directive shall apply to all Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member 
State other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members…who 
                                                 
47 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 52-53. 
48 The Court referred to the cases cited in n. 18, supra. 
49 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 56-57. 
50 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 58. The ECJ added that this 
conclusion, reached on the basis of earlier Union legislation on free movement of persons, held 
good a fortiori with regard to Directive 2004/38, which aims at “strengthening the rights of free 
movement and residence of all Union citizens compared to their rights under earlier instruments 
of secondary law” (Ibid., para. 59).  
51 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 61-65. 
52 According to the ECJ, this competence derived from Articles 18(2), 40, 44, and 52 TEC [current 
Articles 21(2), 46, 50 and 59 TFEU] on the basis of which Directive 2004/38 was adopted (ECJ, 
Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 61). 
53  For the sake of completeness, it must be pointed out that the Irish High Court also referred a 
third question to the ECJ (see ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, 
para. 47). This third question was to be answered only if the ECJ answered the second question 
in the negative. As will be seen below, this was not the case.  
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accompany or join them” (emphasis added).54  As explained above, in each of the 
four cases before the High Court a non-EU national had entered Ireland before 
marrying a Union citizen there.  The referring Court was essentially asking whether, 
under those circumstances, they were “accompanying” or “joining” a Union citizen as 
a family member in the sense of Article 3(1) of the Directive.  As a result, the ECJ 
had to reach a decision on two main issues.  First, whether a Union citizen must 
already have founded a family at the time when he moves to the host Member State in 
order for his non-EU family members to be able to enjoy the rights established by 
Directive 2004/38.  Second, whether a national of a non-member country who has 
entered a Member State before becoming a family member of a Union citizen residing 
in that Member State, accompanies or joins that Union citizen within the meaning of 
Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38. 
 
The ECJ answered this second question in the affirmative.  It justified its wide reading 
of Article 3(1) by referring to the objective of Directive 2004/38, namely to facilitate 
the exercise of the right of Union citizens to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States.55  A more restrictive reading of Article 3(1), it pointed 
out, would allow the host Member State, under certain circumstances, to refuse non-
EU family members of a Union citizen residing in its territory to join the latter.  For 
instance, a third-country national who had entered the host Member State before 
marrying a Union citizen residing in that Member State or who had married a Union 
citizen before the latter established himself in that Member State could be refused a 
right of residence by that Member State.  Such would be liable to discourage the 
Union citizen concerned from continuing to reside there and encourage him to leave 
in order to be able to lead a family life in another Member State or in a non-member 
country.56  That would clearly undermine the objectives of Directive 2004/38.  The 
ECJ concluded that for the applicability of Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38 it was 
not relevant when and where57 the marriage between a Union citizen and his non-EU 
spouse took place or how the latter entered the host Member State.58 
 
2. Analysis 
 
Given the considerable degree of confusion regarding the delimitation of competences 
of the Union and the Member States vis-à-vis non-EU family members of moving 
Union citizens - resulting from the case law discussed higher59 - the importance of the 
                                                 
54 Similarly, Articles 6(1) and 7(1)(d) of Directive 2004/38, relating respectively to the right of 
residence for up to three months and the right of residence for more than three months, require 
that non-EU members of a Union citizen “accompany” or “join” him in the host Member State 
in order to enjoy a right of residence there, as the ECJ pointed out. See ECJ, Case C-127/08 
Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 86. 
55 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 82 (referring to recitals 1, 4, 
and 11 of Directive 2004/38).  
56 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, paras 89, 92.  
57  The ECJ held in this connection that neither Article 3(1) nor any other provision of Directive 
2004/38 contains requirements as to the place where the marriage of the Union citizen and the 
national of a non-member country is solemnised (ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others 
[2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 98). 
58 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 99. The ECJ confirmed this 
finding in ECJ (Order of 19 December 2008), Case C-551/07 Sahin [2008] E.C.R. I-10453, 
paras 24-33.  
59  See the discussion under II.A., supra. 
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Metock and Others judgment is immediately apparent.  The ECJ noted the ambiguity 
in its earlier case law surrounding the rights of non-EU family members under Union 
law and restored clarity by explicitly overturning its judgment in Akrich.  Such 
explicit reversal is a very unusual step for the ECJ to undertake60 and its extraordinary 
character is put into relief by the fact that the Akrich judgment was pronounced fewer 
than five years before the judgment in Metock and Others.61  Consequently, the ECJ 
now appears to have unambiguously embraced the second point of view set out above.  
In Metock and Others, it took the impact of family life on the free movement of 
Union citizens as a focal point and concluded that the Union is competent to regulate 
the entry and residence of family members of Union citizens in the Member States.62  
It clearly ensues that Member States are not permitted under Union law to impose a 
condition of prior lawful residence with regard to the residence rights enjoyed by non-
EU family members of a Union citizen. 
 
The question that needs to be answered is whether the ECJ’s reasoning is convincing.  
This requires an analysis of the different arguments advanced by the ECJ in its 
judgment in Metock and Others.  The first set of arguments of the ECJ was based on 
the provisions of Directive 2004/38.  The Court cited a number of those provisions as 
evidence for its holding that no requirement of prior lawful residence could be 
imposed.  In my view, however, the provisions of the Directive do not provide much 
guidance in this regard, as they are essentially silent on the matter.63  This is not in my 
view the most convincing part of the judgment, therefore.  On a related note, it must 
be observed that it is far from clear to what extent the entry into force of Directive 
2004/38 played a role in the outcome of the judgment.  Arguably, the Court could 
have reached exactly the same outcome under the instruments of secondary law 
predating Directive 2004/38.64  In this regard, the fact should not be overlooked that 
                                                 
60 This explicit reversal is almost unprecedented in the case law of the ECJ. For an exceptional 
case in which the ECJ explicitly overturned earlier case law, see ECJ, Case C-10/89 SA CNL-
SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG [1990] E.C.R. I-3711, para. 10. See also ECJ, Joined Cases C-
267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard [1993] E.C.R. I-609, paras 14-16.  
61 The Akrich judgment, 2003 dates from September 23, 2003; the Metock and Others judgment 
dates from 25 July 2008. 
62  Snell draws an interesting parallel with the Court’s case law on the free movement of goods, in 
which the Court once adopted a very broad interpretation of those provisions, which was later 
reversed with the famous Keck judgment. Snell notes: “Altogether, cases such as Carpenter, 
Commission v Netherlands, Government of the French Community and Walloon government and 
Metock create a certain sense of déjà vu. Just like in the field of goods prior to Keck, the Court 
adopts a very wide view of the scope of the free movement provisions, tackling rules that are 
capable of impeding or dissuading free movers or making the exercise of free movement rights 
less attractive” (Snell, "The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?" (2010) 47 CML 
Rev., 465). 
63  Currie has correctly remarked that the Court was essentially relying on what Directive 2004/38 
did not say and that the Court perhaps implicitly considered that the Union legislator could have 
explicitly codified the Akrich case law if it considered that a condition of prior lawful residence 
should apply (Currie, "Accelerated Justice or a Step Too Far? Residence Rights of Non-EU 
Family Members and the Court's Ruling in Metock" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 320-321). If the Court 
was of this opinion, it should perhaps have stated this explicitly. Moreover, this point of view 
fails to convince, as the provision relied on by the Court in Akrich was taken over by Directive 
2004/38. AG Poiares Maduro takes a more realistic view, in my opinion, stating that Directive 
2004/38 does not provide an explicit answer to this issue (View of AG Poiares Maduro, Case C-
127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 5). 
64  In this sense, Martin, "Comments on Förster (Case C-158/07 of 18 November 2008), Metock 
(Case C-127/08 of 25 July 2008) and Huber (Case C-524/06 of 16 December 2008)" (2009) 11 
Eur. J. Migration & L., 95-108. 
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the Court explicitly cited older case law, decided before the entry into force of 
Directive 2004/38, in support of its findings.  At the same, the fact that Directive 
2004/38 is expressly stated, in its recitals to “strengthen the right of free movement 
and residence of all Union citizens”, as pointed out by the Court, might have provided 
some additional support to the Court’s broad interpretation of the free movement 
provisions.65   
 
The crux of the Court’s reasoning was formed by its interpretation of the Union’s 
competence regarding the free movement of Union citizens.  This interpretation was 
founded on the Court’s interpretation of the aims pursued by the provisions of 
Directive 2004/38 and the consequences thereof for the rights enjoyed by non-EU 
family members of Union citizens.  It is this part of the judgment which needs critical 
analysis.  After analysing whether and to what extent the Court’s interpretation of the 
scope of the Union competence regarding the free movement of Union citizens is 
convincing (a), I will analyse its impact on the competences of the Member States and 
consider whether it leaves sufficient scope for the latter to pursue an effective 
immigration policy (b).  
 
a) Division of competences 
 
In Metock and Others, the Court rightly pointed out that the Union derives its 
competence for granting rights to family members from the fact that ensuring the 
protection of family life is necessary to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of free 
movement rights.  It naturally follows then that the Union should be considered 
competent to grant residence and entry rights to family members as long as the 
absence of these rights would constitute an obstacle to the free movement of Union 
citizens between the Members States, that is, to the “internal aspect” of the free 
movement of persons.  Only in the absence of such impact, the focus of the analysis 
should be on the movement of the non-EU family members, and thus possibly on the 
“external aspect” of the free movement of persons, for which the Member States 
remain principally competent.  This view is further supported by the fact that the 
rights of family members are not autonomous rights but rights that are “parasitic” on 
the rights of the Union citizen they are related to.66 
 
The question to be answered then is whether the refusal of a right of residence to a 
non-EU family member of a Union citizen constitutes such an obstacle.  This entirely 
depends on how the free movement provisions are interpreted.  The point is perfectly 
illustrated when the reasoning adopted by the ECJ in Akrich is compared with the 
reasoning followed by the ECJ in Metock and Others.  In Akrich, the ECJ took the 
view that the exercise of the right to free movement is only discouraged by a refusal 
of residence rights to family members of a Union citizen if it entails for the latter the 
loss of the right to be joined by his family members.  The ECJ further observed that 
such is only the case if the citizen concerned was lawfully residing with his family 
                                                 
65  See the discussion in Currie, "Accelerated Justice or a Step Too Far? Residence Rights of Non-
EU Family Members and the Court's Ruling in Metock" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 319-322. The 
Court has also relied on this element to provide a generous interpretation of the provisions of 
Directive 2004/38 in other cases (see, e.g., ECJ, Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, 
para. 49). 
66 See also n. 108, infra, and ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719, paras 23, 24 and 30. 
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members in a Member State before moving to the host Member State.  Otherwise, he 
would not be treated less favourably in the host Member State than in the home 
Member State, and hence not be discouraged to move there in any way.67  The ECJ 
was essentially comparing the conditions for family reunification enjoyed in the home 
Member State with those in the host Member State and considered that there would 
only be an obstacle to the exercise of free movement rights if the latter were less 
favourable than the former. 
 
In Metock and Others, by contrast, the ECJ considered that the refusal of a right of 
residence to a non-EU family member of a Union citizen constitutes an obstacle to the 
exercise of free movement rights, even where the non-EU family member did not 
previously reside legally in another Member State.  This point of view cannot be 
explained when merely the conditions relating to family reunification enjoyed in the 
home Member State are compared with those applicable in the host Member State.  
Not surprisingly, some commentators,68 reasoning along the lines of Akrich, have 
criticised the Court’s judgment in Metock and Others for recognising the possibility 
for Union citizens to rely on Union provisions relating to family reunification even in 
situations where no actual obstacle to the exercise of free movement rights was 
involved. 69   As will become clear from the following, I do not agree with this 
criticism.  The Court’s judgment becomes convincing if other considerations are taken 
into account.  In my view, the Court based its judgment probably on two main 
considerations, while two additional considerations may also have influenced the 
Court’s decision.  These considerations will be discussed in what follows. 
i) Considerations supporting a broad construction of the free movement provisions 
 
In the first place, it must be pointed out that, if Member States were permitted but not 
required to impose a condition of prior lawful residence, some Member States would 
allow non-EU family members who had not previously resided legally in another 
Member State 70  to their territory, whereas others would refuse them.  As a 
consequence, a Union citizen would incur a disadvantage when exercising his free 
movement rights by moving to a Member State of the second category rather than one 
belonging to the first category because thereby he would be denied the right to family 
reunification which he could have enjoyed otherwise. 71   It is clear that this 
discouraging effect would create an obstacle to the exercise of free movement rights 
to a Member State of the second category, precisely where the non-EU family 
member had not previously resided legally in another Member State.    
                                                 
67 ECJ, Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, paras 52-54; Opinion of AG Geelhoed in 
Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, para. 71. 
68  See Tryfonidou, "Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More 
Liberal Approach" (2009) 15 E.L.J., at 648-653. The author makes a similar argument in another 
article, which has the rights of economically active Union citizens as its prime focus 
(Tryfonidou, "In Search of the Aim of the EC Free Movement of Persons Provisions: Has the 
Court of Justice Missed the Point?" (2009) 46 CML Rev., 1591-1620).  
69  In the European Law Journal article concerned, Tryfonidou concentrates on the rights for family 
members of Union citizens and on the cases Eind, Metock and Others and Sahin and voices the 
familiar criticism that in these cases no obstacle to the exercise of free movement rights was 
present, since no right was lost by moving from one Member State to another one. 
70  And who did not satisfy the conditions of national immigration laws. 
71  See in this sense, the View of AG Poiares Maduro, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] 
E.C.R. I-6241, para. 9.    
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This first consideration is clearly present in the Court’s judgment in Metock and 
Others.  The Court pointed out that, under the narrow reading of “obstacles” in 
Akrich, the free movement of persons would vary from one Member State to another, 
as some Member States would be permitting entry and residence of their family 
members, whereas others would not.72  Such would run counter to the objective of the 
internal market, as set out in Articles 3(3) TEU and 26 TFEU – and, one might add, to 
the objective of a Citizens’ Europe - which presupposes that Union citizens can travel 
from one Member State to the other enjoying the same rights and conditions in every 
Member State.  Accordingly, in Metock and Others, the Court did not content itself by 
merely comparing the conditions relating to family reunification present in the home 
Member State and the host Member State.  It also took account of the potentially 
different conditions in other Member States.  As such, the Court indicated the need for 
a “level playing field” as regards the rights of entry and residence of non-EU family 
members of Union citizens in the Member States, in a way reminiscent of its seminal 
Micheletti judgment.73  Consequently, the fact that different Member States could 
potentially enact different conditions with regard to the first access of non-EU family 
members of Union citizens should be considered sufficient to trigger the Union’s 
competence regarding free movement of persons. 
 
However, this first consideration alone does not provide a satisfactory basis for the 
Court’s judgment, for two reasons.  First, it is generally accepted that the free 
movement provisions should not be triggered by obstacles which are merely potential.  
While it is possible that the situation described above, with some Member States 
requiring prior lawful residence in contrast to others, would result from a more narrow 
interpretation of the free movement provisions, it could also give rise to the possibility 
that all Member States would require prior lawful residence.74  In such a scenario, a 
level playing field would already ensue from a more narrow interpretation of the free 
movement provisions, at least in the sense that all Member States would require 
compliance with the immigration laws of one Member State before granting residence 
rights to non-EU family members.75  Second, the first consideration does not give a 
wholly convincing justification for applying the free movement provisions in 
circumstances such as the one present in Metock and Others, in which a residence 
right is refused to a non-EU family member only a considerable time after the Union 
citizen concerned has moved to the host Member State.  As has been rightly pointed 
out in legal literature, it cannot immediately be seen how such refusal would, in those 
circumstances, discourage a Union citizen from moving to the host Member State.76  
One could reply to that concern that a Union citizen could be discouraged from 
moving to a Member State with stricter immigration laws because such might in the 
                                                 
72 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 67. 
73  ECJ, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, para. 12 (“That conclusion is reinforced 
by the fact that the consequence of allowing such a possibility would be that the class of persons 
to whom the [Union] rules on freedom of establishment were applied might vary from one 
Member State to another”). See also the detailed discussion in Chapter 2. 
74  Especially in a context of difficult economic circumstances and political pressure to reduce 
immigration. 
75  The immigration laws of the different Member States would obviously not be identical in scope 
or requirements. 
76  See Tryfonidou, "Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More 
Liberal Approach" (2009) 15 E.L.J., 634-653. Similar observations apply with regard to the Jia 
case; see Tryfonidou, "Jia or 'Carpenter II': The edge of reason" (2007) 32 E.L. Rev., 908-918. 
Chapter 4: Applicability of the free movement provisions 
 221
future prevent him from being joined by a non-EU (future) family member.  That 
explanation may be considered less than satisfactory, because of its hypothetical 
construct.  The stated problem however completely disappears if the following, 
second consideration is taken into account.  
 
In the second place, it must be emphasised that Directive 2004/38 not only confers a 
right to free movement, but also a right of residence in the host Member State, as is 
prominently stated in its title.77  A refusal of a right of residence to a non-EU family 
member of a Union citizen may not only interfere with that citizen’s right to free 
movement, but equally with his right of residence.  If a Union citizen would not, in 
the absence of prior lawful residence, have the right of to be joined by a non-EU 
family member, such would interfere with his continued residence in that Member 
State.  He would be forced to leave the Member State of residence of his choice and 
move to another Member State or even a third country in which he would be entitled 
to live together with his family members.  On this line of reasoning, it is clear that a 
refusal of a right of residence by the host Member State to a non-EU family member 
would trigger the competence of the Union. 
 
This second consideration was explicitly presented in the View of AG Poiares 
Maduro78 and figured also in the judgment of the Court, in particular in its answer to 
the second question, concerning the interpretation of Article 3(1) of Directive 
2004/38.79  In reply to that question, the Court stated that a Union citizen has the right 
to be joined by family members even if he founded a family after establishing himself 
in the host Member State.  The absence of such a right would not have been an 
obstacle to the free movement of persons under the narrow Akrich interpretation, 
because the Union citizen in the situation described cannot be said to lose, when 
moving to the host Member State, the right to legally reside with his family members.  
Yet the ECJ held in Metock and Others that it would constitute an obstacle to the free 
movement rights of the Union citizen concerned because it would be “such as to 
discourage him from continuing to reside there and encourage him to leave”.80  In 
other words, the ECJ focused on the “fundamental” right of residence 81  and the 
impact of a refusal of a residence right to family members on the enjoyment of this 
right. 
 
When the second consideration is taken into account, a satisfactory reply can be given 
to the two problems stated higher.  First, it is clear that, even if all Member States 
were to impose a condition of prior lawful residence, the refusal of a right of 
                                                 
77  AG Poiares Maduro has observed in this connection that Directive 2004/38, in contrast to earlier 
instruments on the free movement of persons, “places equal emphasis on the right to reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States” and that it is therefore “no longer only the 
mobility but also the stability and permanence of residence in another Member State that is 
intended to be secured” (View of AG Poiares Maduro, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others 
[2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 13). 
78  View of AG Poiares Maduro, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 13. 
79  Yet, more implicitly, this conception also figures in the Court’s answer to the first question. See 
in particular ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 63 (“The 
refusal of the host Member State to grant rights of entry and residence to the family members of 
a Union citizen is such as to discourage that citizen from moving to or residing in that Member 
State”; emphasis added) and para. 64. 
80 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 89.  
81  See ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 89. 
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residence to family members would amount to an obstacle to the right of residence of 
the Union citizen concerned, since such refusal might force the latter to leave to a 
third country, a possibility explicitly pointed at by the Court.82  Accordingly, the 
Court went further in Metock and Others than merely taking the potential conditions 
relating to family reunification in all Member States into account and requiring a 
“level playing field”.  It also explicitly referred to the possibility of family 
reunification in a third country.  Second, it is clear that, in circumstances where a 
Union citizen is only joined by a non-EU family member after his move to the host 
Member State, a refusal of a right of residence will obviously interfere with his 
continued residence in that State.  Consequently, the criticism voiced in legal 
literature in the sense that the Court in cases like Metock and Others is no longer 
concerned with obstacles to free movement rights can be rejected. 
 
A third consideration underlying the judgment in Metock and Others may have been 
the need to protect fundamental rights, the right to respect for family life in particular.  
As I have explained elsewhere,83 the extension of residence rights to family members 
of Union citizens was prompted not only by the need to take away obstacles to the 
exercise of free movement rights, but also by the need to respect fundamental rights.  
This has been acknowledged by the Court in a number of important judgments.84  
This fundamental rights rationale has in fact been a strong additional ground relied on 
by the Court to give a broad interpretation to the rights enjoyed by family members of 
Union citizens.  In Metock and Others, however, the Court, rather surprisingly, did 
not explicitly base its judgment on fundamental rights considerations.  The only 
explicit reference to fundamental rights is found to the Court’s observations on 
situations falling outside the scope of Union law.85 
 
Yet, the fundamental rights rationale is, arguably, implicit in the Court’s reasoning.86  
This appears from the Court’s reference to the case law just mentioned, which is 
grounded on fundamental rights considerations.  In this connection, it must also be 
remarked that the ECJ’s reference to “normal family life” clearly echoes the order of 
the President in the case. 87   In his order, the President considered that it was 
appropriate to apply the accelerated procedure because this would allow the Court to 
bring a swifter end to the legal uncertainty surrounding the scope of the free 
movement rights of non-EU family members, which was preventing the applicants 
from leading a “normal family life”.88  In this context, the President referred explicitly 
to the duty of the Union to respect Article 8 ECHR. 
 
The need to respect the right to respect for family life may indeed have been seen by 
the Court as an additional ground for its broad interpretation of the free movement 
provisions.89  Article 8 ECHR, in some circumstances, prevents Member States from 
                                                 
82  ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 89. 
83  See Chapter 5, infra. 
84  A famous example is ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279. 
85  ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 79. 
86  See Costello, "Metock: Free movement and 'Normal Family Life' in the Union" (2009) 46 CML 
Rev., 614. 
87  ECJ (Order of the President of 17 April 2008), Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241. 
88  See the discussion in Cambien, "Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister 
for Justice, Equality and Law Reform" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 327-330. 
89  While the need to respect fundamental rights does not in itself dictate the scope of Union law, it 
must inform the Court’s interpretation of secondary free movement legislation. 
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deporting family members of Union citizens or refusing them a right of residence.90  
By holding that the Member States are not entitled to impose a condition of prior 
lawful residence, the Court in fact interpreted the free movement provisions in a way 
apt to avoid breaches of Article 8 ECHR.  While it is rather unfortunate that the Court 
did not state these fundamental rights considerations explicitly, it was right in my 
view to ground its reasoning firmly in what I have called an “obstacles approach”.  
The reason is that Article 8 ECHR leaves the Member State a considerable margin of 
discretion in applying their immigration laws.  The Court’s interpretation of the 
provisions of Directive 2004/38, by contrast, arguably leaves less scope for Member 
States to do so (see the discussion under II.B.2.b., infra).  Consequently, the 
“obstacles approach” is preferable in order to guarantee the effective enjoyment of the 
free movement rights by Union citizens. 
 
Finally, and for the sake of completeness, it should be remarked that the ECJ also 
referred to the provisions of Directive 2003/86 to support its interpretation of 
Directive 2004/38.  Since the entry into force of Council Directive 2003/86,91 third 
country nationals lawfully residing in the territory of the Member States have the right 
to be joined by their family members.92  This right is evidently subject to certain 
conditions, but it is clear from the wording of the Directive that it cannot be made 
dependent on the condition that a family member has previously resided legally in 
another Member State.  As the Court pointed out in Metock and Others, to interpret 
Directive 2004/38 as permitting such a condition would lead to an anomalous 
difference between the rights of family reunification enjoyed by third country 
nationals and those enjoyed by Union citizens.93   
 
There is some force in this argument.  At a general level, it seems logical that Union 
citizens should not derive fewer rights from Union law than third country nationals.  
Moreover, Directive 2003/86 in its preamble specifically refers to the aim of granting 
third country nationals “rights and obligations comparable to those of citizens of the 
European Union,” as was agreed at the Tampere European Council.94  In this sense, 
the Court’s parallel interpretation of the two Directives 95  should certainly be 
welcomed, because it leads to some consistency to the Union rules on family 
reunification.  Still, the argument derived from 2003/86 would not, in my view, in 
itself justify the broad interpretation of Directive 2004/38.  The reason is that 
Directives 2004/38 and 2003/86 deal with fundamentally different legal regimes, and 
hence the parallelism between them is necessarily limited.96  The conclusion must be 
that it is an interesting argument, but in second order only. 
                                                 
90  See the discussion in Chapter 5, infra. 
91 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, [2003] 
O.J. L251/12. 
92 See generally Peers EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2006), at 213-218. 
93 As the ECJ noted: ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 69. 
94 Conclusions of the European Council held in Tampere on October 15 and 16, 1999 (1999) 10 
EU.Bull point 1.6.1, para. 21.  
95  Remark that in the Chakroun case, the Court, conversely, referred to the provisions of Directive 
2004/38 – as interpreted in Metock and Others – when interpreting of Directive 2003/86 (see 
ECJ, Case C-578/08 Chakroun [2010] E.C.R. [2010] I-1839, para. 64). 
96  Remark, for instance, that Directive 2004/38 requires an inter-State element, to the difference of 
Directive 2003/86. If the interpretation of Directive 2004/38 were to be completely axed on the 
provisions of Directive 2003/86, that requirement would no longer hold. This is not to say that 
an inter-State element is not relevant at all to the provisions on the right of free movement and 
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ii) Evaluation 
 
The foregoing makes clear that the ECJ was ready in Metock and Others to adopt a 
broad conception of “obstacles” to the free movement of Union citizens and hence of 
the Union’s competence in this connection.  To the difference of Akrich, the ECJ did 
not consider it sufficient to merely compare the actual conditions surrounding family 
reunification in the host Member State with those applicable in the Member State 
where the citizen concerned was established before moving.  Instead, the ECJ adopted 
a broader perspective, taking account of the fact that the potentially different 
conditions surrounding family reunifications in all the Member States would entail 
obstacles to the exercise of free movement rights.  Moreover, the Court did not limit 
its focus to obstacles to the exercise of the right to free movement, but equally 
considered possible obstacles to the right of residence in the host Member State.  This 
broad interpretation of the free movement provisions, entailing a broad construction 
of the rights enjoyed by non-EU family members of a Union citizen, is convincing, 
because it is apt to guarantee the effective enjoyment of the fundamental right to free 
movement and residence.  It is apt, moreover, to comply with fundamental rights 
standards and leads to a more harmonised treatment under Union law of Union 
citizens and third country nationals as regards family reunification. 
 
The consequence of the Metock and Others judgment is that non-EU family members 
of a Union citizen will have a right of residence in the host Member State, irrespective 
of whether they have previously resided legally in another Member State.  However, 
as the Court explicitly confirmed, the Union citizen concerned must have moved to 
another Member State. 97   The reason is that otherwise the refusal of a right of 
movement to or residence in another Member State would not be obstructed.  Once a 
Union citizen has moved to another Member State, however, he is also entitled to rely 
on Union law upon his return to his home Member State.  The legal soundness and 
evolution of this point will be examined in detail below, under “III”. 
 
b) Scope for effective immigration policies in the Member States?  
 
If we accept that the ECJ’s broad interpretation of the rights enjoyed by non-EU 
family members is justified in order to guarantee the effective enjoyment of the free 
movement of Union citizens, the next issue to address is the impact of this broad 
construction on the immigration policies of the Member States.  It is clear from the 
fact that ten Member States intervened in Metock and Others and from their strong 
support in favour of competence for the Member States to regulate the first access of 
non-EU family members to the Union territory that many Member States were 
                                                                                                                                            
residence of third country nationals (see the discussion in Carrera and Wiesbrock, "Whose 
European Citizenship in the Stockholm Programme? The Enactment of Citizenship by Third 
Country Nationals in the EU" (2010) 12 Eur. J. Migration & L., 354-357), but it surely takes a 
less prominent place in that context, which illustrates the fundamental difference in the current 
legal regime governing Union citizens and third country nationals. 
97  Namely a Member State of which he or she is not a national. After having moved to another 
Member State, the Union citizen concerened can invoke the said rights also upon his or her 
return to his or her home Member State. 
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concerned that the judgment would undermine their immigration policies.  The 
intervening Member States submitted that, in a context typified by strong pressure of 
migration, it was necessary to control immigration at the external borders of the 
Union.  They took the view that, if Directive 2004/38 were to be interpreted as 
prohibiting a host Member State from requiring prior lawful residence in another 
Member State, it would undermine the ability of the Member States to have an 
effective immigration policy because it would rule out an individual examination of 
all the circumstances surrounding a first entry into the Union.98 
 
It cannot be denied that the interpretation followed by the Court will have an impact 
on the immigration policies of the Member States.  It will have as a consequence that 
Member States will, under certain circumstances, have to grant a residence permit to 
third country nationals whom they would have previously refused one.  In Ireland, for 
instance, a residence permit now normally has to be given to non-EU spouses in 
circumstances like those in Metock and Others, even though at the national level such 
was previously considered undesirable.99  Given the erga omnes effect of preliminary 
rulings, 100  other Member States with immigration laws similar to the Irish 2006 
Regulations have also had to remove certain restrictions to the residence rights of 
non-EU family members of Union citizens.101  The net effect of this is that it will 
become easier for non-EU family members of a Union citizen to establish themselves 
in the Member States.  Not surprisingly, in some Member States in particular, the 
Metock and Others judgment has provoked fierce negative reactions.  For instance, in 
Denmark, high-ranking officials publicly reacted negatively to the judgment and the 
far-going impact it was perceived to have on the traditionally restrictive Danish 
immigration policies.102  The UK, for its part, put forward draft conclusions in the 
Council which, according to some commentators, served to curtail or even ignore the 
legal consequences deriving from the Metock and Others judgment.103  
 
Still, it is important to carefully analyse first the precise impact of the judgment on the 
competences of the Member States.  It is a striking aspect of the Metock and Others 
                                                 
98 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 71. 
99 See, for example, the interim decision in H.Ct. Ir., Gogolova and Others v. Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform [2008] I.E.H.C. 131. 
100 See Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray (ed.)), Constitutional Law of the European Union (2nd ed.) 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at 195. 
101 The UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, for instance, accepted the Metock and Others 
judgment and noted that it would “affect a number of Tribunal and Court of Appeal decisions.” 
(see HB (EEA right to reside - Metock) Algeria [2008] UKAIT 00069 (U.K.)).  
102  See Kirk, “Danish immigration law under fire after EU court ruling”, EU Observer, 29 July 
2008, available at http://euobserver.com/9/26557. The Danish Prime Minister reacted to the 
judgment by stating that Denmark would not change its immigration laws, which contained 
provisions similar to the Irish provisions contested in Metock and Others (see Kubosova, 
“Rasmussen Defends Danish Immigration Rules Against EU Law”, EU Observer, 28 August 
2008, available at http://euobserver.com/9/26652). The negative Danish reaction was explicitly 
noted in the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2008) 840 
final. See also the detailed discussion in Lansbergen, "Metock, Implementation of the Citizens' 
Rights Directive and Lessons for EU Citizenship" (2009) 31 Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law, 285-297. 
103  Peers, “The UK proposals on EU free movement law: an attack on the rule of law and EU 
fundamental freedoms” (2008) Statewatch Analysis, available at 
www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-72-eu-attack-on-fundamental-rights-08.pdf. 
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judgment that the ECJ was at pains to emphasise the limited impact of its judgment, 
probably in reaction to the well-voiced concerns on part of the Member States 
regarding the possible loss of competence to pursue effective immigration policies.  
The ECJ explained that its judgment was limited in two important ways.  On the one 
hand, it pointed out that the broad interpretation given to the free movement 
provisions would only benefit limited categories of persons.  The scope of the 
interpretation was, in other words, limited ratione personae.  On the other hand, the 
ECJ explained that the Member States are, within certain bounds, still able to restrict 
the right of residence of non-EU family members of Union citizens.  These limitations 
can be labelled limitations ratione materiae.  I will now analyse these different 
limitations, focussing on their extent and their possible consequences. 
 
i) Limited impact 
 
In the first place, the ECJ explained that the interpretation of Directive 2004/38 given 
in Metock and Others only concerns non-EU family members of a Union citizen who 
“accompany” or “join” him, provided that the other conditions of the Directive are 
also satisfied.  This means, first, that Directive 2004/38 does not prohibit Member 
States from applying the full set of their immigration laws with regard to non-EU 
nationals who are not family members of a Union citizen in the sense of Article 2(2) 
of Directive 2004/38. 104   Accordingly, only persons belonging to one of limited 
categories of family members of a Union citizen benefit from the broad interpretation 
given by the Court.  For instance, non-dependent ascendants,105 collateral ascendants 
or siblings of a Union citizen cannot, in principle, rely on Directive 2004/38 in order 
to claim a right of residence in the host Member State.  Second, only where the Union 
citizen concerned fulfils the classic condition of self-sufficiency,106 will his family 
members enjoy a derivative right of residence in the host Member State.  This 
excludes family members of a Union citizen who does not have sufficient resources to 
provide for their subsistence.  Third, since Directive 2004/38 only grants rights to 
family members who “accompany” or “join” a Union citizen, it in fact limits the 
rights of entry and residence of these family members to the Member State in which 
that citizen resides.107  Consequently, Metock and Others leaves the competence of 
the Member States with regard to non-EU nationals who are family members of a 
Union citizen who does not reside in their territory unaffected.108  Lastly, the Metock 
and Others judgment in no way impacts on the competences of the Member States 
with regard to non-EU family members of a Union citizen in purely internal 
situations.109  
                                                 
104 See the detailed discussion in Chapter 5, infra. 
105 See Article 2(2)(c) and (d) of Directive 2004/38. See the detailed discussion of the condition of 
dependency in Chapter 5, infra. 
106  See Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38. 
107 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 94.  
108 In Eind, the ECJ explicitly noted, with regard to the provisions on free movement of workers, 
that “[t]he right to family reunification under Article 10 of Regulation No 1612/68 does not 
entail for members of the families of migrant workers any autonomous right to free movement” 
and that it followed from this that “the right of a third-country national who is a member of the 
family of a [Union] worker to install himself with that worker may be relied on only in the 
Member State where that worker resides” (ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719, 
paras 23-24). 
109 That issue will be discussed in detail under III., infra. 
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In the second place, even the host Member State is still allowed to restrict the rights of 
entry and residence of non-EU family members of a Union citizen, within the 
confines of Directive 2004/38.  This essentially leaves two main grounds on which a 
refusal or termination of residence can be based.  First, under Article 27 of the 
Directive, the host Member State may restrict the free movement rights of non-EU 
family members of Union citizens on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health, provided that such measures comply with the provisions of Chapter VI 
of the Directive.110  Consequently, measures taken on grounds of public policy or 
public security must comply with the principle of proportionality111 and with certain 
procedural safeguards,112 and must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of 
the individual concerned.  It is further specified that previous criminal convictions 
may not in themselves constitute grounds for invoking public policy or public security 
reasons and that the personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a 
genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental 
interests of society.113  Accordingly, past offences will not normally justify a refusal 
of a right of residence.114  Moreover, any restriction of the free movement rights 
adopted on the grounds mentioned has to be in accordance with fundamental rights, 
the fundamental right to respect for family life in particular.115 
 
Second, under Article 35 of Directive 2004/38 (entitled “Abuse of rights”), the host 
Member State can refuse, terminate, or withdraw residence rights in the case of abuse 
of rights or fraud.  This provision of the Directive in fact refers to the principle of 
abuse of law, which is a general principle of Union law.116  The principle is often 
                                                 
110 Chapter VI of the Directive is entitled “Restrictions on the right of entry and the right of 
residence on grounds of public policy, public security or public health”. Detailed guidance on 
the application of these provisions can be found in the Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for better transposition and application of 
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2009) 313 final, which builds 
on the Commission Communication on the special measures concerning the movement and 
residence of EU citizens which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health, COM(1999)372. 
111  This implies that a less restrictive measure than a refusal of residence should not suffice to 
secure the interests involved. 
112  See Article 31 of Directive 2004/38. 
113 See Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38. See also ECJ, Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 
Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] E.C.R. I-5257, paras 66-68; ECJ, Case C-503/03 Commission 
v Spain [2006] E.C.R. I-1097, para. 46. 
114  Accordingly, if Akrich would have been decided now, the previous infringements committed by 
Mr. Akrich would probably not have constituted grounds for refusing him a right of residence 
(see Costello, "Metock: Free movement and 'Normal Family Life' in the Union" (2009) 46 CML 
Rev., 606). Nevertheless, particularly grave offences may still support such a refusal, as was 
clarified by the ECJ in Tsakouridis (ECJ, Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] E.C.R. nyr). The 
same may be true for persistent petty criminality: ECJ, Case C-349/06 Polat [2007] E.C.R., para. 
35. 
115  ECJ, Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] E.C.R. nyr, para. 50. 
116  See Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (Bray and Cambien (eds.)), European Union Law (3rd ed.) 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 853. For a detailed discussion of its application in the case 
law of the Courts, see Sørensen, "Abuse of Rights in Community law: A principle of Substance 
or Merely Rhetoric?" (2006) 43 CML Rev., 423-459; Waelbroeck, "La notion d'abus de droit 
dans l'ordere juridique communautaire", in Mélanges en hommage à Jean-Victor Louis vol. I 
(Brussels, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2003), 595-616; Triantafyllou, "L’interdiction 
des abus de droit en tant que principe général du droit communautaire" (2002) C.D.E., 611-632. 
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invoked in the context of the free movement of persons117 by Member States who 
claim that individuals make improper use of Union law in order to generate more 
favourable rights than they would normally be entitled to.  The Court has since long 
accepted that Member States may adopt measures to counter such abuses.118  In other 
words, it appears that where an individual fraudulently or improperly relies on the free 
movement provisions, Member States may deny him or her the benefit of these 
provisions.  In this sense, the principle of abuse can be seen as an exception or 
derogation to the free movement provisions, just like measures adopted on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health.  However, it appears that, just like the 
possibility for derogations on those grounds, the scope for Member States combating 
abuses of the free movement provisions is interpreted restrictively.  Again, such 
measures may only be adopted if they are proportionate and in accordance with a 
number of significant procedural safeguards119 and, again, such measures can only be 
adopted on a case-by-case basis.120  Besides, measures adopted on the basis of Article 
35 of the Directive must also comply with fundamental rights, in particular with the 
right to respect for family life and the right to marry.121   
 
In the context of the rights enjoyed by family members of Union citizens, three types 
of “abuse” can be distinguished.  In the first place, there are cases of what is 
commonly called “fraud”.  A good example in the context of the free movement of 
persons is the forgery of documents or the false representation of facts in order to rely 
on the benefits conferred by Union law on Union citizens and their family 
members. 122   For instance, a false passport or birth certificate could be used to 
fraudulently claim a family relationship with a Union citizen in order to qualify as his 
or her family member under Directive 2004/38.  The treatment of cases of fraud under 
Union law is rather straightforward, since it is generally accepted and uncontroversial 
that, when fraud is present, an individual may be denied the benefits of Union law.123 
 
In the second place, a Union citizen may attempt to create an artificial link with 
another Member State in order to bring himself within the scope of Union law and 
thereby claim the Union rights relating to family reunification, which are possibly 
more generous than those conferred by the national law of his Member State of 
residence.  This type of abuse, which is related to the doctrine of “purely internal 
                                                 
117  The principle was in fact first announced by the Court in the famous Van Binsbergen case, 
concerning the free movement of persons (see ECJ, Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] E.C.R. 
1299). 
118  See, e.g., ECJ, Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] E.C.R. 1299, para. 13; ECJ, Case C-212/97 
Centros [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 24. 
119 Article 35 of the Directive provides: “Member States may adopt the necessary measures to 
refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case of abuse of rights 
or fraud, such as marriages of convenience. Any such measure shall be proportionate and subject 
to the procedural safeguards provided for in Articles 30 and 31.” 
120  See Sørensen, "Abuse of Rights in Community law: A principle of Substance or Merely 
Rhetoric?" (2006) 43 CML Rev., 453 
121  See, respectively, Articles 8 and 9 ECHR and Articles 7 and 9 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 
122  See in this connection, the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, COM(2009) 313 final. 
123  See Sørensen, "Abuse of Rights in Community law: A principle of Substance or Merely 
Rhetoric?" (2006) 43 CML Rev., 431 
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situations”, is discussed in detail under “III”.  In this context, it must already be 
emphasised that Union law does not allow Member States much scope to invoke this 
type of abuse in order to deny a person the rights conferred by Union law.  First of all, 
it appears from the case law that the intention with which an individual relies on the 
Union free movement provisions is not relevant for the assessment of abuse.124  Even 
Union citizens who create a link with another Member States for the apparent sole 
reason of escaping the more restrictive laws of their Member State of residence, do 
not for that matter abuse the free movement provisions.125  Moreover, it appears that 
an acceptable link with another Member State can be very easily established, 
according to some lines of cases at least.  Below, I defend the view that the required 
inter-State element should, arguably, be interpreted in a more demanding way than 
certain cases do, in order to create more legal certainty and to avoid the creation of 
arbitrary distinctions between Union citizens.126  
 
In the third place, the free movement provisions can be abused by fraudulently 
establishing family relationships between a Union citizen and a non-EU national in 
order to enable the latter to claim the rights enjoyed under Union law by family 
members of Union citizens.  This type of abuse is essentially linked to the problem of 
“marriages of convenience”.127  This is the type of abuse Article 35 of Directive 
2004/38 is concerned with in the first place, as is apparent from its wording.128  As 
such, the Directive confirms the judgment in Akrich, in which the Court held that 
there would be an abuse if the free movement provisions were relied on in the context 
of a marriage of convenience.129  Such was explicitly stated not to be the case in the 
circumstances of the Metock and Others case.130  
                                                 
124  See, for instance, in the context of the free movement of workers: ECJ, Case C-109/01 Akrich 
[2003] E.C.R. I-9607, para. 55: “it should be mentioned that the motives which may have 
prompted a worker of a Member State to seek employment in another Member State are of no 
account as regards his right to enter and reside in the territory of the latter State provided that he 
there pursues or wishes to pursue an effective and genuine activity”. See also Opinion of AG 
Poiares Maduro in Case C-255/02, Halifax [2006] E.C.R. I-1609, para. 70. 
125  This is well illustrated by the Zhu and Chen case, in which the Court ruled that the fact that a 
Chinese mother went to Belfast in order to have her baby born there and acquire the Irish 
nationality because such would enable her to claim a right of residence in the UK, did not 
constitute an abuse of law (see ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925). 
126  See under III.C., infra. 
127  For a discussion, see de Hart, "The Marriage of Convenience in European Immigration Law" 
(2006) 8 Eur. J. Migration & L., 251-262 and the country-specific contributions in that issue. 
128  See also recital 28 in the preamble to the Directive: “To guard against abuse of rights or fraud, 
notably marriages of convenience or any other form of relationships contracted for the sole 
purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence, Member States should have the 
possibility to adopt the necessary measures” (emphasis added). Reference should also be made 
to Article 13(2) of the Directive, which states that in case of divorce, annulment of marriage or 
termination of registered partnership, non-EU family members will retain their right of residence 
on condition that “the marriage or registered partnership has lasted at least three years, including 
one year in the host Member State”. It is clear from the initial Commission proposal that this 
provision was inserted “in order to avoid people using marriages of convenience to get round the 
residence entitlement rules” (see Commission proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2001) 257 final, [2001] O.J. C270E/150, 
Article 13(2)). 
129 ECJ, Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, paras 57-58. 
130  For instance, had the marriages in the Metock and Others case been proven to be marriages of 
convenience, Ireland would not have been obliged under Directive 2004/38 to grant residence 
rights to the non-EU spouses concerned. The Irish High Court deemed, however, that none of 
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Detailed guidance on the application of Article 35 of Directive 2004/38 can be found 
in the Commission guidance on the transposition and application of Directive 
2004/38.131  A marriage of convenience is defined as a marriage that is “contracted 
for the sole purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence under the 
Directive that someone would not have otherwise”.132  The Commission explains that 
the Directive allows Member States to investigate individual cases where there is a 
well-founded suspicion of abuse, but that it prohibits systematic checks.  At the same 
time, it is pointed out that measures taken by Member States to fight against 
marriages of convenience may not be “such as to deter EU citizens and their family 
members from making use of their right to free movement or unduly encroach on their 
legitimate rights” and must not “undermine the effectiveness of [Union] law or 
discriminate on grounds of nationality”.   
 
ii) Consequences 
 
The conclusion from the foregoing discussion should be that Union law allows 
Member States to restrict the residence rights of non-EU family members of a moving 
Union citizen, but only insofar as this is justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health or in order to tackle abuse or fraud.  As should be clear from 
the discussion above, this leaves Member States only limited scope to apply their 
immigration laws vis-à-vis these individuals.  It is clear that even a pure and blatant 
infringement of national immigration laws is not a ground for refusing a right of 
residence to family members of Union citizens. 133   Such a refusal will only be 
acceptable where it is justified on the grounds just mentioned.  These derogations to 
the free movement provisions are to be interpreted restrictively, moreover, and have 
to be applied in accordance with demanding procedural safeguards and with 
fundamental rights standards.  Directive 2004/38, in fact, has the explicit aim of 
tightening the conditions under which these exceptions can be invoked, as compared 
with earlier free movement directives.134  Furthermore, the fact that an individual 
                                                                                                                                            
the marriages concerned was a marriage of convenience (ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and 
Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 46). 
131  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final. Detailed guidance can also be found in the earlier Council 
Resolution of 4 December 1997 on measures to be adopted on the combating of marriages of 
convenience, [1997] O.J. C382/1. 
132  The same definition can be applied mutatis mutandis to other relationships. See in this 
connection also Article 16(2)(b) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the 
right to family reunification, [2003] O.J. L251/12. That Directive contains, in its Article 16, a 
more detailed regime for dealing with abuses. See, on the difference in this regard between 
Directive 2003/86 and 2004/38, de Hart, "The Marriage of Convenience in European 
Immigration Law" (2006) 8 Eur. J. Migration & L., 257. 
133  This is confirmed by the Court in cases such as Ruiz Zambrano or Carpenter. 
134  See recital 22 in the preamble to Directive 2004/38: “The Treaty allows restrictions to be placed 
on the right of free movement and residence on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health. In order to ensure a tighter definition of the circumstances and procedural 
safeguards subject to which Union citizens and their family members may be denied leave to 
enter or may be expelled, this Directive should replace Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 
February 1964 on the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence 
of foreign nationals, which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
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assessment of each case needs to take place makes it impossible for Member States to 
adopt general measures to limit the immigration of non-EU family members of Union 
citizens.  General policy considerations such as the need to reduce immigration will 
not be a valid ground that can be relied upon in this connection.135    
 
There appears to be a big concern on part of the Member States that an excessive or 
improper use of the provisions on free movement of Union citizens and their family 
members will reduce their capacity to effectively pursue a coherent immigration 
policy.  Such is clear from the reaction of the Member States in the Council after the 
Metock and Others judgment.  After discussion of that judgment in the Council, the 
Council issued conclusions in which it stressed the need to prevent and combat any 
misuses and abuses of the free movement provisions.136  Similarly, the Council has, 
more recently, issued conclusions in which it welcomed the Commission’s guidance 
on the transposition and application of Directive 2004/38, but at the same time 
repeated in a very clear and explicit wording the need to tackle cases of fraud and 
abuse.137  The need to prevent and avoid abuse and fraud also figures prominently in 
the Stockholm Programme.138  In this context, the European Council has called on the 
Commission to closely monitor the implementation and application of the free 
movement provisions to avoid abuse and to cooperate with the Member States to 
effectively address abuses, inter alia by exchanging relevant information and 
statistics. 
 
The call for an effective application of Articles 27 and 35 of Directive 2004/38 can be 
welcomed in the context of a Citizens’ Europe.  Indeed, in cases where the conditions 
of application of those Articles are satisfied, over-arching interests are at stake, which 
justify restrictions being imposed on the exercise of free movement rights.  It is 
important that these derogations are cogently and coherently applied in order to deny 
the benefit of the free movement provisions to those who have no legitimate claim to 
them.  At the same time, there is a real concern that Member States, reluctant to 
accept the full consequences of the provisions on the free movement of Union citizens 
for their immigration policies, will make an overly broad use of the grounds for 
derogations just mentioned, going beyond the scope of application of these 
derogations, properly construed.  Telling in this connection are the conclusions of the 
2008 Commission report on the application of Directive 2004/38.  The report 
concluded that the overall transposition of the Directive was rather disappointing, 
particularly as regards the rights of entry and residence of family members and the 
                                                                                                                                            
health [(OJ, English Special Edition 1963-1964, p. 117), as amended by Council Directive 
75/35/EEC of 17 December 1974 (OJ 1975 L 14, p. 14)]”. 
135  See in this connection, Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38, which states that “Justifications that 
are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on considerations of general prevention 
shall not be accepted”. 
136  Council conclusions of 27 and 28 November 2008 on abuses and misuses of the right to free 
movement of persons.  
137  Council Conclusions of 21 September 2009 concerning the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. For a 
very critical analysis of an earlier – and more radical – draft of these conclusions, see Peers, 
“The UK proposals on EU free movement law: an attack on the rule of law and EU fundamental 
freedoms” (2008) Statewatch Analysis, available at www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-72-eu-
attack-on-fundamental-rights-08.pdf. 
138  See: “The Stockholm Programme — An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens”, [2010] O.J. C115/1. 
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provisions of Chapter VI.139  This may point at a reluctance on part of the Member 
States to accept the full consequences of the free movement provisions.  The 
Commission has announced that it will step up its efforts to ensure that Directive 
2004/38 is correctly implemented and applied, by cooperating with and offering 
assistance to the Member States,140 but also by launching infringement procedures.141  
It is to be hoped that the Commission’s efforts will lead to guaranteeing an effective 
application of the free movement provisions and prevent an overly broad use of the 
exceptions thereto.  
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Since the judgment in Metock and Others it has become crystal-clear that it suffices 
for a Union citizen to move to another Member State in order to derive from Union 
law a right to be joined or accompanied by his close family members.  It is not 
required that the family members concerned have resided legally in another Member 
State before moving to the host Member State nor is it required that the family 
relationship was established before either the Union citizen or his family members 
moved to the host Member State.  Consequently, Union law should govern the first 
entry of non-EU family members of Union citizens to the territory of the Union.  This 
broad interpretation of the scope of the free movement provisions is justified by the 
need for the Union to tackle obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental right to free 
movement and residence.  Moreover, a broad interpretation of the free movement 
provisions in this context is supported by important fundamental rights considerations 
and has the benefit of creating more uniformity in the rules relating to family 
reunification concerning Union citizens and third country nationals.     
 
At the same time, it is clear that this broad interpretation of the scope of the free 
movement provisions has a considerable impact on the immigration policies of the 
Member States.  Member States can no longer apply their immigration laws to family 
members of a Union citizen residing in their territory.  This restriction of the Member 
States’ powers regarding immigration seems to be a necessary corollary of the free 
movement of Union citizens.  Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the broad 
interpretation far from extinguishes the possibility for the Member States to pursue an 
effective immigration policy.  First of all, its consequences are limited ratione 
personae in that only affects certain categories of family members and only to the 
extent that the conditions of Directive 2004/38 are fulfilled.  Moreover, Member 
States are still allowed to restrict the free movement rights of family members of a 
                                                 
139  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2008) 840 final. 
140  The 2009 guidance was given by the Commission precisely in order to give assistance and 
information to the Member States and Union citizens, in particular in relation to the problems 
identified in the report (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, COM(2009) 313 final). 
141  See the Report cited in n. 140, under “5” and the Sixth Report from the European Commission 
of 27 October 2010 on progress towards effective EU Citizenship 2007-2010, COM(2010) 602 
final. 
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Union citizen on grounds or public policy, public security or public health or in case 
of abuse,142 although these grounds have to be interpreted rather restrictively.   
 
It can be concluded that the ECJ in Metock and Others succeeded at striking a delicate 
balance between the legitimate interests of the Member States in safeguarding 
effective immigration control and preserving the effet utile of the Union provisions on 
the free movement of persons. 143   While Member States generally retain the 
possibility of subjecting the first entry of third-country nationals to individual 
assessment, they may not craft their immigration laws in general terms that are 
detrimental to the rights of Union citizens, by denying them the right to lawfully 
reside with their non-EU family members.  One could conclude that immigration is 
firmly added to the fields in which Member State have to exercise their competence in 
accordance with the provisions on the free movement of Union citizens.144  As such, 
the broad scope of the free movement provisions inevitably leads to more harmonized 
national immigration laws, which is desirable in the light of the Union objective of 
approximation of national legislations on the conditions for admission and residence 
of third-country nationals.145  
 
The impact of the provisions on the free movement of Union citizens and their family 
members, especially after the broad interpretation given in recent case law, is a 
sensitive issue for many of the Member States, as is clear from the reactions from 
certain Member State officials and from the Council in the aftermath of the Metock 
and Others judgment.  This should not surprise as questions of admission of people to 
the national territory are always very close to questions of sovereignty.146  Moreover, 
family reunification in many European countries is the most important form of 
migration both in terms of numbers and in terms of its impact on the receiving 
society.147  There is a real concern that certain Member States will try to escape the 
full consequences of the free movement of Union citizens and their family members 
by making an overly broad use of the permissible derogations to the free movement 
provisions.  In this connection, the Union institutions have an important role to play to 
ensure the effective implementation and application of the free movement provisions, 
both through cooperation with the Member States and through rigid enforcement. 
 
                                                 
142  Besides, the Member States can still surround breaches of their immigration laws with sanctions 
that do not restrict free movement rights. As the ECJ held in Metock and Others: “even if the 
personal conduct of the person concerned does not justify the adoption of measures of public 
policy or public security within the meaning of Article 27 of Directive 2004/38, the Member 
State remains entitled to impose other penalties on him which do not interfere with freedom of 
movement and residence, such as a fine, provided that they are proportionate” (ECJ, Case C-
127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 97 (referring to ECJ, Case C-459/99 
MRAX [2002] E.C.R. I-6591, para. 77)). 
143  In this sense also Lansbergen, "Metock, Implementation of the Citizens' Rights Directive and 
Lessons for EU Citizenship" (2009) 31 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 285-297. 
144 A parallel could be drawn in this regard with, inter alia, the field of direct taxation. See, inter 
alia, ECJ, Case C-520/04 Turpeinen [2006] E.C.R. I-10685, para. 11. 
145 See Conclusions of the European Council held in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 15 1999 
(1999), 10 EU.Bull point 1.6.1., para. 20. 
146  X., “Editorial comments: The EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Implementing 
the Stockholm program” (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1307-1316. 
147  Groenendijk, "Family Reunification as a Right under Community Law" (2006) 8 Eur. J. 
Migration & L., 215. 
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III IS MOVEMENT REQUIRED AT ALL? 
 
A. Traditional approach 
 
1. Link with Union law 
 
The traditional orthodox approach to the applicability of the provisions on Union 
citizenship, in particular those relating to the free movement of Union citizens, is 
grounded in the Court’s longstanding approach to the applicability of the provisions 
on the free movement of economically active persons.  The Court has consistently 
held that the free movement provisions “cannot be applied to activities which have no 
factor linking them with any of the situations governed by [Union] law and which are 
confined in all relevant respects within a single Member State”.148  It follows that, 
according to the traditional approach, these provisions can only apply to situations 
presenting a link with Union law and this link is interpreted, moreover, as a link with 
two or more specific Member States. 149  Those provisions are not applicable, by 
contrast, to situations of which all relevant elements are linked to one Member State 
only.  After the introduction of the provisions on Union citizenship, the Court firmly 
stated that this case law remained valid and that the provisions on Union citizenship 
as such did not provide a sufficient link with Union law.150  It followed that Union 
citizens could only rely on the free movement provisions if their situation presented a 
link with two or more specific Member States.  Consequently, only under those 
circumstances could family members of a Union citizen claim residence rights based 
on Union law.  It is only with recent case law discussed under B that the Court seems 
to have abandoned its orthodox approach to some extent (see under III.B., infra). 
 
A link with two or more specific Member States is most commonly provided by the 
fact that a Union citizen has exercised his right to free movement by moving from his 
home Member State to another Member State and has taken up residence in the latter 
Member State.  Accordingly, the Union citizen concerned is entitled to claim in that 
Member State the rights conferred by Union law on Union citizens and their family 
members.  Once the right to free movement is exercised, a Union citizen may also 
rely on Union free movement law against his home Member State.  It is settled case 
law that Article 21 TFEU precludes a Member State from treating its nationals less 
favourably for the sole reason that they have exercised their free movement rights.151  
                                                 
148 See, e.g., ECJ, Joined Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan [1982] E.C.R. 3723, para. 16; 
ECJ, Case C-153/91 Petit [1992] E.C.R. I-4973, para. 8; ECJ, Case C-18/95 Terhoeve [1999] 
E.C.R. I-345, para. 26; ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 33.  
149  The underlying justifications of this orthodox approach will be discussed below (see under 
III.A.3., infra). 
150  See ECJ, Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] E.C.R. I-3171, para. 23: 
“In that regard, it must be noted that citizenship of the Union […] is not intended to extend the 
scope ratione materiae of the [Treaties] also to internal situations which have no link with 
[Union] law […]”. 
151  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas [2006] E.C.R. I-10451, para. 31. For a 
discussion of that case law, see Van Nuffel and Cambien, "De vrijheid van economisch niet-
actieve EU-burgers om binnen de EU te reizen, te verblijven en te studeren" (2009) 57 SEW, 
144-154. 
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Furthermore, in the famous Singh case,152 the Court held that a migrant worker who 
was lawfully residing with his spouse in the host Member State was entitled, upon his 
return to his home Member State, to be joined in that State by his spouse.  According 
to the Court, the spouse of a migrant worker in such a situation “must enjoy at least 
the same rights of entry and residence as would be granted to him or her under 
[Union] law if his or her spouse chose to enter and reside in another Member 
State”.153  Singh was concerned with the free movement of workers, but the same 
reasoning should probably apply more broadly to the free movement of Union citizens 
and their family members, irrespective of their economic activity.  Such is arguably 
confirmed by the Eind judgment, in which the Court seems to have applied the 
reasoning followed in Singh analogously to the situation of a Union citizen who was 
no longer economically active.154  
 
However, even before the recent case law discussed under III.B., the Court appeared 
to accept that a Union citizen must not necessarily move between two Member States 
in order to provide for a sufficient link with Union law.  In a number of cases, the 
Court accepted that Union citizens fell within the scope of Union law, despite the fact 
that they had never left their Member State of residence.  In Garcia Avello and Zhu 
and Chen, the Court appeared to accept that the fact that the Union citizens concerned 
possessed the nationality of a Member State other than their Member State of 
residence provided a sufficient link with Union law.155  In one case, the Court even 
considered that Union law was applicable where the spouse of a Union citizen had 
exercised her free movement rights, unlike that Union citizen himself. 156  All the 
same, it should be clear that in the cases just mentioned a clear link was present with 
two different Member States.  Precisely this link was relied on by the Court in order 
to consider the situation as falling within the scope of Union law.157   
 
The bottom-line is that the Court was traditionally willing to apply the provisions on 
the free movement of Union citizens only in situations that presented a sufficient 
“cross-border” dimension or “inter-State” element, i.e. a link with at least two specific 
Member States, even a tenuous one.  Once such a link was present, a Union citizen 
could rely on the full spectrum of rights conferred on him and his family members.  In 
the absence thereof, the Court considered the situation to be a purely internal one, to 
                                                 
152  ECJ, Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] E.C.R. I-4265, with case notes by White in (1993) E.L. Rev., 
527-532 and Fierstra in (1994) SEW, 198-202. For a critical discussion of the case, see 
Tryfonidou, "Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal 
Approach" (2009) 15 E.L.J., 634-653. 
153  ECJ, Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] E.C.R. I-4265, para. 23. 
154  See Bierbach, "European Citizens' Third-Country Family Members and Community Law" 
(2008) 4 EuConst, 356. 
155  See ECJ, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, para. 27 (Union citizens 
possessing the nationality of the Member State of residence and that of another Member State); 
ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 19 (Union citizen possessing the 
nationality of another Member State than that of residence). However, the Court clarified in its 
recent McCarthy judgment (ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr.) that this 
commonly accepted interpretation of at least the Garcia Avello judgment is wrong and that the 
possession of the nationality of another Member State was not a crucial element for the outcome 
of that case. See the detailed discussion under III.B.1.c., infra  
156  ECJ, Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] E.C.R. I-6421, paras 22-25. 
157  However, judgments like Garcia Avello can, under the new approach followed in the recent case 
law discussed below, be satisfactorily held to fall within the scope of Union law without it being 
necessary to rely on a link with two specific Member States. 
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which the Union law did not apply.  This approach is sometimes referred to as the 
“purely internal rule” or the “wholly internal rule”.  Only very recently, the case law 
has changed on this point to some extent (see the discussion under III.B., infra). 
 
For the sake of completeness, it must be pointed out, however, that there are 
provisions of Union law conferring rights on Union citizens whose application is not 
in any event dependent on the presence of an inter-State element.  The most famous 
example in this regard is no doubt Article 157 TFEU [ex Article 141 EC], which lays 
down the principle of equal pay for male and female workers.158  Similarly, some of 
the core citizenship rights can be exercised in one’s own Member State, regardless of 
any link to another Member State.  This is true, in particular, for the right to petition 
the European Parliament in accordance with Article 227 TFEU, the right to apply to 
the Ombudsman in accordance with Article 228 TFEU or the right to write to any of 
the institutions or bodies of the Union in an official language and have an answer in 
the same language (see Article 24 TFEU).  The right to diplomatic or consular 
protection under Article 23 TFEU, for its part, can only be exercised in a third country 
and does also not require a link to be demonstrated with two or more Member States.  
All the same, the rights I am concerned with here, namely the rights enjoyed by 
family members of Union citizens have traditionally been seen as a corollary of free 
movement and have been considered by the Court to apply only in situations 
presenting a sufficient inter-State element. 
 
2. Reverse discrimination 
 
One consequence of the orthodox approach is that only Union citizens whose situation 
is characterized by a sufficient inter-State element enjoy the rights conferred by Union 
law on Union citizens and their family members.  Conversely, Union citizens who 
find themselves in a purely internal situation, because their situation does not present 
a link with two or more specific Member States, cannot rely on these rights.159  This is 
clearly illustrated by the Morson and Jhanjan case,160 in which the ECJ held that two 
Dutch nationals working in the Netherlands had no right under Union law to bring 
their parents, of Surinamese nationality, into the country to reside with them.  As 
nationals working in their own Member State “who had never exercised the freedom 
of movement within the Union”, 161  their situation was to be regarded as purely 
internal. 162   This case was obviously decided before the introduction of Union 
citizenship, but its rationale remained valid afterwards. 
 
                                                 
158  This provision applies even if all relevant elements are situated within one Member State, as has 
been confirmed by the Court (see ECJ, Case 149/77 Defrenne [1978] E.C.R. 1365). 
159 See Craig and De Búrca EU law. Text, Cases, and Materials (4th ed.) (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 782-783. 
160 See ECJ, Joined Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan [1982] E.C.R. 3723.  
161 Ibid., para. 17. 
162 The situation in these cases should be contrasted with the one at hand in ECJ, Case C-370/90 
Singh [1992] E.C.R. I-4265. In that case, an Indian national had married a British national and 
travelled with her to Germany, where they had both worked for some years before returning to 
the UK. It was decided that Mr. Singh could claim the right under Union law to join his spouse 
in the UK because, through the period of working activity in another Member State, the Union 
legislation on the free movement of persons had become applicable.  
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Consequently, the orthodox approach followed in the case law can give rise to 
instances of “reverse discrimination”, i.e. Union citizens who find themselves in a 
purely internal situation being treated less favourably than Union citizens who can 
demonstrate a sufficient link with Union law.163  The reason is that Union citizens in a 
purely internal situation cannot rely on the rights conferred by Union free movement 
law, but only on the possibly less favourable rights conferred by the national law of 
their Member State of residence.  Instances of reverse discrimination do not infringe 
the Union principle of non-discrimination because the latter is not applicable to purely 
internal situations.  However, it must be emphasized that, with regard to the issue of 
rights enjoyed by family members of Union citizens, the scope for reverse 
discrimination is limited by reason of Article 8 ECHR.164 
 
3. Outline 
 
The purely internal rule has given rise to significant controversies and to passionate 
debates and fierce criticism in legal literature.  Even Advocates General have entered 
the debate, expressing different views on the issue and openly disagreeing with each 
other.165  Before discussing the possible and desirable evolution of the case law on 
this point, it is important to briefly outline the reasons for the current position of the 
Court and the main reasons why it may be problematic.  This will provide me with an 
appropriate framework for my analysis below.  
 
The fundamental reason for the existence of the purely internal rule lies rather 
obviously in the division of competences between the Union and the Member States.  
Union law has a limited scope of application and cannot be relied on, therefore, in 
situations that fall outside this scope.  On this fundamental level, the purely internal 
rule cannot, in my view, be questioned with good reason.  Reversing this rule, by 
                                                 
163 Different authors have given different definitions of the concept. The definition given here is 
one which suits the remainder of my analysis. It confirms to the view that seems to be most 
generally accepted among scholars. For a more nuanced and critical analysis of the doctrine, see, 
inter alia, Tryfonidou Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2009), 271 pp.; Tryfonidou, "Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: 
An Incongruity in a Citizens' Europe" (2008) 35 LIEI, 43-67; Nic Shuibhne, "Free Movement of 
Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" (2002) 39 CML Rev., 731-771; 
Papadopoulou, "Situations purement internes et droit communautaire: un instrument 
jurisprudentiel à double fonction ou une arme à double tranchant?" (2002) C.D.E., 95-129; 
Poiares Maduro, "The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Reverse Discrimination and 
Purely Internal Situations", in Kilpatrick, Novitz and Skidmore (eds.), The Future of Remedies 
in Europe (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), 117-140; Cannizzaro, "Producing 
'Reverse Discrimination' through the Exercise of EC Competences" (1997) YbEL 29-46 and, 
more specifically with regard to rights enjoyed by family members of Union citizens, Walter, 
Reverse Discrimination and Family Reunification (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), 78 
pp;  Goldner, "Family Reunification of European Community Nationals" (2005) Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law & Policy, 163-202; Groenendijk, "Familienzusammenführung als 
Recht nach Gemeinschaft srecht", (2006) 26 Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik, 
191-198. See the helpful overview of literature on the subject in Hanf, "'Reverse Discrimination 
in EU Law': Constitutional Aberration, Constitutional Necessity, or Judicial Choice?", (2011) 18 
MJ, 29-61. 
164 See ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 79. 
165  Compare Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 91 
to 97 and 122 and Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 
31. 
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allowing Union law to be applied in situations that present no link with Union law, 
would upset the entire Union construct and would belie some of its most basic 
principles, such as the principle of conferral.  The real contentious question, however, 
is where the line between the scope of Union law and that of national law should be 
drawn.  In other words: what should be considered a sufficient link with Union law in 
order for a situation to fall within the scope of Union law and when, conversely, 
should a situation be considered to be a purely internal one?  On this level, the 
orthodox approach, requiring an “inter-State” element can with more reason be 
criticised.  
 
Two main objections have been voiced against the traditional approach of the Court to 
the application of the free movement provisions.  In the first place, it is sometimes 
argued that it is incompatible with the concept of the internal market as an “area 
without internal frontiers”166 because in a true internal market the crossing of a border 
between Member States should not be a relevant distinguishing factor for the 
application of Union law.167  More broadly, the orthodox approach can be said to be 
contrary, for the same reason, to the idea of the Union as an “area of freedom, security 
and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured”. 168   In the second place, and more importantly for the purposes of my 
analysis, the current approach is sometimes said to be at odds with the provisions on 
Union citizenship.169  In this connection it is argued that the distinction drawn in the 
case law between Union citizens who can demonstrate an even tenuous inter-State 
element and those who cannot is arbitrary and that Union citizenship should, as the 
most fundamental status of nationals of the Member States170 embody a guarantee to 
equal treatment of Union citizens regardless of any further link with Union law.  
Accordingly, in the most extreme version of this argument, all instances of reverse 
discrimination of Union citizens should be held to violate Union law, the provisions 
on Union citizenship and equal treatment in particular. 
 
In order to remedy the problems stated, generally speaking, two solutions can be 
envisaged.  On the one hand, it can be argued that Union law should have a wider 
scope of application and that it should also apply vis-à-vis Union citizens who cannot 
demonstrate an inter-State element.  This could be achieved mainly by interpreting the 
status of Union citizen, or some of the rights associated with this status, as a sufficient 
link with Union law even in situations in which no further inter-State element is 
present.  On the other hand, it could be argued that the scope of Union law should be 
                                                 
166  See Article 26(2) TFEU. 
167  This idea was cogently put forward, inter alia, by Jessurun d’Oliveira: Jessurun d’Oliveira, "Is 
Reverse Discrimination Still Permissible Under the Single European Act?", in De Boer (ed.), 
Forty Years On: The Evolution of Postwar Private International Law in Europe (Deventer, 
Kluwer, 1990), 71-86. See also Opinion of AG Mischo in Joined Case 80/85 and 159/85 Edah 
[1986] E.C.R. 3359. 
168  See Article 3(2) TEU. 
169  See the discussion infra and, inter alia, Tryfonidou, "Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal 
Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens' Europe" (2008) 35 LIEI, 43-67; Nic Shuibhne, "Free 
Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" (2002) 39 CML Rev., 
731-771. See also Spaventa, "Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union 
Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects" (2008) 45 CML Rev., 13-45 and Jacobs, "Citizenship 
of the European Union - A Legal Analysis" (2007) 13 E.L.J., 591-610. 
170  Settled case law of the ECJ. See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193, 
para. 31; ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 82; ECJ, Case C-
135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para. 43. 
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more limited and that the Union free movement provisions should only be applicable 
to Union citizens who, besides demonstrating an inter-State element, demonstrate a 
sufficient obstacle to the exercise of free movement rights.  This would, arguably, 
result in a less arbitrary distinction between Union citizens who can invoke Union law 
and those who cannot. 
 
In the following, I will first discuss new proposals for determining the scope of 
application of the Union citizenship provisions which were advanced in recent case 
law (B).  These proposals contain different solutions for remedying the problems 
associated with the purely internal rule and all go in the direction of widening the 
scope of Union law.  Next, I will evaluate the different proposals in light of their legal 
soundness and their possible consequences and consider the most plausible and most 
appropriate future directions for the case law of the Union courts.  Consequently, I 
will put forward some arguments which go to some extent in the direction of a 
restriction of the scope of Union law (C).  I will then formulate an answer to the 
question raised above, namely does movement still matter for the applicability of 
Union law, and should it (D)? 
 
It is not my intention to exhaustively analyse or even set out the existing case law on 
the purely internal rule or to elaborate an all-encompassing new analytical framework 
for the scope of application of Union law.  Instead I will concentrate on cases 
involving Union citizenship and, more in particular, on the rights enjoyed by Union 
citizens relating to family reunification.  The question I will try to answer then 
becomes whether movement between Member States is or should be a relevant 
element to determine the rights enjoyed by family members of Union citizens.  
Consequently, I will not be concerned with cases involving the free movement of 
goods, in which reverse discrimination can also be a contentious issue,171 nor with 
arguments relating to the internal market or with arguments relating to the consistency 
in the application of Union law governing the different freedoms.172  My analysis is 
more limited in scope and could only be a basis for a more encompassing theory 
regarding the scope of application of Union law.  That being said, due attention will 
be paid to the legal soundness and consistency of the approach advocated in light of 
the general framework of Union law. 
 
B. Future evolution: widening the scope of Union law? 
 
In this section, I discuss new approaches to the determination of the scope of Union 
law which surfaced recently in the case law of the ECJ and in Opinions by Advocates 
General.  As stated higher, I will concentrate on cases concerning the rights enjoyed 
by family members of Union citizens.  I will first discuss the proposals done by AG 
Sharpston in her Opinions in the Flemish Care Insurance Scheme case and the Ruiz 
Zambrano case and the approach followed by the Court in Ruiz Zambrano and 
McCarthy.  Next, I will evaluate the soundness of these different approaches and their 
likely consequences. 
 
                                                 
171  See, for instance, Ritter, "Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi 
and Article 234 " (2006) 31 E.L. Rev., 690-710. 
172  See, on that issue, inter alia, the very interesting Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases 
C-158/04 and C-159/04 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos [2006] E.C.R. I-8135. 
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1. Proposals in case law 
 
a) Proposals AG Sharpston 
 
One of the most prominent advocates of a wider interpretation of the scope of the 
Union free movement provisions is AG Sharpston.  In two famous opinions, the AG 
has proposed to give a wider interpretation of the required link with Union law, which 
would enable the Court to apply Union law in situations not characterized by any 
inter-State element and thus falling outside the scope of Union law according to the 
orthodox approach outlined above.  To this purpose, she has relied essentially on the 
provisions of Union citizenship and the right to equal treatment enjoyed by Union 
citizens.  AG Sharpston did so for the first time in her Opinion in the Flemish Care 
Insurance case, which I will only briefly discuss below, because it involves an issue 
different from the main issue of my analysis.  She took up and further elaborated the 
ideas of that Opinion in a more recent Opinion, namely in the Ruiz Zambrano case.  
That case concerned exactly the subject I am concerned with here, namely the rights 
of non-EU family members of Union citizens, and will therefore be discussed in some 
detail below.  
 
As a preliminary remark, it should be emphasized that AG Sharpston is neither the 
first nor the only Advocate General who has defended the view that the provisions on 
Union citizenship could provide a sufficient link with Union law or that Union law 
should be held to preclude (to some extent) reverse discrimination of Union 
citizens.173  Already in 1995, AG Léger took the view that, taken to its ultimate 
conclusion, the concept of Union citizenship should lead to Union citizens being 
treated absolutely equally, irrespective of their nationality.174  AG Poiares Maduro, 
for his part, has expressed the view that “it is now clearly one of the fundamental 
objectives of the [Union] to ensure that no discrimination of any kind should arise as a 
result of the application of its own rules”.175  In Huber, AG Poiares Maduro added 
that “[t]he prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality is no longer merely 
an instrument at the service of freedom of movement; it is at the heart of the concept 
of European citizenship”.176  However, to my knowledge such statements have always 
appeared in a specific context or in an embryonic form rather than being fully 
elaborated into a coherent framework of analysis.  For that reason, I will concentrate 
on the Opinions of AG Sharpston, which do set out an elaborate analytical framework 
on this point.  
 
i) Flemish Care Insurance case 
 
                                                 
173  It has been noted in fact, with regard to early citizenship cases, that Advocates General have 
taken a much more inventive and transformative approach to Union citizenship than the Court 
(see Toner, "Judicial Interpretation of European Union Citizenship - Consolidation or 
Transformation" (2000) 7 MJ, 174). This trend seems to continue to some extent in recent years. 
174  Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa [1996] E.C.R. I-2253, para. 63. 
175  Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani [2004] E.C.R. I-8027, para. 
63.  
176  Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-524/06 Huber [2008] E.C.R. I-9705, para. 18. 
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The case concerned the Flemish Decree on the organisation of care insurance, which 
stipulated that it covered only persons working in the Flanders or Brussels region and 
residing in those regions or in another Member State.177  As a consequence, persons 
working in those regions, but residing in the French- or German-speaking region of 
Belgium were excluded from its scope.  Moreover, no comparable system of care 
insurance was in place in the French- or German-speaking region to which these 
persons could have recourse.  An action was brought before the Belgian 
Constitutional Court in which it was alleged, inter alia, that the residence requirement 
contained in the Decree violated the Union free movement provisions. 
 
In its judgment, 178  the ECJ considered that the contested residence requirement 
unjustifiably restricted the free movement of persons.  However, the Court considered 
this to be the case only vis-à-vis nationals of other Member States or Belgian 
nationals who had made use of their right to free movement.  The residence 
requirement was not, by contrast, contrary to Union law when applied vis-à-vis 
Belgian nationals who had never made use of their right to free movement because 
they fell outside the scope of Union law.  At the same time, the Court suggested, in an 
oft-cited paragraph, that the Belgian Constitutional Court could apply to purely 
internal situations a similar approach as the one applicable to situations falling within 
the scope of Union law.179  The Belgian Constitutional Court did not, however, take 
up this suggestion and declared the residence requirement invalid only to the extent 
that it was applicable to non-Belgian Member State nationals and to Belgian nationals 
who had made use of their right to free movement.180  
 
                                                 
177  Decreet houdende de organisatie van de zorgverzekering of 30 March 1999 (Moniteur belge of 
28 May 1999, 19149) as modified by Decreet houdende wijziging van het decreet van 30 maart 
1999 houdende de organisatie van de zorgverzekering of 30 april 2004 (Moniteur belge of 9 
June 2004, 43593). Before the 2004 modification, the Decree stipulated that only persons 
residing in Flanders or Brussels were covered.  
178  ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, with case notes by Dautricourt in (2008) R.D.U.E., 603-611; 
Martin in (2008) Eur. J. Migration & L., 365-379; Van der Steen in (2008) N.T.E.R., 301-307; 
Vandamme in (2009) CML Rev., 287-300. For a detailed discussion of the judgment and its 
consequences for the organisation of the Belgian social security systems, see Verschueren, "De 
regionalisering van de sociale zekerheid in België in het licht van het arrest van het Europese 
Hof van Justitie inzake de Vlaamse zorgverzekering” (2008) Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale 
Zekerheid, 177-231 and Verschueren, "Social Federalism and EU Law on the Free Movement of 
Persons", in Cantillon, Popelier and Mussche (eds.), Social Federalism: The Creation of a 
Layered Welfare State. The Belgian case (Antwerp-Oxford-Portland, Intersentia, 2011), 197-
226. 
179  ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 40 (“It may nevertheless be remarked that 
interpretation of provisions of [Union] law might possibly be of use to the national court, having 
regard too to situations classed as purely internal, in particular if the law of the Member State 
concerned were to require every national of that State to be allowed to enjoy the same rights as 
those which a national of another Member State would derive from [Union] law in a situation 
considered to be comparable by that court”).  
180  Constitutional Court, Judgment 11/2009 of 21 January 2009, with a case note by Van Elsuwege 
and Adam in (2009) 5 EuConst, 327-339. The judgment of the Belgian Constitutional Court was 
too a large extent based on considerations concerning the division of competences ratione loci 
within the Belgian Legal order (see on that issue, Velaers and Vanpraet, “De materiële en 
territoriale bevoegdheidsverdeling inzake sociale zekerheid en sociale bijstand (II)” (2009) TBP, 
195-218). 
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The Court did not follow the Opinion of AG Sharpston, in which she proposed that 
Union law should also be applied in the case of Belgian nationals working in Flanders 
or Brussels who had never made use of their free movement rights. 181  The AG 
observed that the organization of the Flemish care insurance created a sort of internal 
barrier in the sense that only (non-moving) Belgians living in certain regions of 
Belgium were entitled to the care insurance scheme.  She remarked in this connection: 
 
“I must confess to finding something deeply paradoxical about the proposition that, 
although the last 50 years have been spent abolishing barriers to freedom of movement 
between Member States, decentralised authorities of Member States may nevertheless 
reintroduce barriers through the back door by establishing them within Member 
States.”182 
 
The AG proposed to apply Union fee movement law also where the exercise of free 
movement rights was hindered by internal barriers resulting from the adoption of 
differing rules adopted by decentralized authorities within a Member State.  In this 
connection she pointed out, first, that the Court has been willing to apply the 
provisions on the free movement of goods to internal tariff barriers affecting free 
movement of goods. 183  This case law, based inter alia on the idea that internal 
barriers are not compatible with the internal market, could according to the AG be 
applied by analogy to the free movement of persons.  The AG found further support 
for her view in the provisions on Union citizenship.  She suggested that Article 21 
TFEU could possibly be interpreted as conferring not only a right to move and then 
reside, but also a right to reside without prior movement between Member States.  
That interpretation would make it possible for “static” Union citizens to invoke the 
principle of non-discrimination in their own Member State against a decentralised 
authority that “unquestionably exercises the auctoritas of the State”.184 
 
It should be clear that the suggestions of AG Sharpston in her Opinion in the Flemish 
Care Insurance case would be of interest first and foremost in situations where an 
internal barrier is created by the different rules adopted by autonomous decentralized 
authorities.185  The Court’s refusal to follow the suggestions of the AG probably rests 
on considerations related to the need to respect the division of competences between 
the Union and the Member States and on the consideration that Union law should not 
intervene in the internal division of competences within a Member State. 186  
                                                 
181 See Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and 
Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, paras 112-157. The AG 
added, however, that the ECJ would probably not wish to decide such a fundamental point in the 
case at hand and certainly not without reopening the oral procedure and inviting Member States 
to make their views on the issue known (ibid., para. 157). 
182  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 116. 
183  ECJ, Case C-163/90 Legros [1992] E.C.R. I-4625; ECJ, Joined Cases C-363/93, C-407/93 to C-
411/93 Lancry [1994] ECR I-3957; ECJ, Joined Cases C-485/93 and C-486/93 Simitzi [1995] 
E.C.R. I-2655; ECJ, Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani [2004] E.C.R. I-8027. 
184  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, paras 133-157. The AG specified that 
discriminations against certain categories of “static” Belgians could possibly be justified (ibid., 
para. 155). 
185  This situation could arise in federal Member States like Austria, Belgium or Germany, but also 
in other Member States with powerful regional entities such as, for instance, Italy or Spain. 
186  In fact, even the judgment of the Court, which takes a less radical line than the AG, has been 
criticized for unjustifiably interfering with the internal division of powers. See, amongst others, 
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Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere,187 there may be good reasons to apply 
Union law where the exercise of free movement rights is hindered by internal barriers 
in a Member State enacted by decentralized authorities with legislative powers.  As 
has been remarked, the Court has been willing to treat autonomous decentralized 
entities of a Member State as Member States for the purposes of the application of 
Union rules in other contexts.188  It could be argued that it should be willing to do so 
when applying the provisions on the free movement of Union citizens.189  I will not 
elaborate that point here, since the primary focus of my analysis is the scope of the 
residence rights enjoyed by family members of Union citizens and since the internal 
conferral of competences to autonomous entities within a Member State and the 
influence of Union law thereon will not normally be relevant for that issue.190  I will 
also not analyse in detail the part of the AG’s reasoning based on considerations 
relating to the internal market, as I am primarily focusing on the rights of family 
members of non-economically active Union citizens.191 
 
By contrast, the part of the reasoning of the AG grounded in Union citizenship is 
highly relevant for my analysis.  The idea that the provisions on Union citizenship in 
                                                                                                                                            
Cloots, "Germs of Pluralist Judicial Adjudication: Advocaten voor de Wereld and Other 
References from the Belgian Constitutional Court " (2010) CML Rev., 661-664; Verschueren, 
"Europese krijtlijnen voor een sociaal federalisme", in Cantillon, Popelier and Mussche (eds.), 
Naar een Vlaamse sociale bescherming in België en Europa? (Antwerp-Oxford, Intersentia, 
2010), 243-245. 
187  See the detailed discussion in Cambien, "Het vrij verkeer van burgers van de Unie in recente 
Europese rechtspraak: rethinking the classics?", in Foblets, Maes and Vanheule (eds.), 30 jaar 
Vreemdelingenwet (Bruges, Die Keure, 2011), 461-503. 
188  See the detailed discussion in Lenaerts and Cambien, "Regions and the European Courts: Giving 
Shape to the Regional Dimension of Member States" (2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 609-635. 
189  See Dautricourt and Thomas, "Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons under 
Community Law: All For Ulysses, Nothing For Penelope?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 450-454; Van 
Elsuwege and Adam, "Situations purement internes, discriminations à rebours et collectivités 
autonomes après l'arrêt sur l'assurance flamande" (2008) C.D.E., 705-709; Van Elsuwege and 
Adam, "The Limits of Constitutional Dialogue for the Prevention of Reverse Discrimination 
(Case note: Constitutional Court, Judgment 11/2009 of 21 January 2009)" (2009) 5 EuConst, 
337-339. This argument is problematic, of course, in the sense that it would reauire the Court to 
possibly upset the division of competences between the Union and the Member States. 
190  Even though, in theory a situation could be imagined in which different autonomous entities of a 
Member State enacted different rules regarding family reunification, thereby creating internal 
barriers to the free movement of persons. This hypothetical situation will be left aside for my 
analysis.  
191  In any event, is seems to me that the reliance on cases involving internal barriers to the free 
movement of goods is rather problematic, as there are relevant differences between 
(economically active) persons and goods. In this sense, see Martin, "Comments on 
Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon (Case C-212/06 of 1 
April 2008) and Eind (Case C-291/05 of 11 December 2007)" (2008) 10 Eur. J. Migration & L., 
370-371. See, more in general on the different regime applicable to persons and goods, e.g., 
Enchelmaier and Oliver, “Free movement of goods: Recent developments in the case law” 
(2007) 44 CML Rev., 659 et seq.; Snell, "And Then There Were Two: Products and Citizens in 
Community Law", in Tridimas and Nebbia (eds.), European Union Law for the Twenty-First 
Century: Volume II (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004), 49-72 and the discussion in 
Nic Shuibhne, "The Outer Limits of EU Citizenship: Displacing Economic Free Movement 
Rights?", in Barnard and Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2009), 167-195. See also Martenczuk, "Visa Policy and EU External 
Relations", in Martenczuk and van Thiel (eds.), Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for 
EU External Relations (Brussels, VUB Press, 2008), 21 (who explains the problematic nature of 
parallels drawn between persons and goods in a wholly different context, namely that of the 
EU’s visa policy). 
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itself could provide a sufficient link with Union law could remedy some of the 
problems associated with the traditional approach followed in the case law, as I have 
outlined above.  AG Sharpston further elaborated this reasoning in her more recent 
Opinion in Ruiz Zambrano.  
 
ii) Ruiz Zambrano 
 
Mr. Ruiz Zambrano was a Colombian national who came to Belgium in 1999, where 
he was later joined by his Colombian spouse and their first child, who had the 
Colombian nationality too.  His request for asylum was rejected by the Belgian 
authorities, who ordered him to leave the country.  In spite of that order, he remained 
in Belgium, where he repeatedly and unsuccessfully applied for a residence permit.192  
His applications were rejected because they did not satisfy the requirements of 
Belgian immigration law.  Between October 2001 and October 2006, Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano was gainfully employed, in a way compliant with the requirements of the 
Belgian social security system.  He did not, however, hold a work permit.  For this 
reason, his application for unemployment benefits, submitted after he was forced to 
quit his job,193 was refused by the Belgian authorities.   
 
The question to be answered by the ECJ was whether Mr. Ruiz Zambrano could 
derive a right of residence in Belgium from Union law and whether Union law would 
exempt him from the obligation to hold a work permit.194  The crucial element in this 
regard was that, during his stay in Belgium, Mr. Ruiz Zambrano’s spouse gave birth 
to a second and third child, who acquired the Belgian nationality on grounds of their 
birth in Belgium.195  Since these children are Union citizens, it was argued that Mr. 
                                                 
192  Mr. Ruiz Zambrano sought the annulment of those decisions and, in the meantime, requested the 
suspension of the order requiring him to leave Belgium. This allowed him to continue to remain 
in Belgium (Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 
21). 
193  Mr. Ruiz Zambrano was forced to quit his job after the Belgian labour authorities discovered 
that he was working without a work permit and ordered the termination of his employment (ECJ, 
Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 27). 
194  It is important to point out that the dispute before the referring Belgian court (the Tribunal du 
travail de Bruxelles) in fact concerned the rejection by the Belgian authorities of Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano’s claim for unemployment benefits. The outcome of that dispute was, however, 
completely dependent on the ECJ’s ruling on whether Mr. Ruiz Zambrano could derive a right 
of residence in Belgium from Union law. AG Sharpston pointed out that if Mr. Ruiz Zambrano 
derived a right of residence from Union law as the family member of a Union citizen (see the 
discussion below), the requirement to hold a residence permit would no longer apply under 
Belgian law (see Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, 
paras 39-40). For this reason perhaps, she did not explicitly consider the validity of the refusal of 
a work permit under Union law. The Court, by contrast, considered explicitly the validity under 
Union law of both the refusal to Mr. Ruiz Zambrano of a residence permit and the refusal to him 
of a work permit.  
195  Pursuant to Article 10(1) of the Belgian Nationality Code, in the version applicable at that time, 
children born in Belgium acquired the Belgian nationality if they would otherwise be stateless. 
However, since an amendment of that article in 2006, such will only be the case “if, by 
appropriate administrative action instituted with the diplomatic or consular authorities of the 
country of nationality of the child’s parent(s), the child’s legal representative(s) can obtain a 
different nationality for it” (see Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano 
[2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 16). This amendment was held to be constitutional by the Belgian 
Constitutional Court, but only when interpreted restrictively in the sense that the new wording 
only applies if the diplomatic or consular authorities referred to have no margin of discretion to 
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Ruiz Zambrano was entitled to reside with them in Belgium.  To support this point, 
Mr. Ruiz Zambrano heavily relied on the Zhu and Chen case, in which the Court held 
that a young minor Union citizen was entitled to be accompanied in the host Member 
State by the parent who is his or her primary carer.196  The problematic aspect of his 
argument was, however, that in contrast with baby Chen, the children of Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano had never resided in a Member State other than that of their nationality.  
For that reason, it seemed that the situation of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano was a purely 
internal one, in which no reliance on Union law was possible.  This point of view was 
defended before the ECJ by no less than eight Member States and by the Commission. 
 
In her Opinion,197 AG Sharpston, again, invited the Court to depart from its traditional 
approach to the issue of “purely internal situations”.  She made two proposals which 
would allow the Court to apply Union law to the facts of the case in the case, in spite 
of the prima facie absence of any inter-State element.198  Her first proposal was based 
on the view that Article 21 TFEU confers a right of residence in the Member States 
irrespective of any prior movement between Member States.  That interpretation 
would allow static Union citizens, such as the children of Ruiz Zambrano, to invoke 
the Union free movement provisions.  In this connection, the AG drew an explicit 
parallel with the Rottmann judgment, in which the Court held that the withdrawal of 
nationality, in the circumstances of that case, fell “by reason of its nature and its 
consequences” within the scope of Union law because it could lead to the loss of 
Union citizenship and the rights associated therewith.  According to the AG, a refusal 
of a right of residence to Mr. Ruiz Zambrano would similarly entail for his children 
the loss of one of the most important citizenship rights, namely the right to free 
movement and residence in the Member States, because they could not exercise this 
right independently given their young age.  On the basis of that reasoning, the 
situation of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano and his children would fall “by reason of its nature 
and its consequences” within the scope of Union law and thus reliance by Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano on Union free movement law would become possible.199  Naturally, it 
                                                                                                                                            
register the child and does not apply where it is not possible for the parents to have recourse to 
those authorities (Case 73/2008 of 24 April 2008). See also the discussion in van der 
Mei, van den Bogaert and de Groot, "De arresten Ruiz Zambrano en McCarthy - Het 
Hof van Justitie en het effectieve genot van EU-burgerschapsrechten", (2011) N.T.E.R., 
198-199. 
196  See the detailed discussion in Chapter 5, infra. 
197  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr. 
198  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 67-122. The 
AG did a third proposal which would also be apt to cure certain instances of reverse 
discrimination (Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, 
151-177). This third proposal was, however, mainly concerned with possible future evolutions 
of the scope of Union fundamental rights protection and could not yet be followed under the 
current stance of the law according to the AG. This third proposal is less important for my 
analysis. For this reason, I will discuss it only briefly below. 
199  The AG clarified that even if the interpretation of Article 21 TFEU as conferring an independent 
right of residence would not be accepted, the refusal of a right of residence to Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano would still constitute a potential obstacle to the future exercise by his children of their 
free movement rights as Union citizens and therefore their situation would still need to be 
considered to fall “by reason of its nature and its consequences” within the scope of Union law 
(Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 103). 
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would still be possible then that the refusal of a right of residence to them would be 
justified by a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim.200  
 
The AG’s second proposal - which would come into play if the Court would not be 
willing to follow her first proposal - was based on an innovative interpretation of the 
Union principle of equal treatment, which would be suitable to remedy reverse 
discrimination.  The AG suggested that Article 18 TFEU should be interpreted as 
prohibiting reverse discrimination caused by the interaction between Article 21 TFEU 
and national law where three cumulative conditions are satisfied.  First, it would have 
to be the case that a “static” Union citizen was treated less favourably than other 
Union citizens purely because of the fact that he or she had never exercised his or her 
free movement rights.  Second, the reverse discrimination complained of would have 
to entail a violation of a fundamental right protected under Union law.  The AG added 
in this connection that what constituted a “violation of a fundamental right” would 
have to be defined where possible by reference to the case-law of the ECtHR.  Third, 
Article 18 TFEU would be available only as a subsidiary remedy, confined to 
situations in which national law did not afford adequate fundamental rights protection.  
It would be the task of the national courts to apply these cumulative criteria. 
 
AG Sharpston was clearly looking for sound legal arguments that would enable the 
Court to escape the “black hole” of the wholly internal rule and allow it to apply 
Union law in cases like Ruiz Zambrano which lack a clear inter-State element.  The 
AG thereby did not propose to abolish that rule, but merely suggested possible 
interpretations of Union law which would allow Union citizens to establish a 
sufficient link with Union law even in situations which were under the traditional case 
law of the ECJ considered purely internal.  Her main concern was clearly that the 
traditional approach leads to reverse discrimination, which can be characterized as 
being arbitrary.  As was explained above, it is indeed the case that the only element 
that seemed to prevent Mr. Ruiz Zambrano to rely on the Zhu and Chen case law was 
the fact that his children had never exercised their right to free movement.  AG 
Sharpston called this situation “paradoxical” and expressed a certain sense of 
“unease” with it.201  As I will explain in the following, the Court followed a different 
approach which also enabled it to apply Union law in the circumstances of the case.  
Below I will analyse the different approaches of AG Sharpston and the Court and 
discuss whether they enable the Court to take away the current perceived arbitrariness 
while at the same time striking a proper balance between the effectiveness of free 
movement rights and the interests of the Member States. 
 
b) Ruiz Zambrano judgment  
 
As was explained higher, the Court has traditionally held that the situation of a Union 
citizen only comes within the scope of Union law if it presents a certain inter-State 
element, i.e. a link with two or more specific Member States.  In its judgment of 2 
                                                 
200  AG Sharpston was of the opinion that the Belgian refusal of a right of residence constituted a 
disproportionate interference, but added that this matter was ultimately to be decided by the 
national court (Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, 
para. 121). 
201  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 84 and 88. 
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March 2010 in Rottmann,202 however, the Court, arguably for the first time, departed 
from this approach and was ready to consider a more abstract link with the Union 
legal order as sufficient in order for a situation to fall within the scope of Union 
law.203  In paragraph 42 of that judgment the Court held that a decision of a Member 
State to withdraw a fraudulently obtained nationality fell “by reason of its nature and 
its consequences”, within the ambit of Union law.  The reason was that the decision 
would likely entail for the person concerned the loss of Union citizenship and the 
rights associated therewith.  The link with Union law lay thus in the fact that the 
person concerned would lose his most fundamental status under Union law and would 
no longer be able to exercise the rights associated with that status throughout the 
Union.  As I have explained in Chapter 1, it would be possible to argue, on grounds of 
that reasoning, that every decision involving Member State nationality that leads to 
the acquisition, loss or denial of Union citizenship now falls within the scope of 
Union law.  
 
A similar reasoning was followed by the Court in its judgment in Ruiz Zambrano.204  
In a remarkably short judgment, the Court pointed out that the children of Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano were undeniably Union citizens and that Union citizenship was, according 
to settled case law, the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States.205  
Referring to paragraph 42 of the Rottmann judgment, the Court stated that Article 20 
TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving Union citizens 
of the “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their 
status as citizens of the Union”.206  The Court held that the refusal of a residence 
permit and of a work permit to a person in a situation like Mr. Ruiz Zambrano had 
precisely this effect.  The reason was that a refusal of a residence permit would 
require that person’s children to accompany their parents to a third country.  
Similarly, the refusal of a work permit would entail the risk that that person would not 
have sufficient resources to provide for himself and his family, which would also 
result in the children having to leave the territory of the Union.  In both 
circumstances, the children would, as a result, be unable to exercise the substance of 
the rights conferred on them by virtue of their status as Union citizens. 207  That 
outcome would be at variance with Article 20 TFEU. 
                                                 
202  ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] E.C.R. I-1449., with case notes by Cambien in (2011) 17 
Colum. J. Eur. L., 375-394 and in (2010) SEW, 379-382; De Groot in (2010) Asiel & 
Migratierecht, 293-300; Jessurun d’Oliveira in (2010) NJB, 1028-1033; Kochenov in (2010) 47 
CML Rev., 1831-1846; Mouton in (2010) Revue de Droit International Public, 257-280; 
Oosterom-Staples in (2010) N.T.E.R., 188-194.  
203  I discussed that judgment and its possible consequences in great detail in Chapter 2. One could 
consider case Eman and Sevinger to be an early other example of this new approach towards the 
scope of Union law (ECJ, Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] E.C.R. I-8055). In that 
case, the Court held the Union principle of equal treatment to be applicable, even though the 
case did not present any inter-State link. The Court did not explicitly consider why Union law 
was applicable, but the reason was probably that the case concerned elections to the European 
Parliament, which provided a sort of abstract link with Union law.  
204  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, with Case Notes by Cambien in (2011) 
SEW 410-413, Hailbronner and Thym in (2011) 48 CML Rev., 1253-1270 and Nowak in (2011) 
Colum. J. Eur. L. (forthcoming). 
205  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 40-41. 
206  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 42. In other paragraphs of the 
judgment, the Court refers in this connection to the “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen”. Both expressions mean presumably the 
same. Throughout this chapter I will use the expression “citizenship rights”. 
207  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 43-44. 
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Consequently, the Court did not take up AG Sharpston’s proposal to interpret Article 
21 TFEU as conferring a free-standing right of residence or her proposal.  It even 
implicitly rejected it by holding that Directive 2004/38 could not find application.208  
Nor did it follow the AG’s proposal to interpret Article 18 TFEU as being applicable 
to certain instances of reverse discrimination.  The Court did not at all, in fact, 
consider the case from the angle of fundamental rights.  By contrast, the Court was 
clearly very much inspired by the parallel drawn by AG Sharpston with the reasoning 
followed in Rottmann, although it drew this parallel somewhat differently (see the 
discussion under III.B.4., infra).  In any event, the Court’s readiness to interpret 
Article 20 TFEU as providing a sufficient link with Union law in the circumstances of 
the case constitutes a very important evolution in the case law on Union citizenship.  
This new approach was again adopted by the Court, and further clarified, in its 
judgment of 5 May 2011 in McCarthy.209 
 
c) McCarthy judgment  
 
The applicant in the case, Mrs. McCarthy, was a British national who had lived her 
whole life in the UK.  In 2002, she married a Jamaican national, who was not, 
however, entitled to reside in the UK in accordance with the British immigration 
rules.  Since her mother was born in Ireland, Mrs. McCarthy also possessed the Irish 
nationality.  After her marriage, she applied for the first time for an Irish passport.  
Relying on this Irish nationality, Mrs. McCarthy and her husband argued that they 
were entitled to residence on the basis of Union law, namely in their capacity of 
Union citizen and husband of a Union citizen, respectively.  Their application was 
rejected, however, by the British authorities on the ground that the conditions for a 
right of residence on the basis of Union law were not satisfied.210 
 
The question to be answered by the Court was, again, whether the applicant could in 
the circumstances of the case rely on the provisions of Union law.  Mrs. McCarthy 
had never exercised her right to free movement and, consequently, her situation, 
prima facie, seemed to amount to a purely internal situation.  Yet, such was far from 
certain after the Court’s judgment in Ruiz Zambrano, rendered a mere two months 
earlier.  Moreover, the question arose whether the fact that Mrs. McCarthy possessed 
the nationality of another Member State than the Member State in which she resided 
could provide a sufficient link with Union law.  As explained higher, some earlier 
cases, the Garcia Avello case in particular, appeared to confirm that the possession of 
the nationality of two Member States was sufficient in order to enable a Union citizen 
to invoke Union law.  
                                                 
208  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 39. The Court relied in this 
connection on Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38, which provides that the directive applies to “all 
Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a 
national, and to their family members”. 
209  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr.. 
210  It is not fully clear whether this refusal was based on the fact that Mrs. McCarthy fell outside the 
scope of Union law or on the fact that she did not satisfy the conditions for a right of residence 
under Union law. Given that she was completely dependent on State benefits for her subsistence, 
she did in any event not satisfy the condition of self-sufficiency. The Court did not consider this 
element at all in its judgment, in contrast to AG Kokott (see Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-
434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 44). 
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The Court ruled that Union law was not applicable in the circumstances of the case.  
In the first place, Mrs. McCarthy could not rely on the provisions of Directive 
2004/38 because that Directive is only applicable to Union citizens who move to or 
reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national. 211  
Consequently, Mrs. McCarthy’s husband could not derive rights from the Directive 
either.  In the second place, Mrs. McCarthy could not invoke Article 21 TFEU since 
the contested national measure did not have the effect of depriving her of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of her citizenship rights or of impeding the exercise of her 
right of free movement and residence.212  In this connection, the Court explicitly 
distinguished the circumstances of the McCarthy case from those at stake in Ruiz 
Zambrano and Garcia Avello. 213   The fact that Mrs. McCarthy possessed the 
nationality of two Member States could not change anything with regard to these 
findings.  On the one hand, it did not change the fact that Mrs. McCarthy had never 
made use of her right to free movement.214  On the other hand, this fact did not trigger 
the application of national measures depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of her citizenship rights or impeding the exercise of her right of free 
movement and residence.215 
 
It is immediately apparent that the Court in McCarthy built on its judgment in Ruiz 
Zambrano in two regards.  First of all, it repeated its view that Directive 2004/38 does 
not apply to static Union citizens, while providing a rather more elaborate justification 
for this point of view.  Second, it repeated its holding that static Union citizens can 
fall within the scope of Union law where they are faced with a national measure 
depriving them of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights, 
although it found this not to be the case in the circumstances of the case.  Still, it must 
be pointed out that the judgment on this point presents two remarkable differences 
with the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano.  In contrast with the latter judgment, the Court 
based its decision in McCarthy on Article 21 TFEU rather than on Article 20 TFEU.  
Moreover, it did not only refer to the deprivation of the enjoyment of citizenship 
rights, but consistently made reference too to impediments to the exercise of free 
movement rights.  I will come back to these differences when analyzing the Court’s 
judgment in more detail below (see under III.B.4.a.ii., infra).. 
 
Before embarking on an analysis of the different proposals for enlarging the scope of 
Union law; it is important to make a point about an aspect of the McCarthy case that 
will be touched upon only sporadically below, namely the question of whether dual 
nationality can provide a sufficient link with Union law.  As pointed out higher, after 
the judgment in Garcia Avello, 216  many commentators took the view that the 
possession of the nationality of two Member States sufficed for a Union citizen to fall 
within the scope of Union law.  The case concerned a dispute regarding the family 
name of children of a Belgian-Spanish couple who lived in Belgium.  The Court 
                                                 
211  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 30-43. 
212  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 44-56. 
213  I will discuss this point in more detail below. 
214  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 40-41. 
215  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., para. 54. 
216  ECJ, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, with case notes by Ackermann in 
(2007) CML.Rev., 141-154; Foubert in (2005) SEW, 141-143 and Oosterom-Staples in (2004) 
N.T.E.R., 57-61. 
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accepted that the situation of these children fell within the scope of Union law, despite 
the fact that they had never left Belgium.  It pointed out that the children possessed 
both the Belgian and the Spanish nationality.  Consequently, their situation was that 
of nationals of one Member State (Spain) legally residing on the territory of another 
Member State (Belgium) and this was sufficient, according to the Court, to consider 
their situation as falling within the scope of Union law.217  On the substance of the 
case, the Court ruled that, as a consequence of the fact that the Belgian rules 
concerning the determination of surnames were different from the Spanish rules, the 
children would have to bear different surnames under different legal systems.  This 
situation was liable to cause serious inconvenience for them at both professional and 
private levels and, therefore, infringed Union law.218 
 
In McCarthy, the Court clarified that the fact that a Union citizen has the nationality 
of two Member States does not in itself provide a sufficient link with Union law.  It 
will only provide such a link if it triggers the application of national measures 
depriving the citizen concerned of the genuine enjoyment of his citizenship rights or 
impeding the exercise of his right to free movement.  On this point, the Court 
explicitly distinguished Garcia Avello from McCarthy.219  Thereby the Court in fact 
gave a narrower interpretation to Garcia Avello than would appear from a literal 
reading of that judgment.220  Moreover, the Court reformulated the Garcia Avello 
judgment in terms of obstacles to the right to free movement laid down in Article 21 
TFEU, whereas the case itself was unquestionably decided under the principle of non-
discrimination laid down in Article 18 TFEU.  It clearly follows that the Court is of 
the opinion that the possession of dual nationality is not in itself relevant for the 
applicability of Union law.  What matters is whether a national measure has the effect 
of depriving a Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of his citizenship rights or 
impedes his free movement.  This will be discussed in detail below (see under 
III.B.4.a., infra). 
 
One important remaining question is whether cases of dual nationality, as just 
discussed, must be distinguished from a situation in which a static Union citizen 
resides in a Member State other than that of which he possesses the nationality.  Zhu 
and Chen concerned a Union citizen who, just like Mrs. McCarthy, had never left her 
Member State of residence and who possessed the nationality of another Member 
State.  To the difference of Mrs. McCarthy, however, she did not posses the 
nationality of her Member State of residence.  The Court ruled, referring to its 
judgment in Garcia Avello, that this situation could not be assimilated to a purely 
internal situation.221  The question arises whether the judgment in McCarthy affects 
                                                 
217  ECJ, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, para. 27.. 
218  More specifically, the Court ruled that the refusal by the Belgian authorities to register the 
children under their surname formed in accordance with the Spanish rules constituted an 
unjustified discrimination of persons having the dual Belgian-Spanish nationality vis-à-vis 
persons having only the Belgian nationality.  
219  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 51-53. 
220  A literal reading of the Garcia Avello judgment gives the impression that the Court decided that 
the case fell within the scope of Union law purely on account of the fact that the children also 
had the Spanish nationality (see ECJ, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613, para. 
27; see similarly ECJ, Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul [2008] E.C.R. I-7639, para. 17). 
Possible impediments to the exercise of their rights are only discussed later in the Garcia Avello 
judgment, i.e. after the Court established that Union law was applicable to the case.  
221  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 19. 
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the outcome of such cases too.  In other words, it can be wondered whether the fact 
that a Union citizen has only the nationality of a Member State other than his Member 
State of residence suffices to bring him within the scope of Union law.  A literal 
reading of certain passages in the McCarthy judgment appear to support a negative 
answer.  In particular, the Court’s emphasis on the fact that only Union citizens who 
have moved to another Member State can rely on the provisions of Directive 2004/38 
would seem to support that conclusion.222  Still, it is probably the case that Union 
citizens like the applicant in Zhu and Chen have to be regarded as automatically 
falling within the scope of Union law, even after the McCarthy judgment.  The reason 
is that a static Union citizen who only possesses the nationality of another Member 
State than the one in which he resides can unquestionably be qualified as a Union 
citizen residing in a Member State other than the one of which he possesses the 
nationality.223  On this ground, Union law and Directive 2004/38 in particular will 
arguably be applicable to his situation.224   
 
2. Article 21 TFEU 
 
a) Self-standing right of residence  
 
The first proposal of AG Sharpston in her Opinion in the Ruiz Zambrano case was to 
interpret Article 21 TFEU as conferring a free-standing right of residence, irrespective 
of any movement between Member States and of a link with two or more Member 
States.  This would obviously entail a reversal of the existing case law, as the Union 
Courts traditionally systematically require a link with at least two Member States in 
order to apply Article 21 TFEU to a given situation.  
 
Article 21 TFEU confers the right to “move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States”.  This is the general right of free movement and residence 
enjoyed by Union citizens, of which the free movement rights conferred on the 
different categories of economically active persons are specific expressions.225  The 
right contained in Article 21 TFEU in fact “builds” on these previously existing 
specific free movement rights, but extends the group of beneficiaries of free 
                                                 
222  See in particular ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., para. 38. 
223  As required by Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38. He or she will never have resided in the 
Member State of his or her nationality, in contrast to persons like Mrs. McCarthy who will 
always have resided in a Member State of which they have the nationality.  
224  Accordingly, on this ground Zhu and Chen can be distinguished from McCarthy (see, in the 
same vein, Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 37). An 
additional justification for this distinction is that applying the provisions of Directive 2004/38 to 
Union citizens having the nationality of their Member State of residence is arguably in violation 
of international law (see ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., para. 34 and the 
discussion under III.B.2.a., infra), whereas this objection does not apply when the provisions of 
Directive 2004/38 are applied to static Union citizens who only posses the nationality of another 
Member State. 
225  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-193/94 Skanavi [1996] E.C.R. I-929fs, para. 22 (on the freedom of 
establishment); ECJ, Case C-100/01 Oteiza Olazabal [2002] E.C.R. I-10981, para. 26 (on the 
free movement of workers); ECJ, Case C-208/05 ITC [2007] E.C.R. I-181, para. 64 (on the 
freedom to provide services). 
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movement rights to include also non-economically active persons. 226   If that 
underlying, historical origin is taken into account, it should be clear that Article 21 
TFEU was based on the idea of a movement between Member States.  Indeed, the 
“classic” free movement rights of economically active persons necessarily require a 
movement between Member States as they are concerned with removing barriers 
between Member States in order to further the objectives of the internal market.227  
Certainly in the initial years, the free movement rights of Union citizens were entirely 
based on those of economically active persons, causing some commentators to 
characterise Union citizenship as a form “market citizenship”. 228   However, 
interesting to note is that the Court even in some recent judgments seems to confirm 
that the reasoning to be followed under Article 21 TFEU is completely analogous to 
the reasoning to be followed under the provisions on the free movement of 
economically active persons.229  
 
Still, it could be argued that the provisions on Union citizenship, and the significance 
that has gradually been attributed to them, supersedes the objectives of the internal 
market and that, hence, Article 21 TFEU should not be interpreted analogously with 
the classic free movement provisions.  As AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer has pointed out: 
 
“The creation of citizenship of the Union, with the corollary of freedom of movement for 
citizens throughout the territory of the Member States, represents a considerable 
qualitative step forward in that it separates that freedom from its functional or 
instrumental elements (the link with an economic activity or attainment of the internal 
market) and raises it to the level of a genuinely independent right inherent in the political 
status of the citizens of the Union.”230 
 
This has led some commentators to defend the theory that the rights laid down in 
Article 21 TFEU are not concerned with removing obstacles to the internal market 
and thus should find application regardless of any element of movement between 
                                                 
226  More precisely, the right of free movement and residence for non-economically active persons 
was in fact already laid down in three directives adopted in 1990: Council Directive 90/364/EEC 
of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, [1990] O.J. L180/26; Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 
June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity, [1990] O.J. L180/28; Council Directive 90/366/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the 
right of residence for students, [1990] O.J. L180/30, later replaced by Council Directive 93/96/EEC 
of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students, [1993] O.J. L317/59. On the historical 
origins of the general right of free movement and residence, see O'Leary The Evolving Concept 
of Community Citizenship: from the Free movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (London, 
Kluwer Law International, 1996), 109 et seq. and the many references cited therein. 
227  This is very well explained in Tryfonidou Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Alphen aan den 
Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2009), Chapter 1 and Papadopoulou, "Situations purement 
internes et droit communautaire: un instrument jurisprudentiel à double fonction ou une arme à 
double tranchant?" (2002) C.D.E., 117 et seq. See also, in detail, Spaventa Free Movement of 
Persons in the European Union: Barriers to Movement in their Constitutional Context (Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2007), 63 et seq. 
228  See Everson, "The Legacy of the Market Citizen", in Shaw and More (eds.), New Legal 
Dynamics of European Union (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), 73-89. See also O'Leary The Evolving 
Concept of Community Citizenship: from the Free movement of Persons to Union Citizenship 
(London, Kluwer Law International, 1996), 68-70. For an interesting argument that “market 
citizenship” may still be an appropriate descriptor of Union citizenship in its current state, see 
Nic Shuibhne, "The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship " (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1597-1628. 
229  See, in particular, ECJ, Case C-152/05 Commission v Germany [2008] E.C.R. I-39, paras 20-30. 
230  Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-65/95 and C-111/95 Shingara and 
Radiom [1996] E.C.R. I-3343, para. 34; Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-386/02 
Baldinger [2004] E.C.R. I-8411, para. 25.  
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Member States.  This application of Article 21 TFEU, which would mean a reversal 
of the Court’s case law, would allow to cure most instances of reverse discrimination, 
because even “static” citizens would in their home Member State be entitled to rely on 
Article 21 TFEU in order to claim the rights and benefits deriving from Union law.  
Tryfonidou has argued that reverse discrimination is a difference in treatment based 
on the fact that a person has not contributed to the construction of the internal 
market.231  This phenomenon can, still according to Tryfonidou, be explained by the 
fact that Union law traditionally only applied to persons who contributed to the aim of 
attaining the internal market and that, consequently, persons who did not so contribute 
could not rely on the rights conferred by Union law.  The introduction of the 
provisions on Union citizenship means that Union law no longer only includes within 
its scope persons who have contributed to the internal market.  Tryfonidou concludes 
that the criterion of having contributed to the internal market is no longer reasonable 
and that reverse discrimination is therefore no longer justified and should be held 
incompatible with Union law and with the principle of equal treatment in particular. 
 
I find it hard to fully agree with Tryfonidou’s analysis.  While I agree with her 
observations that reverse discrimination traditionally arose because Union free 
movement law was concerned only with persons contributing to the internal market 
and that the introduction of Union citizenship means that economic activity is no 
longer required for the Union free movement provisions to apply, I find the 
conclusion she reaches on this basis far from inescapable.  Even if the provisions on 
the free movement of Union citizens are no longer only concerned with economically 
active persons, they may still aim at promoting movement between Member States.  
Historically this aim was linked to the internal market, since guaranteeing the free 
movement of economically active persons would further the completion of the 
internal market.  With regard to non-economically active Union citizens, this aim may 
well be linked to other purposes, such as the need to strengthen European integration 
232or, in the case of students for instance, the need to strengthen the European higher 
education area.233  In other words “movement” has not necessarily become irrelevant 
as a criterion in a Citizens’ Europe.  Consequently, what Tryfonidou fails to 
acknowledge in my view is that the extension of the scope of beneficiaries of the free 
movement provisions was accompanied with an extension of or a shift in the purposes 
pursued by these provisions. 234  Accordingly, instances of reverse discrimination, 
made possible by the current application of Article 21 TFEU, should be analysed 
along the lines of these new purposes pursued.  If movement is relevant to the 
achievement of these purposes, Union free movement law may possibly still only 
                                                 
231  See Tryfonidou Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2009), 154 et seq. See also Tryfonidou, "Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal 
Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens' Europe" (2008) 35 L.I.E.I., 43-67. 
232  This view fits well with what Bauböck has labelled a “unionist perspective” to Union citizenship 
(Bauböck, "Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Supranational Union", (2007) 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 470). 
233  As is explicitly acknowledged in Communication from the Commission of 3 March 2010, 
EUROPE 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020. 
234  Admittedly, in one article Tryfonidou does seem to make a distinction between the aims pursued 
by the provisions on the free movement of economically active persons and the provisions on 
the free movement of Union citizens in general, without however specifying the latter or 
changing her findings in view of this distinction (Tryfonidou, "In Search of the Aim of the EC 
Free Movement of Persons Provisions: Has the Court of Justice Missed the Point?" (2009) 46 
CML Rev., 1591-1620).  
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apply to moving Union citizens,235 creating the possibility for unfavourable treatment 
of static citizens.  It is therefore far from an inescapable conclusion that the 
discrimination between static Union citizens and moving Union citizens should now 
be held incompatible with Union law. 
 
There are, in fact, strong arguments in favour of the view that Article 21 TFEU, even 
though it is not mainly concerned with the objectives of the internal market, still 
requires an element of movement between Member States.  First, it should be pointed 
out that the movement of Union citizens furthers some of the Union’s most important 
non-economic objectives, such as social cohesion and political integration.236  The 
crucial importance of the mobility of Union citizens is confirmed in various important 
policy documents such as the Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme237 
and the Commission guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 
2004/38.238  Residence in one’s own Member State – at least in the absence of any 
preceding movement - does not further these interests to the same extent, and could 
on that ground be argued not to be covered by Article 21 TFEU.  Against this 
background, it would be defensible to interpret Article 21 TFEU as being concerned 
with movement between Member States.  Accordingly, it would be logically coherent 
to limit its application to Union citizens who have moved between Member States. 
 
Very interesting in this connection is the Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in 
Petersen, in which he proposed a new framework for applying the provisions on the 
free movement of economically active Union citizens and non-economically inactive 
Union citizens.239  Simply put, the AG suggested that the protection afforded by the 
                                                 
235  This would possibly also comprise static citizens holding the nationality of another Member 
State, since their situation could arguably be equated to that of moving Union citizens. I will 
elaborate this point further below. 
236  The promotion of cohesion and integration are fundamental objectives of the Union, as is clear 
from Article 3(3) TEU and Title XVIII of the TFEU and from the preamble to the TEU). Where 
a Union citizen moves to another Member State and resides there, such will likely create bonds 
between nationals from different Member States and thereby foster social cohesion. Residence 
in another Member State entitles a Union citizen moreover to take part there, under certain 
conditions, in municipal elections (see Article 22(1) TFEU), which is beneficial for political 
integration. The aims of fostering social cohesion and integration are expressly stated in recitals 
17 and 18 to the preamble of Directive 2004/38. See also the discussion in Maas Creating 
European Citizens (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 100 et seq., who notes the argument 
that “increased mobility within Europe will facilitate building a shared political community” (at 
p. 102) and observers that “movers develop a sense of European loyalty and entitlement (at p. 
105). 
237  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Delivering an area of 
freedom, security and justice for Europe's citizens Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm 
Programme, COM(2010) 171 final, which states (at p. 4): “Facilitating citizens' mobility is of 
crucial importance in the European project. Free movement is a core right of EU citizens and 
their family members. It needs to be rigorously enforced”. 
238  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, which states (at p. 3) that “The free movement of citizens 
constitutes one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market and is at the heart of the 
European project and that the freedom of movement of persons is one of the foundations of the 
EU”. 
239  Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-228/07 Petersen [2008] E.C.R. I-6989, paras 
13-39. 
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provisions on the free movement of citizens should depend on whether there is a link 
to the fundamental rights or to the democratic factors of belonging to a political 
community. 240   The AG’s suggestions were not taken over by the Court in its 
judgment241 and I will not discuss them in any detail here.  The point of interest to 
note is that the AG’s proposal clearly shows that interpreting the free movement 
Union citizenship as going beyond the objectives of the internal market does not mean 
that movement between States becomes irrelevant, but rather that such movement 
may be thought to serve other, non-economic, objectives. 
 
Second, limiting Article 21 TFEU to cases of movement between Member States 
seems to accord with the intention of the Member States, the masters of the Treaties.  
Although the wording of Article 21 TFEU242 is inconclusive in this regard, it must not 
be overlooked that that Article explicitly states to be subject to the “limitations and 
conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them 
effect”.  An analysis of the wording of Directive 2004/38 strongly indicates that its 
provisions are limited to cases of movement between Member States, as was very 
well explained by AG Kokott in her Opinion in McCarthy243 and confirmed by the 
Court in Ruiz Zambrano244 and McCarthy.245  In McCarthy,246 the Court pointed out, 
moreover, that under international law nationals have an unconditional right to 
residence in their home State, irrespective of economic activity.  It would be 
problematic therefore to hold that Article 21 TFEU includes this right and subjects it 
to the “limitations and conditions” of Directive 2004/38.247   
 
                                                 
240  According to AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, if such a link was present, the provisions on Union 
citizenship, Articles 20 and 21 TFEU in particular, would come into play, both with regard to 
economically active and non-economically active Union citizens. This would have for a 
consequence that the Union citizens in question would be afforded the highest level of 
protection. In the absence of such a link, the margin of discretion of the Union legislature and 
the national authorities would be increased (see Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-
228/07 Petersen [2008] E.C.R. I-6989, paras 36-38). 
241  ECJ, Case C-228/07 Petersen [2008] E.C.R. I-6989 (the Court decided the case purely on the 
basis of the free movement provisions on economically active persons). 
242  The wording of Article 21 TFEU itself does not give a conclusive answer as to whether 
residence in one’s own Member State in the absence of any movement is covered by that article. 
As AG Sharpston has pointed out, there is no textual obstacle to interpreting the “right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States” as “freedom both to move and to 
reside” (Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and 
Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 144). In this respect, 
Article 21 TFEU is no different than Article 45(3)(b) TFEU. As AG Warner remarked in his 
Opinion to the Saunders case, the wording of that Article (which used to be Article 48(3)(b) 
TEEC) was not limited to movement between Member States (Opinion of AG Warner in Case 
175/78 Saunders [1979] E.C.R. 1129, p. 1143). The Court, however, clearly limited its 
interpretation of the Article to situations of “movement” (ECJ, Case 175/78 Saunders [1979] 
E.C.R. 1129, paras 10-11). 
243  Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 24-31. 
244  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 39.  
245  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 30-38. 
246  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 29 and 33-34 (referring to Article 3 of 
Protocol No 4 to ECHR). 
247  See, in this connection also ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719, para. 31. 
Admittedly, it does make a difference whether the right of residence is derived from 
international law or from Union law in terms of the residence rights enjoyed by family members, 
as is perfectly demonstrated by the McCarthy case.  
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Third, it is clear that the Court’s case law, as already indicated, seems to be predicated 
on the idea that Article 21 TFEU is necessarily limited to cases of “movement”.  This 
case law, holding inter alia that “Directive 2004/38 aims to facilitate the exercise of 
the fundamental right of residence of Union citizens in a Member State other than that 
of which they are a national” 248 is justified if considered in the light of the two 
observations just set out.  Admittedly, the Court has applied the free movement 
provisions in cases in which no physical movement was present, as was pointed out 
by AG Sharpston in her Opinion to Ruiz Zambrano as an argument in favour of her 
view that Article 21 TFEU is not limited to cases of movement.249  The two classic 
examples that are invariably cited in this context are Garcia Avello and Zhu and 
Chen.  Those cases were concerned, however, with the rights in one Member State 
enjoyed by nationals from another Member State.  Applying Union law in those cases 
is consistent with both the aims of the free movement provisions and their wording.250  
Moreover, Garcia Avello concerned national measures creating restrictions to the 
right to travel to other Member States rather than to the right of residence in one’s 
own Member State.  The possible application of Article 21 TFEU to the 
circumstances of that cases would arguably therefore not be justified on account of 
the mere fact that Union citizens residing in their own Member State had never left 
their Member State.  This will be further discussed below. 
 
Concluding, the first option for enlarging the scope of Union law would be to 
interpret Article 21 TFEU as conferring an independent right of residence in the 
Member States, irrespective of any inter-State element.  The main advantage of this 
approach would be that it would make reverse discrimination of Union citizens 
impossible, in contrast to the classic approach towards the free movement of Union 
citizens.  It would have for a consequence that any Union citizen residing in a 
Member State would fall within the scope of Union law, regardless of any movement 
between Member States, and could claim the rights conferred by Union law, the right 
to equal treatment in particular.251  Member States could, as a consequence, no longer 
deny the (more favourable) rights deriving from Union law to their static nationals.  
Specifically with regard to family reunification, it would mean that static Union 
citizens could also invoke the right to be joined or accompanied by family members, 
under the conditions of Directive 2004/38. 
 
At the same time, the suggested interpretation would potentially have a significant 
impact on the competences of the Member States 252  because Union law would 
become applicable in cases thought hitherto to be purely internal ones.  Specifically 
with regard to the rights enjoyed by family members of Union citizens, it would 
oblige Member States to accord to their own nationals the rights relating to family 
                                                 
248  ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 89. 
249  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 77-78. 
250  Member State nationals with the nationality of another Member State are undeniably nationals 
from another Member State. Giving them rights in their home Member State contributes to the 
integration of nationals from another Member State into the society of that State and thereby 
promotes social cohesion. It could be argued, moreover, that, at least in the Zhu and Chen case, 
the situation of the Union citizen concerned was brought within the scope of Union law by 
assimilating her situation to those of moving Union citizens. 
251  Each form of less favourable treatment of static Union citizens compared with moving Union 
citizens could be characterised as an obstacle to this right of residence in the own Member State.  
252  See Dautricourt and Thomas, "Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons under 
Community Law: All For Ulysses, Nothing For Penelope?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 449-450. 
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reunification laid down in Directive 2004/38, regardless of any inter-State element.  In 
some Member States, which accord their own nationals the same rights as Union 
citizens, 253  such would not have great consequences. 254   Other Member States, 
however, accord nationals who fall outside the scope of Union law lesser rights 
regarding family reunification than Union citizens falling within this scope. 255  
Depending on how strictly the requirement of an inter-State element is interpreted, 
these lesser rights regarding family reunification currently cover substantial groups of 
Union citizens. 256   Indeed, some authors have stated that the majority of Union 
citizens currently fall outside the scope of Union law. 257   Accordingly, the first 
proposal would entail in the second category of Member States that all nationals 
would be able to claim the rights regarding family reunification laid down in 
Directive 2004/38.  This would obviously have a substantial impact on the 
immigration policies of the Member States concerned.258  The suggested enlargement 
of Union law would not be restricted to specific circumstances, moreover, but extend 
to all Union citizens residing in a Member State without any further condition.  For 
this reason, of the three proposals discussed here, the first proposal is by far the one 
which would have the largest impact on the competences of the Member States.  
 
As explained in the foregoing, the suggested wide interpretation of Article 21 TFEU 
is problematic because it seems not fully in accordance with the underlying intentions 
of the Member States in adopting the provisions on the free movement of Union 
citizens or with the objectives pursued by those provisions.259  It is a doubtful basis 
therefore for such a major overhaul in the case law of the Union Courts, especially in 
                                                 
253  This has traditionally been the case in Belgium, for instance. The same is true, with some 
exceptions, in Spain and Italy. See the discussion in Walter Reverse Discrimination and Family 
Reunification (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), 15-19. Recently, however, a legislative 
proposal has been adopted to restrict the rights of Belgian nationals when compared to other 
Union citizens. See the legislative proposal (wetsontwerp) of 26 May 2011 “tot wijziging van de 
wet van 15 december 1980 betreffende de toegang tot het grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging 
en de verwijdering van vreemdelingen voor wat betreft de voorwaarden tot gezinshereniging”. 
For a detailed discussion of this legislative proposal, see Cambien, "Mogen statische 
Unieburgers worden gediscrimineerd? Enkele beschouwingen bij Ruiz Zambrano en McCarthy" 
(2011) T.Vreemd, 242-253. 
254  Even in Member States that accord exactly the same rights to all Union citizens, it will make 
some difference whether a Union citizen falls within the scope of Union law or not since Union 
citizens within the scope of Union law derive important procedural guarantees from Union law 
(see also n. 285 and accompanying text, infra).  
255  This is the case, inter alia, in Denmark and the Netherlands. For an overview of the legal regime 
surrounding family reunification of static Union citizens, mobile Union citizens and third 
country nationals in different Member States, see Walter Reverse Discrimination and Family 
Reunification (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), 5-23. 
256  For a discussion of how flexible or demanding the inter-State element is interpreted in the 
current case law, and the legal uncertainty currently surrounding this issue, see infra, under 
III.C.  
257  See, for instance Kochenov, "Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the 
Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 214. 
258  Remark in this regard that family reunification in many European countries is the most 
important form of migration both in terms of numbers and in terms of its impact on the receiving 
society (see Groenendijk, "Family Reunification as a Right under Community Law" (2006) 8 
Eur. J. Migration & L., 215). 
259  For this reason, I also find the parallel drawn by AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano with the 
Rottmann case to be problematic. As I explain below, a fruitful parallel with the Rottmann case 
can be drawn, however, when one focuses on Article 20 TFEU rather than on Article 21 TFEU 
(see the discussion under III.B.4., infra). 
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view of the fact that it would lead to a significant shift in the division of competences 
between the Union and the Member States.  As AG Sharpston remarked herself: “it is 
necessary to avoid the temptation of ‘stretching’ Article 21 TFEU so as to extend 
protection to those who ‘just’ fail to qualify”.260  This enlargement of the scope of 
Article 21 TFEU would probably require an intervention of the Union legislator (see 
the discussion under III.B.5., infra).  Besides, it could be objected to the first approach 
that if one is concerned with curing reverse discrimination, a solution should rather be 
founded on the basis of Article 18 TFEU.  This will be further examined below (see 
under III.B.3, infra).   
 
b) Obstacles to future movement  
 
On the basis of the foregoing, it can be concluded that Article 21 TFEU should not be 
interpreted, under the current stance of the law, as conferring a free-standing right of 
residence.  There is, however, an alternative approach which would allow treating 
Article 21 TFEU as a sufficient link with Union law even with regard to static Union 
citizens in their home Member State.  This approach, which is clearly apparent in the 
McCarthy judgment,261 focuses not on the right to residence in the home Member 
State, but rather on the right to leave the home Member State and move to another 
Member State.  It is thus in accordance with the view just set out that Article 21 
TFEU is concerned with taking away obstacles to movement between Member States.   
 
The Court has in the past held that Member States may not unjustifiably hinder the 
exercise of the right to free movement by their own nationals by making it difficult or 
impossible for them to move to another Member State.262  The most extreme such 
case is probably Jipa, 263 which concerned an outright prohibition imposed by the 
home Member State to travel to another Member State.  The Court confirmed that 
“the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the [Treaties] would be rendered 
meaningless if the Member State of origin could, without valid justification, prohibit 
its own nationals from leaving its territory in order to enter the territory of another 
Member State”.264  It could be argued that, in cases like Ruiz Zambrano or McCarthy, 
the refusal of a right of residence to the close family member of a Union citizen, 
would, in certain circumstances, force this citizen to follow his family members to a 
third country.265  As a consequence, it would, in practical terms, become impossible 
for them to travel from their home Member State to other Member States.   
                                                 
260  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 143. 
261  See, although not fully similar, the argument made by AG Sharpston (Opinion of AG Sharpston 
in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 98-103. 
262  In the context of the free movement of goods, such national measures would be qualified as 
“export restrictions”. 
263  ECJ, Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] E.C.R. I-5157. See the discussion in Oosterom-Staples, "Het 
fundamentele recht op vrij verkeer nader bepaald: het arrest Jipa onder de loep" (2009) N.T.E.R., 
12-17. 
264  The Court referred, by way of analogy to cases dealing with the freedom of establishment and 
the free movement of workers: ECJ, Case 81/87 Daily Mail and General Trust [1988] E.C.R. 
5483, para. 16; ECJ, Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] E.C.R. I-3453, para. 31; and ECJ, Case C-
415/93 Bosman [1995] E.C.R. I-4921, para. 97. 
265  This is true first and foremost where it concerns a non-EU family member. Where it concerns a 
Union citizen, it will normally be possible to establish a right of residence in his or her Member 
State of nationality. 
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There are, however, some potentially problematic aspects to the reasoning just set out.  
In the first place, it would seem prima facie that the refusal of a right of residence to 
family members of a Union citizen in cases like Ruiz Zambrano or McCarthy would 
induce that citizen to exercise his free movement rights rather than hinder him in 
doing so.  Indeed, by moving to another Member State the Union citizen concerned 
would bring himself within the scope of Union law and thereby secure a right of 
residence for himself and his family members in the Member States.266  Admittedly, 
one problem in this connection is that it is not clear from the case law what 
“movement” would suffice for a Union citizen in order to bring his situation within 
the scope of Union law.267  This uncertainty makes the incentive to exercise free 
movement rights perhaps less strong.  However, the natural way for the Court to solve 
this problem would be to bring further clarification to the precise inter-State element 
required for a situation to fall within the scope of Union law rather than using this 
problematic aspect of its case law as a ground to widen the scope or Article 21 TFEU 
(see the discussion under III.C., infra).  Another problem could be that a Union citizen 
and his family do not posses sufficient means in order to establish residence in 
another Member State, in particular where lawful residence in another Member State 
is required as a link with Union law.268  Under such circumstances, a refusal of a right 
of residence, would not provide an incentive for a Union citizen to exercise his free 
movement rights, but rather require him to leave for a third country.   
 
In the second place, even if it is accepted that a refusal of a right of residence to a 
close family member of a Union citizen, in the circumstances described, requires him 
to leave the Union to a territory where he cannot exercise his free movement rights, it 
does not automatically follow that such a situation falls within the scope of Article 21 
TFEU.  As the Court held in Kremzow, a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising 
free movement rights does not establish a sufficient connection with Union law to 
justify the application of Union provisions.269  In the case of Ruiz Zambrano, there 
was no indication of any intention on part of the children to move to another Member 
                                                 
266  Admittedly, the Court in Metock held that a refusal of a right of residence to a family member of 
a Union citizen would be incompatible with Union law where it would “discourage him from 
continuing to reside in a Member State and encourage him to leave in order to be able to lead a 
family life in another Member State or in a non-member country” (ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock 
and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 89). However, crucially, the Court made this statement 
with regard to the host Member State, not the home Member State. 
267  See the discussion on arbitrariness and uncertainty under III.C., infra. This point is sharply 
exposed by AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano. The AG wonders whether it could suffice for a a 
friendly neighbour to take Diego and Jessica on a visit or two to Parc Astérix in Paris, or to the 
seaside in Brittany in order for them to establish a sufficient link with Union law (Opinion of 
AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 86). It seems, however, 
not sensible, to accept that such a visit would be sufficient in this regard. Accordingly, on the 
facts of Ruiz Zambrano, there does not seem to be a realistic option for the children to establish 
a “cross-border” element. Hence, the refusal of a right of residence to their parents cannot 
realistically be said to induce them to exercise their right to free movement by moving to another 
Member State (see further the discussion below, under III.B.4.a., infra). 
268  See the discussion on arbitrariness and uncertainty, infra under III.C. 
269  ECJ, Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] E.C.R. I-2629, para. 16, with a case note by Brems in 
(1997) Colum. J. Eur. L., 474-479. See also ECJ, Case 180/83 Moser [1984] E.C.R. 2539, para. 
18. See also the discussion in Poiares Maduro, "The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of 
Reverse Discrimination and Purely Internal Situations", in Kilpatrick, Novitz and Skidmore 
(eds.), The Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), 122-
123.  
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State.  In such circumstances, the obstacle to the exercise of the right to free 
movement might be too “thin” in order to trigger the application of Article 21 TFEU.  
However, it appears that the Court has in recent cases adopted a more lenient 
approach towards possible future exercises of the right to free movement.270  In cases 
like Garcia Avello or Grunkin and Paul, for instance, it has accepted that 
impediments to the potential future exercise of the right to free movement can suffice 
in order to bring a situation within the scope of Union law.  Consequently, the second 
problem just mentioned seems to be no longer an issue. 
 
The conclusion from the foregoing is that Article 21 TFEU could, if certain conditions 
are satisfied, provide a sufficient link with Union law, even with regard to static 
Union citizens.  Specifically with regard to family reunification, a national measure 
refusing a right of residence to the non-EU family member of a static Union citizen 
would trigger the application of Article 21 TFEU if it would force the latter to leave 
the territory of the Union and thereby make it impossible for him to move from his 
Member State to another Member State in the future.  The Court accepted this 
reasoning for the first time explicitly in McCarthy.271  However, it explicitly linked it 
to the Court’s holding in Ruiz Zambrano that national measures depriving a (static) 
Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of his citizenship rights fall within the scope 
of Union law.  As I will explain below, impediments to the right to move to another 
Member State should be seen as one such instance of deprivation of the genuine 
enjoyment of citizenship rights.  I will therefore consider the conditions for its 
applications in more detail below in the framework of the discussion of the argument 
that measures depriving a Union citizen of the enjoyment of the substance of his 
Union citizenship rights should trigger the applicability of Union law (see under 
III.B.4., infra).  Since that argument, grounded on Article 20 TFEU, takes other 
citizenship rights into account besides the right to free movement, it is a more weighty 
and convincing justification for extending the scope of Union law to static Union 
citizens than Article 21 TFEU considered independently.   
 
3. Articles 18 and 21 TFEU 
 
I will now turn to the second proposal found in the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz 
Zambrano.  This second proposal is not so much centred on a wider interpretation of 
Article 21 TFEU, but rather on a wider interpretation of Article 18 TFEU, which lays 
down the principle of equal treatment.  It would allow applying Article 18 TFEU to 
certain instances of reverse discrimination, subject to a number of limitations.  In its 
most basic version, the proposal would come down to interpreting Article 18 TFEU as 
prohibiting reverse discrimination caused by the interaction between Article 21 TFEU 
and national law which entails a violation of a fundamental right protected under 
Union law, where at least equivalent protection is not available under national law.  
This would essentially subject the interpretation to three restrictive conditions, as I 
                                                 
270  See Van Elsuwege and Adam, "Situations purement internes, discriminations à rebours et 
collectivités autonomes après l'arrêt sur l'assurance flamande" (2008) C.D.E., 680.  
271  Previously, the Court had never held that a measure hindering the (future) exercise of free 
movement rights fell within the scope of Union law in a case where a previous inter-State 
element was absent On the facts of Jipa, for instance, it was clear that the case concerned the 
measures imposed by the Romanian authorities in reaction to previous illegal residence in 
Belgium and the decision of the Belgian authorities to repatriate.  
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pointed out above.272  In the following, I will try to determine the precise meaning of 
and justification for these limitations, which will allow me to evaluate the 
persuasiveness and legal soundness of the proposal. 
 
In the first place, it is clear that the proposal would only concern cases involving 
Union citizenship.  This would not, in my view, imply a large restriction ratione 
materiae, as Union citizenship is often used as a “triggering” element to claim rights 
in very diverse fields, even in fields which the Union is not competent to regulate.273  
By contrast, this probably would entail a restriction ratione personae, since it is clear, 
in my view, that legal persons are not Union citizens. 274   Moreover, the AG’s 
proposal only concerns cases involving Article 21 TFEU, so it would not entail any 
change as regards cases involving other fundamental freedoms than the free 
movement of persons, such as cases involving the free movement of goods.275  More 
difficult to determine is whether the AG’s proposal is limited to non-economically 
active Union citizens.  I do not think this is the case, because, first, Article 21 TFEU, 
in its most general sense, applies to both economically active and non-economically 
active persons and, second, the aim of the AG Sharpston proposal is to cure, under 
certain conditions, reverse discrimination, which can currently be inflicted on static 
citizens, regardless of whether they are economically active or not.276  It is clear, by 
contrast, that the proposal does not concern in the first place reverse discrimination in 
the carrying out of an economic activity, but rather reverse discrimination suffered in 
a field closely linked to the social or political dimension of the status of Union 
citizen.277  Rights related to family reunification could, in the current stance of Union 
law, certainly be said to belong to that dimension.278 
                                                 
272  See under III.B.1.b., supra. 
273  For a discussion, see Van Nuffel and Cambien, "De vrijheid van economisch niet-actieve EU-
burgers om binnen de EU te reizen, te verblijven en te studeren" (2009) 57 SEW, 144-154. 
274  White, Workers, Establishment, and Services in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 260-261. 
275  This means, for instance, that manufacturers of goods in a “purely internal situation” would not 
benefit from the new interpretation of Article 18 TFEU in order to claim more rights vis-à-vis 
their Member State (see, for instance, ECJ, Joined Cases 314-316/81 and 83/82 Waterkeyn 
[1982] E.C.R. 4337 and the resulting reverse discrimination for certain categories of French 
producers). See the discussion in Poiares Maduro, "The Scope of European Remedies: The Case 
of Reverse Discrimination and Purely Internal Situations", in Kilpatrick, Novitz and Skidmore 
(eds.), The Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), 120-
122. 
276  Remark in this connection that AG Sharpston explicitly states that her second proposal concerns 
Union citizens resident in their Member State of nationality “who had not exercised free 
movement rights under the TFEU (whether a classic economic free movement right or free 
movement under Article 21 TFEU)” (Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano 
[2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 146 (emphasis added)). 
277  In this connection, I suggest that a distinction could be made between Union citizens in their 
capacity of economic actors and Union citizens “as citizen”. The second proposal by AG 
Sharpston should in my view only concern the second set of cases. Some support for making 
such a distinction can be found in an Opinion of AG Jacobs, in which he stated “the present case 
concerns not the rights of citizens of the Union acting as such but the professional activities of a 
trade mark agent submitting an application to register a trade mark” (Opinion of AG Jacobs in 
Case C-361/01 P Kik [2003] E.C.R. I-8283, para. 47 (emphasis added)). Further support for this 
distinction can be found in the Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Petersen, which was 
briefly discussed higher (Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-228/07 Petersen 
[2008] E.C.R. I-6989, paras 13-39). 
278  See, for a detailed discussion in this sense, Goldner, "Family Reunification of European 
Community Nationals" (2005) Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy, 163-202. 
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A related question is whether the restriction of reverse discrimination to cases 
involving Article 21 TFEU would restrict the scope of Union citizenship cases 
concerning reverse discrimination in any meaningful way.  One could be led to think 
that every case of reverse discrimination suffered by a Union citizen is the direct 
consequence of the current interpretation of Article 21 TFEU as not being applicable 
to static citizens.279  This is correct, except, of course, when the Court’s recent case 
law is taken into account.  As a consequence of cases Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano, 
certain categories of Union citizens will be able to invoke Article 20 TFEU, but under 
rather restrictive conditions only.  This, again, creates the possibility of reverse 
discrimination of static Union citizens who do not satisfy the conditions for invoking 
Article 20 TFEU.  Consequently, reverse discrimination is at present more accurately 
made possible by the limited interpretation of both Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, even 
though it will still mainly arise as result of the limited application of Article 21 TFEU.  
The bottom-line is probably that Article 21 TFEU could limit the scope of AG 
Sharpston’s second proposal in the most meaningful way in the sense that it would 
exclude cases of reverse discrimination relating directly to economic activities.  
Applying such a limitation would leave the Court’s current interpretation of the 
economic free movement rights unaffected, at least as far as economic activities are 
concerned.280   
 
In the second place,281 the reverse discrimination concerned would need to entail a 
violation of a fundamental right protected under Union law and national law should 
not afford adequate protection of that right.  The fundamental right which is primarily 
relevant in this context is the right to respect for family life.  It is clear from the case 
law of the ECtHR, which the ECJ considers to be a guiding source, that the refusal of 
the right for close family members to reside with a Union citizen in the latter’s home 
Member State can constitute a violation of Article 8 ECHR.282  If national law in such 
a situation would not provide adequate remedies to protect that right in a way at least 
equivalent to the protection offered by Union law, a static Union citizen would be 
entitled to rely on Article 18 TFEU and claim equal protection of that right as is 
enjoyed by moving citizens.  Accordingly, the national court would have to apply to 
this Union citizen Union law and the protection contained therein of fundamental 
rights.  Consequently, the second proposal would make Union law a remedy for 
reverse discrimination where national law would tolerate a violation of the right to 
                                                 
279  Even in Zhu and Chen, which did not involve physical movement between Member States, the 
situation was considered to fall within the scope of Union law by applying Article 21 TFEU 
(ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 26).  
280  The issue of residence rights for family members of economically active Union citizens would 
come under the said proposal since it concerns the social dimension of Union citizenship rather 
than pure economic activity. In this regard, the proposal would mean a change towards the 
current interpretation of the provisions on the free movement of economically active persons.  
281  I treat the second and third condition mentioned by AG Sharpston in this connection together 
here, because that better suits the structure of my analysis.  
282  See the detailed discussion in Chapter 5, infra. On the facts of Ruiz Zambrano, AG Sharpston 
considered that if Mr. Ruiz Zambrano would be refused a right of residence by the Belgian 
authorities, Article 8 ECHR would likely be violated, inter alia on account of the fact that he 
had apparently become fully integrated into Belgian society and did not pose a threat or danger 
(Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 54-66). On 
the facts of McCarthy, AG Kokott considered that it could not entirely be ruled out that a refusal 
of a residence right to Mrs. McCarthy’s husband constituted an inference with Article 8 ECHR 
(Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 59-60). 
Chapter 4: Applicability of the free movement provisions 
 263
respect for family life by not granting sufficient rights to family members of a static 
Union citizen. 
 
There are a number of potential problems associated with this approach.  First of all, 
there is the apparent problem that the scope of Union law would be made dependent 
on the interpretation of national law by the national court.  This would, arguably, not 
be apt to guarantee uniformity and legal certainty throughout the Union.  However, it 
can be countered that the national court will normally be the institution best placed to 
evaluate the protection offered by national law.  Moreover, national courts are the 
“primary” courts responsible for applying and enforcing Union law in the Union legal 
system and allowing them the role described could be said to be in accordance with 
the Union principle of subsidiarity.  In line with this, Union law has a long tradition of 
“subsidiary protection”, as AG Sharpston remarked. 283  Admittedly, the examples 
cited by the AG concern national rules providing for effective protection of Union 
rules or principles and not national rules determining the scope of Union law.  Still, 
the problem of legal uncertainty or lack of uniformity could be overcome by allowing 
the Union Courts to review the national court’s interpretation of national rules on 
fundamental rights protection, in a way similar to what is possible with regard to the 
examples mentioned by the AG.  The Court has often reviewed the compatibility with 
Union law of an interpretation of national law by a national court, even where it 
concerned the scope of Union law.284  
 
Second, the question arises what the added value of Union law could be in situations 
involving a violation of fundamental rights caused by an inadequate national legal 
framework.  Since all Member States are in any event bound by the ECHR, a Member 
State which did not adequately protect, for instance, the right to respect for family 
life, would in any event be obliged to remedy this situation and bring its national legal 
framework in accordance with the guarantees flowing from the ECHR.  One could 
wonder therefore why it would be useful to apply Union law to the scenario described 
in the AG’s second proposal.  The answer is rather straightforward I believe.  Union 
law would apply precisely in those situations where the Member State, despite being 
bound by the ECHR, would not adequately protect the fundamental rights contained 
therein.  Allowing the national court to apply Union law in such situations would 
considerably strengthen the fundamental rights protection afforded to static Union 
citizens.  As has been remarked by Spaventa, the applicability of Union law entails 
significant procedural guarantees such as the possibility and duty for each national 
court to set aside national rules conflicting with fundamental rights protected by 
Union law,285 which would otherwise not necessarily be available to static Union 
citizens.  
 
Third, and most importantly, the proposal would entail a limited but certain 
enlargement of the scope of Union law – compared to how it is currently interpreted – 
                                                 
283  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para 148. The AG 
cited the examples of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, the right to effective legal 
protection and the principle of State liability for breach of Union law. 
284  The Metock and Others case (ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241) is a 
case in point: the Court reversed a decision of the national authorities, which reflected case law 
of that Member State’s highest court, in which it was considered that a situation fell within the 
scope of national law rather than that of Union law. 
285  Spaventa, "Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its 
Constitutional Effects" (2008) 45 CML Rev., 37-38. 
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and reduce the margin of appreciation of the Member States, which would have to 
comply with Union law in situations where this is at present not the case.  The 
question is whether the considerations justifying this enlargement of the scope of 
Union law carry sufficient weight to outbalance considerations relating to the need to 
preserve the scope of Member State powers.  AG Sharpston has pointed out that the 
ECJ has already been prepared, invariably sported by fundamental rights 
considerations, to give a generous interpretation of the scope of Union law in Union 
citizenship cases, but that the present case law lacks coherence and leads to random 
results.  It is precisely the importance of fundamental rights for Union citizens and the 
idea that making their protection depend on movement can no longer be sustained in 
the context of a Citizens’ Europe which brings her to suggest an approach which 
would enlarge the scope of Union law to some extent.  
 
It must, however, immediately be remarked that even fundamental rights are only 
protected under Union law in situations falling within the scope of Union law.  
Consequently, they cannot be invoked in the absence of a link with Union law.286  In 
other words, the mere fact that fundamental rights are violated cannot, according to 
settled case law, be considered sufficient to apply Union law.  The question arises 
therefore what link with Union law the AG’s second proposal is based on.  Perhaps 
the link with Union law in the situation described is offered by the paramount 
importance of fundamental rights in the Union legal order and their particular 
importance for Union citizens.  Fundamental rights could be said to carry a higher 
value than other rights associated with Union citizenship.  On this basis, it could be 
argued that the protection of a Union citizen’s fundamental rights should not be 
dependent on having moved between Member States.287  In this connection, it must be 
remarked that the Court in its Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy judgment relied on the 
fundamental nature of Union citizenship in order to extend the protection of Union 
law to static Union citizens.  National measures depriving a person of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights attached to Union citizenship are henceforth 
considered to fall within the scope of Union law. 288  It could be argued that the 
paramount importance attached to fundamental rights could similarly justify 
extending the protection for Union law to static Union citizens confronted with a 
national measure violating their fundamental rights.  Still, it must be remarked that 
accepting this position would mean a departure from long-standing settled case law on 
fundamental rights.   
 
Besides, one could object that if the approach followed in the AG’s second proposal is 
in fact concerned with the protection of fundamental rights rather than with equal 
treatment, the reliance on Article 18 TFEU to enlarge the scope of Union fundamental 
                                                 
286  See also the discussion in Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, "The Role of General Principles of EU 
Law", in Arnull, Barnard, Dougan and Spaventa (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States: Essays 
in European Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2011), 
179-197 and Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, "The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and 
General Principles of EU Law" (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1629-1669.  
287  For a forceful argument that fundamental rights considerations may be relied on to cure 
instances of reverse discrimination, see Nic Shuibhne, "The European Union and Fundamental 
Rights: Well in Spirit but Considerably Rumpled in Body?", in Beaumont, Lyons and Walker 
(eds.), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Oxford and Portland, Hart 
Publishing, 2002), 177-196. See also Eeckhout, "The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
Federal Question" (2002) 39 CML Rev., at 171-173. 
288  See the detailed discussion under III.B.4., infra. 
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rights protection is rather artificial.  Making the Union fundamental rights protection 
dependent on a direct link with Union law, provided for instance by the existence of 
Union competence 289  or by Article 20 TFEU, 290  may be thought to be more 
straightforward.  In this connection, it has been argued that the reliance on the 
principle of equal treatment does add an important dimension to the second proposal.  
An important rationale for having Union law apply in the scenario described above is 
that it is precisely Union law which creates a difference in the fundamental rights 
protection enjoyed by Union citizens, namely by affording only Union citizens that 
can rely on Article 21 TFEU the Union level of protection, while leaving other Union 
citizens with a potentially insufficient fundamental rights protection.  Accordingly, it 
has been argued that where Union law causes an unequal treatment it should offer the 
Member States the legal solution to remedy this treatment.291  Allowing the national 
courts to apply Union law in cases of inadequate fundamental rights protection offers 
them exactly such solution, 292  while at the same time making them the primary 
responsible for mastering and implementing the solution.  Still, this reasoning is 
problematic, because it is somewhat circular: in a sense, the fact that fundamental 
rights are only protected by Union law within the scope of Union law is relied upon in 
                                                 
289  See in this connection, the third and last part of the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano 
(Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 151-177). 
In this third proposal, AG Sharpston suggests to make the availability of Union fundamental 
rights protection dependent “neither on whether a Treaty provision was directly applicable nor 
on whether secondary legislation had been enacted, but rather on the existence and scope of a 
material EU competence”. For interesting observations on this part of AG Sharpston’s Opinion, 
see Craig, "The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis" (2011) 48 CML Rev., 429 
et seq.  
290  See the discussion under III.B.4., infra. 
291  This theory was advocated by Poiares Maduro, both in a scholarly contribution (Poiares Maduro, 
"The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Reverse Discrimination and Purely Internal 
Situations", in Kilpatrick, Novitz and Skidmore (eds.), The Future of Remedies in Europe 
(Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), 138-140) and in his Opinion in the Carbonati 
Apuani case (see Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani [2004] 
E.C.R. I-8027, paras 59-69). See also Nic Shuibhne, "Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly 
Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" (2002) 39 CML Rev., 764-766. Ritter has objected to this 
approach, arguing that it is the Member States and not the Union that cause reverse 
discrimination (Ritter, "Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi 
and Article 234 " (2006) 31 E.L. Rev., 706). I do not agree with Ritter’s view. Admittedly, 
stricter national rules give rise to instances of reverse discrimination and Member States have 
the power to take these instances away by changing their rules. Still, it can not be denied that the 
reverse discrimination in these instances arises in the first place because Union law offers more 
generous rights than the national legislator considered opportune for situations governed by the 
legal order of that Member State. 
292  This is particularly the case where the national court would not, under national law, be 
competent to remedy the inadequate fundamental rights protection. As Poiares Maduro remarks: 
“The best solution to the problems raised by the fact that some national legal systems are not 
prepared to deal with question of reverse discrimination arising from the European integration 
process, is the empowering of national courts through [EU] law” (Poiares Maduro, "The Scope 
of European Remedies: The Case of Reverse Discrimination and Purely Internal Situations", in 
Kilpatrick, Novitz and Skidmore (eds.), The Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000), 139). This point is perhaps illustrated by the Flemish Care 
Insurance case, although not in relation to fundamental rights. In the aftermath of that case, it 
has been argued that the Belgian constitutional framework was simply not adequate to remedy 
the reverse discrimination at issue (see the discussion in Van Elsuwege and Adam, "The Limits 
of Constitutional Dialogue for the Prevention of Reverse Discrimination (Case note: 
Constitutional Court, Judgment 11/2009 of 21 January 2009)" (2009) 5 EuConst, 327-339). 
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order to argue that Union law should be extended to violations of fundamental rights 
traditionally considered to fall outside the scope of Union law.293 
 
The bottom-line is that the second proposal of AG Sharpston is perhaps not altogether 
convincing.  The link with the principle of equal treatment is somewhat artificial.  
Moreover, it is doubtful whether a violation of fundamental rights can provide a 
sufficient link with Union law in itself, on account of their fundamental importance 
for the Union legal order.  The approach adopted by the Court in Ruiz Zambrano and 
McCarthy is perhaps more convincing.  Considering Union citizenship as a sufficient 
link with Union law, under certain, circumstances, is more straightforward and, given 
the fundamental status of Union citizenship, arguably more persuasive as an argument 
for extending the scope of Union law.  Below I will argue that fundamental rights can 
be considered a one as one of a package of rights attached to Union citizenship.  
National measures violating fundamental rights can therefore be considered to fall 
within the scope of Union law to the extent that they can be said to have as a 
consequence the deprivation of the person concerned of the genuine enjoyment of his 
Union citizenship rights.294  The explicit and intrinsic link with Union citizenship 
arguably provides a stronger foundation for the extension of Union law to static 
Union citizens confronted with certain measures violating their fundamental rights.  It 
is likely therefore that the ECJ will confirm and further consolidate this approach 
rather than adopt the second proposal of AG Sharpston. 
 
Still, the second proposal of AG Sharpston is not without merits.  Allowing Union 
law to be applied in situations where national law does not adequately protect 
fundamental rights considerably strengthens the protection of those rights and furthers 
the Union’s objective to constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with 
respect for fundamental rights.295  Certainly after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, and the ever growing importance attributed to fundamental rights,296 such 
enlargement of the scope of Union law would seem desirable.  At the same time, the 
scope of the enlargement and thus the impact on the competences of the Member 
States is rather limited if it is interpreted in accordance with the limitations set out 
higher.  Moreover, the proposal explicitly pays heed to the principle of subsidiarity in 
the sense that Union law would only be triggered where the national law of the 
Member States falls short.  The possibility cannot be excluded, therefore, that the 
Court will be willing to embrace the approach just discussed in a future case.  In this 
connection it must be remarked that the solution adopted by the Court in Ruiz 
                                                 
293  This is, of course, an oversimplification of the argument. AG Poiares Maduro explicitly points 
out that the mere fact that a situation arises from the limited scope of application of Union law is 
not sufficient to trigger the application of Union law. In this connection, he points out that in the 
situation described the principle of equal treatment is violated. Still, to some extent this 
argument appears to rely on the limited scope of application of the Union principle of equal 
treatment in order to justify an enlarged application of that principle. In this connection, it is 
certainly worth remarking that the Court in its judgment in the Carbonati Apuani case did not 
take over the suggestions from AG Poiares Maduro (ECJ, Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani 
[2004] E.C.R. I-8027). 
294  Such will normally only be the case where a national measure requires a Union citizen to leave 
the territory of the Union. See the detailed discussion under III.B.4., infra. 
295  See Article 67(1) TFEU. 
296  The most important innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are certainly the fact that the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights obtained legal value and the possibility for the Union to accede 
to the ECHR. See the discussion in Cambien and Roes, "Het Verdrag van Lissabon: anywhere as 
long as it's forward?" (2010) Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht, 195-206. 
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Zambrano does not provide a remedy in a case where a static adult Union citizen were 
refused the right to be joined by a non-EU family member.297  In such a case, the 
second proposal by AG Sharpston could provide a more satisfactory solution.  On the 
facts of McCarthy, for instance, it may be argued that the Court would have come to a 
different conclusion had it based its reasoning on Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, in line 
with the second proposal of AG Sharpston.298 
 
4. Article 20 TFEU 
 
In Ruiz Zambrano the Court accepted for the first time that Article 20 TFEU 
precludes Member States from adopting certain measures even with regard to static 
Union citizens.  Accordingly, the Court appears to have accepted that Union 
citizenship and the rights attached thereto can in certain circumstances provide a 
sufficient link with Union law, regardless of any inter-State element.  This constitutes 
a very significant change in the case law on Union citizenship because it entails a 
broader interpretation of the scope of Union law than was traditionally accepted.  The 
Court confirmed and to some extent further clarified this approach in its more cent 
judgment in McCarthy.299    
 
The consequence is that it is now accepted that Union citizenship can provide a 
sufficient link with Union law in certain circumstances.  However, it should be 
emphasised from the outset that it would be wrong to read the said cases as stating 
that Union citizenship, in accordance with Article 20 TFEU, will henceforth in all 
circumstances constitute a sufficient link with Union law300 and that, consequently, 
reverse discrimination of Union citizens is henceforth no longer tolerated by Union 
law.301  That interpretation is clearly at odds with the outcome in McCarthy, in which 
the Court held that Union law was not applicable in the circumstances of the case.  
The judgments should presumably be read as holding that (static) Union citizens can 
rely on Union law against national decisions that deprive them of the genuine 
                                                 
297  See the discussion under III.B.4.a., infra). 
298  This would, of course, depend on the assessment of whether the refusal of a right of residence to 
the husband of Mrs. McCarthy violated Article 8 ECHR (that possibility could not entirely be 
ruled out according to AG Kokott: Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] 
E.C.R. nyr, paras 59-60). 
299  Although in McCarthy, the Court based this reasoning on Article 21 TFEU.  I will explain below 
that the reasoning adopted in both cases is essentially the same and that Article 20 TFEU should 
be seen as the more general preferred legal basis for this approach. 
300  Under that interpretation, the said judgments would, in addition, clarify that Member States are 
precluded from depriving Union citizens from the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their 
citizenship rights. That prohibition would serves, on that interpretation of the judgment, as a 
limitation to the powers of the Member State where they act within the scope of Union law.   
301  See, in that sense, X, “La Cour franchit le Rubicon. Citoyen: la fin des situations purement 
internes” (2011) Journal du Marché Intérieur, available at 
http://jmieurope.typepad.com/jmi/2011/03/la-cour-franchit-le-rubicon-citoyen-la-fin-des-
situations-purement-internes.html (although preceding the McCarthy judgment). To be precise, 
taking the view that Union citizenship will henceforth constitute a sufficient link with Union law 
does not necessarily mean that one agrees that the possibility for reverse discrimination of Union 
citizens has been abolished. One could take the view that Ruiz Zambrano implies that Member 
States have a greater margin of appreciation with regard to static Union citizens than with regard 
to other Union citizens, since only Member State decisions that deprive static Union citizens of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights would be prohibited by Union 
law.   
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enjoyment of their citizenship rights.302  Consequently, Union citizenship will provide 
a sufficient link with Union law only in circumstances where a Member State measure 
would have the effect of depriving a Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of his citizenship rights.  Accordingly, the classification of a Member State 
measure as a measure entailing such deprivation serves to define the scope of Union 
law rather than the scope of the powers of the Member States in situations coming 
within the scope of Union law.   
 
This rather restrictive reading of the judgment is consistent with the Rottmann 
judgment, on which the Court relied to support its point.  In fact, the Court’s holding 
in Ruiz Zambrano that Article 20 TFEU precludes measures which have the effect of 
depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their rights is 
followed by “see, to that effect, Rottmann, paragraph 42”.303  That paragraph of the 
Rottmann judgment is concerned with the scope of Union law and not with limitations 
deriving from Union law, as I have explained in great detail in Chapter I.  In that 
paragraph, the Court held that a withdrawal decision fell within the scope of Union 
law “by reason of its nature and its consequences”.  The reason was that the decision 
entailed for the person concerned the loss of Union citizenship and the possibility to 
exercise the rights associated therewith throughout the Union.  It is clear that the 
Court aligned its decision in Ruiz Zambrano on this latter aspect, namely the 
consequences of the national decision.  Just like the withdrawal decision in Rottmann, 
the Belgian decisions in Ruiz Zambrano would render the Union citizens in question 
unable to exercise their citizenship rights.  In drawing this parallel, the Court was 
clearly inspired by the Opinion of AG Sharpston, who also relied on Rottmann in 
order to argue that the situation of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano and his children fell within the 
scope of Union law,304 although the AG connected this reasoning to Article 21 TFEU.  
 
In the following, I will try to determine the scope of the said judgments and their 
likely consequences with as much precision as possible.  Below I will evaluate 
whether the Court’s judgment provides a welcome new approach to the wholly 
internal rule.  By way of a general remark it must be pointed out that the judgments, 
in particular the one in Ruiz Zambrano, are remarkably brief and the Court’s 
reasoning remarkably succinct.  Consequently, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain 
the precise reasoning followed and the consequences of the judgments for the 
applicability of Union law in the future.   
 
                                                 
302  In McCarthy, the Court additionally made reference to impediments to the right to free 
movement. As I will explain below, impediment to the right to free movement should be seen as 
a specific instance of measures depriving a Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of his 
citizenship rights. 
303  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 42. That paragraph was, in turn, 
referred to by the Court in McCarthy (ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., para. 
47). 
304  See Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 93-97. 
The AG explicitly took over the famous wording of paragraph 42 of Rottmann, holding that the 
situation of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano and his children fell “by reason of its nature and its 
consequences” within the scope of Union law. I do not think this was entirely appropriate, since, 
as I explained in Chapter 2 the term “nature” in Rottmann most probably referred to the status of 
Union citizenship. This status was not as such affected in Ruiz Zambrano. Therefore it would 
seem more appropriate to hold that the situation fell within the scope of Union law only because 
of its consequences.  
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a) Analysis  
 
i) Substance of citizenship rights 
 
The first issue to determine is what exactly is meant by the expression “substance of 
citizenship rights”.  Unlike AG Sharpston, who connected the parallel with Rottmann 
explicitly to the loss of the right to free movement and residence, the Court did not 
explain what rights it was referring to.  Prima facie the most plausible interpretation 
of the phrase is that the Court referred first and foremost to the rights listed in Article 
20(2) TFEU.  As was discussed elsewhere,305 at least some of these rights can only be 
exercised in the territory of the Member States.  Consequently, national decisions 
forcing a Union citizen to leave the territory of the Union would make it impossible 
indeed to exercise those rights.  Moreover, the reference to the “substance” of these 
rights seems to indicate that the Court was concerned not just with any of these rights, 
but with the most important of them.306   
 
It cannot be disputed that the most important right in this connection is the right to 
free movement and residence laid down in Article 21 TFEU.307  Besides, it should be 
clear that the whole claim of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano was precisely based on the Article 
21 TFEU and the parallel reasoning in Zhu and Chen.  In McCarthy the Court even 
explicitly mentioned impediments to the right to free movement in this connection.  
As I have argued above,308 Article 21 TFEU can indeed be considered to be infringed 
where a Member State refuses a right of residence to a close non-EU family member 
of a static Union citizen.  This will be the case where that national measure forces the 
Union citizen concerned to leave the territory of the Union and thereby hinders the 
potential future exercise of the right to move between Member States.  Such will only 
be the case where the Union citizen concerned does not have the means to establish a 
connection with another Member State and thereby bring his situation within the 
scope of Union law.309   
 
Still, it would be wrong to limit the reference to the substance of the rights associated 
with the status of Union citizen to the right to free movement.  If that were the case, 
the Court would presumably have mentioned it explicitly in Ruiz Zambrano and there 
would have been no need for the Court to make an explicit distinction in McCarthy 
between national measures depriving a Union citizen of the enjoyment of his 
citizenship rights and national measures impeding the exercise of the right to free 
                                                 
305  See the discussion in Chapter 3, supra. 
306  Such is perhaps more clear from other language versions of the Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy 
judgments. The Dutch version employs the expression “de belangrijkste aan de status van burger 
van de Unie ontleende rechten”, the German version the expression “Kernbestands der Rechte 
die ihnen der Unionsbürgerstatus verleiht” and the French version the expression “l’essentiel des 
droits attachés au statut de citoyen de l’Union”. 
307  It is clear from the case law of the Court that this is the most important of the rights listed in 
Article 20(2) TFEU. The right to free movement is moreover the right that enables Union 
citizens to go to another Member State in the first place, where they could then exercise other 
Union citizenship rights. 
308  See under III.B.2.b., supra. 
309  In Ruiz Zambrano such was arguably the case. This may explain the Court’s insistence on the 
fact that the Belgian refusal of a work permit would leave the family without sufficient resources 
and require them to leave to a third country.  
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movement.  The other citizenship rights mentioned in Article 20(2) should probably 
also be taken into account.  It can be argued, for instance, that Union citizens who are 
forced to reside abroad cannot meaningfully exercise – or not to the same extent as 
Union citizens residing in the Member States – for instance the right to apply to the 
Ombudsman or the right to participate in European parliamentary elections.  The 
same is indubitably true for fundamental rights,310 which can also in this context be 
considered as citizenship rights.311   
 
The bottom-line is probably that the Court’s reference to the substance of Union 
citizenship rights should normally be understood as a reference to a “package” or 
“bundle” of rights associated with Union citizenship.  The right to free movement 
takes a prominent place in this connection.  The McCarthy judgment appears to 
indicate that impediments to this right can be sufficient in order to trigger the 
application of Union law, whereas in other cases it will normally required that the 
genuine enjoyment of some of the most important citizenship rights is impeded.  In 
this connection it must be pointed out that the Court seems not to have been 
concerned just with immediate and direct restrictions to the exercise of citizenship 
rights, but also with restrictions to the potential or future exercise of citizenship rights.  
In this light, the Court’s Ruiz Zambrano judgment becomes convincing.  Indeed, by 
forcing the children of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano to leave the territory of the Union, the 
Belgian refusal decisions would in fact make it impossible for them to grow up in 
                                                 
310  On the facts of Ruiz Zambrano, the Belgian refusal decisions would arguably restrict the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights, by forcing Union citizens to move to a third country with a 
potentially lesser level of fundamental rights protection, or even violate them (see the Opinion of 
AG Sharpston, in which the AG argued that the right to respect for family life was probably 
violated by the Belgian refusal decisions (Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz 
Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 54-66)). See also the Opinion of AG Kokott in McCarthy, in 
which she considered that the contested decisions possibly violated Article 8 ECHR (Opinion of 
AG Kokott in Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 59-60). It is striking that, 
unlike the Advocates-General, the Court did not make explicit reference to fundamental rights in 
Ruiz Zambrano nor in McCarthy. Perhaps the Court did not wish to single out fundamental 
rights as one citizenship right. Van der Mei, van den Bogaert en de Groot suggest that the Court 
was perhaps reluctant to refer to fundamental rights given that the material facts took place 
before the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a source of primary Union 
law (van der Mei, van den Bogaert and de Groot, "De arresten Ruiz Zambrano en McCarthy - 
Het Hof van Justitie en het effectieve genot van EU-burgerschapsrechten", (2011) N.T.E.R., 196-
197) and given the absence of an established link with Union law on the facts of the case. In my 
view this is not wholly convincing because the Court could well have drawn on other sources of 
fundamdntal rights, such as the ECHR – as the said authors rightly observe.  
311  Admittedly, fundamental rights are also enjoyed by third country nationals in the Union, but the 
same is true for some of the citizenship rights mentioned in Article 20(2) TFEU. Fundamental 
rights are often considered to be Union citizenship rights. This view is perfectly illustrated by 
the famous Opinion of AG Jacobs in Konstantinidis, in which the AG held: “In my opinion, a 
[Union] national who goes to another Member State as a worker or self-employed person […] is 
entitled not just to pursue his trade or profession and to enjoy the same living and working 
conditions as nationals of the host State; he is in addition entitled to assume that, wherever he 
goes to earn his living in the European [Union], he will be treated in accordance with a common 
code of fundamental values, in particular those laid down in the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In other words, he is entitled to say ‘civis europeus sum’ and to invoke that 
status in order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights” (Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case 
C-168/91 Konstantinidis [1993] E.C.R. I-1191, para. 46). The link between Union citizenship 
and fundamental rights is also explicit in the Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (see, in 
particular, Title V of the Charter, entitled “Citizens’ Rights”). For some critical views on this 
linking, see Besson and Utzinger, "Introduction: Future Challenges of European Citizenship - 
Facing a Wide-Open Pandora's Box" (2007) 13 E.L.J., 578. 
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Belgium and get educated there in the local language and nurtured in the local 
culture. 312   Thereby they would fail to develop the potential of their Union 
citizenship, which would enable them to meaningfully exercise the rights associated 
with that status at a later stage, such as the right to participate in European elections 
for instance.  As such, the Belgian decisions would effectively deprive them of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights. 
 
ii) Article 20 TFEU vs Article 21 TFEU 
 
As was remarked higher, the Court in McCarthy repeated its holding in Ruiz 
Zambrano that national measures having the effect of depriving a Union citizen of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of his citizenship rights fall within the scope of 
Union law.  It did so, however, with two remarkable differences.  In the first place, 
the Court based its decision in McCarthy on Article 21 TFEU rather than on Article 
20 TFEU.  In the second place, it stated that not only national measures depriving a 
(static) Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of his citizenship rights fall within the 
scope of Union law, but added that the same is true for national measures impeding 
the exercise of the right to free movement within the territory of the Member States.  
 
These differences can presumably be explained by the fact that in McCarthy the Court 
was asked by the referring court to clarify the scope of the right to free movement.  
Moreover, given that the case concerned a Union citizen possessing dual nationality, 
the Court inevitably had to clarify its Garcia Avello judgment, which – according to 
the Court’s current reading – also concerned the right to free movement.313  Besides, 
the right to free movement can probably be qualified as the most important citizenship 
right.  As was explained above, impediments to this right should probably be seen as a 
specific instance of measures depriving a Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of 
one of his citizenship rights.  The explicit reference to this right may indicate that the 
Court is of the opinion that impediments to the exercise of this right can suffice in 
order to bring a situation within the scope of Union law.  For other, less important 
Union citizenship rights such will not necessarily be the case.314  
 
Nevertheless, the said differences between Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy give rise to 
confusion with regard to the precise relationship between Articles 20 TFEU and 21 
TFEU.  It would be preferable therefore if the Court would base its holding regarding 
national measures depriving a Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of his 
citizenship rights consistently on Article 20 TFEU.  Article 20 TFEU is a more 
satisfactory legal basis given that Article 20(2) TFEU lists the various citizenship 
rights.  Where relevant, the Court can, of course, add Article 21 TFEU as a legal 
basis, plus an explicit reference to impediments to the right to free movement.  
                                                 
312  See also Hailbronner and Thym, who state that “during the identity-shaping ealy years of their 
lives, EU citizens should not be obliged to leave the Member States and so be socialized outside 
Europe for the sole reason of their parents’ residence status” (Hailbronner and Thym, "Case C-
34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), Judgment of the Court 
of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011", (2011) 48 CML Rev., 1268).   
313  The questions referred concerned the provisions of Directive 2004/38 only, but the Court 
reformulated these questions so as to include both Directive 2004/38 and Article 21 TFEU (see 
explicitly ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 24-26). 
314  See the discussion under III.B.4.A.1., supra. 
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Besides, Article 20 TFEU is a more satisfactory legal basis from a more systematic 
point of view.  As was pointed out already, the Court supported its holding in Ruiz 
Zambrano with an explicit reference to its judgment in Rottmann.  Accordingly, the 
Court drew a parallel between national measures entailing the loss of Union 
citizenship and the rights attached to it and national measures entailing the loss of the 
possibility to genuinely exercise these rights.  On this ground too, it would seem 
preferable to ground both holdings firmly in Article 20 TFEU. 
 
iii) Genuine enjoyment 
 
Now that I have established the likely meaning of the substance of citizenship rights, 
it should be considered what is meant by the “genuine enjoyment” of these rights.  In 
Ruiz Zambrano, the Court ruled that the contested Belgian decisions had the effect of 
depriving the Union citizens concerned of that genuine enjoyment.  The reason for 
this holding was, as explained higher, that they would force the children to leave the 
territory of the Union, given that they could not reside there independently on account 
of their young age.  The question arises how material the young age of the children 
was in reaching this decision.  Would the Court have come to the same conclusion if 
the case had concerned older children who could strictly speaking have resided 
independently in the Member States?  The same question arises in the case of static 
adult Union citizens who would invoke Union law in order to claim a right of 
residence for their third-country spouse or dependent ascendant.  On the one hand, 
older Union citizens could reside independently in the Member States and a refusal of 
a residence right to their family member would not therefore force them to leave the 
territory of the Union, at least not in theory.  On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out 
that older Union citizens too may de facto be obliged to leave for a third country if 
they are not allowed to live in their Member State together with their close family 
member.315  Much will depend, therefore, on how strict the term “genuine enjoyment” 
is interpreted by the Court. 
 
The McCarthy judgment gives a very strong indication that the Court is of the opinion 
that a refusal of a right of residence to a family member can only in the case of young 
Union citizens be considered as a national measure depriving a person of the genuine 
enjoyment of his citizenship rights.  The impossibility for Mrs. McCarthy to be joined 
by her husband, by contrast, did not have this consequence because it did not oblige 
her to leave the territory of the Union.316  Consequently, the Court appears to limit its 
extensive interpretation of Article 20 TFEU to children who face the impossibility to 
be joined by their parent or, arguably, their primary carer.317  This is in line with 
earlier cases, in which the impossibility for children to reside independently in a 
Member State appears to have inspired the Court to recognise for their family 
members more extensive rights than those enjoyed by family members of other Union 
citizens.318  Still, it must be wondered whether the Court, in taking this position, is not 
                                                 
315  This possibility was acknowledged by the Court in Metock and Others with regard to moving 
Union citizens (ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 89). The 
same, arguably, applies to static Union citizens who do not have the means to move to another 
Member State.  
316  ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., para. 50. 
317  See under III.B.4.b., infra. 
318  See, most recently, cases Ibrahim and Teixeira and the discussion in Chapter 5, infra. 
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focussing too much on what is possible in theory.  Adult Union citizens who are 
refused the right to live with their spouse will in many circumstances de facto be 
forced to join their spouse in a third country.  The distinction between children and 
other Union citizens on this point is not wholly satisfactory therefore.  At least in 
those circumstances where the refusal of a residence right to the close family member 
of a static adult Union citizen would amount to a violation of fundamental rights, 
reliance on the Ruiz Zambrano case law should be possible.  It is to be hoped that 
future case law will further clarify this point. 
 
iv) Scope for justification 
 
If my reading of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment is correct, Article 20 TFEU was relied 
on by the Court to bring the situation of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano and his children within 
the scope of Union law.  The immediate consequence of this would be that decisions 
taken vis-à-vis them had to be in accordance with Union law.  The Court rather 
swiftly decided that the disputed Belgian decisions were not in accordance with Union 
law since they violated Article 20 TFEU by making it impossible to genuinely enjoy 
the substance of their citizenship rights.  Thereby, the Court seems to have used 
Article 20 TFEU both as a linking factor to Union law as well as a limitation deriving 
from Union law.  That approach is not entirely coherent.  In my view, the Court 
should better have followed its more elaborate reasoning in Rottmann.  In Rottmann, 
the Court first considered that the disputed withdrawal decision fell within the scope 
of Union law and next considered what limitations deriving from Union law the 
Member State in question, therefore, had to abide by.  The most important such 
limitation was found by the Court to be the principle of proportionality.319  Under that 
principle, the Member State’s interests have to be balanced against the interest of the 
Union citizen concerned.  Overarching Member State interests can, accordingly, 
justify restrictive measures vis-à-vis a Union citizen.  
 
It seems to me that this reasoning could have been readily transposed to the Ruiz 
Zambrano case.  In fact, the compliance of the Belgian refusal decisions with the 
principle of proportionality was explicitly considered by AG Sharpston, be it in 
relation to Article 21 TFEU.  The AG considered that, in order to assess the validity 
of the refusal of a residence permit, Belgium’s interest in applying its immigration 
laws and protecting itself against unreasonable financial burdens would have to be 
balanced against the consequences it would entail for Mr. Ruiz Zambrano’s children 
and their family members.  The AG estimated that the balance would probably tilt in 
favour of the Ruiz Zambrano family, considering inter alia that the family was well 
integrated and that Mr. Ruiz Zambrano had in the past significantly and regularly 
contributed to the Belgian public finances.320  
 
It is regrettable that the Court did not follow the same clear steps in Ruiz Zambrano as 
it did in Rottmann.321  This lack of logical clarity makes the judgment rather difficult 
                                                 
319  As I have discussed in detail in Chapter 2, other Union law principles could also serve as such 
limitations. See in this regard also Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1449. 
320  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 109-121. 
321  In the McCarthy judgment the question regarding possible justifications did obviously not arise, 
since the Court held that Union law was not applicable to the facts of the case.  
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to understand.  Maybe the judgment should be read as holding that a deprivation of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights can never be justified.  
However, that would seem illogical in relation to the Rottmann judgment.  If a 
withdrawal of nationality and Union citizenship can be justified, then a fortiori, the 
deprivation of the enjoyment of some of the rights associated with Union citizenship 
should be open to justification.322  Moreover, it cannot realistically be disputed that 
Member States may have legitimate reasons for refusing a right of residence to the 
third-country family members of a Union citizen which override the interests of that 
Union citizen in enjoying his rights.323  Given that such is true with regard to the 
rights enjoyed by family members of moving citizens, it could not be seen why such 
would not be true in cases where the link with Union law was provided by Article 20 
TFEU.  Otherwise, certain categories of static Union citizens and their family 
members would suddenly enjoy greater protection under Union law than other family 
members.  Perhaps the Court in Ruiz Zambrano merely considered that the Belgian 
refusal decisions could not be justified in the particular circumstances of the case 
before it.324  It would have been beneficial to the clarity of the judgment then if the 
Court had explicitly said so.  That would have provided the judgment with a stronger 
analytical framework and would have shaped more legal certainty and predictability 
for future cases.325  It would also have done more justice to the division of powers 
between the Union and the Member States because the interests of the Member States 
inter alia in pursuing an effective immigration policy would have explicitly been 
taken into account.    
 
A related question that can be asked in this connection is whether Member States can 
subject the right to family reunification of static Union citizens, based on Article 20 
TFEU, to the condition of self-sufficiency.  Prima facie, this question has to be 
answered in the negative, as the condition of self-sufficiency is contained in Directive 
2004/38, which does not apply to static Union citizens.  Still, Ruiz Zambrano provides 
some support for an affirmative answer.  Indeed, Ruiz Zambrano makes it clear that 
Member States may not only not refuse a residence permit to the non-EU parent of a 
young Union citizen.  They may also not refuse him or her a work permit if such 
refusal would make it impossible for him or her to provide for his or her family.  This 
                                                 
322  It must be remarked in this regard that in McCarthy the Court referred approvingly referred to 
Grunkin and Paul, while explicitly mentioning the possibility of justifying obstacles to free 
movement on the basis of objective considerations and in a way proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued (ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr., para. 52).  
323  This should, in accordance with the Metock and Others judgment, be true at least for reasons of 
public policy, public security or public health or in case of abuse of rights. See also under 
III.B.4.b., infra. 
324  Another reason that may explain why the Court did not consider possible justifications is of a 
more procedural nature: it appears that the Belgian government had not put forward any such 
justifications. Still, it would have been beneficial for the conceptual clarity of the judgment if the 
Court had raised the issue of justifications proprio motu. See also on this point, Hailbronner and 
Thym (n. 312, supra), at 1266. 
325  Admittedly, the Court may not have referred to the principle of proportionality, precisely 
because the assessment of that principle would have reverted to the national court, creating a less 
certain outcome of the case. This was indeed an important criticism of the Rottmann case (see, 
inter alia, Kochenov, "Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010, not yet reported" (2010) 47 CML Rev., 1831-1846). 
Still I do not consider this consideration to be persuasive ground to forego any consideration of 
the interests of the Member State concerned in adopting the contested decision. Moreover, there 
was nothing that precluded the Court from carrying out the assessment of the principle of 
proportionality itself.  
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in itself is rather logical: the very recognition of a residence right for the parent of 
young Union citizens is based on the idea that such is necessary to safeguard the 
genuine enjoyment of their citizenship rights.  If Member States were obliged to grant 
a residence permit to that parent, but could at the same time refuse him or her a work 
permit, the effet utile of the rights of the Union children concerned could be put in 
peril.  In essence, the Court is merely further equating here the situation of a static 
Union citizen to that of a moving Union citizen.326  In stating this requirement, the 
Court in my view implicitly indicates that the Union citizen and his parent will only 
have a right of residence if the latter, being so enabled by his or her Member State of 
residence, does provide sufficient resources to support himself and his family 
members. 327   In other words, the classic condition of self-sufficiency to which 
residence in another Member State is subject,328 should in my view also apply to 
static Union citizens.  Admittedly, Directive 2004/38 is not applicable in such cases, 
but the parallel drawn with moving citizens, in the particular scenario of Zhu and 
Chen would so require.329  This would arguably be different, however, in cases where 
the Union children would go to school, in view of the judgments in Ibrahim and 
Teixeira.330 
 
b) Consequences  
 
In order to evaluate the Court’s judgments in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy, it is 
necessary to consider their consequences.  If the judgments are interpreted as I have 
argued they should be, their consequences are limited to certain sets of circumstances, 
but at the same time significant.  Put at its most simple, the judgments in fact extend 
the scope of the ruling in Zhu and Chen to situations which lack an inter-State 
element.331  Accordingly, Member States must issue the parent of a young Union 
citizen resident in their territory with a residence permit, even where it concerns one 
of their nationals who has no link with any other Member State.  As I have argued in 
chapter 4, there seems to be no convincing reason, moreover, to limit this reasoning to 
                                                 
326  Family members of a Union citizen coming within the scope of Union law do not require a work 
permit. AG Sharpston explicitly drew a parallel with that situation and the one at hand in Ruiz 
Zambrano. She submitted that if Mr. Ruiz Zambrano was held to enjoy a derivative right of 
residence based on the fact that his children are Union citizens, this “would arguably permit him 
to benefit, by necessary analogy, from the dispensation from the work permit requirement that is 
available, under Article 2(2)2º(b) of the Law of 30 April 1999, to dependent relatives in the 
ascending line of a Belgian national” (Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz 
Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 39). 
327  In Ruiz Zambrano, such was arguably the case. In fact, Mr. Ruiz Zambrano had worked for more 
than five years and had paid the statutory social security contributions. Had he held a work 
permit, this would have entitled him later to unemployment benefits. Moreover, he would 
presumably have continued to work if he had been given a work permit; in that case he would 
not have been forced to quit his job after the inspection by the Belgian authorities.  
328  By the condition of self-sufficiency in this context I mean that there must be sufficient resources 
for the Union citizen and his family members not to become a burden on the social system of 
their Member State of residence. These resources could derive from the economic activity of the 
non-EU parent of the Union citizen or from his savings. 
329  The recognition of a right of residence in that case was dependent on the finding that baby 
Catherine and her mother had sufficient resources not to become a burden for the UK social 
system (see ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 28).  
330  See the detailed discussion in Chapter 5, infra. 
331  For a detailed analysis of the Zhu and Chen judgment and its impact on the immigration laws of 
the Member States, I refer to Chapter 5, infra. 
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the parent of a young Union citizen.  Other categories of “primary carers” would 
arguably also qualify.  Furthermore, the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano, arguably, 
indicates that multiple persons could derive a right of residence from their capacity as 
the primary carer of a young Union citizen.332   
 
The bottom-line is that the judgments will further contribute to diminishing instances 
of reverse discrimination of Union citizens.  In Zhu and Chen like situations, the 
existence of an inter-State element will no longer matter.  In other circumstances, for 
instance where an adult static Union citizen wants to be joined by his spouse, the issue 
of reverse discrimination appears to be left unaffected by the judgments, although 
there are strong arguments to widen the current restrictive stance of the Court in this 
regard (see under III.B.4.a.iii., supra).  At the same time, it is clear that the judgments 
will have significant consequences for the immigration policies of the Member States, 
as is clear from the above.  In their most crude version, they oblige Member States to 
grant, in all circumstances, a residence permit to the parent of a child which obtained 
their nationality, even in situations formerly considered to be purely internal 
situations.  The consequences of this should not be underestimated, since many young 
children of third country nationals will have acquired the nationality of the Member 
State of residence of their parent without having a link to any other Member State.  
Moreover, once a right of residence is recognised for the Union citizen and his 
parents, they can presumably rely on the Union principle of equal treatment, which 
entails financial burdens for their Member State of residence.   
 
Nevertheless, the judgments arguably do leave some scope for the Member States to 
keep the grant of such residence rights within certain bounds.  First of all, it must be 
emphasised that the children in Ruiz Zambrano were still very young.  In line with 
what was already remarked, children of an older age who have always resided in the 
Member State of their nationality, can probably be expected to be able to exercise 
their citizenship rights independently.333  Hence, they can presumably not rely on 
Union law to claim a right of residence for their parents.  Second, Member States can 
arguably refuse a right of residence in the circumstances described where such is 
justified by legitimate reasons of an overriding public interest.  As pointed out above, 
the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano does not explicitly support this view, but the 
judgment becomes much more coherent and consistent with earlier case law if read 
this way.  If the parallel with moving Union citizens is drawn consistently, Member 
States may refuse a right of residence to the third country national parents of a static 
Union citizen on grounds of public policy, public security or public health or on 
ground of abuse of rights.  Third, Member States may arguably subject the said right 
of residence to the condition of self-sufficiency.  Such is arguably not possible only 
where the Union children are going to school.  However, where in that case the Union 
citizen and his family members need to rely on the social assistance system of their 
Member State of residence, it might be argued that the Member State in question may 
                                                 
332  See the discussion in Chapter 5, infra. 
333  In this connection, I refer to my analysis of the Zhu and Chen case in Chapter 5, infra. In my 
view, the Court in Ruiz Zambrano implicitly took over the reasoning followed in that case to the 
extent that it accepted that minor children cannot reside in a Member State independently from 
their parents, although in Ruiz Zambrano this impossibility impacted on the possibility to enjoy 
the ensemble of citizenship rights, rather than merely the exercise of the right to free movement. 
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restrict the said residence right to families which are sufficiently integrated in its 
society.334   
 
Even if accepted, these limitations are rather limited in scope, especially because they 
need to be interpreted restrictively and applied in accordance with general principles 
of Union law.335  It follows that Member States have only limited scope to rely on 
their immigration laws in order to refuse third country nationals a right of residence in 
the circumstances described.  Indeed, the violation of the provisions of national 
immigration law in itself does not seem to be a ground for such a refusal.  The ECJ in 
Ruiz Zambrano did not seem to consider it relevant that Mr. Ruiz Zambrano had 
overstayed his visa and had been residing illegally in Belgium as far as the Belgian 
immigration law provisions were concerned.336  The likely reaction of the Member 
States will be to further tighten the conditions for the acquisition of their 
nationality. 337   Indeed, given that Member States are obliged to grant a right of 
residence to the non-EU parent of a young Union citizen, they have an incentive to 
make it more difficult for children of third country nationals to obtain their 
nationality, in order to avoid “activating” the Ruiz Zambrano case law. 338   In 
particular Member States with a form of ius soli based nationality339 will be likely to 
tighten the conditions for the acquisition of their nationality by children of third-
country nationals.  Besides, it can be expected that Member States will become more 
insistent on using the possibilities for such children to acquire the nationality of a 
                                                 
334  I refer to my discussion in Chapter 5, infra, of the rights enjoyed by the primary carer of school-
going children. That discussion, which concerns “moving” Union children, can apply by analogy 
to static Union children which fall within the scope of Union law on the basis of Article 20 
TFEU. I further refer to the Opinion of AG Sharpston, who seems to have considered the degree 
of integration to be a potentially relevant factor for the rights enjoyed by the parent of a static 
Union citizen (Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, 
para. 113). 
335  The exceptions based on public policy, public security or public health and abuse of rights are 
interpreted narrowly in the case law of the ECJ. See the discussion under II.2.b., supra. 
336  In this respect, the Court’s judgment resembles its judgment in the Carpenter case (ECJ, Case 
C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279). As was remarked above, the Member States could 
only rely on their immigration law to refuse a right of residence where such a refusal is based on 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health or on ground of abuse of rights. This is, 
again, consistent with Carpenter. In that case, the Court held that the fact that Mrs. Carpenter 
had violated the UK immigration provisions was not an insurmountable obstacle to her claim for 
a right of residence since “her conduct, since her arrival in the United Kingdom in September 
1994, had not been the subject of any other complaint that could give cause to fear that she 
might in the future constitute a danger to public order or public safety” (ECJ, Case C-60/00 
Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, para. 44). 
337  See Hailbronner and Thym (n. 312, supra), at 1265 and Wiesbrock, “The Zambrano case: 
Relying on Union citizenship rights in ‘internal situations’”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 
available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-news/449-the-zambrano-case-relying-on-
union-citizenship-rights-in-internal-situations.  
338  AG Sharpston openly admitted that the solution to the expected unwanted impact of the Ruiz 
Zambrano judgment (and the related fear for opening the “floodgates”) is to amend the rules on 
the acquisition of nationality, although she added that it would be wrong to turn the European 
Union into “Fortress Europe” (see Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano 
[2011] E.C.R. nyr, 114-115). 
339  See in this connection, Honohan, "Ius Soli Citizenship" (2010) EUDO CITIZENSHIP Policy 
Brief No. 1, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/policy-briefs. 
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third country and make the acquisition of their nationality dependent on the 
impossibility to do so.340   
 
As such, the Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy judgments may well have the somewhat 
paradoxical consequence that in the near future fewer persons will enjoy the rights 
associated with Union citizenship rather than more.  Indeed, by being more generous 
towards the rights enjoyed by Union citizens, the Court may well have created an 
incentive for Member States to further restrict access to that status.  This would have 
the effect of further increasing the “gap” between the rights enjoyed by Union citizens 
and those by third country nationals resident within the Union, which is frequently 
deplored in legal literature.341  Such increased gap may well go counter to some of the 
explicitly stated objectives of the Union, as was remarked by AG Sharpston. 342  
Moreover, it must be remarked that, since the Rottmann case, it is clear that even in 
the field of nationality Member States will have to exercise their competence in 
accordance with Union law.  Refusing the acquisition of nationality to children of 
third country nationals may in certain circumstances hurt general principles of Union 
law such as the principle of proportionality or the principle of legitimate 
expectations.343  This may well temper the unexpected consequences of the judgment 
just described. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy the Court has taken a significant step towards 
recognising Union citizenship, acquired in accordance with Article 20 TFEU, as a 
sufficient link with Union law.  If my reading of the judgments is correct, this more 
flexible interpretation of the required link with Union law is at present valid only in 
Zhu and Chen like situations.  In such situations, reverse discrimination of Union 
citizens appears no longer to be tolerated.  Indeed, once static Union citizens come 
within the scope of Union law, the Court appears to assimilate their legal position to 
that of moving Union citizens.  The crucial difference between static Union citizens 
and other Union citizens appears to be therefore, at least at present, that the situation 
of the former will come within the scope of Union law in limited circumstances only.   
 
Of course, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Court will go further along this 
road in future cases and accept Union citizenship as a sufficient link with Union law 
in other circumstances too.  If the Court is willing to go down this road, it would take 
                                                 
340  This is perfectly demonstrated by the amendment of Article 10 of the Belgian nationality code in 
2006 (see Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 
17), which can surely be explained by the occurrence of many cases with facts similar to those 
of Ruiz Zambrano. See the discussion in Foblets and Loones, “Het Wetboek van de Belgische 
nationaliteit andermaal herzien (2006): het parlement ontzien of gezien?” (2007) T.Vreemd., 23-
39. See also Maes, “Vreemdelingen zonder legaal verblijf met Belgische kinderen: uitzetting van 
onderdanen of beschermd gezinsleven als hefboom voor regelmatig verblijf” (2005) T. Vreemd., 
332-339.  
341  See, for instance, Kochenov, "Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the 
Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 225 et seq; 
Besson and Utzinger, "Introduction: Future Challenges of European Citizenship - Facing a 
Wide-Open Pandora's Box" (2007) 13 E.L.J., 581-582 and the literature referred to.  
342  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 115. 
343  I refer to the discussion in Chapter 2. 
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up the suggestion which has since long been put forward by a number of influential 
scholars that, in the current state of Union law, Union citizenship should in itself be 
considered as a sufficient link with Union law. 344   Such would make reverse 
discrimination of Union citizens impossible indeed, because static Union citizens 
would in all circumstances be able to rely on the Union principle of equal treatment to 
claim the same treatment as other Union citizens. 
 
Nevertheless I believe the Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy judgments should not be 
read as an announcement of such a wide construction of the scope of Union law in 
future case law.  The judgments make clear that the Court favours a narrow 
interpretation of the circumstances in which Union citizenship will provide a 
sufficient link with Union law.  The Court’s finding in Ruiz Zambrano that Union law 
was applicable carries a particularly weighty justification in the sense that the Court 
was faced with a situation in which national measures had the effect of making the 
exercise of the most important citizenship rights – and, as I have argued the 
“activation” of a person’s Union citizenship – impossible.  In this sense, the judgment 
is merely an analogous application of the Rottmann judgment.  In both cases, the 
Court essentially held that Member States may not, without due justification,345 take 
measures which de lege or de facto “annihilate” a person’s Union citizenship.  
Viewed in this light, the limited extension in the case law of the scope of application 
of Union law is highly convincing.  Higher, I have argued that the limited extension 
of Article 18 TFEU proposed by AG Sharpston in her Opinion in Ruiz Zambrano has 
its merits too, given the particular significant value carried by fundamental rights.  It 
is possible therefore that the Court will adopt this approach in a future case. 
 
In other cases, which do not rest on the additional rationale of preventing the 
annihilation of an individual’s Union citizenship and the associated rights or of 
protecting fundamental rights, treating Union citizenship as a sufficient link with 
Union law would be a particularly intrusive step, given the significant impact it would 
have on the competences of the Member States.  Such would certainly be good for 
realising the full potential of Union citizenship, but it can be doubted whether the 
Court could legitimately take such a revolutionary step.  It should, perhaps, preferably 
be taken by the Union legislator rather than by the Union Court.346  Given that Article 
                                                 
344  See, inter alia, Dautricourt and Thomas, "Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of 
Persons under Community Law: All For Ulysses, Nothing For Penelope?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 
447-450 (although noting that such a step would probably require intervention from the Union 
legislator first); Spaventa, "Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union 
Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects" (2008) 45 CML Rev., 30 et seq.; White, "Free 
Movement, Equal Treatment, and Citizenship of the Union" (2005) Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 901; 
Toner, "Judicial Interpretation of European Union Citizenship - Consolidation or 
Transformation" (2000) 7 MJ, 168-170; O'Leary The Evolving Concept of Community 
Citizenship: from the Free movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (London, Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), 278. See also the discussion in Nic Shuibhne, "Free movement of persons 
and the wholly internal rule: time to move on?" (2002) 39 CML Rev., 731-771. 
345  The possibility of justification is not mentioned explicitly in the Ruiz Zambrano judgment, but 
as I have argued above, it may have been implicitly there. 
346  See Walter Reverse Discrimination and Family Reunification (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2008), 60; Besson and Utzinger, "Introduction: Future Challenges of European 
Citizenship - Facing a Wide-Open Pandora's Box" (2007) 13 E.L.J., 584 (cited by Kochenov, 
"Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between 
Status and Rights" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 213), who state: “…reverse discriminations are 
the very opposite of what is to be expected in an isopoliteia. If this negative impact on free 
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21 TFEU is explicitly made subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in 
secondary Union law, the Union legislator was arguably given an explicit 
authorisation by the Treaties to determine the scope of the right to free movement and 
residence and could on that ground arguably extend the right of residence enjoyed by 
Union citizens to static Union citizens.  Accordingly, it could amend Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2004/38 to the effect that it would apply to all Union citizens “who move to 
or reside in a Member State”.347  As a consequence, the Directive, including the 
principle of equal treatment laid down in its Article 24, would also apply to static 
Union citizens.348  It is unlikely that the Member States would agree to that, at least in 
the foreseeable future.  That being the case, it is perhaps not for the Court to jam this 
extension “down their throat”.  
 
Another, more limited option would be to merely extend the rights relating to family 
reunification to static Union citizens.  In a not so distant past, the Commission did in 
fact adopt a proposal to this effect.349  An early Commission proposal for a family 
reunification directive stated in its Article 4: 
 
“By way of derogation from this Directive, the family reunification of third-country 
nationals who are family members of a citizen of the Union residing in the Member State 
of which he is a national and who has not exercised his right to free movement of persons, 
is governed mutatis mutandis by Articles 10, 11 and 12 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68 and by the other provisions of Community law listed in the Annex.”350 
 
The explanatory memorandum explained that the existing situation, subjecting static 
Union citizens to national rules, led to an unwarranted difference in treatment and 
that, given that “Union citizenship is indivisible”, Union law should intervene so as to 
grant static Union citizens the benefit of Union rules relating to family 
reunification.351  This part of the proposal never made it into law.  The Commission 
                                                                                                                                            
movement of people is supported, harmonisation might be the solution. Directive 2004/38/EC 
does not yet forbid reverse discrimination, but one may imagine doing so top-down in the near 
future”. 
347  This would at the same time entail a shift in the purposes pursued by Article 21 TFEU. Those 
purposes would no longer be limited to the ones described higher, for which movement between 
Member States was arguably a relevant element. The peaceful enjoyment of residence in the 
Member State of one’s choice could be one of the purposes pursued by Article 21 TFEU if 
Directive 2004/38 would be modified as described.  
348  See Dautricourt and Thomas, "Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons under 
Community Law: All For Ulysses, Nothing For Penelope?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 450. 
349  See Commission proposal on the right to family reunification, COM (1999) 638 final (published 
in [2000] O.J. C116E/66). The proposal is discussed in Walter Reverse Discrimination and 
Family Reunification (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), 41-43 and Nic Shuibhne, "Free 
Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" (2002) 39 CML Rev., 
761-762. 
350  Article 1 of the Directive contained in the proposal stated: “The purpose of this Directive is to 
establish a right to family reunification for the benefit of third-country nationals residing 
lawfully in the territory of the Member States and citizens of the Union who do not exercise 
their right to free movement”. Article 3 stated: “This Directive applies where the applicant for 
reunification is…(c) a citizen of the Union not exercising his right to free movement, if the 
applicant’s family members are third-country nationals, irrespective of their legal status”. 
351  See also the ninth recital to the draft directive contained in the proposal, which states: “To avoid 
discriminating between citizens of the Union who exercise their right to free movement and 
those who do not, provision should be made for the family reunification of citizens of the Union 
residing in countries of which they are nationals to be governed by the rules of Community law 
relating to free movement”. 
Chapter 4: Applicability of the free movement provisions 
 281
deleted it in later versions of the proposal, stating that the alignment of the rights of 
all Union citizens to family reunification would be dealt with later, after the work on 
the Citizens’ Directive (the eventual Directive 2004/38) would be finished.352  Such 
has not happened so far. 353   Perhaps the recent developments relating to Union 
citizenship and recent case law of the ECJ could give a new impetus to the Union 
legislator to adopt new rules relating to family reunification.354  To this purpose, the 
provisions of Directive 2004/38 relating to family members of Union citizens could 
be extended so as to cover also static Union citizens.  The legal basis for this could 
presumably be Article 20 and 21 TFEU, which would thereby be given a wider 
interpretation than is currently the case.355   
 
C. Clarifying the inter-State element 
 
As pointed out higher, the orthodox approach to the link required with Union law 
leads to problems of reverse discrimination.  As was argued under “B.”, this problem 
could be solved by enlarging the scope of Union law and enabling Union citizens to 
rely on Union law in situations formerly considered to be purely internal ones.  This 
seems to be the direction the Court is following in recent case law, with Ruiz 
Zambrano and McCarthy as its current apotheosis.  However, it was also remarked 
that the extension of the scope of Union law in the recent case law of the Court is 
limited.  If my reading of the said cases is correct, Article 20 TFEU can provide a 
direct link with Union law only in cases where a Union citizen is faced with a national 
measure making it impossible to genuinely enjoy the substance of his or her 
citizenship rights.  This covers only a limited number of national measures in a 
limited number of circumstances. 
 
The immediate consequence is that, in other circumstances, the Court’s traditional 
case law on Union citizenship, requiring an inter-State element, still stands.  
Consequently, certain Union citizens will still not be able to rely on Union law in 
those circumstances and reverse discrimination of Union citizens thus remains a 
problem, particularly as regards family reunification.  As I have argued higher, the 
possibility for reverse discrimination is in fact inherent in the current Union legal 
                                                 
352  Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the right to family reunification, COM(2002) 225 
final: see the explanatory memorandum under 2.4. 
353  This was confirmed by the Commission in its 2008 Report on the application of Directive 
2003/86 (Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Application of Directive 2003/86 on the Right to Family Reunification, COM(2008) 610 final). 
The Report states, under point 4, that “family reunification of Union citizens residing in the 
Member State of their nationality is not subject to [Union] law”.  
354  Some additional support for the desirability of this could be found in the fact that Directive 
2003/86 grants third country nationals a right to family reunification irrespective of whether they 
have moved between Member States. The limited parallelism between Directives 2003/86 and 
2004/38, accepted by the Court in Metock and Others (ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others 
[2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 69) could be seen as an additional argument for extending the right 
to family reunification to static Union citizens.  
355  The Treaty provisions on Union citizenship would be a more convincing legal basis for this than 
the provisions formerly contained in Title IV of the EC Treaty (see now Title V of the TFEU), 
as was remarked by Nic Shuibhne (Nic Shuibhne, "Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly 
Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" (2002) 39 CML Rev., 762). 
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framework and could only be abolished after intervention of the Union legislator.356  
As I have explained, the justification for a difference in treatment between Union 
citizens who have moved357 and those who have not is that only the former have 
contributed to the aims of the free movement provisions, such as fostering social 
cohesion and political integration.358  This explains, for instance, why a Union citizen 
who has moved to another Member State may upon his return to the home Member 
State claim the Union rights relating to family reunification, in contrast to a static 
compatriot.359  As remarked higher, this point of view is consistent with the Court’s 
case law on Article 21 TFEU and the underlying intentions of the Member States, as 
apparent from Directive 2004/38.   
 
If that view is accepted, it is important, of course, that it can be determined with 
certainty how much “movement” is required for a Union citizen in order to be able to 
invoke Article 21 TFEU against his own Member State.360  The Court’s case law on 
this point is seriously lacking in clarity.  As Van Elsuwege and Adam have observed, 
it is “not entirely clear what kind of movement should be exercised, when that 
exercise should have happened and for how long a cross-border element should 
exist”.361  Different ECJ judgments give rise to different conclusions on this point.  
On the one end of the spectrum, there are cases in which the Court has held that 
                                                 
356  Another option, which is not the focus of the present analysis, is for the Member States to extend 
the benefits conferred by Union law on moving Union citizens to static Union citizens, in line 
with the suggestion of the Court in ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community 
and Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, para. 40. 
357  In this context, I consider static Union citizens with a dual nationality as moving Union citizens, 
since their position can be assimilated to that of an incoming Union citizen of another Member 
State. 
358  Cloots has criticized this point in relation to the Court’s judgment in the Flemish Care Insurance 
case. The author questions the very relevance of the criterion of “having exercised one’s right to 
free movement within the EU” as a trigger for the applicability of Union law (Cloots, "Germs of 
Pluralist Judicial Adjudication: Advocaten voor de Wereld and Other References from the 
Belgian Constitutional Court " (2010) CML Rev., 661-662). I do not share this criticism. As I 
have stated higher, Union citizens who have exercised their free movement rights have 
contributed to the aims of the Union and have thereby brought themselves within the scope of 
Union law. They should therefore be able to rely on the rights conferred by Union law and their 
status should be equated to that of Union citizens coming from other Member States.  
359  This should not be taken to mean that the right of residence of a returning Union citizen in his 
home Member State is made subject to the conditions of Directive 2004/38. As the Court 
explained in McCarthy, such would be in violation of international law. Rather the fact that a 
Union citizen has moved allows him to claim the benefits of Union law in his home Member 
State, including the right to be treated equally as Union citizens from other Member States, for 
instance with regard to family reunification.  
360  The question that concerns me here is not whether a Union citizen can rely on Union law in 
another Member State. That question was discussed under “II”. It is rather when a Union citizen 
has established a sufficient connection with another Member State in order to rely on Union law 
vis-à-vis his own Member State. Specifically in relation to family reunification, it is clear that a 
Union citizen who resides in another Member State should have the right there to be joined by 
family members (see the discussion on Metock and Others under II.B., supra). The question I 
am concerned with here is whether a Union citizen who has resided in another Member State, 
then returns to his home Member State and subsequently wants to be joined there by family 
members, can rely on Union law for that purpose and under what conditions. 
361  Van Elsuwege and Adam, "The Limits of Constitutional Dialogue for the Prevention of Reverse 
Discrimination (Case note: Constitutional Court, Judgment 11/2009 of 21 January 2009)" (2009) 
5 EuConst, 334, citing the discussion of this issue in Martin, "Comments on Gouvernement de la 
Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon (Case C-212/06 of 1 April 2008) and Eind 
(Case C-291/05 of 11 December 2007)" (2008) 10 Eur. J. Migration & L., 372. 
Chapter 4: Applicability of the free movement provisions 
 283
receiving services in another Member State is sufficient in order to bring a person 
within the scope of Union law. 362   Also the occasional provision of services to 
persons in other Member States seems sufficient to bring a Union citizen within the 
scope of Union law.363  In this connection, it is not even required that either the 
recipient or the provider of services moves to another Member State, since “cross-
border” services are caught by the provisions on the freedom to provide services.364  
Besides, there is a consistent set of cases in which the Court has held that “lawful 
residence” in another Member State brings a Union citizen within the scope of Union 
law.365  In other cases, merely “moving” or “travelling” to another Member State 
appears sufficient for this purpose.366  In other cases still, even moving or travelling 
between Member States is not required.367  On the other end, there are cases in which 
the Court appears to be more demanding, by requiring more than lawful residence in 
another Member State,368 or renders a judgment that is silent on the issue and can be 
so interpreted.369 
 
                                                 
362  See, e.g., ECJ, Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] E.C.R. 195, para. 17; ECJ, Case C-274/96 Bickel and 
Franz [1998] E.C.R. I-7637, para. 15 (Union law covers Union citizens who “visit another 
Member State where they intend or are likely to receive services”). 
363  See ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, paras 29-30. 
364  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] E.C.R. I-1141, paras 15 and 20 to 22. 
365  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] E.C.R. I-2691, para. 61. In the Schempp case, 
the Court even considered it sufficient that the spouse of a Union citizen had established her 
residence in another Member State (ECJ, Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] E.C.R. I-6421, paras 
23-25). Similarly, in earlier case law, the Court found that the fact that a dependent family 
member lived in another Member State sufficed in order to bring a Union citizen within the 
scope of Union law (see ECJ, Case C-255/99 Humer [2002] E.C.R. I-1205, para. 48). 
366  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek [1999] E.C.R. I-6207, paras 20-22 (taking a flight 
from an airport of another Member State considered sufficient in order to fall within the scope of 
Union law).  
367  I refer to case Zhu and Chen. As I have argued higher, the Court in this case apparently relied on 
the specific circumstance that the individual concerned possessed the nationality of another 
Member State than her Member State of residence in order to assimilate her situation to that of 
moving Union citizens.  
368  In the Flemish Care Insurance case, for instance, the Court did not specify what exercise of free 
movement rights was required in order to bring the situations concerned within the scope of 
Union law. Some have questioned whether prior movement by Belgian nationals for non-
economic purposes would also bring them within the scope of Union law (Verschueren, 
"Europese krijtlijnen voor een sociaal federalisme", in Cantillon, Popelier and Mussche (eds.), 
Naar een Vlaamse sociale bescherming in België en Europa? (Antwerp-Oxford, Intersentia, 
2010), 248). The Flemish legislator has esteemed that such was not sufficient. The new, 
amended, version of the Flemish care insurance scheme includes within its scope those persons 
who live in the French speaking part of Belgium, work in Flanders or Brussels and have made 
use of the right of free movement of workers or the freedom of establishment (see Article 4(2) of 
the Care Insurance Decree, as modified by Decreet Vlaams Parlement van 30 april 2009 tot 
wijziging van het decreet van 30 maart 1999 houdende de organisatie van de zorgverzekering 
(Moniteur belge of 28 May 2009)). In my view, this amendment is too narrow in scope since 
prior movement to another Member State for non-economic purposes should also be considered 
sufficient to trigger the applicability of Union law (see in this sense, van der Steen, "Zuiver 
interne situaties: geen omwenteling, wel inperking" (2008) N.T.E.R., 306).  
369  A good example is the Werner case, in which the Court held that mere residence in another 
Member State was not sufficient in order to bring a Union citizen within the scope of Union law 
(ECJ, Case C-112/91 Werner [1993] E.C.R. I-429; see also ECJ, Case C-293/03 My [2004] 
E.C.R. I-12013). Admittedly, that case law was concerned with economically active Union 
citizens and seems, moreover, to have been reversed by the ECJ in recent years (see the detailed 
discussion in Tryfonidou, "In Search of the Aim of the EC Free Movement of Persons 
Provisions: Has the Court of Justice Missed the Point?" (2009) 46 CML Rev., 1591-1620). 
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This case law leads to legal uncertainty370 and thereby makes it difficult for Union 
citizens to determine whether they could or should take steps to bring themselves 
within the scope of Union law in order to rely on the rights conferred on Union 
citizens.  This situation deters the effective exercise of citizenship rights and the 
“activation” of Union citizenship.  If it is sufficient to receive services in another 
Member State, establishing a link with Union law would be very easy.371  As AG 
Sharpston explained in Ruiz Zambrano it would appear to be sufficient then that a 
friendly neighbour had taken Mr. Ruiz Zambrano’s children on a visit or two to Parc 
Astérix in Paris, or to the seaside in Brittany in order to bring their situation within the 
scope of Union law.372  On this broad interpretation of the scope of Union law, almost 
all Union citizens could avail themselves of the rights of Union law.373  At the same 
time, questions could arise as to the appropriateness of the receipt of services as a 
trigger for the applicability of Union law and as to the arbitrariness of excluding 
Union citizens who do not demonstrate this element.  If a more significant inter-State 
element were required, establishing a link with Union law would become more 
difficult.  Here, the trigger for the applicability of Union law would require a more 
meaningful contribution to the aims of a Citizens’ Europe.  At the same time, it could 
lead to a concern, voiced by some scholars, that only Union citizens wealthy enough 
to establish a link with Union law could avail themselves of the benefits of Union law, 
such as the rights relating to family reunification.374   
 
Besides creating legal uncertainty, the recent case law of the ECJ has been criticized 
for leading to arbitrary results.375  It has been noted that it is precisely the relative ease 
with which a link with Union law can be established which makes it even harder to 
                                                 
370  As many authors have emphasized: see, inter alia, Van Elsuwege and Adam, "The Limits of 
Constitutional Dialogue for the Prevention of Reverse Discrimination (Case note: Constitutional 
Court, Judgment 11/2009 of 21 January 2009)" (2009) 5 EuConst, 333-334; Dautricourt and 
Thomas, "Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons under Community Law: All 
For Ulysses, Nothing For Penelope?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 444-445; Van Elsuwege and Adam, 
"Situations purement internes, discriminations à rebours et collectivités autonomes après l'arrêt 
sur l'assurance flamande" (2008) C.D.E., 677-678; Nic Shuibhne, "Free Movement of Persons 
and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" (2002) 39 CML Rev., 745. 
371  This point was clearly articulated in the arguments advanced by the defendants in the Angonese 
case against this broad interpretation of the scope of Union law: “Otherwise, short educational 
exchanges or even periods of as little as one day spent abroad as a tourist could, quite arbitrarily, 
enable a person to invoke [Union]-law rights against his own Member State” (see Opinion of 
AG Fennelly in Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] E.C.R. I-4139, para. 9).  
372  Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 86. The 
Court did not touch upon its case law relating to receipt of services, but considered that the case 
had a sufficient link with Union law for different reasons (see the discussion under III.B.1.b., 
supra). 
373  This is in particular the case if account is taken of the receipt of cross-border services, such as 
television broadcasts from another Member State. Lane and Nic Shuibhne cite the example of a 
Belgian national who watches TF1 from time to time on cable television, wondering whether 
this entitles him to rely on Union law vis-à-vis his own Member State (see Lane and Nic 
Shuibhne, “Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano” (2000) CML 
Rev., 1242). 
374  Spaventa has noted, for instance, that it would be arbitrary to confine the protection of Union 
law to “those who are either sufficiently resourceful – or sufficiently well advised – so as to be 
able to establish a cross-border link” (Spaventa, "Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the 
Scope of Union Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects" (2008) 45 CML Rev., 45).   
375 See, e.g., Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, para. 75 and Nic 
Shuibhne, "Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" 
(2002) 39 CML Rev., 746. 
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justify excluding those Union citizens who cannot demonstrate even a tenuous inter-
State element.376  That is the reason why, even though the wholly internal rule was 
not directly at stake in the Metock and Others case, 377  the doctrine surfaced 
nevertheless.  Some of the intervening governments argued that the ECJ’s 
interpretation of Directive 2004/38 would lead to unjustified reverse discrimination, 
in so far as nationals of the host Member State who have never exercised their free 
movement rights would be the only Union citizens who would not derive rights of 
entry and residence for their non-EU family members. 378   The ECJ, however, 
explicitly confirmed its traditional case law and held that the alleged discrimination 
fell outside the scope of Union law.379   
 
Some authors have argued that the arbitrary consequences resulting from the Court’s 
generous interpretation of the scope of Union law militate in favour of extending the 
scope of Union law rather than restricting it.380  As explained higher, extending the 
scope of Union law to all Union citizens would indeed be apt to end the arbitrariness 
surrounding reverse discrimination, as made possible by the present case law, and 
thereby bolster the status of Union citizenship.  However, as also explained higher, it 
would not be sensible nor be legally sound for this extension of the scope of Union 
law to be carried out by the Union courts alone.  The said extension could arguably 
come about only by an amendment of the Union legislation on the free movement of 
persons.   
 
In conclusion, it appears that the present case law on Article 21 TFEU, which 
revolves around the existence of an inter-State element, suffers from problems of 
legal uncertainty and perceived arbitrariness.  Given that an extension of the benefits 
of Article 21 TFEU to all Union citizens seems possible only after intervention by the 
Union legislator, the Court should take up the responsibility to provide more certainty 
as to which categories of Union citizens fall under that article and should better 
articulate the reasons for this.  If the underlying intention of Article 21 TFEU is to 
facilitate the movement of Union citizens in order to achieve aims related to the 
achievement of a Citizens’ Europe, the Court should perhaps articulate this more 
systematically and apply Article 21 TFEU in accordance with these aims.  
Accordingly, only Union citizens having meaningfully contributed to these aims 
should be entitled to rely on Article 21 TFEU.  Much will depend, of course, on the 
specific national measure a Union citizen is faced with and what right is claimed.   
 
                                                 
376 In the words of Nic Shuibne, “[i]t is precisely the ease with which [Union] law can be triggered 
which sours the logic of leaving the rest aside” (Nic Shuibhne, "Free Movement of Persons and 
the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?" (2002) 39 CML Rev., at 738 (emphasis added)). 
See also Tryfonidou, "Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a 
More Liberal Approach" (2009) 15 E.L.J., 648. 
377 Given the fact that the EU-spouses were all Member State nationals who lived and worked in a 
Member State of which they were not a national, a cross-border element was clearly present. 
378 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 76. 
379 Ibid., paras 77-78. The Court referred to ECJ, Case C-212/06 Government of the French 
Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] E.C.R. I-1683. 
380  Spaventa, "Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its 
Constitutional Effects" (2008) 45 CML Rev., 44-45. 
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Specifically with regard to rights relating to family reunification,381 it can be argued 
that only lawful residence382 in another Member State for a longer period of time 
should trigger the application of Union law and make it possible for a Union citizen to 
claim Union rights relating to family reunification against his own Member State.383  
Merely travelling to another Member State or receiving services in or from another 
Member State does not appear to be sufficient in this regard.  Arguably, only Union 
citizens who have lawfully resided in another Member State for some time have 
sufficiently contributed to the aims of Article 21 TFEU in order to rely on that article 
against their home Member State and rely on the rights relating to family reunification 
there.  As Dautricourt and Thomas have remarked: “It would appear somewhat unfair 
to open the unrestricted benefit of [Union] law for citizens having taken advantage of 
their free movement rights for a very short period of time while excluding the ‘wholly 
sedentary’ citizens”.384  At the same time, the purpose of the residence abroad should 
not matter.  Students, for instance, who have pursued studies in another Member State 
for a longer period of time could certainly be considered to have contributed to the 
aims pursued by Article 21 TFEU and thus entitled to rely on that article.  
 
Accepting this proposal would entail a certain restriction of the scope of the free 
movement provisions as currently interpreted in the case law, but it would, arguably, 
be beneficial.  If the Court were to take this approach, it would much diminish the 
perceived arbitrariness surrounding its present case law, since the distinction between 
Union citizens falling within the scope of Article 21 TFEU and Union citizens falling 
outside that scope would depend on the logical and understandable criterion of having 
meaningfully contributed to the aims pursued by that article.  This approach would 
also generate much more legal certainty for Union citizens and for national authorities 
called upon to apply and implement Union law.385  Of course, it would be up to the 
Court to clarify what period of lawful residence in another Member State should be 
                                                 
381  As I have stated higher, this is the focus of my analysis. I do not seek to develop a 
comprehensive framework for determining the scope of Union law, although the approach 
developed can probably find application more broadly.  
382  Of course, economic activity in another Member State for a certain period of time would trigger 
the application of the provisions on the free movement of economically active persons. Since I 
am principally concerned here with Article 21 TEU and the free movement rights of non-
economically active persons here, I will not discuss that scenario. 
383  An alternative, though in my view less preferable, approach would be to consider that every 
Union citizen who can demonstrate an even tenuous link with Union law falls within the scope 
of Union law, but that the home Member State may justifiably refuse the rights concerning 
family reunification to nationals who have not established a sufficient link with Union law for 
not having lived for a sufficiently long period in another Member State. As Lenaerts has 
remarked, the different steps in the reasoning of the Court, namely determination of the scope of 
Union law and justification of disadvantages incurred by certain categories of Union citizens, 
sometimes boil down to one test (see Lenaerts, "Union Citizenship and the Principle of Non-
discrimination on Grounds of Nationality", in Festskrift til Claus Gulmann - Liber Amicorum 
(Copenhagen, Thomson, 2006), 290-309).  
384  Dautricourt and Thomas, "Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons under 
Community Law: All For Ulysses, Nothing For Penelope?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 445. 
385  As some commentators have remarked, in the absence of clear criteria on this point it is very 
difficult for national authorities to ascertain whether a national falls within the scope of Union 
law. Moreover, if short visits to another Member States would be sufficient to trigger the 
application of Union law, such would expectedly give rise to problems of proof. See Dautricourt 
and Thomas, "Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons under Community Law: 
All For Ulysses, Nothing For Penelope?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 46; Van Elsuwege and Adam, 
"Situations purement internes, discriminations à rebours et collectivités autonomes après l'arrêt 
sur l'assurance flamande" (2008) C.D.E., 678. 
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considered sufficient, and possibly when it should have taken place.386  Admittedly, 
the Court decides on case by case basis.  This should not, however, prevent it from 
articulating the underlying reasons for allowing reliance on Article 21 TFEU and 
announcing more systematic criteria for such reliance.   
 
The downside to the suggested approach is that it would require defining the scope of 
Union law in a more limited way than would theoretically be possible and that, 
consequently, less Union citizens would be able to rely on the rights relating to family 
reunification than under the widest possible interpretation of Union law. 387  This 
downside is, in fact, the direct consequence of the fact that the Court should respect 
the limited scope of Article 21 TFEU by interpreting it in accordance with the aims 
pursued by that Article.  The Court should not, in my view, circumvent these 
limitations by giving an artificially broad interpretation to that Article. 388  
Accordingly, the approach just set out would not only reduce the legal uncertainty and 
the arbitrariness associated with the current case law, but also be more legitimate in 
view of the division of competences between the Union and the Member States. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
As was remarked in the introduction to this Title, the traditional case law on Union 
citizenship leads to a sharp distinction between Union citizens who can invoke the 
rights and privileges deriving from Union law, such as those relating to family 
reunification, and those who cannot.  Only Union citizens who can demonstrate a link 
with two or more specific Member States qualify.  This leads to instances of reverse 
discrimination.  Recent case law goes a long way towards guaranteeing the benefit of 
Union law to broader categories of Union citizens by adopting a flexible interpretation 
of the inter-State element required.  This liberal approach in the case law reduces the 
scope for reverse discrimination of Union citizens, but leads in turn to accusations of 
arbitrariness and legal uncertainty.  The basic problem in this connection is that even 
an innovative interpretation of the provisions on Union citizenship cannot fully bridge 
the gap between those Union citizens covered by them and those Union citizens left 
out.  Indeed, the Union Courts cannot, in my view, legitimately extend the protection 
of Union law to all Union citizens without ignoring the limitations inherent in the 
citizenship provisions.   
 
The most sensible solution to the present problematic situation would be an 
amendment of Directive 2004/38 in the sense of enlarging its personal scope to cover 
static Union citizens.  A more limited option would be to extend just the provisions 
                                                 
386  Martin wonders whether the exercise of the free movement rights should have taken place 
immediately before Union law is invoked (Martin, "Comments on Gouvernement de la 
Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon (Case C-212/06 of 1 April 2008) and Eind 
(Case C-291/05 of 11 December 2007)" (2008) 10 Eur. J. Migration & L., 372). In my view, the 
timing of this exercise should not matter in order to determine the scope of Union law, except 
perhaps in cases of a very long interval between the movement and the moment the right is 
claimed (the Court’s case law provides some indication in this regard: see ECJ, Case C-138/02 
Collins [2004] E.C.R. I-2703, para. 28). 
387  For instance, only Union citizens with sufficient resources to establish lawful residence in 
another Member State would be able to rely on the rights relating to family reunification. 
388  See in this sense, for instance, Ritter, "Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, 
Guimont, Dzodzi and Article 234 " (2006) 31 E.L. Rev., 690-710. 
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relating to family reunification to static Union citizens.  These legislative amendments 
would extend the benefits of Union law to static Union citizens and would thereby 
make reverse discrimination of Union citizens impossible, at least as regards family 
reunification.  At the same time it would take away the legal uncertainty and 
perceived arbitrariness currently surrounding the categories of Union citizens entitled 
to claim the rights regarding family reunification.  Consequently it would put an end 
to the anomalous situation of Member States treating their (static) own nationals less 
beneficially than other Union citizens and even third country nationals389 and do away 
with the need for Union citizens to create sometimes artificial links with Union law in 
order to be able to invoke the Union rights regarding family reunification.390   It is 
unlikely however that legislative amendments on this point will take place any time in 
the near future.  
 
In the absence of intervention by the Union legislator, the solution to the concerns set 
out above - namely reverse discrimination, legal uncertainty and arbitrariness - is that 
the Court articulates more clearly the reasons why a Union citizen can rely on Union 
law and brings a new consistency in its case law by applying the citizenship 
provisions in accordance therewith.  Much will depend on the type of national 
measure a Union citizen is faced with.  Where a Union citizen is faced with a national 
measure which legally or de facto annihilates his Union citizenship, he deserves the 
full protection of Union law.  Accordingly, in such circumstances even Union citizens 
who cannot demonstrate an inter-State element should be entitled to rely on Union 
law, including the provisions relating to family reunification, where such is necessary 
in order to enable them to usefully exercise their citizenship rights.  The required link 
with Union law in such circumstances is provided by Article 20 TFEU, possibly in 
combination with Article 21 TFEU.  This reasoning seems to have been adopted by 
the Court in its judgment in Ruiz Zambrano and confirmed in its judgment in 
McCarthy.  This case law can be applauded for strengthening the Union citizenship, 
while at the same time providing a persuasive justification for a limited extension of 
the scope of Union law to situations previously considered to be purely internal.  
 
A similar approach can possibly be adopted where a Union citizen is faced with a 
national measure leading to reverse discrimination of static Union citizens in a way 
that violates fundamental rights, at least where national law does not provide adequate 
protection.  If, in such instance, the right to respect for family life is violated, the 
Union citizen concerned should be entitled to rely on the Union provisions relating to 
family reunification.  In such circumstances, Articles 18 and 21 TFEU could provide 
the required link with Union law.  This approach was suggested by AG Sharpston in 
her Opinion in the Ruiz Zambrano case, but has to date never been followed by the 
ECJ.  The possibility cannot be excluded that the Court will grab the opportunity to do 
so in future cases. 
 
In other situations, the claim for Union law protection is less strong.  Here, it seems 
that only Union citizens who make a contribution to the aims pursued by the 
                                                 
389  See on this subject, in some detail, Walter Reverse Discrimination and Family Reunification 
(Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), 78 pp. 
390  A famous example is the phenomenon of Dutch nationals moving to Belgium in order to 
circumvent the stricter Dutch legislation regarding family reunification, also now as the 
“Belgian route”. See, for instance, Vanvoorden, "Stelt het arrest Jia een einde aan de België-
route?" (2007) T.Vreemd, 72-84. 
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provisions on Union citizenship should be entitled to rely on Union law and the 
provisions on family reunification in particular.  The central provision in this context 
should be Article 21 TFEU.  As I have argued higher, the aims currently391 pursued 
by that Article are the free movement of Union citizens, which is apt to further the 
achievement of a Citizens’ Europe with more social cohesion and political integration.  
Accordingly, only Union citizens who move and thereby meaningfully contribute to 
these aims should be entitled to rely on Article 21 TFEU in order to derive rights for 
themselves and their family members.  In this connection, it is of utmost importance 
that the Court provides more guidance as to exactly what kind of movement is 
required.  Specifically with regard to rights relating to family reunification, it may be 
argued that only lawful residence in another Member State for a longer period of time 
should trigger the application of Union law and make it possible for a Union citizen to 
claim rights relating to family reunification against his own Member State.  If that is 
accepted, the Court should clarify what period of lawful residence in another Member 
State should be considered sufficient, and possibly when it should have taken place.  
This clarification and systematization of the Court’s case law would entail more legal 
certainty and take away much of the arbitrariness associated with the present case law.  
As a consequence, it would provide a greater incentive for the exercise of Union 
citizenship rights and the “activation” of Union citizenship.  
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have examined what “triggers” the application of the provisions on 
the free movement of Union citizens and their family members.  In this connection I 
have focused on the right to family reunification, which is traditionally considered to 
be a corollary of free movement.  It is clear, first of all, that a Union citizen who 
moves to another Member State derives from Union law a right to be joined or 
accompanied by his close family members.  In this connection it is not required that 
the latter have legally resided in another Member State before residing with him in the 
host Member State.  Moreover, the exact moment on which the family relationship 
was created is irrelevant for the enjoyment of these rights.  The Court’s broad 
interpretation of the rights of entry and residence of family members of Union citizens 
and, hence, of the Union’s competence regarding the free movement of Union 
citizens, is convincing.  It is justified by a need to tackle obstacles to the effective 
enjoyment of the right to free movement and residence by Union citizens and, 
moreover, supported by strong fundamental rights considerations. 
 
In the second place, it is less clear whether a Union citizen should move at all in order 
to claim the benefits of the free movement provisions, such as, in particular the right 
to be joined or accompanied by family members.  Traditionally, this question was 
unambiguously answered in the negative.  Recent case law, however, has gone some 
way towards recognising the enjoyment of these rights even by static Union citizens, 
who have never moved between Member States.  I have argued that the reasoning 
followed in this case law, with Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy as its current 
apotheosis, is convincing, but should probably be limited to cases where a Union 
                                                 
391  As was pointed out already, the precise scope and meaning of Article 21 TFEU is determined by 
secondary Union law. Future secondary Union law could change or enlarge the aims pursued by 
the Article (see the discussion of possible amendments to Directive 2004/38 under III.B.5., 
supra). 
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citizen is confronted with national measures annihilating his Union citizenship.  
Besides, fundamental rights considerations could possibly also justify an extension of 
the free movement provisions to static Union citizens.  In other cases, the enjoyment 
of the benefit of the free movement provisions and the provisions relating to family 
reunification in particular, probably still depends on movement between Member 
States.  Accordingly, they apply only to Union citizens who have moved between 
Member States and have thereby contributed to the aims of a Citizens’ Europe.  In this 
connection, there is a real need for clarification of the required inter-State element.  In 
my view, a rather demanding interpretation of that requirement is to be preferred, 
because it is apt to create more legal certainty and avoid arbitrary distinctions and 
because it is more in line with the division of competences between the Union and its 
Member States.  
 
The broad answer given in recent case law to the questions discussed implies a broad 
construction of the scope of Union competence.  This has a clear impact on the 
immigration policies of the Member States, because family members of Union 
citizens now derive a right of residence from Union law in situations that were 
previously considered to fall outside the scope of Union law.  In these situations, the 
Member States can no longer apply their immigration laws in order to deny a right of 
residence to the individuals concerned.  Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the 
broad interpretation far from extinguishes the possibility for the Member States to 
pursue an immigration policy.  First of all, its consequences are limited ratione 
personae in that only certain categories of family members of Union citizens are 
affected, and only to the extent that the conditions of Directive 2004/38 are satisfied.  
Moreover, Member States are still allowed to restrict the free movement rights of 
family members of a Union citizen on grounds or public policy, public security or 
public health or in case of abuse or fraud. 
 
There is a real concern, however, that Member States will not readily accept the full 
consequences of the free movement of Union citizens, in particular as they are 
construed in recent case law.  As Currie points out, while judgments like Metock and 
Others are legally sound, they may be politically undesired. 392   The broad 
interpretation given to the free movement provisions may give rise to a concern on 
part of certain Member States to be losing the control of their borders.  This effect is 
further reinforced by the Court’s broad interpretation of the categories of family 
members entitled to free movement rights393 and the current context of a financial 
crisis typified by pressure on national governments to reduce immigration.  The said 
concern may lead to averse reactions by some Member States, such as the adoption of 
policies to restrict immigration of family members of Union citizens under the cover 
of an overly broad application of the permissible derogations discussed higher or the 
restriction of the possibilities to acquire their nationality.   
 
At the end of the day, Member States should be willing to fully accept the 
consequences of the creation of Union citizenship and the rights bestowed on Union 
citizens, the important right of free movement in particular.  Since the possibility for a 
Union citizen to be joined or accompanied by family members is essential for the 
effective exercise of their fundamental right to free movement and residence, Member 
                                                 
392  Currie, "Accelerated Justice or a Step Too Far? Residence Rights of Non-EU Family Members 
and the Court's Ruling in Metock" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev., 325. 
393  See the discussion in Chapter 5, infra. 
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States should be allowed to restrict this possibility only where overarching 
fundamental interests are a stake.  Resistance to this reality, fuelled by the claim for 
the need to have the power to pursue an effective immigration policy, may be 
misguided, since a broader construction of the Member States’ powers in this 
connection would run directly counter to the aims of a Citizens’ Europe.  
 
Finally, it may be wondered whether the current Union legal framework surrounding 
Union citizenship is not excessively centred on free movement.  The argument that 
the free movement rights should no longer play any role in triggering the applicability 
of the provisions on Union citizenship has become a familiar one.  The continuing 
possibility of reverse discrimination of Union citizens as regards family reunification, 
for instance, does indeed appear to be somewhat of an anomaly in a Citizens’ Europe.  
Still, as I have argued in this chapter, the exercise of free movement rights does add 
an intrinsic contribution to the achievement of the aims of a Citizens’ Europe and 
could on that ground justify a difference in treatment.  Of course, it might be argued 
that Union law should go beyond that and should prohibit any discrimination of 
Union citizens.  That would contribute to the realisation of the full potential of Union 
citizenship and ipso facto take away a number of the problems surrounding the 
current distinction between those Union citizens entitled to claim the Union rights 
regarding family reunification and those who do not.  Such a major overhaul in the 
Union legal framework should, however, come about only after intervention of the 
Union legislator and is, for that reason, less than plausible for the moment. 
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CHAPTER 5 RELATIVES IN THE ASCENDING LINE 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Free movement for Union citizens and their family members 
 
The right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is 
perhaps the most important right associated with Union citizenship.  Secondary Union 
legislation – at present Directive 2004/38 – confers this right not only on Union 
citizens themselves, but also on their close family members, who may “accompany or 
join” the Union citizen in the Member States.  The reason for this extension is most 
commonly explained by the fact that a Union citizen could be deterred from 
exercising his or her right to free movement if he or she could not be accompanied by 
his or her close family members.1  Such may, moreover, be required, by the right to 
respect for family life, which the Union is bound to respect.  At the same time, it is 
clear that the conferral by the Union of derivative residence rights on family 
members, even those not possessing Union citizenship themselves, can have a great 
impact on the immigration policies of the Member States.  The Member States will 
have to grant a right of residence to persons who would not independently qualify 
under their immigration rules.  Perhaps for this reason in particular, the Union 
legislator has limited the residence rights of family members of a Union citizen by 
conferring these rights only on certain categories of family members and, moreover, 
surrounding them by restrictive conditions. 
 
In this chapter I will examine whether the Union legislator strikes an appropriate 
balance between guaranteeing the effectiveness of the right to free movement for 
Union citizens, on the one hand and safeguarding sufficient scope for the Member 
States to pursue effective immigration policies, on the other hand.  I will focus on the 
residence rights of ascendants of Union citizens, because a case study of this specific 
category of family members will allow a more in depth analysis of this issue.  The 
ensuing conclusions can be expected to largely apply more broadly with regard to 
residence rights enjoyed by family members of Union citizens in general.  Moreover, 
the study of the residence rights enjoyed by ascendants of Union citizens has a 
particular significance, since the restrictive conditions surrounding these rights have 
recently given rise to interesting controversies and have seemingly been partially 
discarded by the ECJ in recent case law.  In the following, I will first present a general 
overview of the rights for family members of Union citizens laid down in Directive 
2004/38 and next outline in more detail the questions tackled by this chapter.  
 
B. Directive 2004/38 
 
                                                 
1  See on this point also the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, supra. 
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1. Legislative history 
 
Union law has a long tradition of conferring residence rights on family members of 
economically active persons.  Accordingly, family members of workers, 2  self-
employed persons and persons providing services3 have since long enjoyed a right of 
residence in the host Member State.  More recently, in 1990, residence rights were 
also conferred on family members of persons who were not yet economically active, 
namely students,4 and persons who were no longer economically active.5  Besides, in 
1990, for the very first time, a general residence right was conferred on all Member 
State nationals who satisfied certain conditions, regardless of any economic activity, 
and their family members.6 
 
These different instruments, and the rights laid down therein, were consolidated by 
the adoption of Directive 2004/38,7 which henceforth regulates the rights of family 
members of Union citizens in a comprehensive way.  The Commission had long 
                                                 
2  Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community, [1968] J.O. L257/2, Article 10. See also Council Directive 
68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence 
within the Community for workers of Member States and their families, [1968] O.J. Eng. Spec. 
Ed. I, 485 and Council Directive 72/194/EEC of 18 May 1972 extending to workers exercising 
the right to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State 
the scope of the Directive of 25 February 1964 on coordination of special measures concerning 
the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health, [1972] O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. I, 474. The Commission has 
proposed to codify the provisions of Regulation 1612/68: see Commission Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the freedom of movement for 
workers within the Union, COM(2010)204 final. 
3  Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment 
and the provision of services, [1973] O.J. L172/14, Article 1(1). See also Council Directive 
64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the 
movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health, [1963-1964] O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. I, 117, Article 2(1); Council 
Directive 75/34/EEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the right of nationals of a Member State 
to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a 
self-employed capacity, [1975] O.J. L14/10; Council Directive 75/35/EEC of 17 December 1974 
extending the scope of Directive No 64/221/EEC on the coordination of special measures 
concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health to include nationals of a Member State who 
exercise the right to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein 
an activity in a self-employed capacity, [1975] O.J. L14/14. 
4  Council Directive 90/366/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for students, [1990] O.J. 
L180/30, later replaced by Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of 
residence for students, [1993] O.J. L317/59 after the ECJ had annulled the first directive on the 
ground that it was based on the wrong Treaty provision (ECJ, Case C-295/90 European Parliament 
v. Council [1992] E.C.R. I-4193). 
5  Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-
employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity, [1990] O.J. L180/28. 
6 Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, [1990] O.J. L180/26. 
7  For details on the legislative history of Directive 2004/38, see Carlier, "Le devenir de la libre 
circulation des personnes dans l'Union européenne: regard sur la directive 2004/38" (2006) 
C.D.E., 13-34; Verschueren, "De nieuwe Europese verblijfsrichtlijn 2004/38 sinds 30 april van 
toepassing: het Europese burgerschap op kruissnelheid" (2006) 2 T.Vreemd, 97-127; Iliopoulou, 
"Le nouveau droit de séjour des citoyens de l'Union et des membres de leur famille: la directive 
2004/38/CE" (2004) R.D.U.E, 523-557. 
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considered that there was a need to reform and codify the various existing legislative 
instruments on the free movement of persons.  On 23 May 2003, the Commission 
presented a proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States. 8   According to the Commission, this ambitious 
proposal served four purposes9: 1) laying down the different rules on free movement 
in a single instrument, in the interests of reader-friendliness and clarity; 2) 
streamlining the arrangements for exercising freedom of movement; 3) tightening up 
the definitions of restrictions on the right of residence; 4) facilitating the right to free 
movement and residence of family members of a Union citizen, irrespective of 
nationality.  The fourth one, in particular, is important for the purposes of my analysis 
in this chapter, as will become clear below. 
 
The Commission’s proposal was endorsed by the European Parliament on 11 
February 2003, subject to a number of important amendments.10  On the basis of those 
amendments, the Commission elaborated an amended proposal. 11   The amended 
proposal formed the basis for the discussions in the Council, which led to the adoption 
of a Common Position on 5 December 2003.12  That Common Position was approved 
by the European Parliament on 10 March 2004. 13  The final Directive, Directive 
2004/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council,14 was adopted on 29 April 
2004 and had to be implemented by 30 April 2006.15  
 
2. Family members 
a) Definition 
 
                                                 
8  Commission proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, COM(2001) 257 final, [2001] O.J. C270E/150. The proposal was submitted to 
the European Parliament by the Commission by letter of 29 June 2001. 
9  See the explanatory memorandum to the Commission’s proposal, para. 1.4. 
10  [2004] O.J. C43E/17. For the proposed amendments and their justification, see the Amended 
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, COM(2003) 199 final. 
11  Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States, COM(2003) 199 final. 
12  Common Position (EC) No 6/2004 of 5 December 2003 adopted by the Council, acting in 
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, with a view to adopting a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing 
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, [2004] O.J. C54E/12. 
13  [2004] O.J. C102E/518. 
14  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, [2004] O.J. L158/77. 
15  See Article 40 of the Directive. 
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Directive 2004/38 extends the right of free movement and residence to family members 
of Union citizens.16  Article 2(2) of the directive states that “family member” means: 
 
"(a) the spouse; 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on 
the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member 
State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with 
the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State; 
(c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the 
spouse or partner as defined in point (b); 
(d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner 
as defined in point (b);” 
 
Family members falling within one of these categories enjoy the right to free 
movement and residence, provided that they can demonstrate the appropriate “link” 
with the Union citizen concerned.  This means essentially that they must “accompany 
or join” the Union citizen (see Article 3(1) of the Directive17).   
 
It is not required that family members have the nationality of one of the Member States.  
Indeed, whereas Article 2(1), defining Union citizenship, explicitly refers to the 
condition of having the nationality of one of the Member States, Article 2(2), defining 
“family member”, does not.  Moreover, numerous articles of the Directive explicitly 
refer to “family members, irrespective of (their) nationality”18 or “family members 
who are not nationals of a Member State”.19  This is further confirmed in the case law 
                                                 
16  For detailed discussions of the rights conferred by Directive 2004/38 on family members of 
Union citizens, see Urbano De Sousa, "Le droit des membres de la famille du citoyen de l’union 
européenne de circuler et de séjourner sur le territoire des états membres, dans la directive 
2004/38/CE", in Carlier and Guild (eds.), L'avenir de la libre-circulation des personnes dans 
l'U.E. (Brussels, Bruylant, 2006), 103-126; Candela Soriano and Cheneviere, "Droit au 
regroupement familial et droit au mariage du citoyen de l'Union européenne et des membres de 
sa famille à la lumière de la directive 2004/38/CE" (2005) Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l'homme, 923-953. For a detailed overview of the rights granted to third-country family 
members by the different Community Directives which were replaced by Directive 2004/38, see 
Barrett, "Family matters: European Community law and third-country family members" (2003) 
40 CML Rev., 369-421. For scholarly works taking a broader perspective on the position of 
family members in Union law, see Ní Shúilleabháin, "Ten Years of European Family Law: 
Retrospective Reflections from a Common Law Perspective" (2010) Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 1021-
1053; Meeusen, Pertegás, Straetmans and Swennen (eds.), International Family Law for the 
European Union (Antwerp-Oxford-Portland, Intersentia, 2007), 461 pp.; McGlynn Families and 
the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 230 pp. For a very insightful analysis centred on the rights of partners under Union law, 
see Toner Partnership Rights, Free Movement and EU Law (Oxford and Portland, Hart 
Publishing, 2004), 286 pp. For an article that focuses on the rights of children, see Stalford, “EU 
Law and Children’s Rights: A Case Study of EU Family Law” (2010) Contemporary Issues in 
Law, 1-24. 
17  Article 3(1) is given a broad interpretation by the ECJ. For instance, in the case of a spouse of a 
Union citizen, it is not required that the marriage took place before the latter moved to the host 
Member State: see ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R., paras 85-93, with a 
case note by Cambien (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 321-341; ECJ (Order of 19 December 2008), 
Case C-551/07 Sahin [2008] E.C.R. I-10453, paras 24-33. See the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, 
supra. 
18  See Articles 3(2)a, 17(3), 23, 27(1) and 28(2) of Directive 2004/38. 
19  See Articles 4(1), 5(1)-(3), 6(2), 7(2), 9(1), 10(1), 12(2), 13(2), 16(2), 18, 20(1) and 24(1) of 
Directive 2004/38. 
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of the ECJ and in the preamble to the Directive.20  From this it will be immediately clear 
that the rights granted to family members of Union citizens will be of importance first 
and foremost to family members not possessing the nationality of one of the Member 
States, i.e. ‘third-country” or “non-EU” family members.  Indeed, other family members 
are Union citizens themselves,21 and thus derive free movement rights directly from this 
status rather than their status of a family member.  However, it cannot be ruled out that 
the status of family member of a Union citizen creates additional rights for this latter 
category as well, since those rights are subject to different conditions.  
 
In addition, the Directive also refers to two further categories of family members in 
Article 3(2), which states: 
 
“Without prejudice to any right to free movement and residence the persons concerned 
may have in their own right, the host Member State shall, in accordance with its national 
legislation, facilitate entry and residence for the following persons: 
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling under the 
definition in point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country from which they have come, 
are dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen having the 
primary right of residence, or where serious health grounds strictly require the 
personal care of the family member by the Union citizen; 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested.”  
 
The Directive does not confer any firm rights on these two categories of family 
members, which I will label “other family members”.  It merely states in their regard 
that “the host Member State shall undertake an extensive examination of the personal 
circumstances and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these people”.22  It 
must be immediately emphasised, however, that Article 3(2) explicitly states to be 
“without prejudice to any right to free movement and residence the persons concerned 
may have in their own right”.  This is important, as family members of the said 
categories may enjoy free movement rights under Union law which derive from their 
status of Union citizenship (if they have the nationality of a Member State) or third 
country national (if they do not have the nationality of a Member State).   
 
b) Differentiated regime for ascendants and descendants 
 
The Commission had proposed a definition of family members that would apply 
“across the band”, i.e. to all categories of Union citizens benefiting from Directive 
                                                 
20  See, in particular, recital 5 in the preamble to the Directive, stating that “The right of all Union 
citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States should, if it is to be 
exercised under objective conditions of freedom and dignity, be also granted to their family 
members, irrespective of nationality”. 
21  This follows, of course, from Article 20(1) TFEU proclaiming, inter alia, that “Every person 
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union” (see also Article 9 
TEU). See, in the same vein, Article 2(1) of Directive 2004/38, stating that “‘Union citizen’ 
means any person having the nationality of a Member State”. 
22  As such, Article 3(2) partly takes over the wording of Article 10(2) of Regulation 1612/68 and 
Article 1(2) of Directive 73/148/EEC, which called on Member States to facilitate the entry of 
any other family members of Union citizens or their spouses who are dependent on them or lived 
with them in the country from where they are arriving (see the Commission proposal for a 
European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2001) 257 
final). 
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2004/38.23  The reason for this proposal was that, under the different sets of rules 
preceding Directive 2004/38, the ascendants of the different categories of persons 
were entitled to residence in the host Member State, except ascendants of students.24  
The Commission had proposed to do away with this differentiated regime for 
students.  The Council, however, decided to reintroduce it.  Article 7(4) of Directive 
2004/38 states: 
 
“By way of derogation from paragraphs 1(d) and 2 above, only the spouse, the registered 
partner provided for in Article 2(2)(b) and dependent children shall have the right of 
residence as family members of a Union citizen meeting the conditions under 1(c) 
above.”  
 
Consequently, ascendants and descendants of students enjoy lesser rights than 
ascendants and descendants of other categories of Union citizens.  This can probably 
be explained by the fact that students have to satisfy less stringent conditions 
regarding self-sufficiency than other Union citizens. 25   As far as ascendants of 
students are concerned, Article 7(4) explicitly provides that “Article 3(2) shall apply 
to his/her dependent direct relatives in the ascending lines and those of his/her spouse 
or registered partner.”  Consequently, ascendants of students only enjoy the much less 
substantial residence rights of Article 3(2) of the Directive.  Nevertheless, it should be 
remarked that the Court has recognised, in certain specific circumstances, important 
residence rights for the ascendants of an EU student who are the latter’s primary 
carer.26  As far as descendants of students are concerned, Article 7(4) grants residence 
rights only to their dependent children, which is narrower than the general category of 
“direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants” stated in Article 
2(2)(c) of the Directive.27  Although such is not explicitly stated, it can be assumed 
that other descendants of students, like non-dependent descendants or descendants in 
a further degree,28 will be able to rely on the rights conferred by Article 3(2) of the 
Directive. 
 
C. Problem statement 
 
As was stated above, the basic reason for granting residence rights to the family 
members of economically active persons, and, more recently, of Union citizens 
regardless of economic activity, is that a genuine free movement of persons can only 
be achieved if “moving persons” have the right to be joined by their family members 
                                                 
23  The categories meant are those listed in Article 7(1)(a)-(c) of Directive 2004/38.  
24  See Article 2 of Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for 
students, [1993] O.J. L317/59. 
25  Students are not required to be economically active and need, besides being covered by a 
comprehensive sickness insurance, only “assure” the relevant national authority that they have 
sufficient resources for themselves and their family (see Article 7(1)(c) of the Directive). 
26  See the discussion under IV., infra. 
27  Strangely enough, the Commission, in a recent simplified guide for Union citizens entitled 
“Freedom to move and live in Europe. A guide to your rights as EU citizen” (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/citizenship/docs/guide_free_movement.pdf) refers in this 
connection to the “dependent descendents” of students, rather than to their “children”. This is 
probably an inaccuracy. 
28  Given the average age of students, this possibility is of little relevance in practice. 
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in the host Member State.29  The absence of such a right could deter a Union citizen 
from leaving his or her country and exercising his or her right to free movement, since 
he or she would thereby have to leave behind his close family members. 30  
Consequently, it would work as an obstacle to the free movement of persons, which 
the Union free movement provisions seek to abolish.  Below, I will refer to the 
justification just out as the “obstacles approach”.  A related justification sometimes 
invoked to extend a right of residence to family members of a Union citizen is that the 
free movement of citizens can only be achieved by guaranteeing the broadest possible 
integration of these family members in the host Member State.31  This view takes the 
interests of the family members (namely enjoying a right to live in the host Member 
State, which allows them to “integrate”) as a starting point rather than those of the 
Union citizen (namely the right to be joined by family members).32  In my view, the 
need to make integration in the host Member State possible rather explains why the 
Union legislator extended certain rights of Union citizens, other than residence rights, 
to members of his family, such as the right for children of an Union citizen to enjoy 
access to education in the host Member State under the same conditions as nationals 
of that Member State.33  The enjoyment of a right of residence, while not in itself 
aimed at integrating the family members in the host Member State, is of course a 
                                                 
29  This has been confirmed by the ECJ in numerous cases; see, e.g., ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock 
and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 52 and the case law referred to. On a more fundamental 
level, the justification for the extension of residence rights to family members is that Union 
citizenship can only reach its full potential if the movement of citizens is guaranteed against all 
restrictions (Snell, "And Then There Were Two: Products and Citizens in Community Law", in 
Tridimas and Nebbia (eds.), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century: Volume II 
(Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004), 62).  
30  See the discussion in Cambien, "Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister 
for Justice, Equality and Law Reform" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 333 et seq. 
31  See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-356/98 Kaba [2000] E.C.R. I-2623, paras 21-22, where the Court states: 
“The aim of Regulation No 1612/68, namely freedom of movement for workers, requires, for 
such freedom to be guaranteed in compliance with the principles of liberty and dignity, the best 
possible conditions for the integration of the [Union] worker's family in the society of the host 
country (Case C-308/89 Di Leo [1990] E.C.R. I-4185, paragraph 13). To that end, Article 10(1) 
of that regulation provides inter alia that a spouse, of whatever nationality, is entitled to install 
himself with a worker who is a national of one Member State and who is employed in the 
territory of another Member State”. See further Sewandono Werknemersverkeer en gezinsleven 
(Deventer, Kluwer, 1998), 157; Strasser, Kraler, Bonjour and Bilger, "Doing Family. Responses 
to the Constructions of ‘The Migrant Family’ Across Europe" (2009) 14 History of the Family, 
166. 
32  Although one could argue that the absence of “integration rights” for the family members could 
work as an obstacle deterring a Union citizen from exercising his free movement rights. See the 
fifth indent of the preamble to Regulation 1612/68: “Whereas the right of freedom of movement, 
in order that it may be exercised, by objective standards, in freedom and dignity, requires that 
[…] obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated, in particular as regards the 
worker's right to be joined by his family and the conditions for the integration of that family into 
the host country” (italics added). Still, in my view, it is important to conceptually distinguish the 
obstacles approach from the integration approach and accept that the former is the more 
important one. Confirmation of this can be seen in the fact that, under previous free movement 
legislation, the right of residence was enjoyed by a larger circle of family members than other 
“integration rights” such as access to the labour market of the host Member State (for an 
overview, see Sewandono Werknemersverkeer en gezinsleven (Deventer, Kluwer, 1998), Ch. 
10). 
33  See ECJ, Case C-308/89 di Leo [1990] E.C.R. I-4185, para. 13 and ECJ, Case C-413/99 
Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, paras 50-51. See further Martin and Guild Free 
Movement of Persons in the European Union (London, Edinburgh, Butterworths, 1996), 126. 
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prerequisite for exercising these other rights. 34   Accordingly, the extension of 
residence rights to family members of a Union citizen indirectly makes their 
integration possible in the society of the host Member State.  A third justification 
sometimes invoked is the need for the Union to comply with fundamental rights, the 
right to respect for family life in particular. 
 
The bottom-line is that the right of residence in the host Member State was extended 
to family members first and foremost in order not to deter Union citizens from 
exercising their free movement rights.  Precisely for this reason, family members only 
have derivative residence rights,35 namely the right to accompany or join a Union 
citizen in the host Member State.36  However, if this is the underlying purpose, it must 
be wondered why these residence rights are restricted in scope.  Even if we accept that 
the need to tackle obstacles to free movement only justifies extending residence rights 
to close family members and even if we accept for a moment that the circle of close 
family members 37  is adequately covered by the categories of privileged family 
members listed in Article 2 of Directive 2004/38, the question remains why the right 
of residence of persons belonging to one of these categories is made subject to 
restrictive conditions such as the condition of dependency with regard to ascendants 
or descendants older than 20.38  It is not clear from the outset why Union citizens 
have the right to be joined only by dependent ascendants and descendants, but not by 
non-dependent ascendants and descendants.  Put differently, it is not immediately 
clear why the absence of such a right is considered an obstacle that needs to be 
abolished by Union free movement rules in the former case, but not in the latter 
case.39  As was already remarked, the reason must probably be sought in the desire of 
the Member States to limit the effect of the Union free movement provisions on their 
immigration policies and to limit the financial burden incurred by the immigration of 
family members of Union citizens.    
 
In this chapter, I will focus on the residence rights enjoyed by ascendants of Union 
citizens and the restrictive conditions surrounding these rights, the condition of 
dependency in particular.  I will try to ascertain whether Union law strikes a proper 
balance between the justifications just advanced for extending a right of residence to 
ascendants of a Union citizen, on the one hand, and the interests of the Member 
                                                 
34  See Greaves, "Who is a Dependent Member of a Worker's Family?" (1988) 13 E.L. Rev., 275 
(stating: “The rights granted to the families of the workers on the other hand, are more relevant 
to the process of integration of the migrant worker's family in the host Member State than to the 
exercise of the right of free movement itself”). 
35  Craig and De Búrca EU law. Text, Cases, and Materials (4th ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 773. 
36  See, e.g., Article 6 of Directive 2004/38.  
37  In the sense that the absence of a right to be joined or accompanied by more distant family 
members would not have the same deterrent effect on the exercise of free movement right, and, 
therefore, not be an obstacle to free movement in the same way as would be the case for close 
family members. 
38  The same question arises when the extension of residence rights to family members is looked at 
through the prism of the need to protect fundamental rights. It is not prima facie clear, for 
instance, why a stronger claim can be made under the right to respect for family life with regard 
to dependent family members than with regard to non-dependent family members. This will be 
considered in more detail below. 
39  Tagaras, "Le champ d'application personnel du regroupement familial et de l'égalité de 
traitement des membres de la famille du travailleur dans le cadre du reglement 1612/68" (1988) 
C.D.E., 341. 
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States, on the other hand.  First, I will analyse the meaning of the terms “direct 
descendant” and “direct ascendant” (II).  I analyse both descendants and ascendants, 
because such will allow me to draw a more well-founded conclusion as to the 
meaning of the term “direct” in this context.  Next, I will inquire into the meaning of 
the condition of dependency, by examining how it is interpreted in the case law of the 
ECJ and how it is implemented by the Member States and come to a conclusion on 
whether this condition is justified (III).  Lastly, I will focus on a recent development 
in the case law which recognises residence rights for the parent who is the “primary 
carer” of a Union citizen, despite the fact that the dependency condition is not 
satisfied (IV). 
 
II DIRECT DESCENDANTS AND DIRECT ASCENDANTS  
 
A. Notion direct descendants 
 
The first issue is to determine what exactly is meant by the notion “direct 
descendants” in Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2004/38.  The term “descendant”, in its 
essence, is rather unambiguous in meaning and refers to the children, grandchildren 
etc. of the Union citizen.  It does not, on a natural meaning cover nieces, nephews etc.  
Black’s Law Dictionary gives the following definition:   
 
Descendant. One who follows in lineage, in direct (not collateral) descent from a 
person. Examples are children and grandchildren.  
descendant, adj. 
collateral descendant. Loosely, a blood relative who is not strictly a descendant, 
like a niece or nephew. 
lineal descendant. A blood relative in the direct line of descent. Children, 
grandchildren, and great-grandchildren are lineal descendants. 
 
However, this basic meaning can be given different interpretations, as it remains silent 
as to the link required between the Union citizen and his or her descendants, i.e. 
whether only blood relatives qualify or also adopted children, for instance.  In 
addition, it must be asked how the term “direct” adds to this meaning.  It must be 
noted that the term “direct” in combination with “descendants” was introduced by 
Directive 2004/38 and did not figure in earlier secondary legislation on the free 
movement of persons.  Prima facie one can assume therefore that this term is not 
without meaning and probably qualifies or restricts the scope of the category of 
descendants in one way or another.  However, an explicit explanation of the term 
figures nowhere in the text of Directive 2004/38 or in the proposals leading to the 
directive.  Not surprisingly, it has given rise to diverging interpretations, as will 
become clear below.  In the following I undertake to precisely determine the scope 
and meaning of the term “direct descendants”.   
 
On an abstract level, I can distinguish three different meanings, which will serve as 
the reference framework for my analysis.40  First, it is possible that only descendants 
                                                 
40  Admittedly, a combination of a number of these interpretations would be possible and further 
nuances within the different interpretations would also be possible. 
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with legal ties to the Union citizen and/or his spouse or partner qualify.  In that case, 
the term “direct” excludes purely biological/genetic descendants.  Second, it is 
possible that only biological/genetic descendants qualify.  Consequently, the term 
“direct” excludes adopted children.41  A third possibility is that only the children of a 
Union citizen and/or his spouse of partner are covered.  Under that interpretation, the 
term “direct” excludes descendants in a further degree (grandchildren, great-
grandchildren etc.).   
 
The second interpretation must be rejected.  As the Court has consistently held, the 
provisions on the free movement of persons must be interpreted broadly.  A narrow 
interpretation, excluding adopted children from the category of descendants is not in 
line with the purpose of the Directive, namely to facilitate free movement by 
providing for the possibility for the family of the Union citizen to integrate in the host 
Member State.  The Commission guidance for better transposition and application of 
Directive 2004/3842 clearly states that the notion of descendants extends to adoptive 
relationships.  As the guidance indicates, this is probably the only interpretation which 
is in accordance with Article 8 ECHR, which the Union is bound to respect.  The third 
interpretation has been defended in legal literature.43  It must be rejected however.44  
If the legislator had intended to restrict the notion of descendants in this way, it would 
probably have used the notion “children” rather than descendants 45  or stated its 
intention more clearly in another way.  In this connection, it must be remarked that 
the Union legislator did refer to “children” rather than descendants when dealing with 
                                                 
41  Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), (St. Paul, Thomson West, 2009) gives the following definition 
of “adoption”: “The creation of a parent-child relationship by judicial order between two parties 
who usu. are unrelated; the relation of parent and child created by law between persons who are 
not in fact parent and child. This relationship is brought about only after a determination that the 
child is an orphan or has been abandoned, or that the parents' parental rights have been 
terminated by court order. Adoption creates a parent-child relationship between the adopted 
child and the adoptive parents with all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities that attach to 
that relationship, though there may be agreed exceptions”. The Oxford Dictionary of Law 
(Martin and Law (Eds.), Oxford Dictionary of Law (6 ed.), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2006), 590 p.) gives the following definition: “The process by which a parent’s legal rights and 
duties in respect of an unmarried minor are transferred to another person or persons”. 
42  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, 4. 
43  Walleyn, "Gezinshereniging na de grote hervorming" (2008) T.Vreemd, 252; Verschueren, "De 
nieuwe vreemdelingenwet: België in lijn met de Europese regelgeving", in Foblets, Lust, 
Vanheule and De Bruycker (eds.), (Bruges, Die Keure, 2007), 194; Urbano De Sousa, "Le droit 
des membres de la famille du citoyen de l’union européenne de circuler et de séjourner sur le 
territoire des états membres, dans la directive 2004/38/CE", in J.-Y. Carlier and E. Guild (eds.), 
L'avenir de la libre-circulation des personnes dans l'U.E., (Brussels, Bruylant, 2006), 108; 
Candela Soriano and Cheneviere, "Droit au regroupement familial et droit au mariage du citoyen 
de l'Union européenne et des membres de sa famille à la lumière de la directive 2004/38/CE" 
(2005) Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme, 949. 
44  See McGlynn, Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 47, who notes that “the intention of including the qualifying 
term ‘direct’ of descendant is not apparent. It may be that this is intended to exlude 
grandchildren, but doubtless they too are ‘direct descendants’”; Oosterom-Staples, "Toelating en 
verblijf van EU-burgers en familieleden volgens de verblijfsrichtlijn (1)” (2007) 
Migrantenrecht, 92. 
45  As it did in Directive 93/96, which refers in its Article 1 to “dependent children” rather than 
“dependent descendants”. 
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the rights of family members of students (see Article 7(4) of Directive 2004/38 and 
the discussion under I.B.2., supra).  This implies that the term descendants had a 
meaning different from “children” according to the Union legislator.  The 
Commission guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38 
also explicitly states with regard to the category of descendants that there is no 
restriction as to the degree of relatedness.46   
 
In sum, it seems that the first interpretation must be embraced.  Accordingly, only 
descendants with legal ties to a Union citizen and/or his spouse or partner are covered.  
This clearly covers stepchildren of a Union citizen.47  The first interpretation gives the 
category of descendants a natural meaning and is, moreover, in line with the Court’s 
case law holding that the provisions on the free movement of persons need to be 
interpreted broadly.  The only hesitation that could exist is with regard to the term 
“direct”, which seems to add little to this interpretation, despite the fact that it was 
explicitly added by the legislator.  Admittedly, the first interpretation excludes purely 
biological or genetic descendants, but they would not be covered by a natural 
interpretation of “descendants” even in the absence of the qualification “direct”.  Still, 
this hesitation is not as such to call the said interpretation into question.  Since 
Directive 2004/38 in many respects enlarges the scope of the free movement rights 
enjoyed by Union citizens and their family members,48 it would be anomalous to 
interpret the term “direct” as restricting these rights.  It is precisely the fact that the 
Directive aims inter alia to simplify and strengthen the right of free movement and 
residence of all Union citizens 49  on which the Court has relied to exclude an 
interpretation of the rights laid down in the Directive which is narrower in scope than 
the rights enjoyed under earlier legislative instruments on the free movement of 
persons.50  The limited added meaning of the term “direct” is further confirmed by the 
fact that it was given no explicit consideration in the proposals and reports leading to 
the adoption of Directive 2004/38.   
 
The addition of the term “direct” probably emphasizes that only descendants qualify, 
and not, by analogous interpretation, persons who are in a position that is in some 
respects similar to that of a descendant.  This would exclude, for instance, collateral 
descendants such as nieces or nephews, but also the spouse or partner of a descendant.  
The same could be said of foster children, although this is more controversial.  Some 
might argue that, on a broad instruction of the term descendant, foster children are 
also covered.  Others may point out that foster children are not commonly considered 
to be someone’s descendants given the absence of significant legal ties.  The same 
remarks apply to children under guardianship.  In my view, these categories are not 
covered by the notion “direct descendants”.  Still, Member States may extend the 
category of descendants under national law so as to include them.  The Commission, 
arguably, is also of this view as far as foster children are concerned.  The Commission 
                                                 
46  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, 5. 
47  Notably in this regard is that the ECJ in Baumbast accepted stepchildren as privileged family 
members (ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 17 in particular). 
48  For example by including the descendants of the spouse or partner of the Union citizen. 
49  See recital 3 in the preamble to the Directive. 
50  ECJ, Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, para. 49; ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1107, para. 60. 
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guidance51 states that “foster children may have rights under the Directive, depending 
upon the strength of the ties in the particular case”.  This seems to indicate a certain 
degree of discretion on part of the Member States.  By contrast, the Commission 
states in its guidance (at p.4) that the category of direct descendants extends to minors 
in custody of a permanent legal guardian.  This broad interpretation is in line with the 
main purpose of the free movement provisions, namely to remove obstacles to free 
movement.  On a broad construction of these provisions, a minor under legal 
guardianship of a Union citizen should be given the same treatment as the child of a 
parent – Union citizen.  Nevertheless I do not agree with this broad construction as it 
stretches the notion of “descendant” beyond its natural meaning.  If the legislator 
wanted to include it, it should have stated this more explicitly.  
 
B. Notion direct ascendants 
 
The Directive refers in its Article 2(2)(d) to “the dependent direct relatives in the 
ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b)”.  The 
inclusion of the ascendants of the partner of the Union citizen is a major improvement 
compared to earlier secondary free movement law because it contributes to the 
Directive’s aim of giving marriages and registered partnerships an equivalent legal 
status under Union free movement law where the laws of a Member State treat them 
as equivalent.  Directive 2004/38 introduced one other change to the category of 
ascendants, namely the addition of the term “direct”, which did not figure in earlier 
secondary legislation.52  The precise meaning of the insertion of this term is not 
immediately clear.  Not surprisingly, the expression “direct relatives in the ascending 
line” has been given a number of different interpretations, as I will discuss in the 
following. 
 
The meaning of the expression “ascendant/relative in the ascending line” in itself is 
fairly straightforward.  It refers to parents, grandparents etc.  By contrast, it does not 
normally include uncles, aunts etc.  However, this basic meaning can be given 
different interpretations, as it remains silent as to the link required between the Union 
citizen and his ascendants, i.e. whether only blood relatives qualify or also adoptive 
parents, for instance.  The same ambiguity surrounds the term in other languages like 
French (“ascendant”) or Dutch (“ascendant”).53  Leading legal dictionaries for these 
three languages give the following definition (in English, French and Dutch, 
respectively): 
 
                                                 
51  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, 5. 
52  Article 10(b) of Regulation 1612/68, for instance, merely referred to “dependent relatives in the 
ascending line of the worker and his spouse”. 
53  Matters are further complicated by the fact that the English and Dutch versions of the directive 
do not use the term “ascendant/ascendant”, but “relatives in the ascending line” and 
“bloedverwanten in opgaande lijn”, respectively. In my view, however, this does not have any 
consequences for the meaning of these terms. I believe that the expressions used have exactly 
the same meaning as the term “ascendant/ascendant”. On the relation between different language 
versions and the translation of ambiguous or vague terms, see Sewandono Werknemersverkeer 
en gezinsleven (Deventer, Kluwer, 1998), chapters 13 and 14. 
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Ascendant. One who precedes in lineage, such as a parent or grandparent. Also termed 
ancestor.  
collateral ascendant. Loosely, an aunt, uncle, or other relative who is not strictly an 
ancestor. Also termed collateral ancestor. 
lineal ascendant. A blood relative in the direct line of ascent; ancestor. Parents, 
grandparents, and great-grandparents are lineal ascendants.54 
 
Ascendant, ante. Auteur direct d’une personne (appelée descendant), soit au premier 
degré (père, mère), soit à un degré plus éloigné dans la ligne paternelle (grands-parents 
paternels, etc.), ou maternelle (grands-parents maternels).55 
 
Ascendent. Bloedverwant die in opgaande rechte lijn in een afstammingsrelatie tot de 
erflater staat (ouders, grootouders enz.).56 
 
The addition of the term “direct” further adds to the confusion.  On an abstract level, 
three interpretations of the notion “direct ascendants/direct relatives in the ascending 
line” are possible.  First, it is possible that only ascendants with legal ties to the Union 
citizen and/or his spouse or partner qualify.  In that case, the term “direct” excludes 
stepparents57 (in the absence of stepparent adoption58) and purely biological/genetic 
parents.  Second, the notion can be held to cover only biological/genetic ascendants.  
Under that interpretation, the term “direct” excludes stepparents and adoptive 
parents.59  Third, it is possible that only the parents of a Union citizen and of his 
spouse or partner are covered.  In that case, the term “direct” excludes ascendants in a 
further degree (grandparents, great-grandparents etc.).  Admittedly, a combination of 
a number of these interpretations would be possible60 and further nuances within the 
different interpretations would be possible.  Still, they provide a good reference 
framework for my discussion.  As will be shown in the following, the different 
interpretations have all been supported by different authors or institutions.   
 
                                                 
54  Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), (St. Paul, Thomson West, 2009). 
55  Cornu and Association Henri Capitant, Vocabulaire juridique (8 ed.), (Paris, PUF, 2007), 986 
pp. 
56  Nackom and Van Hoecke, Juridisch zakwoordenboek (2nd ed.), (Leuven, Acco, 2007), 167 pp. 
“Afstamming” is defined by this dictionnary as “bloedverwantschap in de dalende lijn; een 
afstammingsverband tussen een kind en zijn moeder/vader kan enerzijds gevestigd worden door 
biologische afstamming […], anderzijds door adoptie”. 
57  Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), (St. Paul, Thomson West, 2009) gives the following definition 
of “stepparent”: “The spouse of one's mother or father by a later marriage”. 
58  Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), (St. Paul, Thomson West, 2009) defines “stepparent adoption” 
as “the adoption of a child by a stepfather or stepmother”. 
59  See the definition of the terms “adoption” in n. 41, supra.  
60  A combination of the first and third interpretation or of the second and third interpretation, for 
instance. 
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The second interpretation is problematic.61  In my view it is highly unlikely that the 
Union legislator has intended to exclude adoptive parents from the free movement 
rights conferred on ascendants.  Such would arguably be in violation of its 
fundamental rights obligations. 62   Furthermore, it would create an anomalous 
difference between the categories of ascendants and descendants.  Indeed, higher I 
argued that the term “direct relatives in the descending line” should be understood as 
covering also adopted children.  There seems to be no good reason not to give an 
analogous interpretation to the category of ascendants.  I see further confirmation that 
this interpretation accords with the will of the legislator in the fact that not only 
ascendants of a Union citizen - the primary beneficiary of free movement rights - are 
included amongst the privileged family members, but also those of his or her spouse 
or partner.  This at least demonstrates that the legislator was not only concerned with 
a biological or genetic link between ascendants and the primary beneficiary.  
Moreover, the Commission guidance for better application and application of 
Directive 2004/38 states explicitly that the notion of direct relatives in the ascending 
line extends to adoptive relationships.63   
 
                                                 
61  Prima facie, the third interpretation seems confirmed by the Dutch version of Directive 2004/38 
which refers consistently to “bloedverwanten”, i.e. (translated literally) “blood relatives”. This 
term would seem to indicate a requirement of biological or genetic kinship. However, the term 
“bloedverwanten” no longer corresponds to that traditional interpretation, and is given a wider 
meaning by Belgian and Dutch lawyers, which includes for instance relationships based on 
adoption (see, on the evolved meaning of the term: Koens, Blankman and Driessen, Het 
hedendaagse personen- en familierecht (behoudens het huwelijksvermogensrecht) (Zwolle, 
Tjeenk Willink, 1998), 26 et seq.). For an actual definition of the term, see Dirix, Tilleman and 
Van Orshoven (eds.), De Valks Juridisch woordenboek (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010), 621 pp. 
The definition given by that dictionary of “bloedverwant” is: “persoon die juridisch afstamt van 
een andere persoon, hetzij in opgaande of neerdalende rechte lijn, hetzij in de zijlijn”. Moreover 
it must be noted that other language versions use a more neutral term, namely “relatives” rather 
than “blood relatives” in English and “Verwandten” rather than “Blutsverwandten” in German. 
62  Because the interpretation gives adopted children lesser rights than natural children, as only the 
latter have the right to be joined by their parents in the host Member State. However, adopted 
children are equally protected by Article 8 ECHR (see ECtHR, Decision of 10 July 1975 in Case 
No. 6482/74 X v. Belgium and Netherlands; ECtHR, Decision of 5 October 1982 in Case No. 
9993/82 X v France and ECtHR, Judgment of 22 April 1997 in Case No. 21830/93 X, Y and Z v. 
UK). 
63  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, 4. 
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The third interpretation has been defended by some authors,64 but rejected by others.65  
In my view, it gives a natural and sensible meaning to the term “direct”.  Moreover, 
the interpretation is consistent with one of the purposes of the Directive, namely 
restricting the scope of beneficiaries of free movement rights in order not to confront 
the social assistance systems of the Member States with disproportionate burdens.  
Nevertheless it should be rejected, for a variety of reasons.  First, it raises the 
problem, again, of asymmetry with the category of descendants.  Second, it is at 
variance with the Commission guidance, which states that there is no restriction as to 
the degree of relatedness.66  Lastly, it is not easily reconciled with the wording of 
Article 8(2)(a) of Directive 2003/86, 67  relating to the right of residence of “first 
degree relatives in the direct ascending line” of a third country national or his or her 
spouse.  The explicit reference to “first degree relatives” in combination with “in the 
direct ascending line” implicates that the latter notion is not restricted to first degree 
relatives if it is not to be considered a pleonasm.  
 
In my view, the first interpretation is the most natural one.  The term “ascendants” is 
not commonly understood as covering stepparents. 68   One could object that this 
interpretation is not in line with the interpretation of descendants given above, since 
the latter did include “stepchildren”.  However, that objection is erroneous.  The 
correct parallel to draw, when comparing the categories of descendants and 
ascendants, is that between stepchildren (i.e. the children of the spouse) and the 
parents of the spouse.  The latter clearly do fall within my interpretation of 
ascendants.  On the other hand, just like the spouse of a Union citizen’s child does not 
fall within the category of descendants, it can be argued that the spouse of a Union 
citizen’s father (i.e. his or her stepparent) does not fall within the category of 
                                                 
64  Urbano De Sousa, "Le droit des membres de la famille du citoyen de l’union européenne de 
circuler et de séjourner sur le territoire des états membres, dans la directive 2004/38/CE", in J.-
Y. Carlier and E. Guild (eds.), L'avenir de la libre-circulation des personnes dans l'U.E., 
(Brussels, Bruylant, 2006), 109. The author notes that the restriction to parents (and not 
grandparents etc.) did not exist in free movement law preceding Directive 2004/38 (ibid.). See 
also Walleyn, "Gezinshereniging na de grote hervorming" (2008) T.Vreemd, 253; Verschueren, 
"De nieuwe vreemdelingenwet: België in lijn met de Europese regelgeving", in Foblets, Lust, 
Vanheule and De Bruycker (eds.), (Bruges, Die Keure, 2007), 106; Candela Soriano and 
Cheneviere, "Droit au regroupement familial et droit au mariage du citoyen de l'Union 
européenne et des membres de sa famille à la lumière de la directive 2004/38/CE" (2005) Revue 
trimestrielle des droits de l'homme, 949. See, in the same vein, the General Dental Council 
(GDC) guidance on European Parliament Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
European Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, which states “Who is a direct relative in the ascending line? A person’s parents 
are considered to be direct relatives in the ascending line.” This is obviously not a document of 
high legal value, but it neatly illustrates how the term direct can be interpreted in accordance 
with the second interpretation set out above. 
65  See, e.g., McGlynn, Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 47; Rogers and Scannell, Free movement of 
persons in the enlarged European Union (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2005), 164. 
66  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, 5. 
67  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, [2003] 
O.J. L251/12. 
68  See, in this regard, the definition of “parent” by the Oxford Dictionary of Law: “The mother or 
father of a child. The term also includes adoptive parents, but does not usually include step-
parents”. See further Bainham, “Who or what is a parent?” (2007) 66 C.L.J., 30-32.  
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ascendants.  However, while this is correct, it should be noted that the term “direct” 
does not add much to this interpretation.  Admittedly, purely genetic or biological 
ascendants are excluded by this interpretation.  Presumably however, they would not 
be included either under a natural interpretation of the term ascendants without the 
qualification “direct”. 
 
Before I come to a final conclusion as to the preferred interpretation, I will look into 
the implementation of the Directive by a number of Member States, and verify how 
the category of ascendants was implemented.  This may provide me with additional 
insight into the precise meaning and scope of this category.  Directive 2004/38 was 
transposed in Belgium by a law 69  amending the provisions of the Law of 15 
December 1980.70  Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2004/38 describing the category of 
ascendants is transposed by the Belgian legislator as follow (in Article 40bis §2 of the 
said law): 
 
“§ 2. Sont considérés comme membres de famille du citoyen de l'Union : […] 
4° ses ascendants et les ascendants de son conjoint ou partenaire visé aux 1° ou 2°, 
qui sont à leur charge, qui les accompagnent ou les rejoignent.” (French version) 
 
The intention of the Belgian legislator becomes more clear when regard is had to the 
explanation given in the projet de loi that preceded the adoption of the said amending 
law.71  The projet de loi describes the category of ascendants as follows (at p. 42): 
 
4° Les ascendants (parents, grands-parents, etc.) ou ceux du conjoint ou du 
partenaire tel que visé au 1° ou 2°, qui sont à leur charge (article 2, § 2, point d, de 
la directive). 
 
It further explains that the spouse of ascendants mentioned under 4° is not considered 
a family member, and enjoys only the rights mentioned in Article 3(2) a) of Directive 
2004/38.72  It is crystal-clear from this that the Belgian legislator rejects the third 
interpretation set above (the projet de loi explicitly refers to grandparents etc.) and 
apparently embraces the first interpretation (by excluding stepparents).  However, it 
must immediately be remarked that the Belgian legislator reached this interpretation 
seemingly without taking the term “direct” into account since, first, the term “direct” 
                                                 
69  Loi du 25 avril 2007 modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l' accès au territoire, le séjour, 
l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers / Wet van 25 april 2007 tot wijziging van de wet 
van 15 december 1980 betreffende de toegang tot het grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging en 
de verwijdering van vreemdelingen, (2007) B.S. 25752, available at 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_wet/wetgeving.pl. For a discussion, see Walleyn, 
"Gezinshereniging na de grote hervorming" (2008) T.Vreemd, 247-265. 
70  Loi sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers / Wet 
betreffende de toegang tot het grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging en de verwijdering van 
vreemdelingen, (1980) B.S. 14584, available at 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_wet/wetgeving.pl. 
71  Projet de loi de 11 Janvier 2007 modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l’accès au territoire, le 
séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers, [2006-2007] Doc. Parl., Chambre, 51-
2845/001 ; available at 
http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/flwb&language=nl&rightmenu=right&cf
m=/site/wwwcfm/flwb/flwbn.cfm?lang=N&legislat=51&dossierID=2845.  
72  The projet de loi refers in this regard to “le conjoint des parents visé dans le nouvel article 40bis, 
§ 2, 2° et 3°”. This is probably a mistake, and the reference should be understood as to Article 
40bis, § 2, 3° and 4° (see Sarolea, "Le nouveau visage du droit au regroupement familial après 
deux années de réforme” (2008) Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 366). 
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does not figure in the text of the Belgian law, and, second, the description of the 
category of ascendants was not changed as a consequence of Directive 2004/38.73  
 
By contrast, the word “direct” (“rechtstreeks”) was explicitly inscribed in the Dutch 
legislation.  In the Netherlands, the category of ascendants is transposed as follows: 
 
“de rechtstreekse bloedverwant in opgaande lijn die ten laste is van de 
vreemdeling of van het gezinslid, bedoeld onder a of b”.74 
 
However, neither the Vreemdelingenbesluit itself, nor its explanatory memorandum 
(toelichting) explain how the term “rechtstreekse bloedverwant” needs to be 
understood. 
 
In the UK, the category of ascendants is transposed by Regulation 7 of the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, which states:  
 
“7.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), for the purposes of these Regulations the 
following persons shall be treated as the family members of another person— […] 
(c) dependent direct relatives in his ascending line or that of his spouse or his civil 
partner” 
 
The European Casework Instructions of the UK Border Agency 75  describe this 
category as “Dependants in the ascending line (i.e. parents, grandparents) of the EEA 
national or of his/her spouse/civil partner.” This statement clearly rejects the third 
interpretation stated above.  Curiously, however, the same instructions equate the 
notion “direct relatives in the descending line” with “children”.  The instructions do 
not give further guidelines that clarify whether the definition includes adoptive 
parents or stepparents. 
 
These national provisions lend further support to the conclusion that the notion “direct 
relatives in the ascending line” must be interpreted in accordance with the first 
interpretation set out above.  Accordingly, adoptive parents are included, but probably 
stepparents are not.  This interpretation is, as was pointed out above, parallel to my 
interpretation of “direct descendants”.  Again, it must be observed that the term 
“direct” hardly adds anything in this interpretation.  This probably explains why the 
term was given no explicit consideration in the legislative procedure leading to the 
adoption of the Directive.  Still, it remains to be wondered why the legislator has 
considered it necessary to add the term.   
 
Possibly, the term “direct” was inserted mainly to emphasise that only ascendants are 
covered, and not, by analogous interpretation, persons who are in a position that is in 
some respects similar to that of an ascendant, like foster parents or a legal guardian.  
In my view, they are not, strictly speaking, included in the category of privileged 
ascendants.  Obviously, Member States are competent to extend the notion of 
ascendants under national law to foster parents or the legal guardian of a minor.  This 
discretionary competence is, in my view, partially confirmed by the Commission 
guidance, which states: “foster parents who have temporary custody may have rights 
                                                 
73  See old Article 40 of the Law of 15 December 1980. 
74  Besluit van 23 november 2000 tot uitvoering van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000 
(Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000), Article 8.72)d). 
75  Available at http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/ecis/ . 
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under the Directive, depending upon the strength of the ties in the particular case”.  
With regard to legal guardians however, the Commission states in its guidance that 
the notion of direct relatives in the ascending line extends to minors in custody of a 
permanent legal guardian.  This broad interpretation cannot, in my view be defended 
on account of the need to construe the provisions on the free movement of person 
broadly, as it is not a natural interpretation of the term descendants (see also the 
discussion above).  Accordingly, if the Union legislator wanted to include it, it should 
have stated this more explicitly.76    
 
Some additional support for that view can be found in a provision in the family 
reunification Directive.77  Admittedly, that Directive deals with the right to family 
reunification by third country nationals residing lawfully in the territory of the 
Member States,78 whilst I am concerned here with the rights of family members of 
Union citizens.  All the same, the provisions of Directive 2003/86 are in certain 
regards very similar to those of Directive 2004/38 and not without relevance to the 
interpretation of the latter.  This was explicitly acknowledged by the ECJ in Metock 
and Others.79  Article 10(3) of the Directive provides with regard to family members 
joining a refugee80: 
 
“If the refugee is an unaccompanied minor, the Member States: 
(a) shall authorise the entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification of 
his/her first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line without applying the conditions 
laid down in Article 4(2)(a);  
(b) may authorise the entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification of 
his/her legal guardian or any other member of the family, where the refugee has no 
relatives in the direct ascending line or such relatives cannot be traced.” 
 
Obviously this article applies to third country nationals, but in my view it also reflects 
to some extent the view of the Union legislator on the scope of the rights relating to 
family reunification of Union citizens: Member States are obliged to authorise the 
residence of relatives in the ascending line of a child, but not of his or her guardian.  
The only relevant difference with regard to Union citizens is perhaps that the category 
of privileged ascendants is not limited to the first degree ascendants.  At the same 
time, I note that this discussion is largely theoretical as a guardian will not normally 
be dependent on the minor in guardianship. 
 
                                                 
76  This would possibly be different only in exceptional circumstances where the legal guardian was 
the primary carer of a child and which involved a possible violation of Article 8 ECHR (see 
under IV.B.2.b., infra). 
77  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, [2003] 
O.J. L251/12. 
78  See Article 1 of the Directive. 
79  ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241. The ECJ rejected an 
interpretation of Directive 2004/38 which would have the “paradoxical outcome” that Member 
States with have more far-reaching obligations with regard to admitting non-EU nationals for the 
purposes of family reunification under Directive 2003/86 than under Directive 2004/38 (see 
para. 69). 
80  According to Article 2(b) of the Directive, “refugee” means any third country national or 
stateless person enjoying refugee status within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating 
to the status of refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol signed in New York on 31 
January 1967. 
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C. Conclusion 
 
The meaning of the terms ascendants and descendants in themselves is rather 
straightforward.  More difficult to determine is the precise relationship required 
between a Union citizen and his ascendants or descendants.  This ambiguity is 
reinforced by the qualification “direct”, which is explicitly used by the Union 
legislator for the first time in this connection in Directive 2004/38.  Consequently, the 
expressions “direct ascendants” and “direct descendants” have been interpreted 
differently by different authors and institutions and different views have been 
defended in legal literature.  On closer examination, however, most of these views 
should be rejected.  The correct interpretation in my view is that only ascendants and 
descendants with legal ties to the Union citizen and/or his spouse or partner qualify.  
Admittedly, the term “direct” admittedly does not add much to this interpretation.  
Presumably it was added mainly to make to emphasise that only ascendants and 
descendants are covered, and not, by analogous interpretation, persons who are in a 
position that is in some respects similar.  Still, the foregoing discussion of the existing 
ambiguities and possible diverging interpretations shows that there is a real need for 
clarification in the case law of the Court of the precise meaning of the terms “direct 
ascendants” and “direct descendants”. 
 
III DEPENDENCY 
 
The next issue to determine is the exact meaning of the notion dependency, since 
ascendants of a Union citizen will only enjoy residence rights as his or her family 
member if they are dependent on him or her.  The condition of dependency has given 
rise to discussions in legal literature and is still surrounded by important question 
marks, although some of these have disappeared after clarifications brought by recent 
case law from the ECJ.  In the following, I will try to determine more precisely the 
justification and meaning of this condition, looking at Union legislation and ECJ case 
law, but also at the implementation of this condition by a number of Member States.  
Given that the condition of dependency is interpreted by the ECJ identically with 
regard to both ascendants en descendants, I will discuss cases which concern either of 
those categories of privileged family members.81   
 
A. Meaning 
 
1. Possible justifications  
 
The dependency condition effectively limits the scope of the ascendants of Union 
citizens whose residence rights are guaranteed under Union law.  The reason for this 
                                                 
81  It must be noted that the English language version of Directive 2004/38 does not state the 
condition of dependency in identical terms for both categories: it requires relatives in the 
descending line to be “dependants” and relatives in the ascending line to be “dependent’. Both 
expressions should probably be understood to mean exactly the same. This is confirmed by other 
language versions of the directive which use the same expressions in both cases: see, for 
instance, the French version (which uses the term ‘à charge’ in both cases) and the Dutch 
version (which uses the expression ‘die te hunnen laste zijn’ in both cases).  
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limitation should probably be sought in the desire on part of the Member States to 
limit the scope of the privileged family members in order to minimize the number of 
migrants they are obliged to accept on their territory as a consequence of family 
reunification.  This can be further explained by the concern that migrants will 
potentially constitute a burden on the State finances.   
 
With some imagination, this limitation could be said to be in line with the “obstacles 
approach” set out above: it is probably more of an obstacle to leave behind family 
members dependent on you than family members who can live independently.  Non-
dependent family members can be thought, moreover, to be more likely to have an 
independent right of residence especially where it concerns Union citizens.82   
 
An additional consideration may be Article 8 ECHR, which contains the right to 
respect for family life 83 and which is enforced by Union law. 84  The obligations 
flowing from Article 8 ECHR will be discussed in more detail below.  Simply put, 
that article precludes States, under certain circumstances from refusing family 
members to live together in the host Member State.85  Admittedly, States have a 
margin of appreciation in this regard, and interferences can be justified under Article 
8(2) ECHR.  Nevertheless, it may be thought that refusing dependent family members 
a right to live with the person they are dependent on will be harder to justify under 
Article 8(2) ECHR, since they can presumably not live alone – in the absence of their 
family members. 86   This could also explain why dependent family members are 
considered more worthy of residence in the host Member State by the Union 
legislator.   
 
The foregoing arguments are merely possible justifications for imposing the condition 
of dependency.  Before subjecting them to a more critical analysis, I will consider 
how the ECJ interprets the condition of dependency and determine whether its 
interpretations are in line with the justifications just given or with other justifications 
invoked by the ECJ.  This analysis will allow me, on a more fundamental level, to 
come to a conclusion as to whether the dependency limitation strikes an appropriate 
balance between the interests of the Member States and the principles underlying the 
free movement of persons.  
 
2. Case law  
 
                                                 
82  Union citizens have an independent right of residence if they fulfil the conditions of inter alia 
having sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance cover (see Article 7(1) of 
Directive 2004/38). Without wanting to pre-empt the discussion below on the exact meaning of 
the dependency condition, it can be pointed out already that it seems plausible that non-
dependent family members are more likely to fulfil these conditions than dependent family 
members.  
83  See also Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
84  The Union is bound by international human rights obligations. Hence, Union legislation, 
including Directive 2004/38, has to be in line with Article 8 ECHR.   
85  See also the detailed discussion under IV.A.2., infra. 
86  See the discussion below on the “primary carer” (infra, under IV). See also, Strasser, Kraler, 
Bonjour and Bilger, "Doing Family. Responses to the Constructions of ‘The Migrant Family’ 
Across Europe" (2009) 14 History of the Family, 170. 
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According to the ECJ, the status of “dependent” family member is the result of a 
factual situation characterized by the fact that material support for that family member 
is provided by the Union citizen who has exercised his right of free movement or by 
his spouse.87  Two points clearly ensue from this.  The first point is that dependency 
in this context relates to a factual situation.  The legal status of the family member or 
the legal consequences ensuing from his relationship with the Union citizen in 
question are not immediately relevant.  Accordingly, the ECJ held that the status of 
dependent family member does not suppose the existence of a right to maintenance.88  
The ECJ justifies this position by pointing out that otherwise the status of dependent 
family member would depend on national legislation, which varies from one Member 
State to another, and this would jeopardise the uniform application of Union law.89   
 
That reasoning is convincing.90  It has been argued, however, that by not taking into 
account legal obligations to maintenance, the ECJ is interpreting the dependency 
condition too narrowly because it excludes descendants or ascendants who have a 
right to be supported by their Union family member but are not de facto supported by 
him or her. 91  This results in a situation which is harsh on the family members 
concerned: they can be denied a right to live in the host Member State if the Union 
citizen concerned is not actually supporting them - since they are not then considered 
“dependent” family members - despite the fact that they are legally so entitled.  In my 
view, the ECJ is right in not taking legal obligations into account in assessing 
dependency, for the reasons just explained.  The non-performance of maintenance 
obligations is a matter which should be remedied under national law.  Moreover, this 
interpretation is in line with the desire of the Member States to limit the number of 
migrant family members.   
 
The second point is that dependency relates to material support, i.e. financial 
dependency92 is required and not emotional or affective dependency.  AG Tizzano in 
Zhu and Chen noted in this regard93: 
 
“84. Nor can it be concluded, contrary to what may be inferred from the order for 
reference, that the concept of a dependent family member includes people who are 
‘emotionally dependent’ on the [Union] national who has a right of residence or those 
                                                 
87  ECJ, Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, para. 22; ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen 
[2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 43.  
88  ECJ, Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, para. 21. 
89  ECJ, Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, para. 21; ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, 
para. 36. See also Opinion of AG Lenz in Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, para. 31.  
90  Although, it should not go unnoticed that the Court does in fact refer to the national legislation 
of the Member States for the definition of other terms central to the free movement rules, such as 
“nationality”. See Chapter 2, supra. 
91  Tagaras, "Le champ d'application personnel du regroupement familial et de l'égalité de 
traitement des membres de la famille du travailleur dans le cadre du reglement 1612/68" (1988) 
C.D.E., 334-335. 
92  I use the terms material and financial dependency here as synonyms. Accordingly, financial 
dependency refers to dependency on all types of material support, not just the provision of 
money. Financial dependency is sometimes interpreted more narrowly as covering only the latter 
kind of support. See, e.g., Decision of the Social Security Commissioner (Edward Jacobs) in 
case CIS/2100/2007 [2008], para. 29: “Although support must be ‘material’ it need not 
necessarily be financial. It could, for example, take the form of the provision of housing, 
clothing and food.”   
93  Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 84-86. 
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persons whose right to remain in a Member State ‘depends’ on the right of the [Union] 
national. 
85. Even if we were to ignore the case-law of the Court of Justice just referred to, I would 
observe that only the English language version uses a neutral term like ‘dependent’ 
whereas, as the Commission correctly points out, in all the other language versions the 
term used relates unambiguously to material dependency.” 
 
This is a fair point.  The above cited case law clearly requires material support, which 
excludes emotional dependency.  Moreover, a number of language versions of 
Directive 2004/38 indeed refer, in less ambiguous terms, to a condition of financial 
dependency.  The Dutch version of the directive for instance refers to “ten laste zijn” 
rather than the more neutral “afhankelijk zijn”, the French version to “être à charge” 
rather than “être dépendant” and the German version refers to “Unterhalt gewährt 
wirden” rather than to “abhängig sein”.  The first of these terms each time clearly 
refer to material dependency and are not normally understood to cover emotional 
dependency.94  This interpretation has also been confirmed by the Commission in its 
guidance on the application of Directive 2004/38.95  Moreover, emotional dependency 
would seem to be more difficult to asses, and accepting it would therefore create more 
uncertainty in the application of Directive 2004/38.   
 
Yet, interpreting dependency as relating to financial dependency only is hard to 
reconcile with the “obstacles-approach”.  It is hard to see why a Union citizen would 
be deterred more from exercising his free movement rights if he could not be joined 
by family members which are financially dependent on him than if he could not be 
joined by family members which are emotionally dependent on him.  Some would 
even argue that the absence of the latter right would have a greater deterrent effect on 
Union citizens intending to move to another Member State, since financial support is 
arguably easier to maintain from a distance 96  than emotional support.  More 
importantly, it would seem that this interpretation is difficult to justify under Article 8 
ECHR as it would seem to be the case that the case for emotionally dependent family 
members under Article 8 ECHR is at least as strong as for financially dependent 
family members.97 
 
                                                 
94  The same observation applies with regard to the (nearly identical) terms used in the legislation 
which preceded Directive 2004/38; see inter alia Article 1(1) of Directive 73/148. 
95  See also the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States, COM(2009) 313 final, 5. 
96  Union citizens moving to the host Member State and leaving behind financially dependent 
family members in the home Member State could continue their financial support, for example 
by sending money. 
97  The ECtHR has in the past allowed “family life” to be established on the basis of existing 
emotional ties (see, e.g., ECtHR, Judgment of 23 September 1994 in Case No. 19823/92, 
Hokkanen v. Finland, para. 55; ECtHR, Judgment of 22 June 2004 in Cases Nos. 78028/01 and 
78030/01, Pini and Others v Romania, para. 150), but not on the basis of purely financial ties. 
See also the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Rozakis, joined by Judge Tulkens, in Judgment 
of 13 December 2007 in Case No. 30943/96, Sahin v Germany: “In conclusion, in the balancing 
of the various factors to be taken into account in determining the necessity of the interference in 
a democratic society, weight must be given to the radical nature of the measure of prohibition 
applying in a situation where the parent enjoys a minimum of family life, the aim being in most 
cases simply to safeguard the continuation of emotional ties between the parent and the child”. 
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In Jia98 the ECJ clarified that  
 
“‘dependent on them’ means that members of the family of a [Union] national established 
in another Member State […] need the material support of that [Union] national or his or 
her spouse in order to meet their essential needs in the State of origin of those family 
members or the State from which they have come at the time when they apply to join the 
[Union] national”99  
 
and that: 
 
“in order to determine whether the relatives in the ascending line of the spouse of a 
[Union] national are dependent on the latter, the host Member State must assess whether, 
having regard to their financial and social conditions, they are not in a position to support 
themselves”100   
 
Prima facie this seems to be in line with the aforementioned desire of the Member 
States to restrict the circle of privileged family members to those who actually need 
the support of a Union citizen.  However, the Court also, rather curiously, consistently 
held that there is no need to determine the reasons for recourse to material support or 
to raise the question whether the family member concerned would be able to support 
himself by taking up paid employment.101  This interpretation effectively means that 
the Union is indifferent to the reasons why a family member of a Union citizen is 
receiving material support from the latter.  Whether this is because he can genuinely 
not find a job that allows him to support himself or whether he just prefers to be 
indulgent does not seem to matter for his entitlement to residence as a dependent 
family member.  As one author has put it: “[e]ven idleness will not prevent the 
exercise of the right [to residence as a dependent family member]”.102   
 
That is hard to square with the concern on part of the Member States to limit the circle 
of privileged family members in order to reduce the burden on State finances.  
Through its interpretation, the ECJ opens up residence to precisely those family 
                                                 
98  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, with case notes by Elsmore and Starup in (2007) CML 
Rev., 787-801; Martin in (2007) Eur. J. Migration & L., 457-471; Oosterom-Staples in (2007) 
N.T.E.R., 191-200; Tryfonidou in (2007) E.L.Rev., 908-918; Woltjer in (2007) SEW, 303-306. 
Mrs. Jia, a retired Chinese citizen went to visit her son who was living in Sweden with his 
German spouse. For this purpose, she obtained a visitor’s visa valid for a maximum of 90 days. 
Shortly before the expiry of her visa, she applied to the Swedish authorities for a residence 
permit in her capacity as a dependent family member of a Union citizen, namely the mother of 
the spouse of a Union citizen. She argued that the pensions she and her husband received in 
China were not sufficient to live on and that no additional financial help was available from the 
Chinese authorities. This, she argued, proved her status of “dependent” family member. The 
Swedish authorities rejected Mrs. Jia’s application for a residence permit because they were not 
satisfied that she was a financially dependent family member in the sense of Union free 
movement law.   
99  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 43. 
100  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 37. 
101  ECJ, Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, paras 22-23; ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. 
I-1, para. 36. The Commission has even stated this in broader terms: “There is no need to 
examine whether the family members concerned would in theory be able to support themselves, 
for example by taking up paid employment (italics added).” (see Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for better transposition 
and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2009) 313 
final, 5). 
102  Greaves, "Who is a Dependent Member of a Worker's Family?" (1988) 13 E.L. Rev.275. 
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members which are likely to constitute a burden on the social assistance system of the 
host Member State: jobless people who are in need of support but do not make efforts 
to support themselves.  Persons fitting this profile are likely to apply for welfare 
benefits and, as the Court held in Lebon, the fact that a family member applies for 
such benefits (in casu the Belgian minimex) does not imply that he or she is no longer 
to be considered dependent.103  The Court considers that interpretation to be dictated 
in particular by the principle according to which the provisions on the free movement 
of persons must be construed broadly.104  However, that principle serves to preserve 
the effet utile, whereas the Court’s interpretation is not giving the dependency 
condition any useful effect if regard is had to the purpose it is intended to serve. 
 
In my view, there is more to be said for the interpretation advocated by AG Lenz in 
Lebon.105  The AG agreed that “dependent on” referred to de facto material support, 
but he added that it was necessary to examine the reasons for recourse to this support.  
In his opinion dependency requires that there are objective circumstances independent 
of the will of the person concerned which make it necessary to have recourse to 
support and that the person concerned is not able to meet his own needs by taking up 
suitable employment in spite of serious efforts to find it.106  This interpretation, in my 
view, gives more useful effect to the dependency condition in that it actually limits 
the scope of dependent family members to those persons who are genuinely in need of 
support.  Moreover, it could be argued that it is in line with the obstacles approach: it 
is arguably less of an obstacle to free movement if a person cannot be joined by a 
family member who is able to support himself than by a family member who is not so 
able.  Similarly the latter may have a stronger case under Article 8 ECHR.107  At the 
same time, I point out that any recourse to welfare benefits should not in itself be 
sufficient to qualify the family member concerned as non-dependent.108  However, a 
structural recourse 109  to income-replacing welfare benefits may, under certain 
circumstances, imply that another condition of the residence right for family members 
of a Union citizen is not fulfilled, namely that the latter has sufficient resources for 
himself and his family members not to become a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State.110  Accordingly, in such a situation the family 
member may no longer enjoy a right of residence in the host Member State, not 
because he can no longer be considered dependent, but because of his or her EU 
relative’s insufficient financial resources. 
 
                                                 
103  ECJ, Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, para. 20. 
104  ECJ, Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, paras 22-23; ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. 
I-1, para. 36. 
105  Opinion of AG Lenz in Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811. 
106  Opinion of AG Lenz in Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, paras 39-42. 
107  In that a forced separation of a person from his family members will likely be more difficult to 
justify under Article 8(2) ECHR if this person could not do without the support of his family 
members. 
108  As AG Lenz points out, some benefits consist only of small sums of money, which do not 
remove the necessity for substantial contributions from relatives who provide support (Opinion 
of AG Lenz in Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811, para. 33). 
109  I mean that recourse caused by temporary financial difficulties should not lead to the loss of the 
right of residence, as the Court clearly stated in ECJ, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-
6193, paras 40-45. 
110  See Article 7(1)b) of Directive 2004/38 on the “Right of residence for more than three months”. 
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3. Evaluation 
 
It seems to me that the ECJ’s interpretation of the dependency condition is not 
consistent with what I have identified as the reasons that could justify granting a 
residence right to dependent descendants and ascendants only.  On the one hand, if the 
Member States’ desire to limit immigration based on family reunification out of a 
concern to reduce the burden on State finances is taken seriously, the dependency 
condition has to be interpreted more meaningfully as a real limitation.  One of the 
factors to be taken into account when assessing dependency should be the reasons for 
having recourse to material support.  Only necessity based on objective circumstances 
independent of the will of the family member concerned should qualify for 
dependency.  On the other hand, if the reason for granting a right of residence to 
dependent family members is motivated by fundamental rights concerns and the 
consideration that the absence of such a right would create an obstacle to free 
movement, dependency should also encompass emotional dependency.  However, 
such an interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the current wording of the 
Directive in other language versions. 
 
On a more fundamental level, I am of the opinion, however, that the condition of 
dependency should be removed altogether since the justifications for maintaining it 
are not convincing.  It seems to me that the dependency limitation is implicitly based 
on the mistaken view that dependent ascendants and dependent descendants have a 
stronger case for residence in the Member States than non-dependent ones.  However, 
if dependency is interpreted purely as financial dependency, it must be wondered why 
this makes a strong case for a right of residence.  Financial support can often be 
granted from a distance and does not require the Union citizens to be joined by their 
dependants in the host Member State.  This is especially true if dependency refers to 
needs in the country of origin, since it will often be cheaper to fulfil those needs in 
that country, and hence easier to support the fulfilment of those needs by EU family 
members from a distance, than in the host Member State.111  The case would be 
different for emotional dependency, but it is clear from other language versions that 
this is not a concept the Member States had in mind when insisting on maintaining the 
dependency condition in Directive 2004/38.   
 
I do not consider either that the dependency condition is a limitation which can be 
justified by financial concerns.  It should not be forgotten that the derivative right of 
family members is subject to a number of conditions which are inserted precisely to 
avoid them becoming a financial burden for the host Member State.  Most 
importantly, they are in principle only entitled to residence as long as they do not 
become a burden to the social assistance system and are covered by sickness 
insurance.112  Besides, family members of non-economically active Union citizens 
                                                 
111  On the facts of the Jia case, for instance, it seems plausible that Mr. and Mrs. Jia could have 
been financially supported by their son and his German spouse, living in Sweden, by money 
transfers to China to complement their meagre pensions. Their financial dependency did not 
necessarily warrant a right of residence for them in Sweden. 
112  See, notably, Article 7(1)b) of Directive 2004/38, which makes the right of residence for longer 
than three moments for Union citizens and their family members subject to the condition of 
“having sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on 
the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence and 
having comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State” and Article 14 of the 
Directive, which states: “Union citizens and their family members shall have the right of 
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have no claim to social assistance during the first three months of residence and no 
claim to financial support for students before they have obtained a right to permanent 
residence.113  Financial concerns on part of the Member States can sufficiently be 
addressed by consistently applying these provisions.  Moreover, by excluding non-
dependent descendants and ascendants from the right to residence in the host Member 
State, the Member States excluded precisely those categories who are least likely to 
present a burden for the host Member State.  As the Commission explained in a 
proposal discussed below: 
 
“The present scheme contains some contradictions in that the members of the family who 
are not the worker’s dependants and who are therefore less likely to become a burden for 
the host country, cannot take advantage of family reunification under the terms of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68. However, members of the family who are the worker’s 
dependants and who could possibly oblige the worker to claim social assistance from the 
host country, do benefit from all the advantages offered by family reunification.”114 
 
Furthermore, and related to the two foregoing remarks, maintaining the dependency 
condition as it exists effectively comes down to excluding wealthier family members 
of Union citizens from a right of residence in the host Member State, at least in their 
capacity as a family member.115  I do not think this to be a valid policy choice: the ties 
between these family members may be as strong as between any family members.  
Lastly, not granting residence rights to non-dependent ascendants may compromise 
the effet utile of the residence rights of young Union citizens and may infringe certain 
of their fundamental rights, the right to respect for family life in particular.  This last 
argument finds some support in the case law of the ECJ, as will be discussed below 
(see the discussion on the “primary carer”, infra under V).   
 
The bottom-line is that, in my opinion, if residence rights are given to ascendants and 
descendants of Union citizens because the absence of such a right is considered an 
obstacle to free movement worth removing, that should apply to dependent and non-
dependent ascendants alike.  The Court’s rather broad interpretation of (financial) 
dependency is probably partly motivated by the belief that the dependency condition 
is not wholly justified as a limitation to free movement.  In a particular set of cases, 
the ECJ has even left the dependency condition unapplied (see the discussion on the 
“primary carer”, infra under V).  Nevertheless, the Court’s interpretation, apart from 
                                                                                                                                            
residence provided for in Article 6, as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system of the host Member State”. 
113  Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38. See on this provision, ECJ, Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-
23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] E.C.R. I-4585, with a case note by Fahey in (2009) 
E.L.Rev., 933-949 (social assistance) and ECJ, Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] E.C.R. I-8507, 
with a case note by Schrauwen in (2009) N.T.E.R., 77-83 (financial support for students). See 
also the discussion in Ross, "The Struggle for EU Citizenship: Why Solidarity Matters", in 
Arnull, Barnard, Dougan and Spaventa (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States: Essays in 
European Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2011), 288-
292. 
114  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation amending Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (COM/98/0394 
final) [1998] O.J. C 344/9 . See the explanatory memorandum to the proposal, p. 10-11.  
115  In that richer family members will not normally require financial support. Admittedly, as has 
already been remarked, they are more likely to enjoy an independent right of residence. Yet this 
likelihood is not such as to render the need for a derivative right as a family member nugatory. 
In particular for third-country family member such a derivative right would facilitate residence 
in the host Member State. 
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these particular cases, does not provide a satisfactory solution, for reasons explained 
above.  The real solution would be a change in the secondary Union legislation on 
free movement of Union citizens.   
 
It must be pointed out in this regard that the original Commission proposal for a free 
movement directive did no longer include the condition of dependency. 116   The 
Commission proposal referred in its Article 2(2), point c to “the direct descendants 
and those of the spouse or unmarried partner as defined in point (b)” and in its Article 
2(2), point d, to “the direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or 
unmarried partner as defined in point (b).  This new wording built on the 
recommendations of the High Level Panel on the free movement of persons chaired 
by Mrs. Simone Veil. 117   The report of the High Level Panel, to which the 
Commission proposal explicitly referred,118 states that “There are no valid grounds for 
denying non-dependent children more than 21 years old, or relatives in the ascending 
line who are not dependent, the right to join their family in another Member State.”119  
However, this innovation was not taken over in the final Directive, which maintained 
the condition of dependency for both descendants over 20 and ascendants.  The 
Council stated in this connection that120: 
 
“As far as direct descendants and relatives in the ascending line of the Union citizen are 
concerned, the Council has decided to maintain the existing acquis, by reintroducing 
conditions of age and dependency.” 
 
Even prior to the proposal which led to the adoption of Directive 2004/38, the 
Commission had proposed to enlarge the circle of privileged family members of 
Union workers by doing away with the condition of dependency for descendants and 
ascendants. 121   This happened for the first time in 1988, when the Commission 
proposed amending Regulation 1612/68 inter alia with the aim to respond to the 
political will of the Member States to increase the protection of migrant workers and 
their families. 122  The proposal was finally withdrawn by the Commission on 14 
                                                 
116  Commission proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, COM(2001) 257 final, [2001] O.J. C270E/150. 
117  See the Report of the High Level Panel on the free movement of persons chaired by Mrs Simone 
Veil, presented to the Commission on 18 March 1997, [1998] Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 102 pp. 
118  See the explanatory memorandum to the Commission proposal, p. 8. 
119  See p. 11 and 50 of the Report. This is one of the two gaps the Report recommends filling in 
order to allow families to remain together, the other one being the inclusion of unmarried partner 
in the categories of privileged family members. The Report states in this connection that “family 
rights should be amended to reflect social change”. 
120  See the “Statement of the Council’s reasons” attached to Common Position (EC) No 6/2004 of 5 
December 2003 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, with a view to adopting a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, 
[2004] O.J. C54E/12. 
121  See, inter alia, Communication from the Commission: Free movement of workers - achieving 
the full benefits and potential, COM(2002) 694 final 9. 
122  Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 on freedom 
of movement for workers within the Community, COM/1988/815/FINAL. The initial proposal 
was twice amended by the Commission after reviews by the EP and the EESC: see [1990] 
Chapter 5: Relatives in the ascending line 
 320
October 1998, as no agreement could be reached.  At the same time, the Commission 
put forward a new proposal to amend Regulation 1612/68,123 considering inter alia 
the introduction of Union citizenship 124  and the need to enhance family 
reunification.125  The proposal, again, suggested to do away with the conditions of age 
and dependency in relation to descendants and ascendants. 126   The proposal was 
finally withdrawn by the Commission, after the adoption of Directive 2004/38, which 
repealed Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68.127   
 
In sum, it is clear that both the High Level Panel on the free movement of persons and 
the Commission have considered that the condition of dependency in relation to 
descendants and ascendants should be removed from free movement legislation, 
either because there is no good reason to maintain it, because it is not in tune with 
social changes or because it leads to contradictions.  Still, the Council insisted on 
maintaining it in the new Directive on the free movement of Union citizens, merely 
motivating this desire by pointing at the existing acquis, and the Commission 
accepted this by way of a “compromise”.128  The real reason why the Council was 
                                                                                                                                            
C119/10 and [1990] O.J. C177/40. Article 10 of the modified proposal stated: “The following 
shall, even if they are not nationals of a Member State, have the right to install themselves with 
the national of a Member State who is employed in the territory of another Member State: 
(a) the spouse or any person with similar status under the system of the host country and their 
descendents; 
(b) relatives in the ascending line of the worker or the spouse or any person with similar status 
under the system of the host country; 
(c) any other member of the family in the country of origin who is dependent on or living under 
the roof of the worker or the spouse or person with similar status under the system of the host 
country." 
For a discussion: see Handoll Free Movement of Persons in the EU (Chichester, John Wiley & 
Sons, 1995), 249. 
123  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation amending Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (COM/98/0394 
final) [1998] O.J. C 344/9 . For a discussion of this proposal, see Sewandono, "Het 
Commissievoorstel tot wijziging van Verordening (EEG) nr. 1612/68: Meer bescherming van 
familie- en gezinsleven en meer gelijke behandeling" (1999) SEW, 284-290. 
124  See Recital (2): “Whereas Article 8 of the Treaty established European citizenship; whereas 
freedom of movement for workers without impediment is an essential part of this European 
citizenship”. 
125  See Recital (6): “Whereas freedom of movement for workers means full and effective 
integration of migrant workers exercising their right to freedom of movement, and that of their 
families; whereas family reunification must be enhanced to ensure that the migrant worker's 
family is not broken up as a result of free movement”. 
126  See n. 116, supra, and accompanying text. See in this connection also the Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the follow-up to the 
recommendations of the high-level panel on the free movement of persons, COM (98) 403 final. 
127  See the Communication From the Commission entitled “Withdrawal of Commission Proposals 
which are no longer of Topical Interest”, COM(2004) 542 final/3. 
128  See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament pursuant to the 
second subparagraph of Article 251 (2) of the EC Treaty concerning the common position of the 
Council on the adoption of a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, SEC/2003/1293 final, which states: “As regards relatives in the ascending line 
and descendants of the Union citizen having the primary right of residence, covered by Article 
2(2)(c) and (d), the Council decided unanimously to revert to the acquis by reintroducing age 
and dependency conditions for descendants and relatives in the ascending line. The Commission 
has accepted this amendment, which was endorsed by all delegations, by way of compromise”. 
The compromise must probably seen in relation to the whole common position, which “although 
less ambitious than the Commission's original proposal as amended following Parliament's 
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anxious to maintain the condition in the final version of Directive 2004/38 was 
probably the desire on part of the Member States to limit the circle of family members 
eligible for staying with the migrant Union citizen.129  Since the condition is highly 
likely therefore to stay it must be examined how it can be usefully implemented by 
the Member States, having regard to their concern to limit immigration based on 
family reunification.   
 
B. Implementation 
 
As with other notions which figure in Directive 2004/38 without being explicitly 
defined, the transposition of the categories of dependent family members in the 
national laws of the Member States may give rise to difficulties.  The assessment of 
whether a family member is dependent hinges on two important questions: 1) when 
can a family member be considered to be dependent, i.e. what standard needs to be 
met?130; 2) by what means can this dependency be proven?  The judgment in Jia131 
clarified a number of these issues, 132 at least in abstracto.  However, it remains 
unclear how the rather vague criteria put forward by the ECJ have to be implemented 
in practice.  The concrete assessment of the condition of dependency by the 
authorities of the Member State remains riddled with a number of problems and 
uncertainties, which will have to be clarified by the Union institutions in the future.  I 
will now turn to a discussion in some detail of the most important uncertainties. 
 
1. Essential needs 
 
First of all, there is the need to determine when family members are “not in a position 
to support themselves”.  The Court clarified that this entails an assessment of whether 
the family members in question are able to meet their essential needs without the 
financial support of their EU relatives.133  As I observed higher, the Court, however, 
also held that that there is no need to determine the reasons for recourse to the Union 
citizen’s support.134  Yet, the fact that a family member is not able to satisfy his or her 
essential needs will in many cases constitute the reason for recourse to the Union 
citizen’s support.  In addition, it will be hard to determine what the essential needs in 
the country of origin or residence of the family member concerned are.135  Naturally, 
                                                                                                                                            
opinion, strikes a balance between the positions of the Member States and marks a major step 
forward in terms of freedom of movement and residence in relation to the existing situation” 
(ibid.). 
129  See the submission of the Swedish government in the Jia case, cited by Opinion of AG 
Geelhoed in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, para. 22. 
130  Remember that dependency relates to a factual situation. Consequently, the legal 
characterisation of a situation cannot, at least not in the first place, be relied upon. 
131  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1. 
132  The referring court asked clarification both in relation to the exact meaning of the condition of 
dependency (“substance”) and in relation to the ways in which it can be proven (“proof”).   
133  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 43. 
134  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 36. See also ECJ, Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] 
E.C.R. 2811, para. 22; Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] 
E.C.R. I-7091, para. 39. 
135  Elsmore and Starup, "Case C-1/05, Yunying Jia v. Migrationsverket, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber), 9 January 2007” (2007) CML Rev., 792. 
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there is a great variation between different countries in this regard.  The essential 
needs of people in developing countries differ a great deal from those of the 
inhabitants of developed countries.  This makes it impossible to give a general 
definition of “essential needs”, for instance by way of a minimum sum of money.  An 
individual assessment, having regard to the circumstances in the country of origin, is 
the only possibility to apply this criterion.  The Commission’s guidance for better 
transposition and application of Directive 2004/38 unambiguously states in this 
regard136: 
 
“In order to determine whether family members are dependent, it must be assessed in the 
individual case whether, having regard to their financial and social conditions, they need 
material support to meet their essential needs in their country of origin or the country 
from which they came at the time when they applied to join the EU citizen (i.e. not in the 
host Member State where the EU citizen resides). In its judgments on the concept of 
dependency, the Court did not refer to any level of standard of living for determining the 
need for financial support by the EU citizen.”137 
 
Such an individual assessment can be difficult in practice.  It is not quite clear how 
national courts are to be able to form a concrete idea of the essential needs in all 
different countries and what documents can be used for this purpose.  Probably the 
legal (statutory) minimum subsistence of a country, in countries where this exists, is a 
good point of reference.138  As AG Geelhoed remarked in Jia139: 
 
“It would seem to me that the appropriate test in this regard is primarily whether, in the 
light of these personal circumstances, the dependant’s financial means permit him to live 
at the minimum level of subsistence in the country of his normal residence, assuming that 
this is not the Member State in which he is seeking to reside.”  
 
In other cases, the authorities could look at sources from the country of origin’s 
authorities or at reports from NGOs or international organizations.140  
 
                                                 
136  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, 5. 
137  [The test of dependency should primarily be whether, in the light of their personal 
circumstances, the financial means of the family members permit them to live at the minimum 
level of subsistence in the country of their normal residence (AG Geelhoed in case C-1/05 Jia, 
para. 96).] 
138  The Union legislator has recognised the value of the level of the minimum subsistence in a State 
as a valuable criterion to asses someone’s resources in the framework of the assessment of the 
resources of a Union citizen in the host Member State. See Article 8(4) of Directive 2004/38 
which states: “Member States may not lay down a fixed amount which they regard as "sufficient 
resources", but they must take into account the personal situation of the person concerned. In all 
cases this amount shall not be higher than the threshold below which nationals of the host 
Member State become eligible for social assistance, or, where this criterion is not applicable, 
higher than the minimum social security pension paid by the host Member State.” See similarly 
Article 7(1)(c) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, [2003] O.J. L251/12. On that provision, see the important case ECJ, Case C-
578/08 Chakroun [2010] E.C.R. nyr. 
139  Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, para. 96. 
140  Oosterom-Staples, "Van dingen die maar niet voorbijgaan; toelating van derdelander 
familieleden van burgers van de Unie en ongewenstverklaring van burgers van de Unie" (2007) 
N.T.E.R., 197. 
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2. Financial and social conditions 
 
Second, it is unclear what elements Member States are allowed to take into account 
when assessing whether a family member is financially dependent.  The Court states 
that Member States need to have regard to the “financial and social conditions” of the 
family members concerned, 141  without specifying these.  As far as financial 
conditions are concerned, this would seem to refer to the financial resources of the 
family member concerned, i.e. his or her savings, his or her professional income, the 
social security benefits or pensions he or she receives etc.  More broadly, it could be 
taken to refer to an assessment of the possibility for the family member concerned to 
be self-sufficient, i.e. to his or her ability to generate sufficient income to provide for 
his or her essential needs.  That assessment could take into account the professional 
qualifications of the family member, the job-market of his state of residence, his or 
her job prospects (in case he or she is unemployed) and the social security benefits he 
or she could apply for.  However, as I have already explained, the Court has 
consistently held that that there is no need to raise the question whether the family 
member concerned was able to support himself by taking up paid employment.142  
The Commission has even stated this in broader terms: “There is no need to examine 
whether the family members concerned would in theory be able to support 
themselves, for example by taking up paid employment (italics added).”143  It seems, 
therefore, that only the first (narrower) interpretation of “financial conditions”, as 
referring to the family member’s actual resources is in accordance with the ECJ’s case 
law.   
 
As for “social conditions”, this probably refers to elements such as the age, family 
composition, employment situation etc. of the family member concerned.  The age of 
a family member may be considered a relevant “social condition” to determine 
dependency since older ascendants are more likely to be dependent on the support of 
their relatives than younger ones.  However, in my view, Member States cannot, 
under Union law, make the right of residence of dependent ascendants dependent on 
attaining a certain age.  If the Union legislator had wanted to restrict the category of 
ascendants to persons above a certain age, it would probably have inserted that 
condition explicitly in Union legislation, like it has done for descendants. 144  
Moreover, the intention behind imposing the age condition is probably to exclude 
ascendants who still have good opportunities to support themselves by exercising a 
profession.  However, as pointed out above, Member States may not consider relevant 
whether a family member could support himself by taking up paid employment.  For 
that reason, it would be problematic for Member State authorities to make a right of 
residence for ascendants dependent on having reached the legal age of retirement.  In 
                                                 
141  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 37. 
142  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 36. See also ECJ, Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] 
E.C.R. 2811, para. 22; Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] 
E.C.R. I-7091, para. 39. 
143  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, 5. 
144  Oosterom-Staples, "Van dingen die maar niet voorbijgaan; toelating van derdelander 
familieleden van burgers van de Unie en ongewenstverklaring van burgers van de Unie” (2007) 
N.T.E.R., 198. 
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sum, age can be a factor taken into account to determine dependency, but cannot 
constitute a conditio sine qua non for entitlement to residence.   
 
As far as the family situation of the family member is concerned, account could be 
taken, for instance, of whether the family member is single or in a relationship and 
whether some of his or her children (or further descendants) live in his or her country 
of residence.  The first element would seem to be relevant prima facie because 
couples are generally less in need of financial support than persons who are not in a 
relationship.  On the other hand, the right of residence can not be made dependent on 
“being single” since that condition would be hard to reconcile with Union law, which 
grants a right of residence to all dependent ascendants.  Accordingly, the relationship 
status of a family member can be taken into account by national immigration 
authorities as one factor which makes dependency convincing, but cannot constitute a 
conditio sine qua non for entitlement to residence.  The second element (whether 
other descendants are living in the country of residence of the family member) seems 
relevant since they could be supporting the family member in question and thus the 
latter would not have to rely on his Union relative living in one of the Member States.  
In my view this element could legitimately be taken into account by immigration 
authorities.  Of course, they will need to look into the financial resources of the 
relatives living in the State of origin and their family situation in order to determine 
whether there is a realistic possibility for them to financially support their ascendant.  
They cannot content themselves with the theoretical possibility that these relatives 
could support their ascendant, as hypothetical situations may not be taken into 
account. 
 
Lastly, the state of health/medical condition of the family member could be 
considered an important social condition.  An ascendant in bad health can be 
supposed to be more in need of financial support of his relatives in order to have a 
decent life quality.  The Union legislator has explicitly recognised the health 
condition of a family member as an important factor to grant a right of residence in 
Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38, which states: 
 
“Without prejudice to any right to free movement and residence the persons concerned 
may have in their own right, the host Member State shall, in accordance with its national 
legislation, facilitate entry and residence for the following persons: 
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling under the 
definition in point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country from which they have come […] 
where serious health grounds strictly require the personal care of the family member 
by the Union citizen;” 
 
Admittedly, Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38 relates to persons falling outside the 
categories of privileged family members, and, hence, does not cover the categories of 
dependent descendants and ascendants.  Still, in my view, the medical condition of a 
family member is also relevant for the residence rights of those categories insofar as it 
may indicate the need for financial support on the part of Union relatives, whereas the 
determining factor in Article 3(2)(a) is rather the need for personal care.  I admit, this 
is stretching the term “social conditions”, but in my view it should be so interpreted.  
If this is not accepted, the person concerned will still be able to invoke a right of 
residence on the basis of Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38. 
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A related question is against what time-frame Member States are to carry out this 
assessment of financial and social conditions.  This comes down to the question of at 
what moment and for what period of time there should be a need of financial support.  
On the one hand, it could be argued that the need for financial support should not be 
temporary, but should be lasting. 145   In other words: the problematic social and 
financial conditions of the family member should be structural.  This position was 
defended by AG Geelhoed in his opinion in the Jia case.146  The ECJ, by contrast, did 
not explicitly state this condition of a structural rather than a temporal need for 
support and merely stated that the need for material support must exist at the time 
when the family member applies to join the Union citizen.147  The Commission in its 
guidance clarifies that: 
 
“The Directive does not lay down any requirement as to the minimum duration of the 
dependency or the amount of material support provided, as long as the dependency is 
genuine and structural in character.”148 
 
The bottom-line is probably that the need for financial support must a) exist at the 
moment the family member applies for residence in the host Member State and b) be 
structural.  This last condition does not, however, mean that the state of need has 
existed for a longer period of time.  If, for instance, a family member suffers a grave 
health condition, he or she may be in an acute and lasting need of financial support, 
even though this situation has not existed for a long time.   
 
3. Implementation in Belgium 
 
To get a better understanding of these issues, it is illuminating to look at how the 
authorities of a Member State apply the condition of dependency in practice.  I 
consider the example of Belgium in some detail here.  In Belgium, the law of 15 
December 1980 on the admission to the territory, the residence, the establishment and 
the removal of foreigners 149  states the same condition of dependency for both 
descendants over 20 and ascendants. 150   The notion of dependency (“te hunnen 
laste”/“à leur charge”) is not, however, explained or elaborated upon.  This leaves the 
                                                 
145  In Jia, the Swedish authorities had rejected Mrs. Jia’s application for a residence permit because 
they were not satisfied that she was a financially dependent family member in the sense of 
Union free movement law, pointing out inter alia that there needed to be a real and continuous 
need for material support, not an occasional need or acceptance of financial contributions (ECJ, 
Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 21).  
146  See Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, para. 96. 
147  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 37. 
148  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final. 
149  Loi sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers / Wet 
betreffende de toegang tot het grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging en de verwijdering van 
vreemdelingen, (1980) B.S. 14584, available at 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_wet/wetgeving.pl. For a discussion, see the contributions in 
Foblets, Maes and Vanheule (eds.), 30 jaar Vreemdelingenwet (Bruges, Die Keure, 2011), 682 
pp.; Sarolea, "Le nouveau visage du droit au regroupement familial après deux années de 
réforme” (2008) Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 361-387; Foblets and Vanheule, “Het 
federale vreemdelingenbeleid in België: enkele recente wetswijzigingen” (2007) TBP, 387-408.  
150  See Article 40bis § 2 of that Act. 
Chapter 5: Relatives in the ascending line 
 326
exact interpretation of this notion to the Belgian immigration authorities (the “Dienst 
Voor Vreemdelingenzaken/Office des étrangers”, hereinafter “DVZ”) 151  and the 
Belgian courts.152  The DVZ considers the following criteria relevant to determine 
whether a dependent family member has a right to reside in Belgium 153: 1) the 
revenue of the Union citizen concerned; 2) the revenue of the family member154; 3) 
proof that the family member was financially supported by his or her Union relative 
for at least six months prior to the request for family reunification155; 4) the age of the 
family member; 5) proof of insufficient resources (“Bewijs van 
onvermogen”/certificat d'indigence); 6) whether the family member has family 
members dependent on himself or herself.  The fifth criterion comes down to proving 
the lack of own revenue and the lack of house ownership. 
 
These are different elements which can be taken into account, rather than cumulative 
conditions for entitlement to residence.  It is clear that the Belgian immigration 
authorities have sought a reasonable way to apply the requirement of dependency in 
practice.  Still, it must be pointed out that a number of the above criteria can pose 
problems under Union law.  First of all, it appears that the DVZ uses a fixed income 
level to determine whether a Union citizen has sufficient means to avoid dependent 
persons becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.  
While this is apt to provide legal certainty, it seems contrary to the ECJ’s case law 
holding that every case has to be judged according to its individual circumstances 
rather than tested against generally applicable benchmarks.156  Moreover, in my view, 
the fact whether a Union citizen has sufficient means is not in itself apt to assess 
whether the condition of “dependency” is satisfied.  It is relevant for the assessment 
of another condition, namely that of self-sufficiency, i.e. whether a Union citizen has 
sufficient resources to support himself and his family members.  Both conditions, 
namely the condition of dependency and that of self-sufficiency, seem to be conflated 
to some extent by the Belgian authorities.  This is clearly apparent in a recent 
judgment of the Belgian Constitutional Court.  The Constitutional Court considered 
that the aim pursued by the condition of dependency, as inscribed in the Belgian law 
of 15 December 1980, is to  
                                                 
151  For more information, see the website of this institution: http://www.dofi.fgov.be/.  
152  See, for instance, the recent judgment of the Belgian Constitutional Court of 3 November 2009 
in Case No. 174/2009, Villamar e.o. v. Council of Ministers, with a case note by Denys in (2010) 
T.Vreemd. 47-49, at para. B.9 in particular.   
153  These are internal criteria, which have not been officially published. They are described, 
however, in authoritative Belgian legal literature. See e.g. Walleyn, "Gezinshereniging na de 
grote hervorming" (2008) T.Vreemd, 252-253; Walleyn, “Recente rechtspraak over ouders van 
Belgische kinderen in onregelmatig verblijf” (2006) T.Vreemd. 403-406; X., "Het begrip “ten 
laste zijn” in het kader van gezinshereniging", vreemdelingenrecht.be, 
http://www.vmc.be/vreemdelingenrecht/wegwijs.aspx. 
154  The mere fact that a person’s pension or revenue is below the average income in a third country 
does not suffice in itself to proof the need for material support (Raad voor 
Vreemdelingenbetwistingen, Case 31.564 X/Belgium (decision of 15 September 2009)). 
155  This will normally require bank statements proving that the Union citizen transferred substantial 
sums of money to his or her family member abroad which amount to structural support. It is not 
sufficient merely to demonstrate that the family member abroad has received sums or gifts (see 
Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen, Case 31.564 X/Belgium (decision of 15 September 
2009)). 
156  See also EU CITIZENSHIP REPORT 2010, Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights, 
COM(2010) 603 final (stating, at p. 14: “Several Member States apply EU rules incorrectly as 
they use fixed amounts as a criterion for residence or do not take individual circumstances into 
account.”). 
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“avoid that the [host] State has to bear the financial burden of foreigners who reside on its 
territory by virtue of family reunification with their […] Belgian relatives in the 
descending line, while the latter cannot themselves bear that burden.”157 
 
In my view, this aim is pursued by the condition of self-sufficiency rather than that of 
dependency.  It would be better to make a clear distinction between the two 
conditions, as Directive 2004/38 does, since they serve different purposes.  As I 
explained above, concerns relating to the financial burden incurred by the host 
Member State by the immigration of family members of Union citizens can be met by 
a sensible application of the requirement of self-sufficiency and that of the possession 
of comprehensive sickness insurance.  Such concerns should not be taken into account 
when assessing the condition of dependency.  Accordingly, the Belgian authorities 
are, in my view, wrong to take the revenue of the Union citizen into account in this 
connection. 
 
Second, as Union legislation does not require a minimal duration of dependency, the 
proof of six months of financial support may be in violation of Union law.158  Third, 
the element of age can be problematic if it is applied as a condition of having reached 
a certain age.159  Lastly, the condition of absence of home ownership is probably 
based on the assumption that a home owner could always sell his house in order to 
generate sufficient income.  As such, it may be considered to be a relevant financial 
condition.  However, it may hurt the problem that it takes into account a hypothetical 
situation and not the actual financial situation of the family member.   
 
In sum, the Belgian authorities take into account elements which mainly relate to the 
financial conditions of the family member, namely his or her revenue, whether he or 
she is a home owner and how much support he or she received in the nearby past.  As 
to social conditions, the Belgian authorities seem to consider only the age of the 
family member concerned.  A number of these elements can be problematic under 
Union law, depending on how they are interpreted and assessed.  Besides, the Belgian 
authorities seem not to take into account other elements which seem to be pertinent in 
this regard, such as the health condition of the family member concerned.160 
 
                                                 
157  Judgment of the Belgian Constitutional Court of 3 November 2009 in Case No. 174/2009, 
Villamar e.o. v. Council of Ministers, with a case note by Denys in (2010) T.Vreemd. 47-49, at 
para. B.9 “…die erin bestaat te vermijden dat de Staat de financiële last moet dragen van 
vreemdelingen die op zijn grondgebied verblijven krachtens een gezinshereniging met hun […] 
Belgische bloedverwanten in neergaande lijn, terwijl laatstgenoemden niet zelf kunnen instaan 
voor die last.” (English text quoted is my translation). 
158  See the Commission guidance (at p. 5): “The Directive does not lay down any requirement as to 
the minimum duration of the dependency or the amount of material support provided, as long as 
the dependency is genuine and structural in character”. The Belgian “Council for Alien Law 
Litigation” (Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen), by contrast, takes the position that 
dependency only exists where a family member was supported “for a certain period of time” 
(see Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen, Case 7.173 (decision of 15 September 2009)). 
159  See under III.B.2., supra.   
160  The only way in which the health condition of family members seems to be taken into account is 
by the requirement that family members must demonstrate that they do not suffer from certain 
infectious diseases (see Articles 10(2), sixth subpara., and 43(4) of the Law of 15 December 
1980).  
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4. Proof 
 
Lastly, it will be very difficult for the Member States to determine exactly what 
documentary evidence can be asked to proof dependency.161  On the one hand, the 
ECJ has held that evidence may be adduced by any appropriate means and that 
Member States may not insist on an official document issued by the relevant 
authorities of the country of origin or residence of the family members.162  On the 
other hand, Member States need not accept a mere undertaking from the Union citizen 
or his spouse as sufficient proof.163  The question arises, therefore, what documents 
can be demanded.  The Commission guidance does not at all clarify this issue, but 
only summarises the Court’s case law in this respect.164  In any event it is clear that 
Member States may not require one specific type of documentary evidence.  
Nevertheless, it may be assumed that an official document from the competent 
national authorities of the third country will in most circumstances be considered the 
most appropriate way of proving dependency, 165  although it may not always be 
conclusive.166  In the absence of such a document, or in addition to it, the authorities 
of the host Member State may take into account, for instance, bank statements from 
the family members concerned (possibly proving the lack of sufficient resources), a 
Declaration of bankruptcy (possibly proving the absence of professional income) or 
an Act of expropriation (possibly proving the absence of suitable housing) etc.167  In 
the absence of the possibility for Member State to exhaustively enumerate the types of 
documentary evidence required/accepted, it will be the task of the Union citizen 
concerned to make his case as strong as possible and provide the necessary 
documentary evidence to convince the authorities of the host Member State. 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
The conclusion must be that the notion of dependency is rather clear on a fairly 
abstract level.  It concerns material dependency which may be proven by any 
                                                 
161  Oosterom-Staples, "Van dingen die maar niet voorbijgaan; toelating van derdelander 
familieleden van burgers van de Unie en ongewenstverklaring van burgers van de Unie” (2007) 
N.T.E.R., 198; Woltjer, "Zaak C-1/05, Jia” (2007) SEW, 305. 
162  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, paras 41-42. The Court did acknowledge however that 
such a document would be “particularly appropriate” for the purpose of proving dependency 
(Ibid.). By contrast, Directive 2004/38 states that dependants or members of the households of 
the Union citizen who do not fall within one of the categories of “privileged family members” 
(one of the categories of “other family members” mentioned in Article 3(2)(a)) may be required 
by the host Member State to produce inter alia “a document issued by the relevant authority in 
the country of origin or country from which they are arriving certifying that they are dependants 
in order to obtain a residence card” (Directive 2004/38, Article 10(2)(e)). AG Geelhoed referred 
to Article 4(3)(e) of Directive 68/360 in this connection (Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-
1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, para. 97). 
163  ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 42. 
164  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, COM(2009) 313 final, 5. 
165  See ECJ, Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-1, para. 41. 
166  Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R I-1, para. 98. 
167  Oosterom-Staples, "Van dingen die maar niet voorbijgaan; toelating van derdelander 
familieleden van burgers van de Unie en ongewenstverklaring van burgers van de Unie” (2007) 
N.T.E.R., 198. 
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appropriate means.  To determine material dependency, Member States must look at 
the financial and social conditions of a Union citizen’s ascendant in an individual case 
and determine whether he or she is able to provide for his or her essential needs in his 
or her country of residence.  For the moment there is still some uncertainty as to what 
elements Member States may take into account and how insistent they may be on the 
level of proof required.  Accordingly, it is difficult to give a sensible implementation 
of this notion under national law. 
 
The condition of dependency as it is currently interpreted does not strike a proper 
balance between the financial interests of the Member States and the need to 
guarantee the effective free movement of Union citizens and their family members.  
The ECJ’s interpretation is both too narrow, in that it refuses to take into account a 
number of elements which should be central to the assessment of dependency, such as 
emotional connections, and too broad, in that it refuses to inquire into the underlying 
reasons for dependency.  In addition, even after the recent clarifications brought about 
by ECJ case law, it remains a vague notion, difficult to implement by the Member 
States.  It may be preferable in the future to drop the dependency condition altogether, 
for reasons set out above in detail. 
 
IV PRIMARY CARER   
 
As will be clear from the foregoing, direct ascendants of a Union citizen may only 
join or accompany the latter in the host Member State if they are dependent on him or 
her.  Somewhat curiously, however, the ECJ has been prepared, in certain 
circumstances, to leave the condition of dependency unapplied.  In a number of fairly 
recent cases, the ECJ has held that the parent of a Union citizen was entitled to reside 
in the host Member State despite the fact that this parent was not dependent on the 
latter.  The Court justified this holding in each of these cases by pointing out that the 
parent concerned was the “primary carer” of the Union citizen.  
 
The said case law is rather puzzling, in particular having regard to the fact that the 
Council expressis verbis reintroduced the condition of dependency in the final text of 
the Directive.  In the following I will try to provide an answer to three questions.  
First, I will consider whether and to what extent the stance of the ECJ can be justified 
(i.e. are there good reasons to enlarge the category of ascendants, even against the 
apparent will of the legislator? Does the ECJ strike an appropriate balance between 
the interests of Union citizens and those of the Member States?).  This will bring me, 
second, to an assessment of the scope of this case law (i.e. given the (absence) of 
justifications for the stance of the ECJ in these cases, what is the scope of the 
principles underlying them?).  Lastly, and again related to the previous question, this 
will provide me with insight as to the obligations of the Member States under Union 
law with regard to family reunification (i.e. at the end of the day, which ascendants 
are entitled to residence?).  In this connection, I will analyse the implementation of 
Directive 2004/38 by the UK. 
 
A. Justification 
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Prima facie, and without wanting to pre-empt the discussion below, it seems that the 
ECJ in the said cases added a new category of “derivative” ascendants whose relation 
to the “primary” beneficiary was not one of dependency, but rather lies in the fact that 
these persons “care” for the primary beneficiary.  This is a very interesting point, 
because the “care element” does not figure (and has never figured) in secondary 
Union law dealing with free movement of persons.  This can mean two things: either 
the Union legislator overlooked it when laying down the rules on free movement, or it 
considered it just not to be relevant.  The last point was clearly articulated by AG 
Stix-Hackl in Carpenter, one of the cases in point.168  The AG noted169:  
 
“103. As the Commission rightly submits, the circumstance that Mrs Carpenter cares for 
Mr Carpenter's children and thus indirectly assists him to exercise the rights deriving 
from the freedom to provide services has nothing to do with the question whether Mr 
Carpenter has exercised his rights in such a way that his spouse comes within [Union] 
law. 
104. The relevant provisions of secondary [Union] law also argue against the 
circumstance that the spouse cares for the children of the citizen of the Union being 
legally relevant for the right of residence. Thus the relevant Directive 73/148 refers in 
Article 1(1), with respect to its scope, to a series of circumstances such as the degree of 
relationship, age, dependency and living together as a household. The care of children is 
not included in this - exhaustive - list. It may be concluded that the [Union] legislature 
manifestly attached no importance in this connection to caring for children.” 
 
In the following I will argue that the ECJ is justified in taking the element of “care” 
into consideration.  I can see two justifications for extending the right to free 
movement and residence to the “primary carer” of Union citizens.  The first one lies 
in the need to preserve the effet utile of the free movement provisions.  The second 
lies in the need to respect Article 8 ECHR.  I will now turn to a detailed discussion of 
these justifications on the basis of the cases referred to. 
 
1. Effet utile  
 
The principle of effet utile (“useful effect”) is a very powerful concept in Union law.  
The principle appears under different forms and names (for example: “principle of 
effectiveness”).  In its most basic form, it refers to the need to guarantee that Union 
law can be usefully applied, i.e. that Union rules are fully given the effect they 
envisage.  As such, it is closely linked to the principle of sincere cooperation laid 
down in Article 4(3) TFEU.  That principle, in turn, finds its concrete expression in 
different contexts, in which the Courts have often justified certain obligations on part 
of the Member States by referring to the principle of effet utile.  This is the case, for 
instance, with the principle that national courts applying Union law must have 
jurisdiction to do everything necessary to set aside provisions of (even constitutional) 
law which might prevent Union rules from having full effect170 or with the duty of 
even administrative bodies to disapply conflicting procedural rules of national law in 
                                                 
168  The relevant facts of the case are set out in more detail below (infra, under IV). 
169  Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl in Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279. Admittedly, the 
case was decided before the adoption of Directive 2004/38, but the latter has not changed 
anything in this connection.   
170  ECJ, Case 106/77 Simmenthal ("Simmenthal II") [1978] E.C.R. 629, para. 22; ECJ, Case C-
213/89 Factortame (Factortame I) [1990] E.C.R. I-2433, para. 20. 
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order to give full effect to Union law171 and the principle by which a Member State 
must be liable for loss and damage arising out of breaches of Union law for which it 
can be held responsible.172   
 
The concept of effet utile is also a very important one in the Court’s case law on the 
free movement of persons.  In this context it essentially means that Union rules 
conferring free movement rights on individuals must be interpreted in such a way that 
they do no make it “impossible or excessively difficult” to exercise those rights and 
that national measures having that effect must be disapplied.  The Court will verify 
whether measures restricting the exercise of free movement rights can be justified and 
whether they do not restrict the exercise of these rights further than necessary to 
achieve the aim they pursue, i.e. whether they are in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality.  The ECJ’s concern to safeguard the effet utile of the provisions on 
free movement of citizens is clearly apparent, for instance, in a number of cases in 
which the ECJ invalidated certain requirements imposed by Member States on 
nationals from other Member States.173  Accordingly, and just to illustrate the point, 
the ECJ invalidated measures imposing requirements relating to the origin of the 
financial resources of Union citizens174 or a national measure denying a Union citizen 
a right of residence in the case of only temporal financial difficulties.175 
 
a) Zhu and Chen 
 
The need to preserve the effet utile on the provisions on free movement and residence 
of Union citizens was also the main consideration that led the Court in Zhu and Chen 
to grant a right of residence to Mrs. Chen.  The ECJ was confronted with the question 
whether Mrs. Chen, a Chinese mother of a young baby having the Irish nationality 
could invoke a right of residence in the UK under secondary Union law.176  One of 
the main hurdles to her case was that she, strictly speaking, did not fall within one of 
the categories of family members provided for by Article 1(1) of Directive 73/148 
(now replaced by Directive 2004/38).  Notably, she was not an ascendant “dependent” 
on the Union citizen in question,177 her newly born baby named Catherine.  Rather the 
reverse was true: her baby was completely dependent on her.  The ECJ nevertheless 
considered that Mrs. Chen was entitled to a right of residence, explaining that to 
refuse a right of residence to the parent who is the primary carer of a child entitled to 
                                                 
171  ECJ, Case C-118/00 Larsy [2001] E.C.R. I-5063, paras 50-53. 
172  This is confirmed by a large body of case law on State liability. See, e.g., ECJ, Joined Cases C-
6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci [1991] E.C.R. I-5357. At paragraph 33 the Court 
states: “The full effectiveness of [Union] rules would be impaired and the protection of the 
rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when 
their rights are infringed by a breach of [Union] law for which a Member State can be held 
responsible.” 
173  See the discussion in Van Nuffel and Cambien, "De vrijheid van economisch niet-actieve EU-
burgers om binnen de EU te reizen, te verblijven en te studeren" (2009) 57 SEW, 144-154. 
174  E.g. ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 29-33; ECJ, Case C-408/03 
Commission v Belgium [2006] E.C.R. I-2647, paras 38-53. 
175  ECJ, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193, paras 43-44. 
176  The facts of the case are set out in more detail in Chapter 2, supra. 
177  Article 1(1)d) of Directive 73/148 included ascendants on condition that they were dependent 
just like Article 2(2)d) of Directive 2004/38; it read as follows “the relatives in the ascending 
and descending lines of such nationals and of the spouse of such nationals, which relatives are 
dependent on them, irrespective of their nationality.” 
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reside in the host Member State, would deprive the child’s right of residence of any useful 
effect.178   
 
It is hard to disagree with the Court on this point: as a very young child, baby 
Catherine was completely dependent on the care of her mother and could certainly not 
reside in one of the Member States on her own.  The Court was right, therefore, to 
leave the condition of dependency unapplied in the specific circumstances of the 
case.179  However, the Court’s reasoning on this point is rather succinct, unlike most 
of the other judgments based on effet utile reasoning.  It is certainly striking that the 
Court did not explicitly consider whether and to what extent the restrictive condition 
of dependency could be justified by a legitimate purpose.  The reason for this seems 
rather obvious.  The application of the condition, in the case at hand it had the effect 
of completely rendering impossible the exercise by a Union citizen of her 
fundamental right to fundamental freedom, even though the conditions of financial 
independence were fulfilled.  Since no purpose could conceivably justify such a far-
reaching interference, the ECJ can be forgiven for not explicitly considering it.  Still 
an explicit consideration of this point would have brought more clarity to the ECJ’s 
reasoning and provided more insight into its scope.   
 
For the sake of completeness, it must be mentioned that the Court has confirmed the 
reasoning followed in Zhu and Chen in its recent judgment in case Ruiz Zambrano.180  
The question the Court had to answer in that case was whether a Colombian national 
and his young children, who had the Belgian nationality, derived from Union law a 
right of residence in Belgium.  The applicant explicitly based his claim on Zhu and 
Chen, which concerned similar facts.  The only doubtful element about his claim was 
that, to the difference of the Zhu and Chen case, the Union citizens in question had 
never resided outside Belgium, the Member State of which they were a national.  
Before the ECJ it was argued by no less than eight Member States and by the 
Commission that the case therefore fell outside the scope of Union law.  The Court 
nevertheless decided that Mr. Ruiz Zambrano and his children derived a right of 
residence from Union law.  It pointed out that the children would not be able to reside 
in Belgium independently and that, consequently, the refusal of a right of residence to 
their father would require them to leave the country and thereby deprive them of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substances of the rights conferred on them by virtue of their 
status as Union citizens.  Such outcome would be at variance with Article 20 TFEU, 
according to the Court.   
 
It is certainly striking that the Court in Ruiz Zambrano did not explicitly use the term 
“primary carer” 181 and did not on this point refer to the Zhu and Chen case, in 
particular in view of the fact that Zhu and Chen was explicitly referred to in two of 
the three questions referred for a preliminary ruling.  However, it should be clear that 
the Court’s reasoning on the point that the children of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano could not 
reside in Belgium independently of the latter was analogous to the reasoning followed 
                                                 
178  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 45-46. 
179  Below, it will be further discussed what the scope of the judgment is and to what extent the 
Court’s judgment was predicated on the very specific facts of the case.   
180  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr. See the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, 
supra. 
181  Instead it used the term “third country national with dependent minor children” (ECJ, Case C-
34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 43). 
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in Zhu and Chen.  The Court’s reasoning on this point in Ruiz Zambrano was in fact 
strikingly succinct, perhaps indicating that the Court considered that the reasoning 
followed was well established since the Zhu and Chen case and did not require further 
elaboration.  In any event, the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano did not contribute much to 
a better understanding of the legal position of primary carers under Union law and 
will therefore only be referred to sporadically below. 
 
In the following, I will discuss a number of other cases in which the Court also 
applied a reasoning based on the need to preserve the effet utile of the free movement 
provisions in order to grant a right of residence to the parent who is the primary carer 
of his or her children, namely Baumbast and R, Ibrahim and Texeira, and Carpenter.  
These cases are different from Zhu and Chen in that they concern the residence rights 
of family members of economically active Union citizens.182  This may prima facie 
seem to make them less relevant for my analysis of the free movement of Union 
citizens.  Still, they can, on a proper account, be characterised as “citizenship cases”.  
This is crystal clear for Baumbast and R, Ibrahim and Teixeira, where the applicants 
where non-economically active Union citizens,183 but the same is arguably also true 
for Carpenter. 184   Moreover, it could be argued that economic activity is not a 
relevant distinguishing criterion in this context.  After all, Directive 2004/38 
harmonises the definition of family members for the purposes of free movement of 
persons for both economically active and non-economically active persons.  Still, 
there are clear indications in the case law of the ECJ that the qualification of the case 
as one involving economically active citizens could have significant consequences for 
the residence rights of children and their primary carer.  This will be discussed in 
detail below (see infra, under IV.B.2.a.). 
 
b) Baumbast and R 
 
Baumbast and R185 in fact concerned two cases in which migrant workers who resided 
in the UK together with their school-going children were denied the right to (continue 
to) reside in the UK.  In the Baumbast case, the refusal was based on the fact that Mr. 
Baumbast, a German national, did no longer have a job in the UK and thus could no 
                                                 
182  Or Union citizens who were formerly economically active in the host Member State. 
183  It must be remarked in this connection that Ibrahim and Teixeira are cases in the field of 
“European citizenship” according to the official classification of cases of the Union Courts (see 
www.curia.eu).  
184  See e.g. Spaventa, "From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (non-)economic European 
Constitution” (2004) 41 CML Rev., 773; Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European 
Union: Barriers to Movement in their Constitutional Context (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer law 
international, 2007), 126-127. 
185  ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, with case notes by Martin in (2003) 
Eur. J. Migration & L., 143-162; Sewandono in (2003) SEW, 73-75; Storey in (2002) Journal of 
Civil Liberties, 152-162; Azoulay in (2001-2002) R.A.E.-L.A.E., 1092-1101. See also the 
interesting recent contributions in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulay (eds), The Past and 
Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome 
Treaty (Oxford and Portland, Hart, 2010): Timmermans, “Martínez Sala and Baumbast 
revisited” (p. 345-355), Shaw, “A View of the Citizenship Classics: Martínez Sala and 
Subsequent Cases on Citizenship of the Union” (p. 356-362), Menéndez, “European Citizenship 
after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become More Human but Less 
Social?”(p. 363-393), Closa Montero, “Martínez Sala and Baumbast: an institutionalist analysis” 
(p. 394-401). 
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longer be considered a migrant worker for the purposes of Regulation No 1612/68.186  
In the R case the refusal was based on the fact that Mrs. R, a third country national 
who had been married to a French national, was divorced from her husband, and thus 
could no longer be considered the spouse of a migrant worker for the purposes of 
Regulation 1612/68.187  In both cases the ECJ considered that the children of Mr 
Baumbast and Mrs. R were entitled to reside in the UK, despite the fact that they 
could at the relevant time no longer have been considered children of migrant worker.  
The Court based this finding on Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, which entitles 
children of migrant workers to be admitted to the host Member State’s general 
educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same conditions 
as nationals of that State.188  The Court held that it would be contrary to the wording 
of Article 12 and to its objective, namely to facilitate the integration of the children of 
a migrant worker and his family in the host Member State, to refuse the children in 
question a right of residence in the host Member State.  Furthermore, the Court 
considered that the right of the children to pursue their studies in the host Member 
State would be infringed if permission to remain were refused to the parents who are 
their primary carer.  The Court stated189: 
 
“The right conferred by Article 12 of Regulation No 1612/68 on the child of a migrant 
worker to pursue, under the best possible conditions, his education in the host Member 
State necessarily implies that that child has the right to be accompanied by the person 
who is his primary carer and, accordingly, that that person is able to reside with him in 
that Member State during his studies. To refuse to grant permission to remain to a parent 
who is the primary carer of the child exercising his right to pursue his studies in the host 
Member State infringes that right.” 
 
The Court’s reasoning is similar to its reasoning in Zhu and Chen.190  In Baumbast 
and R too, the primary carer was entitled to reside in the host Member State, because 
otherwise the residence rights of the children, which in casu were necessary to enable 
them to go to school in the host Member State, could not be usefully exercised.  
Again, the Court came to this conclusion despite the fact that, strictly speaking, Mr. 
Baumbast and Mrs. R did not fall within the scope of the beneficiaries of Regulation 
1612/68, as they were no longer (the spouse of) a migrant worker.  At the same time, 
the Court did rather more to justify its refusal to strictly apply secondary free 
movement law than in the Zhu and Chen case.  It pointed out that, in order to facilitate 
                                                 
186  In addition, the Immigration Adjudicator considered that Mr. Baumbast did not fulfil the 
conditions to be entitled to a general right of residence under Directive 90/364. I will not discuss 
that issue in this context, as it concerns the residence right of Mr. Baumbast in his own right, and 
not as a family member, with which I am concerned here. For a good analysis of that issue, see 
Dougan and Spaventa, "Educating Rudy and the (non-)English Patient: A Double-Bill on 
Residency Rights under Article 18 EC" (2003) 28 E.L. Rev., 699-712. 
187  After her divorce, Mrs. R married a UK national. In her capacity as spouse of a UK national she 
was most probably entitled to reside in the UK, as was remarked by the ECJ (ECJ, Case C-
413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 29). This element is of no importance 
however to the further discussion of the case, which concerns her entitlement to reside in the UK 
as mother of children not having the UK nationality but residing in the UK. 
188  Article 12 states: “The children of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in 
the territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State's general educational, 
apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that 
State, if such children are residing in its territory. Member States shall encourage all efforts to 
enable such children to attend these courses under the best possible conditions.” 
189  ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 73. 
190  Not surprisingly, Baumbast and R is referred to by the Court in Zhu and Chen. 
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the free movement of workers, the Union legislator had taken into account the 
importance for the worker, from a human point of view, of having his entire family 
with him and the importance, from all points of view, of the integration of the worker 
and his family into the host Member State without any difference in treatment in 
relation to nationals of that Member State.191  More in particular, it pointed out that 
the purpose of Article 12 of regulation 1612/68 was to ensure that children of a Union 
worker can, even if he has ceased to pursue the activity of an employed person in the 
host Member State, undertake and, where appropriate, complete their education in that 
Member State. 192   It considered that this purpose could not be achieved if Mr. 
Baumbast and Mrs. R were refused a right of residence in the home Member State, 
because such would necessarily mean that the children could no longer reside there 
either, as they were dependent on their primary carer.  In addition, the Court justified 
its position by referring to Article 8 ECHR, a point which will be discussed below 
(see IV.A.2). 
 
It is, in my opinion, no coincidence that the Court in Baumbast and R did more to 
justify its reasoning: the case for an effet utile reasoning was weaker than in Zhu and 
Chen.  Indeed, the provision the effectiveness of which had to be preserved in Zhu 
and Chen was essentially Article 21 TFEU, which lays down one of the most 
fundamental rights of Union citizens.  In Baumbast and R, by contrast, the effective 
application of Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 was at stake.  That provision merely 
grants a right to education in the host Member State and not, according to a strict 
reading of the provision, a right of residence in the host Member State.  More 
importantly, it confers a derivative right on the descendents of a Union worker, who is 
the primary beneficiary of the right to free movement.  One could have expected, 
therefore, that considerations relating to the exercise of the primary beneficiary of the 
free movement right should have been at the centre of the ECJ’s effet utile reasoning.  
In other words: one would have expected the Court to consider to what extent the 
application of Article 12 was needed to safeguard the free movement of the primary 
beneficiaries in question.   
 
The Court, however, proceeded the other way around, at least in the Baumbast case.  
It first established the right of residence for school-going children of migrant workers 
and, from there on, established a right of residence for the primary beneficiary of the 
fee movement provisions, namely the migrant worker himself.193  This upside down 
approach could be criticised for being circular in nature, because prima facie the 
primary carer (Mr. Baumbast) derived a right of residence from the situation of his 
children, who in turn derived their residence from the Union worker status of Mr. 
Baumbast.  It is precisely against such a circular type of reasoning that the 
Commission spoke out when it stated in its submission to the case that:  
 
“a right of residence cannot be derived from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 in favour 
of a person who is not the child of a migrant worker, on the ground that possession of that 
status is a sine qua non of any right under that provision, having regard to its context and 
the objectives pursued by Regulation 1612/68 and in particular Article 12 thereof.”194   
                                                 
191  ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 68. 
192  ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 69. 
193  Although, admittedly, Mr. Baumbast was no longer a migrant worker. Still, precisely the fact 
that he was a former migrant worker made reliance on Regulation 1612/68 possible.  
194  ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 74. 
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The ECJ merely replied to that argument that Article 12 of the Regulation should not 
be interpreted restrictively and must not, under any circumstances, be rendered 
ineffective.195  What the Court probably meant by this is that once children of a 
migrant worker have obtained a right to education in the host Member State, they 
obtain an independent right of residence, which is not conditional, for instance, on 
their parent retaining the status of migrant worker.  This was made abundantly clear 
by the Court in its judgments in Ibrahim and Teixeira, in which the Court reverted to 
its reasoning in Baumbast and R (see the discussion under IV.A.1.c., infra).   
 
The foregoing makes clear why the reasoning followed by the Court in Baumbast and 
R is not circular.  Children of migrant workers admittedly derive their initial right of 
residence in the host Member State from the worker status of one of their parents.  
Once they are enrolled in an educational establishment, however, they derive their 
right of residence in the host Member State from the fact that they are going to school 
there and need to be enabled to continue their schooling in that State.  This, in turn, 
may give entitlement to residence to one of their parents who is their primary carer, 
regardless of whether he or she (still) has the status of migrant worker.  Indeed, when 
the need to safeguard the residence rights of children of migrant workers – as a factor 
promoting integration of the worker’s family in the host Member State and thus 
facilitating free movement of workers – is taken as the focus of the analysis, the 
Court’s reasoning becomes convincing.  The effet utile of those rights would be 
compromised if children could not be accompanied by the parents responsible for 
their care in the host Member State.  In this regard, the effet utile reasoning followed 
by the Court in Baumbast and R, on the one hand, and, Zhu and Chen, on the other 
hand, was in essence the same.  In both cases the Court was essentially concerned 
with safeguarding the residence rights of young children.  It refused to see these rights 
as merely accessory to or conditional on the right of residence of their parents.  This 
reasoning was further accentuated in two parallel cases of 2010 with similar facts, 
namely Ibrahim and Teixeira. 
 
c) Ibrahim and Teixeira196 
 
The applicants in both cases entered the UK as the spouse of a Union migrant worker, 
together with their children.  Consequently, both women separated from their 
husband 197  and continued to live independently in the UK, together with their 
children.  At some point in time, both women applied for housing assistance for 
themselves and for their children.  Their application was rejected because, according 
to the competent UK authority, they were not entitled to reside in the UK under Union 
                                                 
195  ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 74. 
196  ECJ, Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] and ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010], with case notes 
by Cambien in (2010) SEW, 416-419, Starup and Elsmore in (2010) E.L.Rev., 571-1160, 
Schrauwen in (2010) N.T.E.R., 231-237 and O'Brien in (2011) 48 CML Rev., 203-225. See also 
(preceding the judgments of the Court) Currie, "EU Migrant Children, their Primary Carers and 
the European Court of Justice: Access to Education as a Precursor to Residence under 
Community Law" (2009) Journal of Social Security Law, 76-105. 
197  The applicant in Teixeira had even divorced from her husband (ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1107, para. 20). 
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law.198  This view was based on the fact that the applicants were not self-sufficient or 
covered by comprehensive sickness insurance and depended on social assistance to 
cover the living expenses of themselves and their children.  Such was clearly not in 
accordance with the “classic” conditions imposed by Directive 2004/38 in relation to 
residence for non-economically active Union citizens.  In both cases, the applicants 
submitted, however, that they did derive a right of residence under Union law from 
the fact that they were the primary carer of school-going children.  The most 
important factual difference between the two cases was that Ms. Ibrahim was a third 
country national, whereas Ms Texeira was a Union citizen who had previously been 
employed in the UK.  Furthermore, Teixeira’s daughter was over 18 years old, 
whereas Ibrahim’s children were young minors.  This element distinguishes Teixeira 
from all other cases discussed under this title.   
 
The ECJ essentially confirmed its holding in Baumbast and R and held that the 
primary carer of school-going children was entitled to reside in the host Member 
States for the period of his or her children’s education.  It clearly confirmed that 
school-going children of a (former) migrant worker derive an independent right of 
residence from Article 12 of regulation 1612/68.199  It explained that, precisely in 
order to guarantee the effectiveness of this independent right of residence, residence 
rights must be extended to the primary carer of these children, without whom the 
latter cannot realistically exercise this right.  The Court was prepared to go far in its 
protection of the effet utile of the residence rights of school-going children and their 
primary carer by holding, first, that these residence rights were not subject to the 
conditions of self-sufficiency and the possession of comprehensive sickness insurance 
coverage.  The Court held, moreover, that these residence rights cannot be made 
subject to a condition of age.  Accordingly, the primary carer of a school-going child 
is entitled to residence in the host Member State even after that child reaches the age 
of majority for as long as he child continues to need his presence and care in order to 
be able to pursue and complete his or her education. 
 
However, it must immediately be pointed out that the Court went at great lengths to 
base the said rights of residence entirely on Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 and not 
on the provisions of Directive 2004/38.  It pointed out in this connection that 
Directive 2004/38 did not abolished article 12 of the Regulation (unlike articles 10 
and 11 of the Regulation) and firmly asserted that the entry into force of Directive 
2004/38 cannot be interpreted as in any way impacting on the rights derived from 
article 12 of the Regulation.  This begs the obvious question to what extent the 
Court’s reasoning also holds in cases where Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 is not 
applicable, notably with regard to children of non-economically active citizens and 
their primary carer(s).  This will be discussed below (see IV.B.2.a., infra). 
 
                                                 
198  It follows from the Housing Act 1996 and the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness 
(Eligibility) Regulations 2006 that a person is not eligible for housing assistance unless he has a 
right of residence in the United Kingdom conferred by EU law (ECJ, Case C-310/08 Ibrahim 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1065, para. 14). 
199  Accordingly, the Court held that that right is not lost where the parents of the children concerned 
have meanwhile divorced, and that the fact that only one parent is a Union citizen, and the fact 
that that parent has ceased to be a migrant worker in the host Member State are irrelevant in this 
regard (Ibrahim, para. 29 and Teixeira, para. 37, referring to Baumbast and R, para. 63). 
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d) Carpenter 
 
A last case in which the Court, arguably, accepted that the effet utile of the free 
movement provisions would be compromised if the primary carer of a child were 
refused the right to reside in the host Member State is Carpenter.200  This case is 
different from the previous ones in that the Court did not explicitly use the term 
“primary carer”.  However, as I will explain, in my view, it embraced the concept 
implicitly.201  Mary Carpenter, a third country national, was married to a UK national.  
She had lived in the UK for some years with her husband and his children from a 
previous marriage when the Secretary of State made a deportation order against her.  
Mrs. Carpenter appealed against that decision, arguing that she was entitled to reside 
in the UK under Union law, namely as the spouse (a privileged family member) of a 
Member State national.  Again, the difficulty with her case lay in the fact that, prima 
facie, she did not fall within the scope of the free movement provisions, in casu the 
provisions on the freedom to provide services as laid down in Article 49 TEC (now 
Article 56 TFEU) and Council Directive 73/148 (now replaced by Directive 2004/38).  
Article 1(1) of Directive 73/148 granted a right of residence to inter alia the spouse of 
a Member State national who provides services in another Member State.  The 
problem was that Mrs Carpenter invoked the right to reside with a UK national in the 
UK, rather than in “another Member State” in which the latter provided services.  A 
first issue to decide for the ECJ was whether Mrs. Carpenter’s case was not simply a 
purely internal one.  The ECJ rather swiftly decided it was not, since a consistent 
proportion of Mr. Carpenter’s business consisted of providing services, for 
remuneration, to advertisers established in other Member States. 202   Accordingly, 
Mrs. Carpenter was entitled to invoke the provisions on the free movement of 
services.   
 
Next, the ECJ held that she could not invoke Article 1(1) of Directive 73/148 as she 
was not joining her husband in another Member State.203  However, the Court went on 
to consider whether a right of residence in favour of the spouse could be inferred from 
“the principles or other rules of [Union] law”.204  Its reasoning again came down to an 
“effet utile reasoning” as described above.  First, the Court observed that the absence 
of a right of residence for Mrs. Carpenter restricted the exercise of Mr. Carpenter’s 
free movement rights. The Court held that: 
 
“It is clear that the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be detrimental to their 
family life and, therefore, to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercises a 
fundamental freedom. That freedom could not be fully effective if Mr Carpenter were to 
be deterred from exercising it by obstacles raised in his country of origin to the entry and 
residence of his spouse (see, to that effect, Singh, cited above, paragraph 23).”   
                                                 
200  ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, with case notes by Acierno in (2003) E.L. 
Rev., 398-407; Jadoul and Vanneste in (2003) Colum. J. Eur. L., 447-455; Luby in (2003) 
Journal du droit international, 593-596; Toner in (2003) Eur. J. Migration & L., 163-172; Van 
Ooik and Staples in (2002) N.T.E.R., 269-276. 
201  This view was also put forward by Currie, "EU Migrant Children, their Primary Carers and the 
European Court of Justice: Access to Education as a Precursor to Residence under Community 
Law" (2009) Journal of Social Security Law, 91; Reich and Harbacevica, "Citizenship and 
Family on trial: a Fairly Optimistic Overview of Recent Court Practice with Regard to Free 
Movement of Persons" (2003) 40 CML Rev., 633. 
202  ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, paras 28-30.  
203  ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, paras 31-35. 
204  ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, para. 36. 
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Second, the Court noted that a Member State may justify restrictive measures by 
invoking reasons of public interest.  The Court concluded that the restrictions in casu 
disproportionately interfered with Mr. Carpenter’s free movement rights.  It 
essentially came to this conclusion by considering Article 8 ECHR, something I will 
concentrate on below.    
 
For now, I will concentrate on the effet utile argument and explain how, in my view, 
the Court already in Carpenter extended residence right to the primary carer of 
children, in a way similar to the other cases discussed above.  Admittedly, that this 
was the case is not immediately clear.  Indeed, prima facie, Carpenter seems not 
concerned with the effet utile of the free movement rights of children, but rather that 
of spouses, a wholly different category of privileged family members.  The Court 
referred to the need to preserve the free movement rights205 of Mr. Carpenter rather 
than those of the children.  However, the Court did not explain exactly how a refusal 
to let Mrs Carpenter reside in the UK would deter the exercise by Mr. Carpenter of 
the right to provide services in other Member States.   
 
The Court’s reference to the Singh206 case is, in my view, not helpful in this regard.  
In that case Mr. Singh, a third country national, had married a British national and had 
travelled with her to Germany where they had both worked for some time before 
returning to the UK.  The ECJ firmly established that Mr. Singh derived a right of 
residence in the UK because otherwise his spouse would be deterred from exercising 
her right to leave her Member State and exercise an economic activity.  The reason is 
obvious: a Member State national will be less keen on working in another Member 
State if he or she is not sure that he or she can later return to his or her home Member 
State and live there together with his or her spouse and children.207  As the Court 
stated in paragraph 20 of the Singh judgment:  
 
“[A national of a Member State] would in particular be deterred from so doing if his 
spouse and children were not also permitted to enter and reside in the territory of his 
Member State of origin under conditions at least equivalent to those granted them by 
[Union] law in the territory of another Member State.” 
 
However, in my view, that reasoning cannot apply in Carpenter.  The reason is that 
Mr Carpenter never lived in another Member State with his wife and children.  In fact, 
it would seem from the facts given in the case that he had never lived in another 
Member State himself.  It is hard to see then how he would be deterred from 
providing services to nationals in another Member State by the fact that the conditions 
surrounding residence for him and his family are more advantageous in that Member 
State, in which he has never lived, than in his home Member State.  I am not arguing 
here that for the Singh reasoning to apply, the spouse must actually have lived in 
another Member State in which conditions were more beneficial as regards rights for 
family members.  Such reasoning can no longer be maintained after the Metock and 
                                                 
205  More precisely, his freedom to provide services. 
206  ECJ, Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] E.C.R. I-4265. 
207  Tryfonidou, however, has rejected this interpretation of the decision. She submits that the 
obstacle to the right to free movement rather lies in the fact that a Member State national having 
worked in another Member State would be less keen on returning to his home Member State 
(Tryfonidou, "Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More 
Liberal Approach" (2009) 15 E.L.J., 639-640). For reasons explained in detail in Chapter 4, 
supra, I do not agree with this criticism.   
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Others case, 208 in which the Court firmly rejected that argument. 209   As I have 
explained in detail in Chapter 4,210 the conditions relating to family reunification must 
be such that a Union citizen may not be “punished” for exercising his fundamental 
freedoms in Member State B rather than in Member State C.  Consequently, the 
conditions relating to family reunification – more precisely the conditions surrounding 
the possibility for this Union citizen to reside with his or her close family members – 
may not be less advantageous in Member State B than in Member State C.  Such 
reasoning obviously comes into play once the Union citizen in question decides to 
move to another Member State and resides there with his non-EU family members.  In 
the absence thereof, the conditions surrounding family reunification in other Member 
States are completely irrelevant to his situation and cannot deter him in any way.  For 
this reason, I consider that the “obstacles approach” used in Singh and Metock and 
Others is not relevant to the Carpenter case.  As I will explain below, the obstacle in 
the Carpenter case has to be sought elsewhere.   
 
One could rebut my argumentation by stating that one should take into account the 
conditions relating to family reunification not only in other Member States, but also 
those in the home Member State and compare them.  Accordingly, one could argue 
that Mr. Carpenter, on the facts of the case, was punished for his decision to settle in 
the UK, his home Member State, rather than in another Member State with possibly 
more advantageous conditions regarding family reunification.  That argument has to 
be rejected, for it is not logically consistent with an “obstacle to free movement” 
approach.  If, indeed, more advantageous conditions were in place in another Member 
State, it is hard to see how a refusal by the UK to grant Mrs. Carpenter leave to 
remain could have deterred him from exercising his right to move to another Member 
State and reside there.  Rather the opposite is true: he would be encouraged to move 
to another Member State with more flexible immigration rules, under which his 
spouse would possibly be entitled to reside with him.  Only on his eventual return to 
the UK, the Singh principle would come into action.211  
 
How then should the ECJ reasoning in Carpenter be understood, if it cannot be 
understood by merely looking at the situation of Mr. Carpenter and his third-country 
spouse?  In my view, it is necessary to take the situation of Mr. Carpenter’s children 
into account.  It is common sense that if Mrs. Carpenter would not be entitled to 
reside in the UK, she could not look after Mr. Carpenter’s children.  Consequently, it 
                                                 
208  ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241. 
209  See on this issue Cambien, "Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform" (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 334. 
210  See Chapter 4, under II.B.2., supra. 
211  For these reasons, I do not entirely agree with the views of AG Stix-Hackl on the relevance of 
the Singh case to the facts of Carpenter (Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl in Case C-60/00 Carpenter 
[2002] E.C.R. I-6279, paras 67-70). Unlike the AG, I consider the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Singh 
settled in another Member State to be a legally relevant and distinguishing feature of the case. In 
my understanding, the term “returns” in paragraph 23 of the Singh judgment must be understood 
as “returning after having been settled in another Member State”, as was the case in Singh. Be 
that as it may, I do agree with the AG that the ECJ’s reasoning in Singh, holding that the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms brought the situation within the scope of Union law, also 
applies in Carpenter. As the AG notes, the fact that Mr Carpenter exercised a different 
fundamental freedom, namely the freedom to provide services (and not the free movement of 
workers as in Singh), does not in itself make any essential difference as regards the presence of a 
Union dimension (Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl in Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, 
2 para. 65). 
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would become more difficult for Mr. Carpenter to go to other Member States to 
provide services because he would need someone to look after his children.212  This 
was essentially Mrs. Carpenter’s argument before the Immigration Adjudicator213 and 
it is submitted that the ECJ in fact accepted these arguments.  This is how the ECJ’s 
reference to the need to ensure family life in order to protect the full effectiveness of 
the provisions on the freedom to provide services needs to be understood.  In 
conclusion, the ECJ used the effet utile argument to extend the benefit of the right to 
reside to Mrs. Carpenter because she took care of children also enjoying this benefit.  
This is the “primary carer” concept in its embryonic form.  The Court did not 
explicitly stress the importance of the element of “care” for Mrs. Carpenter’s 
entitlement to residence.  However, an implicit reference to this element and an 
indication that it was covered by the Court’s references to family life can be found in 
the last sentence of paragraph 44:   
 
“Although, in the main proceedings, Mr Carpenter's spouse has infringed the immigration 
laws of the United Kingdom by not leaving the country prior to the expiry of her leave to 
remain as a visitor, her conduct, since her arrival in the United Kingdom in September 
1994, has not been the subject of any other complaint that could give cause to fear that 
she might in the future constitute a danger to public order or public safety. Moreover, it is 
clear that Mr and Mrs Carpenter's marriage, which was celebrated in the United Kingdom 
in 1996, is genuine and that Mrs Carpenter continues to lead a true family life there, in 
particular by looking after her husband's children from a previous marriage.” (emphasis 
added)  
 
e) Conclusion 
 
It is clear from the cases just discussed that the ECJ has used an effet utile reasoning 
to justify extending a right of residence to the primary carer of children entitled to 
reside in the host Member State, thereby leaving unapplied certain restrictive 
conditions found in secondary Union law on the free movement of persons.  However, 
it would be wrong to conclude from this that Member States are no longer entitled to 
apply these restrictive conditions with regard to ascendants of Union citizens.  One 
should not overlook the specific circumstances of the cases just discussed.  It may 
well be that they are rather exceptional in nature, which would explain why residence 
rights for the primary carer were recognised in so few cases so far.  That will be 
discussed below, when I will consider the scope of this case law.  First, I will consider 
another element clearly present in the Court’s reasoning in some of the cases 
discussed, namely Article 8 ECHR. 
 
2. Right to respect for family life (Article 8 ECHR)  
 
                                                 
212  See, in this sense, Toner, "Comments on Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State, 11 July 2002 
(Case C-60/00)" (2003) 5 Eur. J. Migration & L., 163, who argues at p. 169: “It is unclear 
whether the practical assistance with childcare was central to the Court’s decision, but its 
conclusion that the deportation of Mrs Carpenter would be an obstacle becomes more 
convincing if the childcare (and consequent ability of Mr Carpenter to devote more time to his 
business) is made central to the reasoning.” 
213  See ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, paras 17 and 18.  
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As was already briefly noted in passing, in two of the cases discussed above 
(Baumbast and R and Carpenter) the ECJ invoked Article 8 ECHR214 to justify its 
holding that a third country national was entitled to reside in the Member State in 
which the children he or she was caring for were residing.  Article 8 ECHR also 
figures in the Court’s judgments in Ibrahim and Teixeira, in which the Court 
explicitly referred to the paragraph of Baumbast and R containing a reference to that 
article.215  
 
Article 8 ECHR was not explicitly considered by the Court in Zhu and Chen, although 
it was mentioned in the questions referred to it for a preliminary ruling.216  This can 
probably be explained by the fact that there was no need to do so as the case for 
granting a right of residence to Mrs. Chen was already very convincing on grounds of 
the effet utile theory.217  Indeed, it is clear that baby Catherine would not have been 
able to live in the UK without her mother.  By contrast, in the Baumbast and R, 
Carpenter and Teixeira cases, the residence right of only one of the parents was 
disputed, so it could have been envisaged that the children could stay with their other 
parent.218  Hence, there was a stronger need for the ECJ to consider arguments based 
on Article 8 ECHR.  In my view these arguments should – even with regard to the 
Zhu and Chen case – be seen as an additional element that may help to justify and to 
better understand the outcome of the cases discussed, as will become clear from the 
discussion below.   
 
Article 8 ECHR is without any doubt among the fundamental rights which, according 
to settled case law, are recognised by the Union.219  The Article was explicitly relied 
upon by the ECJ in Baumbast and R as an additional argument in favour of granting 
residence rights to the primary carer of a child residing in the host Member State.220  
The Court observed that Union legislation on the free movement of persons has to be 
interpreted in accordance with Article 8 ECHR, without, however, further explicating 
the requirements deriving from that Article.  The absence of a more elaborated 
                                                 
214  Article 8 ECHR (Right to respect for private and family 
lifehttp://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm - FN1) states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
215  Ibrahim, para. 31 and Teixeira, para. 39 (referring to Baumbast and R, para. 72). 
216  See ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 15 and 16. Unlike the Court, 
AG Tizzano explicitly referred to Article 8 ECHR. He noted that granting a right of residence to 
the primary carer would be in conformity with Article 8 ECHR (Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case 
C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 94 and 130). 
217  Vanvoorden, "Case Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department” (2005) 4 
Colum. J. Eur. L., 305-321, 320. 
218  Admittedly, in the case of Ibrahim, we lack information about the legal position of Yusuf, 
Ibrahim’s husband, in the UK. It would seem to be the case that he did not have a right to legally 
reside in the UK (see ECJ, Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, para. 17) and, hence, 
that the children could perhaps not reside with him in the UK. 
219  ECJ, Case 249/86 Commission v Germany [1989] E.C.R. 1263, para. 10. 
220  ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 72. 
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argument can, perhaps, be explained by referring to AG Geelhoed’s Opinion.  The 
AG noted in this regard221: 
 
“Finally, recognition of a right to remain in favour of the parent carer is also of 
importance in connection with the ECHR and, in particular, Article 8 thereof which 
guarantees the right to respect for family life. In that regard I would point to the view 
expressed by the appellants that refusal to grant leave to remain to a mother of small 
children constitutes a disproportionate interference with family life and is thus 
incompatible with the ECHR. I am of the view that the Court does not need to express a 
view on whether refusal to grant leave to remain to the parent carer might constitute a 
disproportionate interference; I merely find that a decision to grant such leave does justice 
to Article 8 of the ECHR.” 
 
The bottom-line is that granting a right to the primary carer is in any event in 
accordance with Article 8 ECHR.  The Baumbast and R judgment does not, however, 
provide any insight into the precise requirements flowing from the duty to interpret 
free movement law in accordance with Article 8 ECHR.   
 
A more developed Article 8 ECHR centred argument is found in the Carpenter case.  
In that case the Court not merely referred to the duty to interpret the provisions on the 
free movement of persons in accordance with Article 8 ECHR.  It moreover 
considered in some detail whether the restrictive conditions imposed by the UK (the 
decision not to grant a right of residence to Mrs. Carpenter) could pass scrutiny under 
Article 8 ECHR.  As such, Carpenter was the first in a line of highly significant cases 
in which the Court struck down restrictive conditions surrounding the exercise of the 
right to freedom of movement because they violated Article 8 ECHR.222  In these 
cases the Court consistently underscored the importance of ensuring the protection of 
the family life of nationals of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties.   
 
In Carpenter, the Court first noted that the decision to deport Mrs. Carpenter 
constituted an interference with the exercise by Mr. Carpenter of his right to respect 
for his family life within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR.  Such interference, it 
continued, would infringe Article 8(2) ECHR unless it were “in accordance with the 
law”, “motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that paragraph” and 
“necessary in a democratic society”, that is to say justified by a pressing social need 
and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 223   The Court 
considered that the decision to deport Mrs. Carpenter did not strike a fair balance 
between, on the one hand, the right of Mr. Carpenter to respect for his family life, 
and, on the other hand, the maintenance of public order and public safety.  It pointed 
out, in this regard, that, although Mrs. Carpenter had infringed the immigration laws 
of the United Kingdom, her conduct since her arrival in the United Kingdom had not 
                                                 
221  Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 93. 
222  ECJ, Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] E.C.R. I-6591, para. 53; ECJ, Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-
493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] E.C.R. I-5257, paras 97-98; ECJ, Case C-157/03 
Commission v Spain [2005] E.C.R. I-2911, para. 26; ECJ, Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain 
[2006] E.C.R. I-1097, para. 41; ECJ, Case C-441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] E.C.R. I-
3449, para. 109; ECJ, Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719, para. 44; ECJ, Case C-127/08 
Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 56. Admittedly, these cases do not deal with 
residence rights of “primary carers”, but rather with the residence rights of the third country 
spouse of a Union citizen. 
223  ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, paras 41-42. 
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been the subject of any other complaint that could give cause to fear that she might in 
the future constitute a danger to public order or public safety and that it was clear, 
moreover, that Mrs. Carpenter continued to lead a true family life in the UK, in 
particular by looking after her husband's children from a previous marriage.224  The 
ECJ concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, the decision to deport Mrs. 
Carpenter constituted an infringement of Article 8 ECHR which was not 
proportionate to the objective pursued.225   
 
Wile I agree with the ECJ’s finding, I believe its reasoning on this point could have 
been clearer.  The Court mentioned the three conditions of Article 8(2) ECHR in 
passing, but did not consider them separately.  With regard to the first condition - 
accordance with the law - such would prima facie have been unnecessary: the 
deportation measure was clearly in accordance with the UK immigration rules.  It 
must be noted, however, that in some recent cases the ECtHR, when assessing the 
first condition, has taken into account not only the national law of the State but also, 
with regard to EU Member States, Union law on the free movement of persons.226  
Applying this case law, Article 8(2) ECHR would have required the deportation 
measure in Carpenter to be in accordance not only with UK rules but also with Union 
legislation on the free movement of persons, in particular Directive 73/148.  
Arguably, the deportation measure would have satisfied this test as it was, arguably 
again, in accordance with the wording of the said regulation and the way it had been 
interpreted by the Courts.   
 
The second condition - the pursuit of a legitimate aim - was, again, not explicitly 
considered by the ECJ.  The Court accepted without further explanation that the 
deportation measure pursued the maintenance of public order and public safety.  This 
is correct in my view, but it would have strengthened the legitimacy of the Court had 
it explained its reasoning on this point, as it is, together with the third condition, vital 
in determining the scope left to the Member States under Article 8(2) ECHR.  In my 
view the aim pursued by the deportation measure in Carpenter was the aim of 
ensuring the consistent application of the national procedures and rules on 
immigration.227  That certainly is a legitimate aim under Article 8(2) ECHR, as is 
clear from the case law of the ECtHR.  The ECtHR has repeatedly confirmed the 
legitimate objective of the Contracting parties to control “as a matter of well-
established international law…the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens”.228  It is 
                                                 
224  ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, paras 43-44. 
225  ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, para. 45. 
226  See, most prominently, ECtHR, Judgment of 17 January 2006 in Case No. 51431/99 Aristimuño 
Mendizabal v France, in which the ECtHR concluded that the denial of a carte de séjour to the 
applicant was in violation of both French law and Union law and that the restrictive measure, 
therefore, was not adopted “in accordance with the law” (see paras 73-79). The ECtHR 
explicitly held that “La Cour estime donc que l’article 8 doit être interprété en l’espèce à la 
lumière du droit communautaire et en particulier des obligations imposées aux Etats membres 
quant aux droits d’entrée et de séjour des ressortissants communautaires […]” (para. 69 of the 
judgment). 
227  As was submitted by the UK in its observations to the Court (see Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl in 
Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, para. 18). 
228  See, inter alia, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 February 1991 in Case No. 12313/86 Moustaquim v 
Belgium, para. 43; ECtHR, Judgment of 19 February 1996 in Case No. 23218/94 Gül v 
Switzerland. See further ECtHR, Judgment of 21 June 1988 in Case No. 10730/84 Berrehab v. 
the Netherlands, para. 26. See also the discussion in Forder, “Family Rights and Immigration 
Law: a European Perspective”, in H. Schneider (ed.), Migration, Integration and Citizenship. A 
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important to emphasize this legitimate objective and to point out that Article 8 ECHR 
does not take away the sovereign power to pursue immigration policies.  It is only 
normal then that the ECtHR has consistently held that States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation in this field.229  However, this margin is not unlimited and it seems, 
moreover, that ECtHR has over the years steadily reduced this margin.230  Moreover, 
in the EU, this margin is further reduced still by secondary Union legislation, which 
surrounds for example the possibility for the Member States to invoke public policy 
exceptions with restrictive conditions which are subject to ECJ control. 231   The 
bottom-line is probably that the ECJ should recognise a certain margin of appreciation 
on the part of the Member States when assessing alleged violations of Article 8 
ECHR, although this margin should be interpreted rather narrowly.  That element of 
appreciation is consistently dealt with under the third condition, that of being 
necessary in a democratic society, to which I will turn now. 
 
The third condition - being necessary in a democratic society - is probably the most 
important one, as its application requires a delicate balancing act between the interests 
of the State and the interest of the individual.  In Carpenter, the ECJ based its finding 
that the third condition was not fulfilled on mainly two points: 1) that there was no 
sign that Mrs. Carpenter constituted a danger to the public order or safety of the host 
Member State, and 2) that she led a genuine family life, in particular by looking after 
her husband’s children from a previous marriage.   
 
The first point is reminiscent of the Boultif case,232 to which the Court referred in 
paragraph 42.  That case has become a model for cases in which the ECtHR has to 
pronounce on deportation measures which have been taken after the applicant was 
criminally convicted.233  In these cases, the ECtHR balances the applicant’s right to 
respect for family life against the State’s legitimate aim of “preventing disorder or 
                                                                                                                                            
Challenge for Europe's Future (Maastricht, Forum Maastricht, 2005), 71-108; Rogers, 
“Immigration and the European Convention on Human Rights: are new principles emerging?” 
(2003) E.H.R.L.R., 53-64; Toner, "Community law immigration rights, unmarried partnerships 
and the relationship between European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence and Community 
law in the Court of Justice” (2001) 5 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issue5/toner5.html, at 10 et seq. 
229  E.g. ECtHR, Judgment of 25 March 1983 in Cases No. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 
7107/75, 7113/75 and 7136/75 Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 97; ECtHR, 
Judgment of 26 March 1985 in Case No. 8978/80 X and Y v. the Netherlands, para. 23; ECtHR, 
Judgment of 19 February 1996 in Case No. 23218/94 Gül v Switzerland, para. 38. See in this 
connection: Farahat, "The Exclusiveness of Inclusion: On the Boundaries of Human Rights in 
Protecting Transnational and Second Generation Migrants" (2009) 11 Eur. J. Migration & L., 
262 et seq.; Arai-Takahashi and Crawford, The margin of appreciation doctrine and the 
principle of proportionality in the jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002), 300 
p; Ovey, "The Margin of Appreciation and Article 8 of the Convention" (1998) 19 HRLJ, 10-12. 
230  Mowbray, "The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights" (2005) Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 
72-79. 
231  See the discussion in Chapter 4, supra. See further Lundström, "Family Life and the Freedom of 
Movement of Workers in the European Union" (1996) 10 Int'l J.L. & Pol'y & Fam., 274. 
232  ECtHR, Judgment of 2 August 2001 in Case No. 54273/00 Boultif v. Switzerland. 
233  The applicant in Boultif had committed the offences of robbery and damage to property by 
attacking man, by throwing him on the ground, kicking him in the face and taking 1,201 Swiss 
francs from him (Boultif, para. 9). For a more recent example, in which the Court refers to 
Boultif, see ECtHR, Judgment of 18 October 2006 in Case No. 46410/99 Üner v. the 
Netherlands (applicant convicted of inter alia violent offence against a person, manslaughter 
and assault). 
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crime”.234  It takes into account inter alia the nature and seriousness of the offence 
committed by the applicant and considers the extent to which it could give rise to an 
assumption that the applicant constitutes a danger to public order and security.235  
However, the facts of the Carpenter case were rather different, since Mrs. Carpenter 
had not committed a violent crime.  The only relevant laws she had violated were the 
UK’s immigration rules.  The first point considered by the ECJ was, therefore, not 
relevant or at least not as important as in the cases just mentioned dealing with the 
expulsion of “criminals”.   
 
To underscore the second point, the fact Mrs. Carpenter led a genuine family life, the 
ECJ emphasized that she “was looking after her husband’s children”.  In my view, 
this last element, the element of “care”, was the central one in the assessment of 
Article 8(2) and largely motivated the ECJ’s conclusion that Article 8 ECHR had 
been violated.  This view is confirmed by the case law of the ECtHR,236 - which is 
increasingly followed by the ECJ in its interpretation of the ECHR -, which also 
attributes much importance to the element of care in the application of Article 8 
ECHR.237  In fact, in Üner, the ECtHR listed as one of the elements to take into 
account under Article 8(2) ECHR “the best interests and well-being of the 
children”.238 
 
It could be objected, however, that the Court did not sufficiently consider other 
factors which are taken into account by the ECtHR when balancing interests under 
Article 8(2) ECHR.  As Toner notes, the two points mentioned by the ECJ in 
themselves would in the traditional case law of the ECtHR not have been considered 
sufficient to justify the conclusion that the UK rules were incompatible with Article 8 
ECHR.239  The ECtHR normally considers a number of elements in its assessment, 
                                                 
234  E.g. Boultif, paras 44-46. 
235  E.g. Boultif, paras 50-51. 
236  See for instance the discussion by Thym, "Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 
ECHR in Immigration Cases: a Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?" (2008) 57 Int'l & 
Comp. L.Q., 87-112, 87-112. 
237  See in this regard also the Berrehab judgment of the ECtHR, which concerned the refusal by the 
Netherlands of a right of residence to the Moroccan father of a young child called Rebecca. With 
regard to the third condition, the Court noted that the interference with Article 8 ECHR was 
disproportionate, stating (at paragraph 29) “As to the extent of the interference, it is to be noted 
that there had been very close ties between Mr. Berrehab and his daughter for several years (see 
paragraphs 9 and 21 above) and that the refusal of an independent residence permit and the 
ensuing expulsion threatened to break those ties. That effect of the interferences in issue was the 
more serious as Rebecca needed to remain in contact with her father, seeing especially that she 
was very young”. See also the Şen case (ECtHR, Judgment of 21 December 2001 in Case No. 
31465/96 Şen v. the Netherlands), which demonstrates how the interests of little children are 
pre-eminently capable of founding a claim to family reunification in the host state (see Opinion 
of AG Kokott in Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council [2006] E.C.R. I-5769, para. 
69). 
238  ECtHR, Judgment of 18 October 2006 in Case No. 46410/99 Üner v. the Netherlands, para. 58. 
See also the earlier judgment in the Şen case (ECtHR, Judgment of 21 December 2001 in Case 
No. 31465/96 Şen v. the Netherlands, para. 40). 
239  Toner, "Comments on Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State, 11 July 2002 (Case C-60/00)" 
(2003) 5 Eur. J. Migration & L., 170. 
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which were listed in a comprehensive manner for the first time by the ECtHR in the 
Boultif case, in which it stated240: 
 
“In assessing the relevant criteria in such a case, the Court will consider the nature and 
seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant; the duration of the applicant’s stay 
in the country from which he is going to be expelled; the time which has elapsed since the 
commission of the offence and the applicant’s conduct during that period; the 
nationalities of the various persons concerned; the applicant’s family situation, such as 
the length of the marriage; other factors revealing whether the couple lead a real and 
genuine family life; whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or 
she entered into a family relationship; and whether there are children in the marriage and, 
if so, their age. Not least, the Court will also consider the seriousness of the difficulties 
which the spouse would be likely to encounter in the applicant’s country of origin, 
although the mere fact that a person might face certain difficulties in accompanying her or 
his spouse cannot in itself preclude expulsion.” 
 
These criteria, known as the Boultif-criteria,241 have become the guiding principles for 
the ECtHR in later cases.242  In Üner243 the ECtHR, after listing these criteria, added, 
or rather explicated, two extra criteria: 1) the best interests and well-being of the 
children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the 
applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be 
expelled; and 2) the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country 
and with the country of destination.  In a number of other cases, which deal in the first 
place with the refusal of a Member State to grant a right of residence rather than with 
expulsion or deportation measures taken after criminal conviction(s), the ECtHR has 
phrased the relevant factors to be taken into consideration as follows244: 
 
“[…] Factors to be taken into account in this context are the extent to which family life is 
effectively ruptured, the extent of the ties in the Contracting State, whether there are 
insurmountable obstacles to the family living in the country of origin of one or more of 
them and whether there are factors of immigration control (for example, a history of 
breaches of immigration law) or considerations of public order weighing in favour of 
exclusion (see Solomon v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 44328/98, 5 September 2000). 
Another important consideration will also be whether family life was created at a time 
when the persons involved were aware that the immigration status of one of them was 
such that the persistence of that family life within the host State would from the outset be 
precarious. The Court has previously held that where this is the case it is likely only to be 
in the most exceptional circumstances that the removal of the non-national family 
member will constitute a violation of Article 8 (see Mitchell v. the United Kingdom 
                                                 
240  ECtHR, Judgment of 2 August 2001 in Case No. 54273/00 Boultif v. Switzerland, para. 48. 
These criteria (nicknamed the “Boultif criteria”) have become established case law of the 
ECtHR.   
241  See, e.g. Thym, "Respect for private and family life under article 8 ECHR in immigration cases: 
a human right to regularize illegal stay?” (2008) 57 Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 93. 
242  See, e.g., ECtHR, Judgment of 11 July 2002 in Case No. 56811 Amrollahi v. Denmark, para. 41; 
ECtHR, Decision of 31 May 2005 in Case No. 16387/03, Davydov v Estonia. 
243  ECtHR, Judgment of 18 October 2006 in Case No. 46410/99, Üner v the Netherlands, paras 58. 
See the discussion in Steinorth, "Üner v The Netherlands: Expulsion of Long-term Immigrants 
and the Right to Respect for Private and Family Life" (2008) Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 185-196. 
244  ECtHR, Judgment of 31 January 2006 in Case No. 50435/99 Rodrigues Da Silva and 
Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, para. 39. See also ECtHR, Judgment of 26 April 2007 in Case 
No.16351/03 Konstatinov v. the Netherlands, para. 48; ECtHR, Judgment of 4 December 2008 
in Case No.16351/03 Y v. Russia, para. 104; ECtHR, Judgment of 31 July 2008 in Case No. 
265/07 Omoregie and Others v. Norway, para. 57. 
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(dec.), no. 40447/98, 24 November 1998, and Ajayi and Others v. the United Kingdom 
(dec.), no. 27663/95, 22 June 1999).” 
 
In Carpenter the ECJ considered only the two elements mentioned above explicitly.  
Yet it seems defensible to state that other factors could also have been relevant to the 
case and that striking the appropriate balance under Article 8(2) ECHR would have 
required them to have been taken into account.  Two elements in particular would 
seem to have been relevant to the case.  First, the possibility for the family245 to live 
in another country, for instance the country to which the applicant would be expulsed, 
was not at all considered by the ECJ, while it is central to the ECtHR’s reasoning in a 
vast number of Article 8 ECHR cases.246  It can be wondered whether this is a default 
in the ECJ’s reasoning and whether, taking that element into account, it would have 
come to another conclusion on the violation of Article 8 ECHR.  In my view, this 
question needs to be answered in the negative.  On the basis of the limited facts stated 
in the case, it would seem to have been the case that there was no reasonable 
possibility for the Carpenters to move to the Philippines (the country of origin of Mrs. 
Carpenter), given the fact that Mr. Carpenter’s business (the source of income for the 
family) was established in the UK and given that he was likely not proficient247 in the 
local languages of the Philippines. 248  Besides, it can be argued that the ECJ, in 
interpreting Union free movement legislation in accordance with Article 8 ECHR, 
should not give too much weight to the possibility to live in another country.249  The 
reason is that Union citizens have, under certain conditions, the right to establish 
themselves in the Member State of their choice and to be joined there by their (third-
country) family Members.  For the ECJ, to inquire into the possibility to live in 
another Member State would be tantamount to a straightforward denial of this right.  
                                                 
245  This includes minor children: see the first of the two additional criteria put forward by the Court 
in para. 58 of Üner. 
246  See, e.g., ECtHR, Judgment of 31 July 2008 in Case No. 265/07 Omoregie and Others v. 
Norway, para. 66; ECtHR, Judgment of 18 October 2006 in Case No. 46410/99 Üner v. the 
Netherlands, in which the ECtHR indicates that this possibility is greater in the case of younger 
children, who are still of an “adaptable age”.  
247  Knowledge of the language of a third country is considered a relevant element by the ECtHR to 
asses the possibility for the family to live in that country. In Omoregie and Others, it considered 
that there was a realistic possibility to develop a family life in Nigeria (the applicant’s country of 
origin), inter alia since his Norwegian spouse spent a period in another African country, South 
Africa and since English was also the official language of Nigeria. By contrast, in Boultif, the 
ECtHR considered that the fact that the Swiss spouse of an Algerian national did not speak 
Arabic made it impossible for her to establish her family in Algeria, even despite the fact that 
she spoke French, the second national language of Algeria. On the differences between these 
two decisions, see de Hart, "Love Thy Neighbour: Family Reunification and the Rights of 
Insiders" (2009) 11 Eur. J. Migration & L., 248-249. For a case in which the alleged absence of 
knowledge of the language of a third country was not considered a decisive factor by the 
ECtHR, see ECtHR, Judgment of 26 April 2007 in Case No.16351/03 Konstatinov v. the 
Netherlands. 
248  The same can a fortiori be said about the Zhu and Chen case: baby Catherine was as the second 
child of Chinese nationals not entitled under Chinese law to reside in China, except for periodic 
short-duration stays. The Court did not explicitly consider Article 8 ECHR, but had it done so it 
could (explicitly or implicitly) have concluded that the condition of impossibility to establish 
family life elsewhere was fulfilled (see Hofstotter, "A Cascade of Rights, or Who Shall Care For 
Little Catherine? Some Reflections on the Chen Case" (2005) 30 E.L. Rev., 555).  
249  It must be noted that even the ECtHR does not always take this element to account. It limits its 
assessment to the first three Boultif criteria when a foreigner was born in the host country or 
moved there in his young childhood (see ECtHR, judgment of 10 July 2003 in Case No. 
53441/99 Benhebba v. France, para. 33). 
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This point of view finds some support in recent cases like Metock and Others250 and 
Ruiz Zambrano.251  
 
Second, the ECJ in Carpenter did not at all take into account that the family was 
formed at a moment when the immigration status of Mrs. Carpenter was precarious.252  
The ECtHR has consistently held that in such circumstances the removal of the non-
national family member constitutes a violation of Article 8 ECHR only in the most 
exceptional circumstances, as there can have been no reasonable expectation that 
family life can be continued in the host country.  In my view, the Carpenter case 
presented precisely such an exceptional situation because Mrs. Carpenter was the 
primary carer of minor children.  I find support for this argument in the Hoogkamer253 
case.  In that case a Brazilian woman had overstayed her tourist visa in the 
Netherlands when she married a Dutch national with whom she conceived a daughter.  
The ECtHR decided that she could not be expulsed, despite the fact that her stay had 
been illegal throughout, that she was well aware of it and had not made any attempt to 
regularise it, because of the far-reaching consequences an expulsion would have on 
her responsibilities as a mother and on her family life with her young daughter.254  
The bottom-line was that the fact that she factually255 cared for her baby trumped 
considerations relating to her immigration status.  In my view, the facts in Carpenter 
justify a similar conclusion: the fact that Mrs. Carpenter was the primary carer of 
young children should be considered the decisive factor, which tilted the balance in 
favour of her interest to reside with her children.256 
                                                 
250  In the Metock and Others judgment the Court rejected a certain interpretation of Directive 
2004/38 as incompatible with Union law because “Where a Union citizen founds a family after 
becoming established in the host Member State, the refusal of that Member State to authorise his 
family members who are nationals of non-member countries to join him there would be such as 
to discourage him from continuing to reside there and encourage him to leave in order to be able 
to lead a family life in another Member State or in a non-member country” (ECJ, Case C-127/08 
Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 89). According to Costello, this can be 
interpreted as an “oblique criticism” of the case law of the ECtHR which allows Member States 
to refuse a residence application on behalf of a third country family member if the family could 
establish family life together in the latter’s home country (Costello, "Metock: Free movement 
and 'Normal Family Life' in the Union" (2009) 46 CML Rev., 603-604). 
251  In Ruiz Zambrano (ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr), the Court considered 
that (in the specific circumstances of the case) national decisions forcing Union citizens to leave 
for a third country were in violation of Union law. This reasoning was confirmed in McCarthy 
(ECJ, Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] E.C.R. nyr.). The Court did not explicitly refer to Article 
8 ECHR, but fundamental rights considerations were arguably implicit in the Court’s reasoning 
(see in detail Chapter 4, under III.B.3., supra). 
252  At the moment of the marriage between Mrs. and Mr. Carpenter, the former was in fact staying 
illegally in the UK, overstaying her leave to enter the UK as a visitor and having failed to apply 
for an extension of her stay (ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, para. 13). 
253  ECtHR, Judgment of 31 January 2006 in Case No. 50435/99 Rodrigues Da Silva and 
Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands.  
254  Ibid., para. 44: “In view of the far-reaching consequences which an expulsion would have on the 
responsibilities which the first applicant has as a mother, as well as on her family life with her 
young daughter, and taking into account that it is clearly in Rachael's best interests for the first 
applicant to stay in the Netherlands, the Court considers that in the particular circumstances of 
the case the economic well-being of the country does not outweigh the applicants' rights under 
Article 8, despite the fact that the first applicant was residing illegally in the Netherlands at the 
time of Rachael's birth”. 
255  The Brazilian mother had lost child custody over her daughter. 
256  This may also be a consideration which explains why in Ruiz Zambrano (ECJ, Case C-34/09 
Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr) the Court did not seem to consider relevant the fact that Mr. 
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In conclusion, it is clear from the judgments just discussed that Article 8 ECHR can 
be an additional argument to grant a right of residence to the primary carer of children 
where he or she does not derive such a right from secondary Union law, when strictly 
applied.  The application of Article 8 ECHR will require the balancing of the State’s 
interest in maintaining an effective immigration policy, inter alia by deporting 
undesired or criminal aliens, against the interest of a child to reside with his primary 
carer.  As explained above, the element of care will in most circumstances be the 
decisive one.   
 
3. Conclusion  
 
The bottom-line is that a refusal to grant a right of residence to the primary carer can 
a) hinder the exercise of free movement rights (by the children or the spouse of the 
primary carer) and b) violate the right to respect for family life.  Admittedly, to some 
extent the two justifications are intertwined.  Indeed, one could argue that, in the cases 
discussed, the obstacle to the exercise of the free movement rights consisted precisely 
in the fact that the right to family life could not duly be exercised.257  The proper way 
to put it is that the argument based on Article 8 ECHR complements and reinforces 
the effet utile argument.  Article 8 ECHR can require granting a right of residence to 
the primary carer even where in the absence of such right the child concerned could, 
strictly speaking, still exercise his free movement rights.  That could be the case, for 
instance, where the parent-primary carer but not the other parent of the child would be 
refused a right of residence.  As I observed higher, this explains why the Court 
explicitly considered arguments based on Article 8 ECHR in Baumbast and R, and at 
more length still, in Carpenter, but not in Zhu and Chen.  This shows how Article 8 
ECHR reinforces the argument that the parent-primary carer should enjoy a right to 
join his child in the host State.258 
 
B. Notion Primary carer 
 
In the foregoing I have explained how the ECJ has extended the benefit of the free 
movement rights under Union law to the “primary carer” of children enjoying such 
rights, despite the fact that such was not mandated by secondary Union law on the 
free movement of persons.  I have argued that the ECJ based its holding on two main 
lines of reasoning: an effet utile reasoning, on the one hand, and a fundamental rights 
based reasoning, on the other hand, and submitted that these lines of reasoning were 
to some extent intertwined.  I discussed these lines of reasoning in the light of a 
                                                                                                                                            
Ruiz Zambrano had violated the Belgian immigration provisions; although it did not in that Case 
explicitly consider fundamental rights (see further the detailed discussion in Chapter, supra). 
257  See para. 39 of the Carpenter judgment: “It is clear that the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter 
would be detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions under which Mr 
Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom” (italics added). 
258  According to well established case law of the ECtHR, "the mutual enjoyment by parent and 
child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life" and domestic 
measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right protected by Article 
8 ECHR (see, inter alia, ECtHR, Judgment of 24 February 1995 in Case No. 16424/90 
McMichael v. Switzerland, para. 86; ECtHR, Judgment of 21 December 2001 in Case No. 
31465/96 Şen v. the Netherlands, para. 34).  
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number of recent cases in which the ECJ, arguably, recognised a right of residence for 
the primary carer of children and came to the conclusion that the Court’s reasoning 
was convincing when applied to the facts of these cases.  In my view, the extension of 
a residence right to the primary carer is justified not only in the specific circumstances 
of the cases discussed, but should be seen as a broader principle of Union free 
movement law.  I would argue that the facts of these cases are not exceptional259 and 
that a similar situation in which the residence right of a third country national being 
the primary carer of a Union citizen is at stake is not all that uncommon.  
Accordingly, still in my view, future Union free movement legislation should perhaps 
add the primary carer to the categories of privileged family members of Union 
citizens.  It would not be the first time that a ruling of the ECJ in which it distances 
itself from secondary (and even primary) Union law is later taken over by the Union 
legislator.260  However, I immediately remark that the concept “primary carer” should 
be given a clear definition in order for it to be possible to determine its exact scope. 
 
The primary carer concept is not a traditional concept of Union law, and did not 
appear in Union legislation or Union documents until the Baumbast and R judgment.  
It is perhaps rather unfortunate then that the ECJ merely took over the terminology 
from the referring court261 without making an attempt to define it.  This has led to 
considerable uncertainty surrounding this concept.  In particular, it is unclear whether 
only a (non-dependent) parent can derive a right of residence as the primary carer of a 
Union citizen, or whether the concept should be construed more broadly so as to 
include other ascendants or even other family members, like siblings, or even non 
family members like the guardian of a child.  The case law of the ECJ provides firm 
authority only for the first, narrow, view, since in all cases discussed above the 
primary carer was the parent of the child concerned.  That in itself is not such as to 
close the discussion, since the principles underlying the said cases may well support 
the second, broader, point of view.  Besides, the case law discussed would seem to 
grant a special status of school-going children of migrant workers and their primary 
carer since some of the cases discussed were decided under the specific legal basis of 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68. 
 
                                                 
259  Vanvoorden points out that the facts in Zhu and Chen really are exceptional in that it was 
impossible under Chinese legislation for baby Catherine to live in China with the rest of her 
family. She states in this regard (Vanvoorden, "Case Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department” (2005) 4 Colum. J. Eur. L., 321): “The fact that it was impossible for 
Catherine to stay with the rest of her family in China for a period of more than thirty subsequent 
days most probably influenced the decision of the ECJ; one can only wonder whether the ECJ 
would have followed the same reasoning if Catherine had been able to join the family in China.” 
While I agree that this is a truly particular aspect of the case, I do not consider it to have 
influenced the reasoning of the Court or the outcome of the case. Moreover, this aspect was 
clearly not present in the other cases discussed in which the primary carer was given a right of 
residence. 
260  The most famous example is probably the recognition by the ECJ of the European Parliament’s 
right to bring an action despite the fact that the Treaties (Article 173 TEEC) did not provide for 
such a right, which was later codified in Article 230 TEC (current Article 263 TFEU): see ECJ, 
Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council [1990] E.C.R. I-2041. The requirement that an 
action brought by the European Parliament must seek to safeguard its prerogatives was 
abolished by the Treaty of Nice. 
261  “Primary carer” figured in the second question referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling (ECJ, 
Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 28). It also figured in the first 
question referred to the Court in Zhu and Chen (ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] 
E.C.R. I-9925, para. 15). 
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In the following, I will try to come to a more precise determination of the notion 
primary carer and the scope of the residence rights enjoyed by primary carers under 
Union law.  For that purpose, I will look in more detail into the case law of the ECJ 
and the ECtHR to get a precise understanding of this concept.  Given that it is a 
relatively new concept, at least as far as Union law is concerned, I find it useful to 
consider first how the term is understood in legal systems in which it is traditionally 
known.  
 
1. Terminology 
 
As I pointed out higher, the notion “primary carer” is a relatively new notion in Union 
law.262  However, it is a relatively well-known notion in a number of (common law) 
judicial systems around the world.  The term “primary carer” is rather commonly used 
in the UK, as is witnessed, for instance, by a relatively high number of documents of 
(semi-)public bodies263 using the term.  It is also an important and well defined legal 
concept in other English-speaking countries like Australia264 and the United States,265 
to which I will come back later.  Not surprisingly, in all cases discussed above in 
which the ECJ was concerned with the residence rights of the primary carer the 
referring court was an English court.266  By contrast, the concept is alien to other, 
continental European, legal systems.   
 
This explains the difficulty to translate “primary carer” in other languages, as is 
illustrated by the different language versions of the Baumbast and R and Zhu and 
Chen judgments.  In French, “primary carer” is translated by “le parent qui a 
effectivement la garde de ces enfants”, 267  “la personne assurant effectivement sa 
garde”,268 “le parent qui garde effectivement l'enfant”,269 “la personne responsable à 
titre principal”,270 “le parent […] qui a effectivement la garde d’un enfant”271 or “le 
parent assurant effectivement la garde de cet enfant”.  The multiple and rather 
descriptive translations clearly demonstrate how difficult it is to find an appropriate 
translation for the concept “primary carer” in French.  Telling in this regard is the fact 
                                                 
262  As was noted by Reich and Harbacevica, "Citizenship and Family on trial: a Fairly Optimistic 
Overview of Recent Court Practice with Regard to Free Movement of Persons" (2003) 40 CML 
Rev., 632. 
263  See, e.g., the document on ticket prices for the National Galleries of Scotland, available at 
http://www.nationalgalleries.org/whatson/page/5:4548/.  
264  See, e.g., “A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999” (FA), which embraces the 
concept of “primary carer” in Section 26(1)a).   
265  In the US, reference is usually made to “primary caregiver” or “primary caretaker” rather than to 
“primary carer” (see Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), (St. Paul, Thomson West, 2009)). For a 
discussion of the concept, see Weyrauch, Katz and Olsen, Cases and materials on family law: 
legal concepts and changing human relationships (Saint Paul, West publishing Co., 1994), 438-
444. 
266  Additionally, two references for a preliminary ruling are currently pending before the Court in 
which the Upper Tribunal (United Kingdom) explicitly employs the expression “primary carer” 
(see references in Cases C-147/11 Czop and C-148/11 Punakova).  
267  See ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, paras 64 and 75; ECJ, Case C-
310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, para. 25. 
268  See ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 73. 
269  See ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 73. 
270  See ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 13 and 15. 
271  See ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 45. 
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that in the French version of the Baumbast and R judgment the English term “primary 
carer” is inserted between square brackets in the translation of the second question 
referred to for a preliminary ruling.272  Interesting to note in this connection is a 
comment by Leo Mulders, a translator at the ECJ, who states273:  
 
“Major problems arise where reasoning is based on a specific term which may only be 
valid in one or more language versions, while in other versions a term used is not fully 
equivalent or sometimes even does not occur. Insofar as translator’s footnotes are allowed 
in Opinions of an Advocate General, the problem can be solved relatively easily 274. 
However, such footnotes are not permitted in the Court’s judgments. In such cases square 
brackets may be used to introduce the term required in the rule to be interpreted. Other 
cases require inventiveness on the part of the translator.” 
 
In Dutch the concept is mostly translated by the Court by “de ouder die deze kinderen 
daadwerkelijk verzorgt”, 275  “de ouder die daadwerkelijk voor zijn verzorging 
instaat” 276  or “de persoon die daadwerkelijk voor hun verzorging instaat”, 277 
“voornaamste verzorger”,278 “ouder […] die daadwerkelijk zorgt voor een kind”279 or 
“ouder die daadwerkelijk de zorg voor dat kind heeft”.280  Like the French version, 
the Dutch version of the Baumbast and R judgment explicitly refers to the English 
term “primary carer” between square brackets.281  This clearly illustrates the difficulty 
of translating “primary carer” into languages in which it did not originally exist.  The 
same exercise I have just carried out with regard to the Dutch and the French version 
of the judgment in Baumbast and R could be done with regard to other language 
versions, presumably further strengthening this conclusion.282  That is all the more the 
case as it can be assumed that many language versions will be translated from the 
French version of the judgment, which gives a rather descriptive translation of 
“primary carer” only.  The reason for this is that the judgment will have been drafted 
in French first as French is the working language of the Court,283 even despite the fact 
that only the English version is authentic, English being the language of the case.284   
                                                 
272  Para. 28 of the Baumbast and R judgment (French version).   
273  Mulders, "Translation at the Court of Justice of the European Communities", in Prechal and van 
Roermund (eds.), The Coherence of EU Law The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 54. 
274  [Alternatively, an advocate general facing a comparable problem when discussing an argument 
which does not really pass in his language, may give linguistic information in a footnote, which 
will not always be translated if the problem does not rise in the target language.] 
275  See ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, paras 64 and 75; ECJ, Case C-
310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, para. 25. 
276  See ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 73. 
277  See ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 73.  
278  See ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, paras 13 and 15. 
279  See ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 45. 
280  ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-1107, para. 34. 
281  Para. 28 of the Baumbast and R judgment (Dutch version).   
282  See, for instance, on the German translation (“die Personensorge tatsächlich wahrnehmende 
Person”): Reich and Harbacevica, "Citizenship and Family on trial: a Fairly Optimistic 
Overview of Recent Court Practice with Regard to Free Movement of Persons" (2003) 40 CML 
Rev., 626. 
283  Mullen, “Do You Hear What I Hear? Translation, Expansion, and Crisis in the European Court 
of Justice”, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds), The State of the European Union: Risks, 
Reform, Resistance, and Revival (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), 246-265; Edward, 
"How the Court of Justice Works” (1995) 6 E.L. Rev., 539; Mancini and Keeling, "Language, 
culture and politics in the life of the European Court of Justice” (1995) Colum. J. Eur. L., 397-
399. In theory all language versions should be translated direct from the authentic versions; in 
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The translations quoted above indicate that the essence of the notion primary carer is 
most probably that the person it refers to “effectively cares for the child” or “is the 
person who mainly takes care of the child”.  This is confirmed when we look at the 
definition of the concept in other legal systems in which it has existed traditionally.  
For instance, the “Family Assistance guide” of the Australian government explains 
that, for the purposes of Family Assistance Act, the primary carer is the “member of a 
couple identified as having greater responsibility for the children”.  It is further 
specified that the primary carer is the person who generally “has major daily 
responsibility for caring for the children in the family”, “looks after the children's 
needs”, “makes most arrangements for the daily needs of the children”, “makes 
appointments for the children” and “is the first person for the day care, school, or 
college to contact in emergencies, or is the partner who is responsible for taking the 
children to and from day care/pre-school/ kindergarten/school.” 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary285 gives the following definition of “primary caregiver”286 
(under US law): 
 
“1. The parent who has had the greatest responsibility for the daily care and rearing of a 
child. 2. The person (including a nonparent) who has had the greatest responsibility for 
the daily care and rearing of a child. — Also termed primary caretaker.” 
 
Weyrauch, Katz and Olsen give a more elaborate definition of the concept287: 
 
“The ‘primary caretaker’ is the parent who has taken primary responsibility for, inter alia, 
the performance of the following care and nurturing duties as a parent: (1) preparing and 
planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning and care 
of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for 
social interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends’ houses, or, for 
example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e., baby-sitting, 
day-care etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the 
night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and 
toilet training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social etc.; and, (10) teaching 
elementary skills, i.e. reading, writing and arithmetic.” 
 
These definitions confirm my basic assumption that the “primary carer” is the person 
who is principally responsible for the care of a child.  However, the definitions do not 
provide an unequivocal answer to the question asked above, namely whether only 
parents can qualify as “primary carer” or whether the notion should be construed 
                                                                                                                                            
practice, however, it appears that many language versions are translated form the original French 
version of the judgment. This practice of “indirect” or “pivotal” translations has further been 
institutionalised after the May 2004 enlargement; for a detailed discussion, see McAuliffe, 
"Enlargement at the European Court of Justice: Law, Language and Translation" (2008) 14 
E.L.J., 806-818; McAuliffe, “Translation at the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, 
in D. Stein, F. Olsen and A. Lorz (eds) Translation Issues in Language and Law (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 99-115. 
284  CFI (Order of 5 February 2001), Case T-344/00 Goldstein v Court of Justice, not reported, para. 
6 (cited in Lenaerts, Arts and Maselis, Procedural law of the European Union (2nd ed.), 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 579). 
285  Black's Law Dictionary 9th ed., (St. Paul, Thomson West, 2009).  
286  In my view the terms “primary carer”, “primary caregiver” and “primary caretaker” should be 
considered synonyms in this context (see n. 265, supra). 
287  Weyrauch, Katz and Olsen Cases and Materials on Family Law: Legal Concepts and Changing 
Human Relationships (Saint Paul, West publishing Co., 1994), 439. 
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more broadly, as some scholars have suggested.288  The different language versions of 
the judgments cited above contain some elements that may indicate a broader 
conception of that notion in the EU context.  I will now turn to those cases in more 
detail in order to determine more precisely the meaning and scope of the notion. 
 
2. Case law analysis 
 
In the following, I will try to determine with more precision the meaning and scope of 
the notion primary carer and of the residence rights enjoyed by primary carers under 
Union law.  For that purpose I will base myself on the reasoning followed by the 
Court in the cases discussed above and the principles underlying these cases.  
However, I will first concentrate on the children involved in the cases discussed.  The 
reason is that some of the cases involved school-going children of migrant workers 
and were decided on the specific legal basis of Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68.  
This was even the case after the entry into force of Directive 2004/38,289 which now 
comprehensively lays down the rules on the freedom of movement for Union citizens 
and their family members.  The question that arises therefore is whether the rights 
enjoyed by the primary carer of children are different depending on whether they are 
based on Regulation 1612/68, on the one hand, or on Directive 2004/38, on the other 
hand.  This will be considered first.   
 
a) Regulation 1612/68 vs Directive 2004/38 
 
As I explained higher, Directive 2004/38 comprehensively codified the provisions on 
the free movement of persons previously laid down in different legal instruments 
dealing with the free movement rights of specific categories of persons.  Until 
Ibrahim and Teixeira, the cases in which the Court recognised the free movement 
rights of primary carers had been decided on the basis of the previously existing legal 
instruments.  The question that arose in Ibrahim and Teixeira was whether these older 
cases, the Baumbast and R case in particular, were still good law, in view of the fact 
that Directive 2004/38, which codified part of the Court’s case law,290 did not extend 
the categories of privileged family members of Union citizens so as to include their 
primary carer, even under restrictive conditions.  It could have been assumed, 
therefore, that the Union legislator had implicitly overturned the said cases and that 
the outcome achieved in Baumbast and R – decided under Articles 10-12 of 
Regulation 1612/68 – would have been different had the case been decided under the 
                                                 
288  Starup and Elsmore, "Taking a Logical Step Forward? Comment on Ibrahim and Teixeira" 
(2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 583-584; Vanvoorden, "Case Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department" (2005) 11 Colum. J. Eur. L., 319. 
289  As is clear from cases Ibrahim and Teixeira. 
290  This appears, for instance, from some of the recitals in the preamble to the Directive (see inter 
alia recitals 9 and 27). Another illustration of this phenomenon is given by Currie, who remarks 
that the new definition of family members in Directive 2004/38 codifies ECJ, Case 59/85, 
Netherlands v Reed [1986] E.C.R. 1283 and that the extension of equal treatment rights to 
lawfully resident migrant citizens in Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 art.24 codifies a line of case 
law which started with ECJ, Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] E.C.R. I-
2691 (Currie, "EU Migrant Children, their Primary Carers and the European Court of Justice: 
Access to Education as a Precursor to Residence under Community Law" (2009) Journal of 
Social Security Law, 81, footnote 16). 
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new provisions of Directive 2004/38.  This was, in fact, argued in Ibrahim and 
Teixeira by some of the parties before the Court, who submitted that the entry into 
force of Directive 2004/38 had for a consequence that a right of residence could no 
longer be derived from the provisions of Regulation 1612/68, at least not considered 
separately from the conditions of Directive 2004/38.291 
 
The Court firmly rejected this argument and held that Baumbast and R was still good 
law.  It based this view on essentially four arguments.  First, it pointed out that 
Directive 2004/38 did not repeal Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 unlike Articles 10 
and 11 of that Regulation.  Second, the Court observed that the travaux préparatoires 
to Directive 2004/38 show that it was designed to be consistent with the judgment in 
Baumbast and R. 292   Third, the Court observed that if Article 12 of Regulation 
1612/68 could no longer be interpreted as conferring a right of residence on school-
going children and their primary carer but only as conferring the right to equal 
treatment with regard to access to education, it would have become superfluous with 
the entry into force of Directive 2004/38, which lays down in its Article 24(1) a 
general right to equal treatment, that is applicable to access to education.  Lastly, the 
Court noted that, according to recital 3 in the preamble to Directive 2004/38, the aim 
of that Directive is inter alia to simplify and strengthen the right of free movement 
and residence of all Union citizens and that, hence, Directive 2004/38 could not be 
interpreted as limiting the residence rights previously recognised on the basis of the 
provisions of Regulation 1612/68.  
 
Accordingly, the Court made it clear that the entry into force of Directive 2004/38 did 
not invalidate its earlier case law on the residence rights of primary carers, even 
though it was not codified by that Directive.  The Court’s refusal to interpret the 
provisions of Directive 2004/38 as meaning a “step back” as regards residence rights 
for school-going children and their primary carer can certainly be met with approval.  
More dubious is the Court’s insistence in Ibrahim and Teixeira to base its findings 
relating to these residence rights exclusively on Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 and 
not to any extent on the provisions of Directive 2004/38.  Admittedly, on the facts of 
these cases, the Court was concerned with the residence rights of school-going 
children of (former) migrant workers.  Still, it is striking that the Court carefully 
avoided drawing any conclusions or making any statements regarding the rights of 
school-going children of non-economically active Union citizens and their primary 
carer.  This leaves one wondering whether school-going children of (former) migrant 
workers form a special category as far as the residence rights enjoyed by them and by 
their primary carer are concerned.  This will be considered in more detail in the 
following. 
 
i) School-going children vs non school-going children 
                                                 
291  See ECJ, Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, para. 44; ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1107, paras 31-32. 
292  The Court referred to the Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2003) 199 final, 7. The Court seems to be 
increasingly referring to the preparatory works of legislative instruments (for another recent 
example of a case dealing with Directive 2004/38, see ECJ, Case C-162/09 Lassal [2010] E.C.R. 
nyr., para. 55). 
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The Court made it very clear in Baumbast, Ibrahim and Teixeira that school-going 
children of a migrant worker enjoy an independent right of residence in the host 
Member State, which is not lost, for instance, when their parent-migrant worker loses 
his or her status of migrant worker or leaves the host Member State.  It is clear from 
this case law that this independent right is enjoyed by children of a migrant worker 
enrolled in all types of education, including higher education and university 
education.  Accordingly, school-going children continue to enjoy a right of residence 
when they attain the age of majority 293  and for as long as their schooling lasts.  
Besides, as explained above, the Court held that the right of residence for school-
going children implies that they can be joined in the host Member State by their 
primary carer.  This right to be joined by the primary carer normally ends when the 
child reaches the age of majority, unless the child continues to need the presence and 
care of that parent in order to be able to pursue and complete his or her education.294 
 
However, it is also clear from the case law discussed above that not only school-going 
children have the right to be joined by their primary carer in the host Member State.  
In cases like Zhu and Chen, Ruiz Zambrano295 and, arguably, Carpenter, the Court 
recognised a right of residence for the primary carer of children who were not going 
to school, or without treating that fact as an element central to its decision.296  That 
does not mean that the fact whether children are attending school is irrelevant for 
determining the residence rights enjoyed by them and by their primary carer.  It would 
seem to follow from the case law of the Court that school-going children and their 
primary carer enjoy more extensive residence rights in the host Member State.  The 
cases involving school-going children are different on a number of points.  
 
First, school-going children enjoy more elaborate residence rights age-wise.  In cases 
like Zhu and Chen, the Court stressed that the primary carer should be given a right of 
residence where such was necessary to safeguard the residence rights of a “young 
minor” who is a national of a Member State.  In Teixeira, by contrast, the Court made 
it clear that the residence rights for the primary carer continues at least until the child 
attains the age of majority.297  Besides, it must be remarked that the independent right 
of residence of school-going children of a migrant worker extends even further than 
the residence rights enjoyed by children in the host Member State in their capacity as 
family members of a Union citizen.  The latter category only enjoys a right of 
                                                 
293  As was already apparent from ECJ, Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87, Echternach and Moritz 
[1989] E.C.R. 723. 
294  ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-1107, paras 84-87. 
295  As pointed out above, the Court in Ruiz Zambrano did not explicitly use the term “primary 
carer”. It did, however, confirm its reasoning in Zhu and Chen according to which dependent 
minor children could not reside independently in one of the Member States if they could not be 
accompanied by their parent, thereby confirming in an implicit way the residence rights enjoyed 
by the parent-primary carer of minor, non school-going children. 
296  In this connection it must be observed that on the facts of Ibrahim it would appear that not all 
children of the couple were going to school. Since their four children were aged from one to nine 
(Ibrahim, para. 19), it can be assumed that at least their youngest child was not going to school 
yet. The Court did not, however, make a distinction between the residence rights of the different 
children.  
297  In practice, this distinction will probably not have a great many effects, since children of an 
older age who live in the host Member State will in most cases attend school in that Member 
State.  
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residence if they are under 21 years old or are dependent, 298  whereas no such 
condition exists with regard to the first category.  Second, school-attendance makes a 
huge difference in the case of children who are not nationals of one of the Member 
States.  While young Union citizens may enjoy the right to be accompanied by their 
primary carer in the host Member State in order to preserve the useful effect of their 
right of residence, such is not the case for young third country nationals, since they do 
not normally enjoy an independent right of residence like Union citizens do.  By 
contrast, children of a migrant worker who have the nationality of a third country can 
derive an independent right of residence from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 when 
they attend school in the host Member State.299  The Baumbast and R line of cases is 
not limited to school-going children who have the nationality of a Member State.300  
Third, the right of residence enjoyed by school-going children – at least those of a 
migrant worker (see the discussion under IV.B.2.a.ii., infra) – is an independent right 
of residence, which cannot be made subject to restrictive conditions such as those 
relating to self-sufficiency.  Non school-going children, by contrast, can only rely on 
the general right of residence enjoyed by Union citizens, subject to the restrictive 
conditions surrounding that right.  In Zhu and Chen, for instance, baby Catherine’s 
right of residence in the UK was dependent on demonstrating possession of sufficient 
resources not to become a burden on the UK’s social assistance system and of a 
comprehensive sickness insurance.301  In cases Ibrahim and Teixeira, by contrast, the 
Court held that the right of residence of the school-going children concerned and their 
primary carer could not be made subject to those conditions.302 
 
The bottom-line is that school-going children most probably have a stronger claim to 
residence in the host Member State (for themselves and for their primary carer) than 
non school-going children.  The question is whether the distinction between school-
going children and non school-going children in terms of the right they enjoy is 
justified.  In my view, there are two important justifications for this distinction.  In the 
first place, access to education in the host Member State has a very important place in 
the Union legal order, as is confirmed by the great many high profile cases dealing 
with it.303  It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the ECJ has showed itself prepared 
to give a generous interpretation to the rights of school-going children.  While these 
                                                 
298  See Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38. 
299  See Article 10(1) of Regulation 1612/68: “The following shall, irrespective of their nationality, 
have the right to install themselves with a worker who is a national of one Member State and 
who is employed in the territory of another Member State: (a) his spouse and their descendants 
who are under the age of 21 years or are dependants” (emphasis added). See also the wording of 
Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38, which clearly states that it applies “irrespective of 
nationality”. 
300  In the Baumbast case, one of the children of Mr. Baumbast had only the nationality of a third 
country (ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, paras 16-17). 
301  Higher I have argued that the condition of self-sufficiency could also be imposed by the Member 
States in Ruiz Zambrano like circumstances (see Chapter 4, under III.B.4., supra). 
302  As was already pointed out, in Ibrahim, the youngest children presumably did not go to school 
yet. Yet the Court did not make a distinction between their residence rights – and the restrictive 
conditions normally surrounding them – and those enjoyed by school-going children. The reason 
is probably that it would have been unrealistic to make a distinction between the different 
members of one family who could not reside independently in any event. One could argue that 
the residence rights of the youngest children in the case hinged on those of their older school-
going siblings. Besides, granting residence rights to the youngest children would also seem to 
have been required by Article 8 ECHR. 
303  For a recent example, see ECJ, Case C-73/08 Bressol and Other [2010] E.C.R. I-2735, with a 
case note by Cambien in (2010) SEW, 423-426.  
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rights were initially conceived of by the Union legislator as accessory rights which 
had to facilitate the integration of the migrant’s workers family in the host Member 
State, they have come to be considered by the Court as independent rights, which 
entail entitlement to residence in the host Member State.  Cross-border education is 
vital for the Union’s social and political cohesion and economic performance.304  For 
this reason, children who go to school in a Member State other than that of their 
nationality do have a greater claim for residence in that State than children who do 
not.  
 
In the second place, children who attend school can be presumed to be more 
integrated in the society of the host Member State, which makes it more difficult for 
that Member State to justify interferences with their residence rights.305  However, 
this argument is only valid with regard to children who have pursued education in the 
host Member State for a certain period of time.  Children who have just started 
education in the host Member State cannot be expected to be integrated in the society 
of that State and thus have no stronger claim to residence on the basis of this second 
justification.  Below I argue, accordingly, that Member States can restrict the 
enjoyment of the independent residence right of school-going children and their 
primary carer to children who have pursued education in the host Member State for a 
certain period of time, at least where it is accompanied with a recourse to the social 
assistance system of the host Member State.306  While the present case law does not 
give clear guidance on whether Member States are allowed to impose such durational 
requirements,307 allowing it would have two main advantages.  First, it would restrict 
the independent rights to those school-going children who have a justified claim for 
such right, and thus be in accordance with the justifications for making a distinction 
between school-going and non school-going children in this regard.  Second, it would 
limit the possibilities for claiming rights in the host Member States to certain 
categories of family members and thereby reduce the financial burden for Member 
States.  
 
ii) Children of migrant workers vs children of other Union citizens 
 
The more intriguing question is whether school-going children of (former) migrant 
workers and their primary carer enjoy more residence rights under Union law in the 
host Member State than school-going children of other Union citizens – non-
economically active Union citizens in particular – and their primary carer.  In 
Baumbast, Ibrahim and Teixeira, the Court based the residence rights of the children 
                                                 
304  See the discussion in Cambien, "Student Mobility in the European Union: Facing New 
Hurdles?" (2009) 11 Revista Universitaria Europea, 77-99. 
305  See, in particular, ECJ, Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] E.C.R. I-2119.  
306  See under IV.B.2.a.ii., infra. 
307  O’Brien points out that the Court does not seem to require a substantial period of school-going 
and thus even children that have recently arrived in the host Member State and have just started 
schooling there seem to be entitled to rely on the more generous residence rights enjoyed by 
school-going children, despite the fact that they are hardly integrated in the host Member State 
(O'Brien, "Case C-310/08 London Borough of Harrow v. Nimco Hassan Ibrahim and Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 23 February 
2010; Case C-480/08 Maria Teixeira v. London Borough of Lambeth and Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 23 February 2010" (2011) 48 
CML Rev., 216). I discuss this point in a more detailed and nuanced way below. 
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concerned and those of their primary carer on Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68.  
Consequently, the reasoning followed by the Court would seem to apply only to 
children who at some point in time enjoyed a right of residence in host Member State 
as family member of a migrant worker, since Regulation 1612/68 is only applicable to 
the free movement of workers.  At the same time, it must be remarked that the Court 
specified in Teixeira that it was not required that one of the child’s parents worked as 
a migrant worker in the host Member State on the date on which the child started in 
education.308  Moreover, the Court was rather flexible in accepting a very brief period 
of work in the host Member State as sufficient in order to qualify as a migrant 
worker.309  
 
The main consequence of the qualification of children as family members of a 
migrant worker is that they can, where they attend school in the host Member, invoke 
an independent right of residence in the host Member State for themselves and for 
their primary carer.  This right of residence cannot be made subject to the classic 
conditions of possessing sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness insurance  
which have to be met by non-economically active Union citizens 310  (hereinafter 
“classic residence conditions”).  Accordingly, where a migrant worker loses this 
status in the host Member State and where his children and their primary carer by that 
fact become family members of a non-economically active Union citizen, they still do 
not have to meet the classic residence conditions in order to continue to be entitled to 
residence in the host Member State.  They can, moreover, rely on the right to equal 
treatment with regard to, for instance, welfare benefits in the host Member State, as is 
clearly illustrated by Ibrahim and Teixeira. 
 
It is an open question whether children of a non-economically active Union citizen 
who attend school also derive from this fact an independent right of residence in the 
host Member State which is not subject to satisfying the classic residence conditions.  
Such would make an important difference in the case of school-going children of a 
non-economically active Union citizen who no longer meets the classic residence 
conditions for himself and his family members.  If children in such circumstances too 
enjoyed an independent right of residence, they would be entitled to remain in the 
host Member State for the duration of their schooling, together with their primary 
carer.  The Court’s case law so far does not provide unequivocal guidance on this 
point since, as was already remarked, the line of cases starting with Baumbast and R 
were decided under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, which does not apply to such 
children.311  Two lines of reasoning are possible in order to decide this point.   
                                                 
308  ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-1107, paras 71-75. 
309  See X, "Editorial: Three paradoxes of EU citizenship", E.L.Rev. 2010, 129-130. The Court’s 
relaxed stance is clearly apparent in the Ibrahim judgment. Mr. Yusuf, Ms. Ibrahim’s husband, 
had only been employed in the UK for a total of about eight months and had claimed incapacity 
benefits in the UK for an additional nine months. The Court considered this to be sufficient in 
order for him to fall within the scope of the provisions on the free movement of workers. 
310  See Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38. 
311  In a recent case from the English Court of Appeal, Jeleniewicz v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2008] EWCA 1163; [2009] 1 C.M.L.R. 21 (cited by Currie, "EU Migrant Children, 
their Primary Carers and the European Court of Justice: Access to Education as a Precursor to 
Residence under Community Law" (2009) Journal of Social Security Law, 96), the right to 
residence as a primary carer was invoked by a non-economically active mother of a child in a 
situation where the classic residence conditions were not satisfied and were no recourse was 
possible to Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68. However, the claim was rejected, essentially 
because the child’s right of residence in the host Member State was not accepted. The Court of 
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On the one hand, one could point out that, even after the entry into force of Directive 
2004/38, a clear distinction is maintained between economically active Union citizens 
and non-economically active Union citizens.312  The distinction is clear, first and 
foremost, in the different conditions that have to be met for residence for periods of 
more than three months in the host Member State.  While non-economically active 
Union citizens have to meet the classic residence conditions, no additional conditions 
have to be met by economically active Union citizens besides economic activity.313  
The reason for this distinction is that economically active Union citizens can be 
expected, on account of their economic activity, to gain a sufficient income for 
themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State.  Economically active Union citizens can, moreover, 
be expected to contribute to the financing of that system through the payment of taxes 
and social security contributions.  For this reason presumably, economically active 
Union citizens and their family members enjoy wider access to certain social benefits 
than non-economically active Union citizens and their family members.314  Similar 
financial arguments could be invoked to justify subjecting the right of residence of 
school-going children of economically active Union citizens to a different regime than 
the right of residence of school-going children of non-economically active Union 
citizens.  Indeed, one could argue that the right of residence of the first category could 
not be made subject to the classic residence conditions since in that case the Union 
citizen will in the past have made a contribution to the social assistance system of the 
host Member State, whereas no such argument applies for the second category.315 
 
In my view, this first line of reasoning, which is essentially based on financial 
arguments, has a number of problematic aspects to it.  First, if contributions to the 
social assistance system of the host Member State are taken as a relevant 
distinguishing criterion, the more generous residence rights enjoyed by school-going 
children should be enjoyed by the children of all categories of economically active 
Union citizens, including employed and self-employed Union citizens. 316   Yet, if 
                                                                                                                                            
Appeal did not, therefore, explicitly consider the scope of residence rights enjoyed by primary 
carers in such circumstances.   
312  See, on this distinction, in some detail: White, “Revisiting Free Movement of Workers” (2009-
2010) Fordham Int'l L.J., 1564. See also the discussion in Nic Shuibhne, "The Outer Limits of 
EU Citizenship: Displacing Economic Free Movement Rights?", in Barnard and Odudu (eds.), 
The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2009), 167-
195. For an interesting argument that the provisions on Union citizenship may actually exert a 
negative influence on the rights enjoyed by economically active persons, see O'Leary, 
"Developing an Ever Closer Union Between the Peoples of Europe?" (2008) Edinburgh Mitchell 
Working Paper 6/2008, available at www.law.ed.ac.uk. 
313  Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38. Besides, economically active Union citizens can retain a right 
of residence under conditions which are not open to non-economically active Union citizens (see 
Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38). Economically active citizens can, under certain 
circumstances, also obtain a right of permanent residence before non-economically active Union 
citizens can (see Article 17 of Directive 2004/38). 
314  See Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 and ECJ, Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras 
and Koupatantze [2009] E.C.R. I-4585, with a case note by Fahey in (2009) E.L.Rev., 933-949 
(social assistance) and ECJ, Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] E.C.R. I-8507, with a case note by 
Schrauwen in (2009) N.T.E.R., 77-83 (financial support for students). 
315  See, in this sense, explicitly, Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-
1107, r.o. 81. 
316  The Court will have the opportunity to clarify its case law on this particular issue in pending 
Cases C-147/11 Czop and C-148/11 Punakova. 
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those rights are derived exclusively from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, children 
of self-employed persons are excluded, since that Article does not apply to them.  
Second, it must be pointed out that the supposed contributions to the social assistance 
system of the host Member State can be relatively small.  As is well illustrated by the 
Ibrahim case, a very short period of work in the host Member State suffices in order 
to be qualified as a migrant worker.  Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 can thus be 
relied on by children of the person concerned to obtain a right of residence in the host 
Member State for very substantial periods.317  It can seriously be questioned whether, 
in such circumstances, the supposed contribution to the social assistance system 
makes a real difference which justifies making the distinction stated above.  
Admittedly, it could be countered that in most cases migrant workers will make a 
substantial contribution to the social assistance system of the host Member State and 
that one should consider the contributions of migrant workers “viewed as a group”.318  
Still, the existence in some cases of a hugely disproportionate relation between a 
relatively small contribution to the social assistance system and the ensuing 
entitlement to rely on it for many years obviously weakens the persuasiveness of the 
financial argument set out above.  Third, financial arguments are not the crux of the 
Court’s argument in the cases discussed above in which it recognised an independent 
right of residence for school-going children and their primary carer. This will be 
further explained in the following. 
 
On the other hand, one could point out that the Court, in the cases in which it 
recognised an independent right of residence for school-going children, appears not to 
have been concerned with primarily financial arguments.  In those cases, the Court 
essentially based its findings on the need to preserve the effet utile of the right to 
access to education in the host Member State for children of migrant workers, which 
is warranted in order to ensure their integration into the society of the host Member 
State.319  Precisely for this reason, the Court held that their residence rights and those 
of their primary carer could not be made subject to restrictive conditions such as the 
classic residence conditions.  It should be clear that children of non-economically 
active Union citizens similarly enjoy a right of access to education in the host 
Member State.320  It could be argued that, once such children have obtained a right of 
residence in the host Member State and once they attend school there, they should 
similarly obtain an independent right of residence for themselves and for their primary 
carer which cannot be made subject to restrictive conditions such as the classic 
residence conditions.  This argument would, by analogy, be based on the need to 
preserve the effet utile of the right to access to education in the host Member State for 
children of Union citizens. 
 
                                                 
317  On the facts of the case of Ibrahim, a period of work of less than one year in the UK seems to be 
sufficient to entitle four children of a very young age to reside in the UK and finish their 
schooling there – possibly including higher studies – while being entitled to rely for their 
maintenance on welfare benefits. 
318  See Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-1107, para. 81. 
319  I do not consider here the Court’s fundamental rights based argument. I will turn to that 
argument below. 
320  See Article 24 of Directive 2004/38, which also applies to access to education. 
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In fact, the Union legislator has (partially) confirmed this point of view in Article 
12(3) of Directive 2004/38, to which the Court explicitly referred to support its 
reasoning in Ibrahim and Teixeira.321  That Article states: 
 
“The Union citizen's departure from the host Member State or his/her death shall not 
entail loss of the right of residence of his/her children or of the parent who has actual 
custody of the children, irrespective of nationality, if the children reside in the host 
Member State and are enrolled at an educational establishment, for the purpose of 
studying there, until the completion of their studies.” 
 
The right laid down in Article 12(3) applies to school-going children of all categories 
of Union citizens covered by Directive 2004/38 – i.e. economically active and non-
economically active Union citizens – and is not subject to the classic residence 
conditions.322  Consequently, it would prima facie seem to grant a residence right to 
school-going children of non-economically active Union citizens similar to the one 
that derives from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68.  However, Article 12(3) is only 
applicable in the event of death or departure of a Union citizen from the host Member 
State.  It does not, on its face, apply in the case of a non-economically Union citizen 
who continues to reside in the host Member State after no longer fulfilling the 
requisite conditions.323   
 
All the same, it could be argued that the non-application of the substance of Article 
12(3) in such circumstances would undermine the aim pursued by the Article, namely 
safeguarding the right to access to education for school-going children of a Union 
citizen in the host Member State.  One could point out that there is no apparent reason 
why school-going children would be more deserving to continue their schooling in the 
host Member State when their parent dies or leaves the Member State than when he or 
she, for instance, falls without sufficient resources but continues to reside there.324  
One could argue, therefore, that the Court should adopt a wide interpretation of 
Article 12(3), going beyond its literal wording, and finding application in all 
circumstances where the Union citizen whose children attend an educational 
establishment in the host Member State loses his entitlement to residence in that 
State.325  In all such circumstances, the right of residence in the host Member State for 
                                                 
321  See ECJ, Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, paras 57-58: ECJ, Case C-480/08 
Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-1107, paras 68-69. 
322  This clearly ensues when Article 12(3) is contrasted with Articles 12(1) and (2) of the Directive. 
323  The most obvious example is that of a Union citizen who initially had sufficient resources and a 
comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, but later lost one of these. 
Interesting to note is that Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38 could not be applied in Ibrahim 
because it did not concern a case of departure or death: Mr. Yusuf had ceased to be a worker in 
the UK before he departed from the UK in 2004 and hence his entitlement to residence was not 
lost through his departure (Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-
1065, para. 14). See also the discussion in Currie, "EU Migrant Children, their Primary Carers 
and the European Court of Justice: Access to Education as a Precursor to Residence under 
Community Law" (2009) Journal of Social Security Law, 88-89. 
324  In this connection, it is possible to draw an interesting parallel between Article 12(3) and Article 
16(4) of Directive 2004/38. Article 16(4) only refers to periods of absence from the host 
Member State. Yet the Court has considered that it should apply by way of analogy to periods of 
unlawful residence in that Member State (ECJ, Case C-325/09 Dias [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 
63-65).See also Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-325/09 Dias [2011] E.C.R. nyr., paras 101-
109. 
325  See Starup and Elsmore, "Taking a Logical Step Forward? Comment on Ibrahim and Teixeira" 
(2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 583-584. 
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the children concerned would continue until they finish their schooling.  The same 
would be true for their primary carer, at least until they reach the age of majority.  
 
The second line of reasoning is not without problems either.  One could object that the 
wide interpretation suggested of Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38 goes against the 
apparent will of the legislator, who limited Article 12(3) to cases of death or departure 
of the Union citizen concerned.  Besides, the wider interpretation of Article 12(3) 
would take away much of the added value of Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, an 
Article which was preserved by the Union legislator even after the adoption of 
Directive 2004/38, as was forcefully pointed out by the ECJ in Ibrahim and Teixeira.  
Moreover, accepting the second line of reasoning would have far-reaching financial 
consequences.  Union citizens could be tempted to travel to a Member State with a 
generous welfare system, together with their family members, in order to claim social 
benefits by relying on the above reasoning.  The typical scenario suggested would be 
the following.  After having obtained an initial right of residence in the host Member 
State for themselves and their family members – in their capacity of economically 
active or non-economically active Union citizens –, Union citizens would enrol their 
children in an educational establishment in that Member State.  Once these children 
enrolled in such an establishment, they would be entitled to an independent right of 
residence which could not be made subject to the classic residence conditions.  Such 
an independent right of residence would, moreover, also accrue to their primary carer 
and, arguably, both parents could qualify as primary carer. 326   Accordingly, this 
construction would allow Union citizens the possibility to continue to remain in the 
host Member State, despite not satisfying the conditions of Directive 2004/38, and to 
claim social assistance there.  This could prima facie give rise to a “horror scenario” 
for certain Member States which would see themselves flooded by “welfare 
tourists”.327  
 
The bottom-line is that the second line of reasoning runs counter to serious objections, 
in particular the fact that it does not respect the apparent will of the Union legislator 
and entails serious financial consequences for the Member States.  It is likely 
therefore that the first line of reasoning will be adhered to by the ECJ, despite its 
problematic aspects described higher.  Still, the possibility cannot be totally excluded 
that the ECJ would be willing, in the circumstances of a particular case, to adopt a 
reasoning similar to the second line of reasoning set out above.  The Court could base 
this on the consideration that the wide interpretation suggested is the one only one 
which can adequately safeguard the interests of school-going children and guarantee 
their access to education in the host Member State.  Moreover, the fact cannot be 
ignored that the very recognition in the case law of a right of residence for school-
going children and their primary carer is based on a broad teleological interpretation.  
                                                 
326  See the discussion under IV.B.c., infra.  
327  Telling in this connection is the point of view taken in an article that appeared in the British 
tabloid The Sun on the occasion of the ECJ’s judgment in the Ibrahim case. The picture 
accompanying the article shows Ms. Ibrahim, wearing a headscarf, standing next to a big flat 
screen television. See Wells, “House this for lunacy?”, The Sun, 25 February 2010, available at 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/2867802/Illegal-immigrant-mum-gets-four-
bedroom-house.html. Of course, it must be pointed out that the opinions voiced by The Sun on 
EU affairs are not necessarily representative for the opinions held by UK government officials. 
Still the article illustrates some of emotions or lines of reasoning that the two judgments could 
evoke with certain of them. Below I will argue that any inferences regarding welfare tourism 
must be nuanced. 
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Consequently, the argument that Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38 should be 
interpreted literally should not be given undue weight.  The same is true for the 
argument that a wide interpretation of Article 12(3) would give rise to “creative use” 
of the residence rights accruing to school-going children and their primary carer, as 
outlined above.  It must be pointed out, first, that such creative use is possible in any 
event under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 and Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38.  
Relying on the latter provision, for instance, a Union citizen could briefly leave the 
host Member State in which his children are pursuing education, in order to obtain an 
independent right of residence for the latter and for himself in the capacity of their 
primary carer.  Moreover, it follows from the case law that the application of the 
provisions on Union citizenship can not be resisted by the argument that they entail 
financial consequences for one or more Member States.  As the ECJ has consistently 
held, the provisions of Union citizenship entail a certain degree of financial 
solidarity.328 
 
At the same time, the degree of financial solidarity implied by Union citizenship is 
not without limits.  For this reason, Member States are entitled to limit, under certain 
circumstances, the residence rights of Union citizens from other Member States and 
their family members.  If the ECJ were to adopt the second line of reasoning set out 
above, a careful use of these possibilities would perhaps be the most appropriate way 
to address the financial concerns of the Member States in connection with the creative 
use of residence rights for school-going children.  First of all, it is trite law that a 
Member State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent individuals from 
improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Union law. 329  
Accordingly, a Member State is entitled to put an end to an abuse of Article 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68 or Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38 and to revoke a fraudulently 
obtained right of residence under one of those provisions.330  Whether or not there has 
been abuse must be examined objectively on the basis of a comprehensive appraisal 
of all the circumstances of the individual case and cannot be inferred from the mere 
recourse to the rights granted by the provisions just mentioned.331  Any measure to 
refuse, terminate or withdraw a right that was fraudulently obtained must, moreover, 
                                                 
328  See, inter alia, ECJ, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193, para. 44; ECJ, Case C-
413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, paras 91-93. For a discussion, seeRoss, "The 
Struggle for EU Citizenship: Why Solidarity Matters", in Arnull, Barnard, Dougan and Spaventa 
(eds.), A Constitutional Order of States: Essays in European Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood 
(Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2011),  283-300. 
329  See inter alia ECJ, Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid [1974] 
E.C.R. 1299, para. 13; ECJ, Case C-148/91 Veronica Omroep Organisatie v Commissariaat 
voor de Media [1993] E.C.R. I-487, para. 12; ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] E.C.R. I-
1459, para. 24; ECJ, Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 75. This 
principle is explicitly confirmed in Directive 2004/38 with regard to the rights conferred by that 
Directive (see Article 35 of Directive 2004/38). 
330  See, in this connection, Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-1107, 
para. 83. See also recital (15) in the preamble to Directive 2004/38, stating: “Family members 
should be legally safeguarded in the event of the death of the Union citizen, divorce, annulment 
of marriage or termination of a registered partnership. With due regard for family life and human 
dignity, and in certain conditions to guard against abuse, measures should therefore be taken to 
ensure that in such circumstances family members already residing within the territory of the 
host Member State retain their right of residence exclusively on a personal basis.” (emphasis 
added). 
331  See inter alia ECJ, Case C-478/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] E.C.R. I-7587, para. 45; ECJ, 
Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, para. 55; ECJ, Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes 
[2006] E.C.R. I-7995, paras 36 and 37. 
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be proportionate and comply with certain procedural safeguards.332  At the same time, 
it must be pointed out that the Union Courts have been very reluctant to accept the 
argument of an abuse of Union law provisions, even in cases where the reliance on 
Union provisions appears to have been part of a well-devised strategy to circumvent 
certain restrictions deriving from national law.333  Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that 
in flagrant cases, like one involving a short-time departure from the host Member 
State merely in order to “activate” Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38, abuse of law 
will in the future be accepted as a real limitation to the rights of the person concerned.  
A further argument in support of that would be that in such a case not merely 
provisions of national law are being circumvented, but essential provisions of Union 
law, namely the classic residence conditions laid down in Directive 2004/38. 
 
Second, it could be argued that the host Member State could reserve the independent 
right of residence enjoyed by school-going children and their primary carer to 
children who are sufficiently integrated in the society of that State.  This argument 
draws inspiration from a line of cases in which the Court held that, in order to avoid 
assistance granted to Union citizens from other Member States becoming an 
unreasonable financial burden, a Member State may reserve access to certain social 
benefits – in particular assistance covering the maintenance costs of students – to 
Union citizens who have demonstrated a certain degree of integration into the society 
of that State.334  The Court further held that residence for a certain length of time is an 
appropriate criterion to determine integration.335  Admittedly, the Bidar case law is 
concerned with access to financial aid for students and not with access to education 
itself.  Consequently, a Member State could not rely on Bidar to limit access to 
education to those students only who can demonstrate a sufficient degree of 
integration in their society.336  All the same, in my view, the independent right of 
residence for school-going children does not concern purely access to education in the 
host Member State.  In cases where this right is relied on by primary carers who do 
not satisfy the classic residence conditions, the persons concerned will be entitled to 
rely on the principle of equal treatment in order to obtain income-subsisting social 
benefits in the host Member State.  These benefits, in a more indirect way than 
student loans or grants, cover the maintenance costs of the children concerned and 
enable them to pursue their education in the host Member State.   
                                                 
332  See Article 35 of Directive 2004/38, which refers to Articles 30 and 31 of the Directive. 
333  For clear examples, see ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925 and ECJ, Case 
C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607 (see para. 36, in particular, where it is stated “Thus, in 
reply to one question, Mrs Akrich said that they intended to return to the United Kingdom 
‘because we had heard about EU rights, staying six months and then going back to the UK’. She 
said that she had been given that information by ‘solicitors and others in same situation’.”). See 
also the discussion in Chapter 4, under II.B.b., supra. 
334  See, in particular, ECJ, Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, paras 56-58; ECJ, Joined 
Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] E.C.R. I-9161, para. 43; ECJ, Case C-
158/07 Förster [2008] E.C.R. I-8507, paras 48-50. 
335  Ibid. See further O'Brien, "Real Links, Abstract Rights and False Alarms: The Relationship 
between the ECJ's 'Real Link' Case Law and National Solidarity" (2008) 33 E.L. Rev., 643-665. 
336  Access to education can never be made subject to such conditions since, as the Courts have held, 
the possibility for a student from the EU to gain access to education in another Member State 
under the same conditions as nationals of that Member State constitutes the very essence of the 
principle of freedom of movement for students guaranteed by the Treaties. See Opinion of AG 
Sharpston in Case C-73/08 Bressol and Others [2010] E.C.R. I-2735, paras 79-82. See also the 
more detailed discussion in Cambien, "Student Mobility in the European Union: Facing New 
Hurdles?" (2009) 11 Revista Universitaria Europea, 77-99. 
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Accordingly I would argue that if the Court were to accept the second line of 
reasoning, it should arguably connect this to its Bidar case law and allow Member 
States, under certain circumstances, to restrict the independent residence right enjoyed 
by school-going children and their primary carer to school-going children sufficiently 
integrated in their society.  More in particular, the independent right of residence 
enjoyed by school-going children of a Union citizen who continues to reside in the 
host Member State without satisfying the conditions of Directive 2004/38 could be 
reserved to children who are sufficiently integrated in the host Member State in those 
cases where they would rely on the social assistance system of the host Member State 
for their maintenance costs.337  No such limitation could be imposed in the case of 
school-going children and their primary carer who satisfy the conditions of Directive 
2004/38.338  Accordingly, only children who went to school for a certain period of 
time could benefit from this right while having recourse to the social assistance 
system of the host Member State. 339   As remarked higher, such would be in 
accordance with one of the justifications for making a distinction between school-
going children and non school-going children as far as the residence rights enjoyed by 
them are concerned.  Possibly other factors indicating a degree of integration would 
also have to be taken into account, such as knowledge of the language of the host 
Member State, for instance.  How much “integration” could be asked for is unclear for 
the moment.340  If the view just set out were to be accepted, future case law would 
have to provide guidance on this point.   
 
iii) Conclusion 
 
School-going children and their primary carer enjoy more elaborate residence rights 
in the host Member State than non school-going children and their primary carer.  
They can be said to have a stronger claim to residence for two reasons.  On the one 
hand, the right to access to education in cross-border situations is a fundamental 
aspect of the Union legal order, which warrants additional safeguards.  On the other 
                                                 
337  See also the discussion in Currie, "EU Migrant Children, their Primary Carers and the European 
Court of Justice: Access to Education as a Precursor to Residence under Community Law" 
(2009) Journal of Social Security Law, 97-100. 
338  This equally applies to persons falling under Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38, since the 
Directive itself appears to exempt them from the classic residence conditions. 
339  Some support for this view can be found in Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-480/08 Teixeira 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1107 (see para. 85: “At the time of her application for housing assistance, Ms 
Teixeira had been living in the United Kingdom continuously for approximately 18 years. Her 
daughter Patricia is a Union citizen who was born in the host Member State and, presumably, 
pursued her entire education there. Subject to other findings of fact by the referring court, it 
may, therefore, be assumed that both Ms Teixeira’s situation and that of her daughter represents 
a relatively high level of integration in the host Member State. In those circumstances, a certain 
degree of financial solidarity by the Member State appears to be justified so far as they are 
concerned”). AG Mazák, by contrast, explicitly stated that the length of schooling was not a 
relevant factor as far as the rights enjoyed under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 are concerned 
(Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, para. 33). 
340  As far as maintenance aid for studies is concerned, Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 puts a 
clear limitation on the “integration” that can be asked for, namely five years of residence in the 
host Member State (see also ECJ, Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] E.C.R. I-8507, paras 51-58). I 
do not consider, however, that this provision applies for our purposes because I am concerned 
here with social benefits which de facto enable students to cover their maintenance costs, but 
which are not directly aimed at covering maintenance aid for studies. 
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hand, school-going children can be expected to be more integrated in the society of 
the host Member State and thus more deserving of residence in that State.  In 
accordance with this last justification, I have argued that Member States can restrict 
the enjoyment of the independent residence right for school-going children and their 
primary carer to children who have pursued education in the host Member State for a 
certain period of time, at least where it is accompanied with a recourse to the social 
assistance system of the host Member State. 
 
Less clear at present is whether the independent residence right for school-going 
children and their primary carer is only enjoyed by children of (former) migrant 
workers or also by children of other categories of Union citizens.  I have argued that, 
while the present case law is limited to children of (former) migrant workers, the 
underlying principles and justifications possibly apply more generally.  Accordingly, 
the independent residence right for school-going children and their primary carer 
could be based on a broad interpretation of Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38 and 
would thus apply to school-going children of all categories of Union citizens who 
continue to reside in the host Member State after no longer satisfying the conditions 
of Directive 2004/38.  Accepting this broad interpretation would be apt to safeguard 
the interests of school-going children, but would at the same time entail problematic 
financial consequences.  For that reason, it will not likely be accepted by the ECJ.  
Should it nevertheless be accepted, the ensuing financial consequences could be 
tempered to some extent.  The risk of ensuing disproportionate financial burdens for 
the social assistance systems of the Member States could be overcome by a more 
relaxed stance on the possibility to tackle abuse of residence rights and by allowing 
Member States, in certain circumstances, to restrict the residence rights discussed to 
school-going children who are sufficiently integrated in their society.   
b) Primary carer other than parents of a child 
 
The next question which I set out to answer is whether only parents can qualify as the 
primary carer of children entitled to reside in the host Member State, and thereby 
enjoy the residence rights described above, or whether other persons such as other 
family members or even non-family members who effectively take care of children of 
a Union citizen in the host Member State are also covered.   
 
By way of an introductory remark it should be emphasised that the case law of the 
ECJ provides firm authority only for the first view.  Indeed, as explained above, there 
have only been four cases in which the ECJ explicitly embraced the concept “primary 
carer” in the context of Union free movement law,341 namely Baumbast and R, Zhu 
and Chen and, more recently, Ibrahim and Teixeira.  In all these cases, the primary 
carer whose residence right was disputed was the parent of the children for whom he 
or she cared and in all these cases the dictum of the judgment explicitly confirms the 
residence right of “the parent” who is the primary carer of children.  The bottom-line 
is that the ECJ has never confirmed the right of residence of a primary carer other 
                                                 
341  The ECJ has also explicitly referred to the concept in another context, namely in a case dealing 
with the primary carer of a disabled child (ECJ, Coleman [2008] E.C.R. I-5603). The notion 
primary carer has a specific meaning in relation to disabled persons, which is not immediately 
relevant for the purposes of my analysis. For a discussion of the Coleman case, see Werker and 
Swarte, "Ook moeder van gehandycapt kind wordt beschermd door het verbod van discriminatie 
op grond van handicap" (2008) Nederlands tijdschrift voor de mensenrechten, 1155-1162. 
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than a parent.342  However, this observation is not such as to end the debate.  The 
argument that the primary carer should have a right to reside with the children for 
whom he or she is responsible has never been invoked by referring courts with regard 
to primary carers other than the parents of the child.  In the four cases in which the 
concept was invoked, the residence rights of a parent were at stake.  It is an open 
question whether the ECJ would have come to a different conclusion had the primary 
carer not been a parent.   
 
Higher I explained that the Court, arguably, based its recognition of a right of 
residence for the primary carer on two main lines of reasoning, namely an effet utile 
reasoning, on the one hand, and a fundamental rights based reasoning, on the other 
hand.  In the following I endeavour to determine with more precision the scope of 
primary carers enjoying residence rights, on the basis of these two lines of reasoning 
and the principles underlying the cases discussed.  
 
i) Effet utile reasoning 
 
The Court’s main argument to extend the benefit of the free movement provisions to 
the primary carer was based on the need to preserve the effet utile of these provisions.  
Accordingly, the primary carer derives his or her right of residence from the fact that 
otherwise the child concerned could not usefully exercise his or her right of residence 
– which, in turn, might enable this child to exercise his or her right to access to 
education in the host Member State.  Given that the reasoning of the ECJ seems to 
focus entirely on the interests of the child, it is prima facie hard to see why only 
parents could derive a right of residence from the interests of the child.  That doubt is 
confirmed, moreover, by dicta of the ECJ.  The Court does not only refer to “primary 
carer” in relation to the parent of a child, but also more broadly to the “person who is 
the primary carer”.  In Zhu and Chen, for instance, the Court states (in paragraph 45):  
 
“It is clear that enjoyment by a young child of a right of residence necessarily implies that 
the child is entitled to be accompanied by the person who is his or her primary carer and 
accordingly that the carer must be in a position to reside with the child in the host 
Member State for the duration of such residence.” (Emphasis added) 
 
In this connection, it cannot go unnoticed that AG Tizzano in Zhu and Chen explicitly 
favoured a broad interpretation of the concept “primary carer”.  In paragraph 92 of his 
opinion the AG explains, discussing the Baumbast and R case, that: 
 
“The rationale of the abovementioned case-law lies, of course, above all in the 
requirement of protecting the interests of the minor, having regard to the fact that it is 
precisely that purpose which must be pursued when the power granted to the parents (or 
guardian) to choose the place of establishment of the minor on behalf of the latter is 
exercised.” (Emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
342  It should be noted that in the Carpenter case, which in my view already encompassed the same 
reasoning in a more embryonic form, the primary carer whose residence right was confirmed, 
was the stepparent of the children concerned. Prima facie, and without pre-empting the 
following detailed discussion, it would seem to be the case, therefore, that at least stepparents 
can also qualify as “primary carer” for the purposes of Union free movement law. See also 
McGlynn, Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 47. 
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This would seem to indicate that the Court’s reasoning should not be restricted to the 
parents of a child343 - even though the case at hand was concerned with that specific 
category of primary carers - but could also apply, for instance, to the legal guardian of 
a child.  There is certainly much to be said for this argument.  As was explained 
above, if the rationale of the extension of residence rights to the “primary carer” lies 
uniquely in preserving the effet utile of the residence rights enjoyed by children of a 
Union citizen, there seems to be no good reason to restrict this extension to the 
parents, or even to the family members of those children.  Put differently, where a 
child cannot exercise his residence rights if he or she cannot be accompanied by his or 
her primary carer, it does not matter a great deal whether the latter is a family member 
or not.  In both cases, the effet utile of the residence rights of the child will be 
jeopardised.   
 
However strong this argument in favour of a broad interpretation may seem, I find it 
not altogether convincing.  In my opinion, the argument overstates the importance of 
the interests of the child as the unique ratio decidendi of the ECJ in the cases in which 
it recognised a right of residence for the primary carer.  It overlooks the fact that the 
ECJ in those cases takes secondary free movement legislation, conferring free 
movement and residence rights on certain categories of “privileged” family members 
of Union citizens, as the starting point of its reasoning.  In my view, the ECJ’s 
reasoning in fact consists of two steps.  First, the ECJ determines whether the person 
whose free movement rights are disputed belongs to one of the categories of 
beneficiaries of such rights.  It should be clear that ascendants are amongst these 
beneficiaries, but not siblings or non-family members.344  Next, the ECJ shows itself 
prepared to give a broad interpretation of the person’s residence rights, even one 
going against the strict wording of secondary legislation, in order to preserve the effet 
utile of the free movement rights of another category of beneficiaries.  The underlying 
reason for this broad interpretation of secondary legislation lies invariably in the need 
to protect the rights of the children concerned.  
 
This “two step-reasoning” is clearly present in all the cases discussed above.  In 
Baumbast and R, the ECJ first determined that the spouse of a migrant worker and his 
children were, according to secondary Union legislation, entitled to reside in the host 
Member State.  Subsequently, it considered the applicants so entitled, even despite the 
fact that they were no longer a (spouse of a) migrant worker.  This broad 
interpretation of the category of the applicants as beneficiaries of free movement 
rights was motivated by a desire not to compromise the free movement rights of 
another category of beneficiaries, namely their children.  In Zhu and Chen, the ECJ 
first pointed out that dependent ascendants of a Union citizen are entitled to reside in 
the host Member State in accordance with secondary Union law (first step).  
Subsequently, the ECJ showed itself prepared to consider Mrs. Chen so entitled, 
despite the fact that she was not dependent on her daughter.345  Again, this broad 
interpretation of one category of beneficiaries of free movement rights, namely 
ascendants, was motivated by a desire not to jeopardise the exercise of free movement 
rights by another such category, namely the Union citizen in question herself.  In 
                                                 
343  See Hofstotter, "A Cascade of Rights, or Who Shall Care For Little Catherine? Some 
Reflections on the Chen Case" (2005) 30 E.L. Rev., 555. 
344  See the discussion under I.B.2., supra. 
345  As was already pointed out, the Court confirmed this reasoning implicitly in its judgment in Ruiz 
Zambrano. 
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Carpenter the Court first noted that secondary law on the free movement of persons 
extended the benefit of free movement rights to the spouse of a Member State 
national.  However, this right only applied where this Member State national was 
joined by his spouse in another Member State, which was not the case with the 
Carpenters.  Subsequently, the Court considered that Mrs. Carpenter was entitled to 
residence, even despite this restriction.  The reason lay, again, in the fact that Mrs. 
Carpenter was the primary carer of children and that deciding otherwise would 
jeopardise the effet utile of the free movement provisions.  In Ibrahim and Teixeira, 
the applicants were the spouse of a (former) migrant worker and thus fell within the 
categories of beneficiaries of residence rights under secondary Union legislation.  The 
ECJ did consider, however, that their residence rights could not be made subject to 
other conditions, notably the classic residence conditions, because they were the 
primary carer of school-going children whose residence rights would otherwise be 
jeopardised. 
 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the Court in fact consistently takes one of the 
categories of privileged family members listed in secondary Union legislation as the 
basis of its reasoning, although it is willing to leave certain of the restrictive 
conditions surrounding their right of residence unapplied where the person concerned 
is the primary carer of children entitled to residence in the host Member State.  The 
bottom-line is probably that mostly three categories of family members can invoke a 
right of residence in their capacity of primary carers.  In the first place, ascendants - 
i.e. parents, but also ascendants in a further degree -, could in this way be entitled to 
residence in the host Member State where they are the primary carer of a Union 
citizen, even when they are not dependent on the latter.  In the second place, such is 
also true for the spouse of a Union citizen who is the primary carer of the children of 
the latter.  The spouse of a Union citizen will be either the parent or the stepparent of 
these children and thereby also qualify under the heading “ascendant” of these 
children, as will be further explained below.  In the third place, a similar reasoning 
could be followed with regard to the registered partner of a Union citizen who is the 
primary carer of the latter’s children, since registered partners are also among the 
categories of privileged family members. 
 
More doubtful is whether siblings could also be entitled to residence in the capacity of 
the primary carer of a child in the host Member State.  In principle, they cannot 
qualify under the aforementioned two step-reasoning, since siblings are not amongst 
the categories of privileged family members.  However, one could imagine a situation 
in which a caretaking sibling came to the host Member State as the child of a Union 
citizen and, therefore, as one of the latter’s privileged family members.  Suppose, for 
instance, that a Union citizen leaves the host Member State and that his youngest 
school-going children are effectively taken care of by his oldest child, who no longer 
goes to school.  Strictly speaking the oldest child would not be entitled to residence in 
such a case.346  However, such could nevertheless be argued on the basis of a flexible 
application of the two step-reasoning set out above, which takes into account the fact 
that the oldest child would initially have come to the host Member State as the 
privileged family member of a Union citizen and the fact that he or she is the primary 
                                                 
346  Since siblings are not amongst the privileged family members of a Union citizen entitled to 
accompany or join him in the host Member State and since they cannot rely on Article 12(3) of 
Directive 2004/38, which confers a right of residence only on “the parent who has actual 
custody of the children” (emphasis added). 
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carer of children whose residence rights would otherwise be jeopardised.  In such a 
case, a wide interpretation of the provisions of Directive 2004/38 could both pay due 
respect to the will of the Union legislator and be apt to safeguard the effet utile of the 
rights of the school-going children concerned. 
 
The two step-reasoning described must be endorsed, as it gives due weight to the will 
of the Union legislator.  It would be wrong to ignore the first step in the ECJ’s 
reasoning, which entirely conditions the scope of the second step.  The need to 
preserve the effet utile of the free movement provisions can in my view justify leaving 
unapplied a restrictive condition the application of which would make it impossible to 
give full effect to the provisions it conditions.  It cannot, however, justify establishing 
new categories of beneficiaries of free movement rights contra legem.  By doing so, 
the Court would arguably overstep its constitutional role in that its decisions would no 
longer be based to a sufficient degree on Union free movement legislation.  Entirely 
disregarding the categories of beneficiaries of free movement rights contained in that 
legislation and the limitations surrounding them would come down to disregarding the 
interests of the Member States these provisions are designed to protect.  Arguably, 
this could lead to disproportionate financial burdens for the Member States and to a 
disproportionate interference with their competences in the field of immigration.  The 
bottom-line is that only the two step reasoning set out would guarantee an appropriate 
balance between the effective application of the free movement provisions and the 
interests of the Member States. 
 
It should be clear from this that the effet utile reasoning can only justify granting a 
right to the categories of privileged family members laid down in Directive 2004/38, 
namely ascendant-primary carers and the spouse or registered partner of one of the 
parents who is the primary carer of his or her children.  Under some circumstances, 
siblings can perhaps also be considered to fall within these categories, for reasons 
explained above.  By contrast, other family members, such as aunts or uncles, or non-
family members, such as the legal guardian of the child, cannot qualify for a residence 
right in their capacity of “primary carer” on the basis of the said reasoning.   
 
Any extension of residence rights to these other categories of persons could, as 
explained above, be defended on grounds of the need to safeguard the effet utile of the 
rights of the children concerned.  However, an argument that purely focuses on the 
interests of the children fails to take into account one vital element, namely the fact 
that the Union legislator has decided to grant a right of residence only to a limited 
number of categories of persons who stand in a certain relation to the children 
concerned.  The interests of children can trump certain of the restrictions surrounding 
these categories but they cannot in themselves, in my view, allow the Courts to grant 
rights to other categories of persons.  The fact that the interests of children do not 
carry an absolute weight is illustrated by Article 12(3) of the Directive, which is set 
out higher.  The Union legislator in that article clearly took the interests of school-
going children as its focal point, by conferring a right of residence on them and their 
primary carer.  At the same time it gave a narrow definition of the primary carer, by 
limiting itself to “the parent who has actual custody of the children” rather than the 
“parent or guardian”, for instance.  This indicates that the Union legislator was not 
prepared to safeguard the interests of the child in all circumstances.  The Union 
Courts must respect this choice, at least in so far as it is in accordance with Article 8 
ECHR (see the discussion under IV.B.2.B.II, infra). 
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At the same time, I believe that the effet utile reasoning does allow the Court to give a 
broad interpretation to the categories of family members which can qualify as primary 
carer.  As pointed out, the Directive refers in its Article 2(2)(d) to “the dependent 
direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in 
point (b)”.  I explained above that the exact meaning of this term is not clear-cut, and 
that it can be given a restrictive interpretation, namely one that excludes non-
biological ascendants. 347   Indeed, the term “direct” may seem to exclude non-
biological ascendants, such as stepparents and adoptive parents.  If this restrictive 
interpretation of the category of ascendants - which I reject for reasons explained 
above348 - would nevertheless be held to be the correct one, the need to preserve the 
effet utile of the Directive may, in my view, be such as to justify enlarging this 
category in the case of the primary carer.  In my view, non-biological ascendants like 
a stepparent349 or an adoptive parent should also be entitled to residence if they are 
the primary carer of the child.  The biological element should not matter in this 
regard.  On the facts of Zhu and Chen, for instance, the ECJ should have reached the 
same conclusion had Mrs. Chen not been the biological mother of baby Catherine, but 
her adoptive mother.  The reason is obvious: such interpretation is required in order to 
give full effect to the residence rights of baby Catherine.  Moreover, this result would 
be grounded in an interpretation of the provisions of Directive 2004/38, i.e. the first 
step described above would be complied with, since the Union legislator has given 
residence rights to ascendants of Union citizens.  The need to preserve the effet utile 
would merely require, on the facts of this case, to leave unapplied two restrictive 
conditions surrounding this category of beneficiaries, namely that of dependency and 
that of biological ties with the child.   
 
ii) Fundamental rights based reasoning 
 
A second justification relied on by the Court in order to extend the benefit of the free 
movement provisions to the primary carer is the need to respect fundamental rights, 
the right to respect for family life in particular.  As I explained higher, this argument 
complements and reinforces the effet utile argument.  The question I will try to answer 
here is whether the need to respect fundamental rights provides further support for my 
findings under the previous heading in relation to the scope of the notion primary 
carer under Union law.  Perhaps the need to respect fundamental rights may justify an 
even wider interpretation of that notion.  
 
Higher I explained how a deportation measure taken against the parent-primary carer 
of children residing in one of the Member States should, under certain circumstances, 
be seen as a disproportionate interference with the right laid down in Article 8 ECHR.  
Article 8 ECHR entails for the Member States not only a negative obligation not to 
expulse or deport the parent-primary carer where such disproportionately interferes 
with the right to respect for family life, but also a positive obligation to grant a right 
of residence to the primary carer in order to make enjoyment of a normal family life 
                                                 
347  See supra, under II.B. 
348  At least, with regard to adoptive parents (see supra, under II.B.). 
349  It must not go unnoticed in this regard that the Carpenter case was concerned with the residence 
rights of a stepmother. As I explained higher, in my view, the central element for this decision 
was the fact that the spouse concerned was the primary carer of her stepchildren.   
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possible.350  Of course, it must be pointed out that certain interferences with the right 
to respect for family life can be justified under Article 8(2) ECHR in view of the 
legitimate interest States have in conducting an effective immigration policy.  In 
balancing the State’s interest against that of the third-country national, a number of 
criteria are to be taken into account.351  Higher I argued that, in the context of the EU, 
the element of care should be the central criterion in this assessment, while the 
possibility for the child to live with his parent in another State should not be given 
considerable weight.  Hence, a refusal of residence to the parent-primary carer of a 
young Union citizen will in many circumstances not be justified under Article 8(2) 
ECHR.352   
 
The above discussion dealt only with the residence rights of parent-primary carers.  
The important question to be answered now is whether these principles also apply to 
other categories of primary carers.  I distinguish three such categories, which I will 
discuss in the following: 1) other ascendants; 2) other (non-ascendant) family 
members; and 3) non-family members.  In the first place, it seems clear to me that the 
same principles apply to ascendants of the child other than his parents.  Article 8 
ECHR indubitably applies to the ties between near relatives, for instance those 
between grandparents and grandchildren, “since such relatives may play a 
considerable part in family life”.353  Accordingly, a refusal to the grandparent-primary 
carer of the right to reside with his Union grandchild in the host Member State will, 
under similar circumstances, be as hard to justify under Article 8(2) ECHR as a 
refusal of the parent-primary carer.  This reinforces the conclusion reached using the 
effet utile argument.354  I would add that the same conclusion applies to adoptive 
parents and stepparents, should they not be considered to be covered normally by the 
notion “direct relatives in the ascending line”.  Above I argued that primary carers 
belonging to one of these categories should be given a residence right in order to 
preserve the effet utile of the free movement provisions.  That conclusion is reinforced 
by the need to interpret the free movement provisions in accordance with Article 8 
ECHR.  Article 8 ECHR no doubt covers relations between an adoptive parent and an 
adoptive child.355  Accordingly, a refusal of residence rights to an adoptive parent 
could constitute an unjustified interference with the right to respect for family life, in 
particular where this parent is the primary carer.  The same is true where such a right 
would be refused to a stepparent, as is neatly demonstrated by the Carpenter 
judgment. 
 
                                                 
350  This positive obligation was recognised by the first time by the ECtHR in ECtHR, Judgment of 
13 June 1979 in Case No. 6833/74 Marckx v Belgium, para. 31. See, more generally, on positive 
obligations flowing from the ECHR: Mowbray The Development of Positive Obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford 
and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004), 239 pp. 
351  See under IV.A.2., supra. 
352  Under some circumstances, however, such refusal will be justified. For instance, in the case of a 
deportation measure taken against a primary carer after criminal conviction in a Member State, 
the Member State’s interest in the prevention of crime could trump that of the right to respect for 
family life. See in this regard: ECtHR, Judgment of 18 October 2006 in Case No. 46410/99 
Üner v. the Netherlands, paras 61-67. 
353  ECtHR, Judgment of 13 June 1979 in Case No. 6833/74 Marckx v Belgium, para. 45. 
354  See under IV.B.2.b.i., supra. 
355  ECtHR, Judgment of 28 October 1998 in Case No. 24484/94 Söderbäck, para. 24. 
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In the second place, it may be argued that other family members than ascendants 
should also be entitled to residence under Article 8 ECHR if they are the primary 
carer of a child so entitled.356  This hypothesis holds that where the primary carer of a 
child is not his or her (grand)parent but rather his or her aunt or brother for instance, 
Article 8 ECHR would, under certain circumstances, require that the latter be entitled 
to residence.  Relations between siblings are covered by Article 8(2) ECHR. 357  
Accordingly, the same principles outlined above for ascendants prima facie apply and 
there would seem to be a good case for extension of the right of residence to siblings 
of a Union citizen who are the primary carer of the latter.358  The same probably 
applies to aunts or uncles who are the primary carer of a Union citizen.359   
 
This extension to other family members is problematic because it would enlarge the 
categories of privileged family members of free movement rights to family members 
of a Union citizen who were not considered to have such rights by the Union 
legislator.  Admittedly, one could point at the fact that Union legislation has in any 
event to be interpreted in accordance with fundamental rights.360  Still an extension to 
categories like siblings, 361  uncles or aunts is difficult to couch in terms of 
interpretation.  Rather than interpreting the categories of privileged family members, 
such would seem to add such categories.  That is difficult to reconcile with the 
constitutional role of the ECJ and would, arguably, unfairly impact on the public 
finances of the Member States and on their competence in the field of immigration, as 
explained above. 
 
                                                 
356  See the suggestion by Van Ooik and Staples, "Het recht op gezinsvorming en gezinshereniging 
volgens het Europese Hof van Justitie. Hoeveel ruimte is er nog voor een restrictief 
immigratiebeleid voor de lidstaten?" (2002) N.T.E.R., 276. 
357  See, e.g., ECtHR, Judgment of 21 October 1997 in Case No. 25404/94 Boujlifa v France, para. 
36; ECtHR, judgment of 13 February 2001 in Case No 47160/99 Ezzouhdi v France, para. 26 
and ECtHR, judgment of 19 February 1998 in Case No 26102/95 Dalia v France, para. 45. See 
also van Dijk, "Protection of 'Integrated' Aliens Against Expulsion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights" (1999) 1 Eur. J. Migration & L., 297-301; Lundström, "Family 
Life and the Freedom of Movement of Workers in the European Union" (1996) 10 Int'l J.L. & 
Pol'y & Fam., 267. 
358  Some authors have gone even further and argued that Article 8 ECHR requires the right of 
residence to be extended to siblings of Union citizens, regardless of whether they are the primary 
carer or not (see Vanvoorden, "Case Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department” (2005) 4 Colum. J. Eur. L., 319, who wonders whether the circumstances which 
gave rise to the Zhu and Chen case, it could be argued that Article 8 ECHR requires that baby 
Catherine’s little brother should also be given leave to reside in the UK). I disagree: since, as I 
have argued above, the element of care is the central consideration in deciding that Article 8 
ECHR has been violated, that Article will not normally have been violated if a sibling who is not 
the primary carer is refused residence. 
359  See ECtHR, Decision of 3 July 2001 in Case No. 47390/99 Javeed v. the Netherlands, in which 
the ECtHR accepted that there was family life within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR between 
the applicant and her minor nieces (however, it declared the application inadmissible for, in the 
circumstances of the case, further elements of dependency involving more than the normal 
emotional ties were lacking).  
360  See in this regard the preamble to Directive 2004/38, which states: “This Directive respects the 
fundamental rights and freedoms and observes the principles recognised in particular by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.” 
361  Higher I have submitted with regard to the effet utile argument that it would be possible to argue, 
under certain circumstances, that siblings fall within the categories of privileged family 
members. The same reasoning can apply in the context of a fundamental rights based argument. 
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All the same, it must be pointed out that it is unlikely that there are many 
circumstances in which Article 8 ECHR would require the conferral of a right of 
residence on a brother, sister, aunt or uncle of a child, even if they are the latter’s 
primary carer.  The prima facie conclusion above that other family members who are 
the primary carer of a Union citizen are afforded the same protection under Article 8 
ECHR should be nuanced.  It would seem to be the case that interferences with the tie 
between a parent and his or her child are harder to justify than interference with the tie 
between a brother and sister for example.362   
 
Thym argues in this connection that recent case law of the ECtHR embraces a narrow 
definition of the notion “family life” as relating only to the “nuclear family” or “core 
family” of spouses and minor children, while treating relations between other family 
members under the notion “private life”.363  The notion of “private life” is wider in 
scope than “family life” and covers a person’s “network of personal, social and 
economic relations”.364  Justifications of interferences with an individual’s private life 
will be assessed differently, taking into account a wider range of factors.  According 
to Thym, the new jurisprudence on private life will entail a more complex balancing 
act, for which the eight Boultif criteria may only be a starting point.365  It probably 
follows from this that the element of “care” should be given less weight amongst the 
different criteria to be taken into account and, hence, that the justification for granting 
a right of residence to other family members who are the primary carer of a Union 
citizen is less strong under Article 8(2) ECHR.  It could be argued, therefore, that the 
recent case law of the ECtHR on Article 8 ECHR marks a convergence with the 
narrow conception of family in recent Union Directives. 366   This convergence is 
probably not a coincidence, as the ECHR appears to increasingly take Union law and 
ECJ case law into account when interpreting the ECHR.367  The bottom-line is that 
                                                 
362  See van Dijk, Van Hoof, van Rijn and Zwaak, Theory and practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006), 694. 
363  Thym, "Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration Cases: a 
Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?" (2008) 57 Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 91 et seq. The author 
refers to ECtHR, judgment of 9 October 2003 (GC) in Case No. 48321/99 Slivenko et al v Latvia 
and ECtHR, judgment of 15 January 2007 (GC) in Case No. 60654/00 Sisojeva et al v Latvia.  
364  ECtHR, judgment of 9 October 2003 (GC) in Case No. 48321/99 Slivenko et al v Latvia, para. 
96. 
365  Thym points out that decisive factors will include the integration into the labour market, 
dependence on social assistance, language skills as an indicator of social integration, criminal 
behaviour, links with the country of origin or their absence and the duration of the stay in the 
host country (Thym, "Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration 
Cases: a Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?" (2008) 57 Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 94). 
366  That is true for Directive 2004/38 (which is the main focus of my analysis), but also for Council 
Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, [2003] O.J. 
L251/12 and Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents, [2004] O.J. L16/44. 
367  For a very clear example of a case in which the ECtHR considers Union free movement law and 
the way it is interpreted by the ECJ at some length: ECtHR, Judgment of 17 January 2006 in 
Case No. 51431/99 Aristimuño Mendizabal v France, paras 73-79. Conversely, the ECJ 
increasingly takes the case law of the ECtHR into account. See, inter alia, the extensive 
references to case law of the ECtHR in ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi 
[2008] E.C.R. I-6351. The end result is a convergence that is to be welcomed. On this 
convergence: see, amongst many others, Harpaz, “The European Court of Justice and its 
relations with the European Court of Human Rights: The quest for enhanced reliance, coherence 
and legitimacy” (2009) 46 C.M.L.Rev., 105-141; Balfour, "The Application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Justice" (2005) Harvard Law School 
Student Scholarship Series, available at http://lsr.nellco.org/; Lebeck, "The European Court of 
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the absence of a right of residence for non-ascendants who are the primary carer of a 
Union citizen will in most circumstances presumably not constitute an unjustified 
interference with Article 8(2) ECHR.   
 
In the third place, the case for allowing non-family members who are the primary 
carer of a child, like his or her foster parents368 or legal guardian,369 to invoke Article 
8 ECHR in order to claim a right to reside in the host Member State with that child is 
also doubtful.  The reason is obvious: it is far from self-evident that the bond between 
non-family members can qualify as family life.  In this regard, it must be pointed out 
that the notion of family life in Article 8 ECHR is an autonomous concept, which 
must be interpreted independently of the national law of the Contracting States.  The 
family life to be considered is not de iure family life, but de facto family life.370  
Accordingly, primary carers not belonging to the legal family of the child are not 
necessarily excluded from the scope of Article 8 ECHR.371   
 
It has long been argued that the relation between foster parents and foster children 
could constitute “family life” for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.372  This point of 
view has been confirmed by the ECtHR in a recent case in which it held that, in the 
circumstances of that case, the relation between a child and his foster parents 
amounted to “family life” in the sense of Article 8 ECHR.373  The same reasoning 
                                                                                                                                            
Human Rights on the Relation Between ECHR and EC-law: the Limits of Constitutionalisation 
of Public International Law" (2007) 62 ZöR, 195-236; Scheek, "The Relationship Between the 
European Courts and Integration through Human Rights" (2005) 65 ZaöRV, 864 et seq.; 
Lawson, "The Impact of the EU Constitution on the Relationship between Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg", in Curtin, Kellerman and Blockmans (eds.), The EU Constitution: The best Way 
Forward? (The Hague, Asser Press, 2005), 377-395; Spielmann, "Human Rights Case Law in 
the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies and Complementaries", in 
Alston, Bustelo and Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 757-780.  
368  Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), (St. Paul, Thomson West, 2009) gives the following definition 
of “foster parent”: “An adult who, though without blood ties or legal ties, cares for and rears a 
child, esp. an orphaned or neglected child who might otherwise be deprived of nurture, usu. 
under the auspices and direction of an agency and for some compensation or benefit. Foster 
parents sometimes give care and support temporarily until a child is legally adopted by others.” 
369  Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), (St. Paul, Thomson West, 2009) gives the following definition 
of “guardian”: “One who has the legal authority and duty to care for another's person or 
property, esp. because of the other's infancy, incapacity, or disability”. The Oxford Dictionary of 
Law (Martin and Law (Eds.), Oxford Dictionary of Law (6 ed.), (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 590 p.) gives the following definition of “guardian”: “One who is formally 
appointed to look after a child’s interests on the death of the child’s parents”. 
370  Settled case law of the ECtHR; see ECtHR, Judgment of 18 December 1986 in Case No. 
9697/82 Johnston and Others v Ireland, cited by van Dijk, Van Hoof, van Rijn and Zwaak, 
Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006), 
690. 
371  See for instance, holding that the bond between a father and his non-recognised biological child 
can amount to family life: ECtHR, Judgment of 1 June 2004 in Case No. 45582/99 Lebbink v 
Netherlands, para. 35. 
372  Wortmann and Duijvendijk-Brand, Compendium van het personen- en familierecht (The Hague, 
Kluwer, 2009), 190; van Dijk, Van Hoof, van Rijn and Zwaak, Theory and practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006), 693. Van Dijk, Van Hoof, 
van Rijn and Zwaak refer to the dissenting opinion of Commission member Schermers, attached 
to the report of the Commission of 14 July 1988, Cecilia and Lisa Eriksson, A.156, p. 56: 
“Normally, there will be family life between foster parents and their children”. 
373  ECtHR, Judgment of 27 April 2010 in Case No. 16318/07 Moretti and Benedetti v Italy. 
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could apply a fortiori to the relation between a child and his legal guardian, 374 
although such has so far never been explicitly confirmed by the ECtHR in its case 
law.  Besides, there is no doubt that, in any event, foster parents and legal guardians 
can come within the scope of “private life” for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.375  
 
In my view, if the said categories should indeed be considered to fall within the scope 
of family life, this could require granting residence rights to them if they are the 
primary carer of a child entitled to reside in the host Member State.  The assessment 
under Article 8 ECHR then becomes parallel to the one with regard to ascendants.  
From a Union law perspective, this outcome could be based on a wide interpretation 
of the notion “ascendants”, as such would arguably be required by Article 8 ECHR.  It 
could be argued in this connection that the ECJ should be prepared to follow the lead 
from the ECtHR and consider the factual ties rather than only the blood or legal ties 
between family members.376  Accordingly, under certain exceptional circumstances, 
Article 8 ECHR would require an even wider interpretation of the notion primary 
carer than is justified under the effet utile argument.  Admittedly, this wide 
interpretation would considerably stretch the meaning of the category ascendants 
beyond the intention of the legislator and thereby have the same problematic 
consequences as outlined above.  However, it must be immediately pointed out that 
the circumstances in which the relation between a child and his or her foster parent of 
legal guardian may qualify for family life under Article 8 ECHR will be rare, as is 
clear from the comparative lack of case law to that effect.  Moreover, it can be 
assumed that there will be more scope for the Member States to justify interferences 
with the relation between children and their legal guardian or foster parent, in 
particular when they are treated under the heading “private life” rather than “family 
life”. 
 
Besides foster parents and legal guardians, there is on other category of non-family 
members that could commonly be the primary carer of a child, namely the unmarried 
partner of one of the parents of a child, even in the absence of a registered partnership.  
Unmarried and non-registered partners do not fall within the scope of privileged 
family members of a Union citizen and cannot therefore be granted a right of 
residence on the basis of the two step-reasoning set out above.  Yet, it is possible that 
they are part of the de facto family of a child.  Under such circumstances, Article 8 
ECHR might require that they be granted a right of residence in the host Member 
State together with the child in question.  The case law of the ECtHR does not provide 
unequivocal guidance on this issue, but it seems to indicate that, under certain 
circumstances, cohabiting unmarried partners are covered by Article 8 ECHR.377  If 
that is accepted, the notion of primary carer might have to be enlarged so as to 
encompass the unmarried partner in order to bring Union law in conformity with 
                                                 
374  Since the tie between a child and his or her legal guardian is much stronger from a legal point of 
view. 
375  See van Dijk, Van Hoof, van Rijn and Zwaak, Theory and practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006), 693 (referring to ECtHR, Judgment of 8 July 
1987 in Case No. 9749/82, W v. the United Kingdom, para. 59 and ECtHR, Judgment of 26 May 
1994 in Case No. 16969/90, Keegan, para. 55). 
376  See in this sense Stalford, "Concepts of Family under EU Law - Lessons from the ECHR" 
(2002) 16 Int'l J.L. & Pol'y & Fam., 410-434. 
377  See, for instance, ECtHR, Judgment of 13 June 1979 in Case No. 6833/74 Marckx v Belgium; 
ECtHR, Judgment of 27 October 1994 in Case 18535/91 Kroon v Netherlands; ECtHR, 
Judgment of 26 May 1994 in Case 16969/90 Keegan v Ireland.  
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Article 8 ECHR. 378   That would, again, have the obvious problem of adding a 
category of beneficiaries of free movement rights against the apparent will of the 
Union legislator, although it has been suggested that a wide interpretation could be 
given to the category of “parents”, which would encompass unmarried partners.379  
Some support for arguing that unmarried partners fall within the scope of Directive 
2004/38 could be derived from its Article 3(2)(b).  In any event, it would seem to be 
the case that, even if the ECJ would be willing to accept that the residence rights of 
unmarried partners who are the primary carer of a child are protected under the right 
to respect for family life, Member States would still enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation to justify restrictions to this right, on account of their powers in the field 
of immigration or family matters.  This margin would in any event seem to be greater 
than with regard to married partners. 380   The same obviously applies where the 
residence rights of the unmarried partner-primary carer are dealt with under the right 
to respect for private life, rather than the right to respect for family life (see the 
discussion, supra). 
 
iii) Conclusion 
 
On the basis of the fore-going it should be clear that mostly three categories of 
persons can invoke a right of residence in their capacity of primary carers, namely 
ascendants of a Union citizen, the spouse of the parent of a Union citizen381 and the 
registered partner of the parent of a Union citizen.  Exceptionally, siblings of a Union 
citizen may also qualify for residence under that status, namely where they entered the 
host Member State as the privileged descendant of the parent of that Union citizen.  
The category of ascendants should be given a wide interpretation and covers adoptive 
parents and stepparents.  In exceptional circumstances, namely where deciding 
otherwise would be in violation of the right to respect for family life, it also covers 
foster parents, legal guardians and, possibly, the unmarried and non-registered partner 
of one of the parents.  Other family members and non-family members are not 
normally entitled, under the present secondary Union legislation, to derive a right of 
residence from their capacity of primary carer since the recognition of such a right is 
difficult to reconcile with the wording and purpose of the present secondary Union 
legislation and the apparent will of the Union legislator.  At the same time, it is 
undisputed that Member States are not precluded from granting residence rights to a 
wider scope of persons under their national laws.  
 
                                                 
378  Toner Partnership Rights, Free Movement and EU Law (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 
2004), 81-82 and 229-231. 
379  Barrett, "Family Matters: European Community law and Third-country Family Members" 
(2003) 40 CML Rev., 391, footnote 81. 
380  See the discussion in Toner Partnership Rights, Free Movement and EU Law (Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004), 229-231 and 253-254. 
381  As was remarked higher, the second category is in fact covered by the first category since the 
spouse of a parent of a Union citizen will normally be either the parent tor the stepparent of that 
Union citizen and thereby fall under the category of ascendants. Besides, the case law discussed 
concerns the primary carer of children who are Union citizens themselves or children of a Union 
citizen who do not necessarily are Union citizens themselves. In this chapter I focus on the first 
category. 
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c) Multiple primary carers 
 
A last question is whether multiple persons could claim a right of residence in their 
capacity as the primary carer of a child entitled to residence in the host Member State.  
One can imagine indeed that a child has more than one person who effectively takes 
care of him.  The question is whether these different persons could all derive a right of 
residence from this fact.   
 
The Court’s case law does not provide much guidance on this point.  In all cases 
discussed higher, the primary carer whose right of residence was at issue was the 
mother of the child.  The Court did not have to pronounce on the right of residence of 
the father in addition to that of the mother.  At the same time, it cannot go unnoticed 
that in Ruiz Zambrano,382 on the facts of the case, both the right of residence of the 
father and the mother were at stake, 383  although the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling and the judgment of the ECJ were concerned only with the rights 
of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano and not with those of his spouse.384  As I explained higher, the 
Court ruled favourably on the possibility for the children of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano to 
invoke a right of residence in Belgium and on that of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano to invoke a 
derivative right of residence as their primary carer.385  The question remains how that 
will affect the right of residence of Mrs. Ruiz Zambrano in Belgium.386  While it 
seems rather evident that she must also be given a right of residence in Belgium,387 
the more difficult question is from what Union legal basis388 she could derive this 
right of residence.  She could certainly not invoke a right of residence as a dependent 
ascendant of her children, since she is most definitely not financially dependent on 
them.  Besides, she could not invoke a right of residence as the spouse of a Union 
citizen, since Mr. Ruiz Zambrano is a third country national.  Possibly, she could be 
entitled to residence as the spouse of a third country national legally resident in 
Belgium under Directive 2003/86.389  The problem with that possibility, however, is 
that Mr. Ruiz Zambrano does not derive his right of residence from having “lawfully 
resided” in Belgium in accordance with the terms of that Directive, but only enjoys a 
derivative right as father of Union citizens.390  Another evident option would be that 
                                                 
382  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr. 
383  It is clear from the facts of the case that both Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz Zambrano applied for a 
residence permit in Belgium (see ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 
21-22). 
384  The reason for this is most likely that the dispute before the national court (the Tribunal du 
travail de Bruxelles) in fact concerned the rejection by the Belgian authorities of Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano’s claim for unemployment benefits. The more fundamental question the ECJ had to 
decide is whether the impact of this decision and the ensuing consequences for the rights 
enjoyed by his children in their capacity as Union citizens were in accordance with Union law. 
385  As pointed out above, the Court did not explicitly use the term “primary carer”, although it did 
confirm its reasoning in Zhu and Chen. Instead it used the term “third country national with 
dependent minor children” (ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 43). 
386  See van der Mei, van den Bogaert and de Groot, "De arresten Ruiz Zambrano en McCarthy - Het 
Hof van Justitie en het effectieve genot van EU-burgerschapsrechten", (2011) N.T.E.R., 194. 
387  The Court may implicitly have confirmed this, stating that “if a work permit were not granted to 
such a person, he would risk not having sufficient resources to provide for himself and his 
family” (ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para. 44 (emphasis added)). 
388  I leave Belgian national law aside for the purposes of my analysis.  
389  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, [2003] 
O.J. L251/12. 
390  It is not clear whether the residence permit that will be given to Mr. Ruiz Zambrano subsequent 
to the judgment of the Court can qualify for “lawful residence” under Directive 2003/86. In any 
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Mrs. Ruiz Zambrano derives her right of residence from the fact that her minor 
children are dependent on her, similar to what is the case for her husband.  Accepting 
that option, however, necessarily means accepting the possibility that multiple 
primary carers can invoke a right of residence.  I will now consider this possibility in 
more detail, starting from the Court’s two lines of reasoning set out above. 
 
On the one hand, the Court’s effet utile argument is essentially based on the premise 
that children cannot exercise their rights independently, in the absence of their 
primary carer.  Put differently, young children can only reside in the host Member 
State and go to school there if the person who effectively takes care of them is entitled 
to reside with them in that State.  Prima facie it can be assumed that more than one 
person effectively takes care of certain children.  It is not controversial to state that in 
many families, both parents will to some extent take care of their children, who will 
often need both of their parents to be around.  Of course, in such a case it would need 
to be established that both parents are actually needed by their children in order to 
exercise their rights.  Such could be the case, for instance, where one of the parents 
works during the daytime, while the other parent takes care of the children, whereas 
both care for them in the evenings and weekends.391  That scenario would certainly 
seem more plausible in the case of young minors than in the case of older children.  In 
the scenario described, there would be two primary carers or, as has been suggested, a 
distinction could be made between the “primary carer” and the “secondary carer”.392  
I prefer not to make such a distinction, since it may convey the impression that the 
“secondary carer” is less deserving of residence rights in the host Member State.  A 
person who effectively takes care of children and is needed by the latter in order for 
them to exercise their rights should therefore preferably be labelled a “primary carer”. 
 
On the other hand, there is the argument based on fundamental rights, the right to 
respect for family life in particular.  As has been explained higher, the Court has held 
that: 
 
“the removal of a person from the country where close members of his family are living 
may amount to an infringement of the right to respect for family life as guaranteed by 
Article 8 of the ECHR, which is among the fundamental rights, which, according to the 
Court's settled case-law, are protected in [Union] law.”393 
 
This is highly relevant in the situation I am concerned with here, namely a situation in 
which two parents effectively take care of their children.  If one of the parents would 
be recognised as the primary carer of children and be entitled to reside with them in 
the host Member State, but not the other parent, the core family would be forced to 
separate.  It would seem to be the case that such interference with the right to 
protection for family life will be hard to justify. 394  This is an additional strong 
                                                                                                                                            
event, it appears that in the past Mr. Ruiz Zambrano only enjoyed a provisional residence permit 
(see ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr, para.32). This does not qualify for 
lawful residence, as is explicitly stated by Article 3(2)(b) of the Directive.   
391  This factual situation comes close to that of the Carpenter case, although in that case the father 
was not considered to be a primary carer. 
392  Starup and Elsmore, "Taking a Logical Step Forward? Comment on Ibrahim and Teixeira" 
(2010) 35 E.L. Rev., 584. 
393  ECJ, Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] E.C.R. I-5257, 
para. 98. 
394  I refer to the discussion under IV.A.2, supra. 
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argument for recognising the possibility of multiple primary carers deriving a right of 
residence from Union free movement law. 
 
An interesting question arises in the case of parents who both claim to be the primary 
carer of their child where at least one of them is a Union citizen.  One could wonder 
whether, when the latter parent is entitled to reside in the host Member State in his or 
her capacity of primary carer, the other parent could claim a right of residence as his 
or her spouse or registered partner.  In principle, such would not seem to be possible if 
the parent-primary carer would not reside in compliance with the conditions of 
Directive 2004/38 and thus the conditions for residence by privileged family members 
would not be met.395  Yet, it has been remarked that the primary carer is apparently 
entitled to rely on other provisions of Directive 2004/38, Article 24 of the Directive in 
particular.396  This is arguably demonstrated by the Ibrahim case: Ms. Ibrahim was 
entitled to rely on the right to equal treatment with regard to housing benefits, despite 
the fact that she was not “residing on the basis of this Directive”, as required by 
Article 24.  Yet, the possibility for her to rely on the principle of equal treatment can 
be defended by pointing out that without this possibility her right of residence and that 
of her children would be rendered meaningless.397  Moreover, the Court has held that 
the possibility to rely on the general right to equal treatment, now laid down in Article 
18 TEU, is not necessarily subject to the conditions of Directive 2004/38 being 
satisfied.398  Similar arguments do not apply in favour of applying the provisions of 
Directive 2004/38 relating to the residence rights of family members to primary carers 
who do not reside in the host Member State in accordance with the provisions of the 
Directive.  Moreover, applying those provisions would unjustifiably impose financial 
burdens on the Member States.  I would conclude therefore that, where the conditions 
of Directive 204/38 are not satisfied, the parents of a child who is entitled to residence 
in the host Member State will only be so entitled where they both qualify as his or her 
primary carer.399  This would, arguably, only be different if a refusal of a right of 
                                                 
395  Of course, if the parent-primary carer resided in compliance with the provisions of Directive 
2004/38, he or she would, under the conditions of that Directive, be entitled to be joined or 
accompanied by his or her spouse or registered partner. In such a case, however, the primary 
carer would have an independent right of residence as a Union citizen and there would 
presumably be no need to rely on his status of primary carer. That situation is not the situation I 
am concerned with here.   
396  Schrauwen, "Zelfstandig verblijfsrecht van schoolgaande kinderen van werknemers en hun 
verzorgers: ontbreken van bestaansmiddelen niet relevant" (2010) N.T.E.R., 236-237. Another 
interesting discussion is whether the primary carer can rely on Article 16 of Directive 2004/38 in 
order to derive a right of permanent residence after five years of residence in the host Member 
State in his or her capacity of primary carer or whether residence in that capacity does not 
qualify for that provision. I refer to the discussion in O’Brien (n. 307 , supra, at 221-223). The 
Court has never explicitly stated on this question, but it would appear from the case law that 
only residence in compliance with the conditions laid down in secondary law will qualify under 
Article 16 of the Directive (see notably ECJ, Case C-325/09 Dias [2011] E.C.R. nyr.; see also 
the more detailed Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-325/09 Dias [2011] E.C.R. nyr, paras 84-
92 in particular). 
397  Ms. Ibrahim had no own income and could not cover the living costs of herself and her children 
without social assistance. 
398  See ECJ, Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-7573 and the case note by Van Ooik and 
Schrauwen in (2005) SEW, 42-46. 
399  O’Brien similarly concludes that the primary carer’s spouse cannot derive a right of residence as 
the family member which is not subject to the conditions of Directive 2004/38. She seems to 
reject, however, the possibility that multiple primary carers may be entitled to residence in the 
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residence to a parent who was not the primary carer would be in violation of Article 8 
ECHR. 
 
C. Implementation by the UK 
 
In this section I will look into the consequences for the national immigration laws of 
the Member States.  More precisely, I will analyse what impact the judgments 
discussed above have had on the drafting of the UK immigration rules.  I focus on the 
UK because the contentious decisions in all cases discussed took place in the UK.  For 
this purpose, I will study how the UK legislator has taken this case law into account 
and to what extent it has adapted the UK immigration rules accordingly.  This study 
may provide me with a tentative answer to some of the questions raised higher.  
Moreover, it will provide me with insight into the extent to which the provisions on 
Union citizenship, through the case law of the Court, can have a real impact on the 
policies of the Member States and bring them to change their rules so as to guarantee 
the effet utile of the rights enjoyed by Union citizens.  In this connection, it should 
also be possible to draw some conclusions as to whether the current case law, given 
the uncertainties pointed out higher, provides a workable basis for implementation by 
the Member States authorities. 
 
As is clear from a recent Commission report, the implementation of Directive 2004/38 
is no sinecure.  According to the report, no single Member State had, by the time of its 
drafting, fully and correctly implemented the Directive. 400   It can be expected, 
therefore, that the said case law, which appears to bring certain nuanced exceptions to 
the Directive, will not be fully and accurately reflected in the relevant UK provisions.  
As will become clear in the following, the UK legislator seems to have fully grappled 
with the consequences of the Zhu and Chen case, by adapting the UK immigration 
rules to that judgment.  The more recent Ibrahim and Teixeira cases, by contrast, 
appear not yet to have been taken into account by the UK legislator.  The resulting 
picture is rather troublesome as it remains unclear to what extent these cases will have 
an impact on UK immigration law.  
 
1. Implications of Zhu and Chen 
 
It will be remembered that Zhu and Chen involved a refusal to grant leave to reside to 
Mrs. Chen under the UK immigration rules and that the ECJ judged such refusal to be 
in violation of Union free movement law.  Not surprisingly, the UK immigration rules 
have undergone important changes after the judgment was rendered.  Specific sections 
were inserted that deal with the right of “leave to enter or remain as the primary carer 
or relative of an EEA national self-sufficient child”.  New Paragraphs 257C-257E of 
the Immigration Rules, which entered into force on 1 January 2005,401 state: 
                                                                                                                                            
host Member State in that capacity, noting that Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 will mostly 
benefit “lone parents” and their children (n. 307 , supra, at 213).  
400  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2008) 840 final. 
401  See the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules –HC164 December 2004, available at 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/statementsofchanges/.  
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Requirements for leave to enter or remain as the primary carer or relative of an 
EEA national self-sufficient child 
257C. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain as the 
primary carer or relative of an EEA national self-sufficient child are that the applicant: 
(i) is:  
(a) the primary carer; or  
(b) the parent; or  
(c) the sibling,  
of an EEA national under the age of 18 who has a right of residence in the United 
Kingdom under the 2006 EEA Regulations as a self-sufficient person; and  
(ii) is living with the EEA national or is seeking entry to the United Kingdom in order 
to live with the EEA national; and  
(iii) in the case of a sibling of the EEA national:  
(a) is under the age of 18 or has current leave to enter or remain in this capacity; 
and  
(b) is unmarried and is not a civil partner, has not formed an independent family 
unit and is not leading an independent life; and  
(iv) can, and will, be maintained and accommodated without taking employment or 
having recourse to public funds; and  
(v) if seeking leave to enter, holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry 
in this capacity.  
In this paragraph, "sibling", includes a half-brother or half-sister and a stepbrother or 
stepsister. 
 
Leave to enter or remain as the primary carer or relative of an EEA national self-
sufficient child 
257D. Leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the primary carer or relative of 
an EEA national self-sufficient child may be granted for a period not exceeding five years 
or the remaining period of validity of any residence permit held by the EEA national 
under the 2006 EEA Regulations, whichever is the shorter, provided that, in the case of an 
application for leave to enter, the applicant is able to produce to the Immigration Officer, 
on arrival a valid entry clearance for entry in this capacity or, in the case of an application 
for leave to remain, the applicant is able to satisfy the Secretary of State that each of the 
requirements of paragraph 257C (i) to (iv) is met. Leave to enter or remain is to be subject 
to a condition prohibiting employment and recourse to public funds. 
 
Refusal of leave to enter or remain as the primary carer or relative of an EEA 
national self-sufficient child 
257E. Leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the primary carer or relative of 
an EEA national self-sufficient child is to be refused if, in the case of an application for 
leave to enter, the applicant is unable to produce to the Immigration Officer on arrival a 
valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity or, in the case of an 
application for leave to remain, if the applicant is unable to satisfy the Secretary of State 
that each of the requirements of paragraph 257C (i) to (iv) is met. 
 
It is clear from these paragraphs that the UK legislator endeavoured to incorporate the 
Zhu and Chen judgment in the UK Immigration Rules.402  I will not discuss the above 
paragraphs in detail, but will instead concentrate on a number of issues which relate to 
                                                 
402  Not surprisingly, the UK Border Agency “European Casework Instructions ~Free Movement of 
Persons Directive (2004/38/EC)” refer to Paragraph 257C of the Immigration Rules under the 
heading “2.5.2. Family Members of EEA Minor Children (Chen)” (available at 
http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/ecis/). 
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the discussion above.  There are a number of interesting points to make.  First, prima 
facie it would seem that the UK legislator considers that not only family members can 
derive a right of residence from their capacity of “primary carer”.  Indeed, the 
headings of paragraphs 257C-257E refer to “the primary carer or relative”, which 
seems to imply that the primary carer in this context is necessarily not a relative of the 
child.  However, a more correct interpretation is probably that “relative” refers to the 
parent or the sibling of the child (categories “b)” and “c)” in paragraph 257C), 
whereas “primary carer” covers other close family members.  That interpretation is 
confirmed by the European Casework Instructions of the UK Border Agency, which 
deal with paragraph 257C under the heading “Family Members of EEA national 
Minor Children (Chen)”.  In this context the instructions state that “Paragraph 257C 
of the Immigration Rules allows for non-EEA parents and other close relatives of self 
sufficient EEA children to be granted leave to enter or remain in the UK” (italics 
added). 403   This interpretation is more consistent with my interpretation outlined 
above since it does not exclude grandparents, great-grandparents etc.  At the same 
time, it is clear that, in any event, the definition of “primary carer” is not limited to 
ascendants.  Aunts or uncles for example could also be considered as close relatives 
and thus qualify as primary carer.  Siblings, on the other hand, will not normally 
qualify as primary carer.  They are in principle404 entitled to residence only if they 
fulfil the conditions of “iii)”, which means inter alia that they must be under eighteen.  
Parents, by contrast, seem to qualify if they fulfil the conditions of paragraph 257C, 
regardless of whether they are the primary carer of their child.  It should be clear from 
this, and from the discussion above, that in my view the UK legislator has given a 
broader definition of the notion “primary carer” than was required under Union law. 
 
Second, while the ECJ in Zhu and Chen referred to the “primary carer of a young 
minor”,405 the UK legislator simply requires the child to be under the age of eighteen.  
In other words, it has not limited the category of minors in any way to a subcategory 
of “young minors”.  On the one hand, this may be more far-reaching than is required 
under Union law.  Indeed, as I have explained above, the ECJ’s holding in Zhu and 
Chen referred to a “young minor” and there are convincing reasons to argue that the 
justifications for granting a right of residence to the primary carer will not apply – 
depending on the circumstances of the case – in the case of older children.  Older 
children can, in certain circumstances, reside independently and without a need for a 
                                                 
403  Further confirmation of this interpretation is provided by the entry clearance website of the UK 
Border Agency (available at http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/ecg/), under EUN 5.5 which 
suggests the following “refusal wording”: “Not the primary carer or relative of EEA national 
child: ‘... but I am not satisfied that you are the primary carer, the parent of the sibling of an 
EEA national under the age of 18 who has a right of residence in the United Kingdom under the 
2006 EEA Regulations as a self-sufficient person’". 
404  The structure of paragraph 257C seems to indicate that siblings can only qualify if they satisfy 
the additional conditions of “iii)”. Nevertheless, under a strict reading of that provision, it cannot 
be excluded, that a sibling who does not satisfy those conditions could still qualify for residence 
under the category “primary carer”.  
405  See, inter alia, the dictum of the ECJ in Zhu and Chen: “In circumstances like those of the main 
proceedings, [Article 21 TFEU] and Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right 
of residence confer on a young minor who is a national of a Member State, is covered by 
appropriate sickness insurance and is in the care of a parent who is a third-country national 
having sufficient resources for that minor not to become a burden on the public finances of the 
host Member State, a right to reside for an indefinite period in that State. In such circumstances, 
those same provisions allow a parent who is that minor’s primary carer to reside with the child 
in the host Member State.” 
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primary carer to look after them.  On the other hand, it appears that the UK legislator, 
with regard to school-going children, has been too restrictive.  Indeed, it clearly 
results from Ibrahim and Teixeira that the residence rights for school-going children 
and their primary carer do not necessarily end when the former attain the age of 
majority. I will come back to this point in more detail below. 
 
Lastly, the immigration rules do not confer a fully-fledged right of residence on the 
primary carer.  Both condition “iv” of paragraph 257C and the last sentence of 
paragraph 257D deny the primary carer the right to take up employment in the UK.  
This contrasts with the rights of what I have called privileged family members, who, 
under Article 23 of Directive 2004/38, are entitled to take up employment or self-
employment in the host Member State.  The UK Border Agency European Casework 
Instructions state in this regard (at paragraph 2.5.2.): 
 
“The ECJ case of CHEN ruled that an EEA national child who holds sickness insurance 
would have a right to reside in the UK with his/her non-EEA national parents provided 
there were sufficient resources to ensure that the child did not become a burden on public 
funds […].  
This ruling did not say that the EEA national child's parent would have a right to reside as 
a ‘family member’ as defined in [EU] law because the parent will not be financially 
dependent on a child. The parent is entitled to reside in a Member State with his or her 
child solely to facilitate the child to exercise his or her Treaty rights. The ruling did not 
give non-EEA national parents the right to work.”406  
 
Consequently, the UK authorities seem to take the view that the primary carer is only 
entitled to reside in the host Member State in order to make it possible for the child to 
reside there.  He or she does not have the right to take up employment, nor to have 
recourse to public funds.407  The underlying reasoning seems to be based on the fact 
that the primary carer is only entitled to reside with a child who is self-sufficient (the 
condition required by Union secondary law in the case of non-economically active 
Union citizens).  This is taken to mean that the child should draw on resources that do 
not derive from the host Member State. 408  Otherwise a circular reasoning could 
ensue409: the child would be entitled to reside in the host Member State if his or her 
primary carer was employed there (and hence could provide the necessary financial 
resources in order for the child to be self-sufficient), and the latter would derive his 
entitlement to take up employment from the fact that he or she was residing with a 
self-sufficient child.  The bottom-line is that child’s financial resources may not 
derive from the employment of his or her primary carer in the host Member State or 
from the latter’s recourse to the social assistance system of the host Member State.   
 
It can be wondered, however, whether this interpretation of the Zhu and Chen 
judgment is in accordance with Union law.  The judgment itself does not explicitly 
                                                 
406  See, similarly, the entry clearance website of the UK Border Agency (available at 
http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/ecg/), under EUN 5.2. 
407  See paragraph 257D of the Immigration Rules. 
408  Clayton, Textbook on immigration and asylum law (3rd ed.), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008), 190-191 and the case-law referred to. 
409  Clayton, Textbook on immigration and asylum law (3rd ed.), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008), 191; Hofstotter, "A Cascade of Rights, or Who Shall Care For Little Catherine? Some 
Reflections on the Chen Case" (2005) 30 E.L. Rev., 555.  
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consider the right for the primary carer to work in the host Member State.410  The 
question did not arise, probably because the Chens had sufficient income from their 
family business based in China.411  Still, it is clear from the facts stated by the Court 
that it was Mrs. Chen’s employment that provided for the needs of both herself and 
baby Catherine.412  Two observations may provide an answer to this question.  On the 
one hand, it is certainly legitimate for the UK legislator to tend to avoid a situation in 
which the primary carer and the child become a financial burden on its social 
assistance system.  That is in line with the purpose of Directive 2004/38.  Accordingly, 
it may refuse leave to remain to a primary carer where the latter has no income and is 
likely to have recourse to public funds.  On the other hand, this purpose does not in all 
circumstances justify a refusal for the primary carer to take up work.  In a situation 
where the primary carer has a genuine job offer, or where he or she is lawfully 
employed in the host Member State, there is no real risk of a financial burden on the 
social assistance system.  Still, in the UK, under such circumstances, the primary 
carer and the child he or she accompanies have no right of residence.413   
 
It follows, in my view, that the complete prohibition for the primary carer to take up 
employment is a disproportionate interference with the free movement rights enjoyed 
by minor Union citizens.  This view seems to be confirmed to some extent by the Ruiz 
Zambrano judgment.414  Moreover, the prohibition goes directly against an important 
rationale of Union free movement law, which is to promote the integration of family 
members in the host Member State in order to give full effect to the free movement 
provisions.  It is preferable, as I have argued above, to accord the primary carer the 
same residence rights as the privileged family members.  Such would be in 
accordance with my view that granting a residence right to the primary ultimately 
rests on a (broad interpretation) of the category of ascendants, a category of privileged 
family members.415  It must be remarked that the prohibition is, when applied strictly, 
in any event not in accordance with the Court’s judgment in Ibrahim and Teixeira.  In 
those cases the Court affirmed that the classic residence conditions did not apply to 
the independent residence rights enjoyed by school-going children of a (former) 
migrant worker and their primary carer.  Accordingly, the fact that the primary carer 
relied on the social assistance system of the host Member State for her income did not 
in itself take away their entitlement to residence. 
 
                                                 
410  Interesting to remark is that Article 8 ECHR does not guarantee either to the persons concerned 
the right to a particular type of residence permit (see ECtHR, Judgment of 17 January 2006 in 
Case No. 51431/99 Aristimuño Mendizabal v France, para. 66). 
411  Clayton, Textbook on immigration and asylum law (3rd ed.), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008), 190. 
412  ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, para. 13. 
413  See ER and others (Ireland) [2006] UKAIT 00096. 
414  ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. nyr. See the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, 
supra. In that case the Court applied a reasoning similar to the one followed in Zhu and Chen to 
the situation of static young Union citizens and their father. The Court explicitly held that a 
refusal of a work permit to the father would infringe Union law because it would deprive him of 
the possibility to generate a sufficient income for himself and his family. It would seem to 
follow that a Member State may not forbid a primary carer to take up paid employment.  
415  The corollary of this view is a rather narrow interpretation of the “primary carer” concept, which 
does not normally cover non-family members, for instance. See the discussion under IV.B., 
supra. 
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In conclusion, the UK’s implementation of the primary carer concept is rather 
doubtful.416  This is all the more the case after the recent judgments in Ibrahim and 
Teixeira, as will become clear in the following. 
 
2. Implications of Ibrahim and Teixeira 
 
The recent Ibrahim and Teixeira judgments have not (yet) led to any change in the 
general UK immigration rules or in the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations 2006.417  As a consequence, the rights enjoyed by primary carers in the 
UK can no longer fully be determined on the basis of UK immigration rules, since the 
existing rules are, as was noted above, incompatible with Ibrahim and Teixeira on a 
number of points.  Such is not unlike Directive 2004/38, which does not lay down 
residence rights for the primary carer either.418  However, it would be in the interest 
of legal certainty and transparency that the residence rights for primary carers would 
be explicitly and clearly laid down in national legislation of the Member States, which 
are the primary responsible for applying Union free movement law and for pursuing a 
coherent immigration policy.   
 
Interestingly, the UK legislator did change the national immigration provisions in the 
aftermath of the Baumbast and R case in order to bring them in line with that 
judgment.  The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 
2003 amended the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000, by 
adding two categories of privileged family members.  It added the following 
paragraphs to Regulation 6 of the latter Regulations, which - employing a rather 
strange formulation - determined the persons who are privileged family members of 
another person: 
 
“(2A) If the other person has divorced his spouse, the person is his divorced spouse 
provided she is the primary carer of their dependent child who is under 19 and attending 
an educational course in the United Kingdom. 
(2B) If the other person has ceased to be a qualified person on ceasing to reside in the 
United Kingdom, the persons are— 
(a)his spouse or his divorced spouse, provided she is the primary carer of their dependent 
child who is under 19 and attending an educational course in the United Kingdom; and 
(b)descendants of his or of his spouse who are under 21 or are their dependants, provided 
that they— 
(i)are attending an educational course in the United Kingdom; 
(ii)resided with him in the United Kingdom when he was a qualified person; and 
(iii)are not able to attend an equivalent educational course outside the United 
Kingdom” 
 
                                                 
416  See Fernandes, "The ‘Chen’ Cases (Case Comment)” (2007) 21 J.I.A.N.L., 246, who argues that 
excluding the class of persons mentioned in paragraph 257C from the 2006 Regulations is 
incompatible with Directive 2004/38. 
417  One could take the view that this is not surprising. It could be argued that the judgments were in 
the first place concerned with access to housing benefits and that they stand for the holding that 
even persons who do not qualify for residence under UK immigration rules could still be 
entitled, under certain circumstances, to claim social benefits. Still, it cannot realistically be 
disputed that the judgments were concerned with the residence rights enjoyed under Union law 
by primary carers of school-going children.   
418  Except, arguably, in its Article 12. 
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These paragraphs exemplify the UK legislator’s interpretation of the Baumbast and R 
judgment and provide a possible answer to some of the questions stated higher.  
However, the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000 were 
repealed by the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, which 
implement Directive 2004/38 for the UK.  The new Regulations no longer confer 
rights on the primary carer of children, presumably because the UK legislator was of 
the opinion that Directive 2004/38, which does not mention the primary carer either, 
exhaustively codified the residence rights enjoyed by family members of Union 
citizens.  Since the provisions above are no longer in force, I will not further analyse 
them here.  They would in any event have needed to be amended by new legislation in 
order to implement the Ibrahim and Teixeira judgments.  No such legislation is in 
force at present, as was remarked higher.  
 
It is more illuminating to look at recent documents issued by the UK Department for 
Work and Pensions to clarify the consequences of the Ibrahim and Teixeira 
judgments, namely a circular419 and a memo420 entitled “Right to Reside – Parent and 
Primary Carer of a Child in Education”.  These documents were issued to grant 
clarification to the UK authorities competent for granting social benefits such as the 
one at issue in the Ibrahim and Teixeira cases.  Put differently, they are primarily 
concerned with the application of UK rules relating to certain social benefits, rather 
than with the residence rights of primary carers under Union law.  Nevertheless, they 
necessarily clarify the latter issue since the eligibility for these benefits in the UK 
depends on it.  
 
The said documents contain a number of criteria determining the scope of the right of 
residence enjoyed by school-going children and their primary carer.  It is stated that a 
claimant will have a right of residence under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 if: 
 
1. the claimant is the parent (or step parent) and primary carer of a child and  
2. the claimant or the child’s other parent is a citizen of another EEA State or 
Switzerland […] and  
3. that person is working or has worked as an employed person in the UK […] and  
4. there is a common period where that child was in general education in the UK whilst 
the migrant worker also lived in and was employed in the UK
 
 […] and  
5. that child is still in general education in the UK and is under 18 […]  
 
A number of interesting points ensue.  First of all, according to the criteria, only the 
parent or stepparent of a child can be entitled to residence as the primary carer of that 
child.  Second, only the primary carers of children of employed Union citizens 
qualify, to the exclusion of carers of children of self-employed or non-economically 
active Union citizens.421  Third, it would seem that only one person can qualify as a 
primary carer under the criteria set out.  Fourth, the fourth criterion indicates that a 
certain period of schooling of the child concerned must take place while the parent of 
the child is working.422  Lastly, in order to qualify for the right of residence, the child 
concerned must be under eighteen years old. 
                                                 
419  Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit Circular HB/CTB A10/2010 of May 2010, available 
at www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/a10-2010.pdf.  
420  Memo DMG 30/10 revised of December 2010 “Right to Reside – Parent and Primary Carer of a 
Child in Education”, available at http://dwp.gov.uk/docs/m-30-10.pdf.  
421  This is made explicit in para. 9 of Memo DMG 30/10 revised. 
422  See also para. 12 of Memo DMG 30/10 revised. 
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As will be clear from my analysis above, the UK Department for Work and Pensions 
takes a rather literal and rather restrictive interpretation of the Ibrahim and Teixeira 
judgments.  I may be wondered whether that department has not overly focused on the 
specific situation at hand in these cases, thereby overlooking the Court’s ratio 
decidendi.  This restrictive interpretation is, in my view, not easy to reconcile with the 
underlying justifications for the Court’s holdings on a number of points.  As I have 
explained higher, there are good arguments to make for not limiting the said case law 
to children of employed Union citizens and for accepting that residence rights can be 
enjoyed by multiple primary carers.  I have also defended the view that the notion 
primary carer should not be given a restrictive interpretation and cannot be limited to 
parents or stepparents.  In this connection, it can certainly not go unnoticed that the 
UK immigration rules, as modified after the Zhu and Chen case, contain a wider 
notion of “primary carer”.  The relation between the UK immigration rules and the 
department documents just discussed seems therefore ambiguous at best.  I will come 
back to this point below. 
 
The fifth criterion states that the child must be under eighteen at the moment of the 
claim for residence, although it is stated that the right of residence for the primary 
carer can, exceptionally, continue beyond the age of eighteen if the child continues to 
need the presence and care of that person in order to be able to complete his or her 
education.423  This can probably be reconciled with a literal reading of the Teixeira 
judgment, in which the Court also stated that the right of residence does not 
necessarily end when the child attains the age of majority, which implies that the right 
of residence was obtained before that age was attained.424  Still, it can be wondered 
whether Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 cannot also be relied upon by children of a 
Union citizen who have already attained the age of majority (contrary to the fifth 
criterion above).  Such would appear to accord better with the underlying 
justifications for the Court’s decision425 and with the Court’s holding that Article 12 
of Regulation 1612/68 must be given a broad interpretation.426 
 
The fourth criterion set out above seems not fully in line with the Ibrahim and 
Teixeira judgments, for two reasons.  In the first place, it seems to limit the enjoyment 
of a right of residence to the primary carer of children who have pursued education in 
the host Member State for a certain period of time.427  No such durational requirement 
can be derived from the wording of the judgments in Ibrahim or Teixeira and the need 
for a certain period of schooling in order to derive rights from Article 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68 was explicitly rejected by AG Mazák.428  Still, as I have argued 
above, a durational requirement could be defended in cases where the Union citizen 
                                                 
423  See para. 13 of Memo DMG 30/10 revised. 
424  ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-1107, paras 86-87. 
425  More in particular, with the need to preserve the effet utile of the free movement provisions. 
Once it is accepted that children above the age of majority need their primary carer in order to 
exercise their right to access to education, it seems logical that children who, under such 
conditions, begin their education in the host Member State after having attained the age of 
majority, must be allowed to be joined by their primary carer. Holding differently would 
prejudice the effet utile of the rights of these children.  
426  ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] E.C.R. I-7091, para. 74. 
427  The precise duration required does not appear from the criteria and will have to be determined 
by the UK authorities implementing them. 
428  Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] E.C.R. I-1065, para. 33. 
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concerned remains in the host Member State without satisfying the residence 
conditions of Directive 2004/38 and where the primary carer and the school-going 
children depend for their subsistence on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State.429  In the second place, the fourth criterion requires that the Union 
citizen is, for a certain period of time, employed while his child pursues education.430  
The Court in Teixeira explicitly rejected the view that such was required, holding that 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 confers a right of residence also on school-going 
children of former migrant worker and stating that “it is enough that the child who is 
in education in the host Member State became installed there when one of his or her 
parents was exercising rights of residence there as a migrant worker”.431  The fourth 
criterion set out above seems, therefore, to be in violation of Union law.   
 
In sum, the interpretation by the UK Department for Work and Pensions of the 
Court’s recent case law on the residence rights for primary carers of school-going 
children is conservative at best and more probably at variance with the Court’s case 
law on some points.  Future case law of the Union Courts or documents from the 
Union institutions will need to clarify a number of questions set out above, but it is 
highly likely that the information stated in the documents discussed will need to be 
changed in order to bring it in accordance with Union law.   
 
Besides, it remains at the moment unclear what the relation is between these 
documents and the provisions on the residence rights of primary carers contained in 
paragraphs 257C-257E.  So far the UK authorities appear to treat Zhu and Chen like 
situations completely separate from the situations exposed in the Baumbast and R 
lines of cases.  The problem is that paragraphs 257C-257E are broad in wording and 
seem to capture both types of situations.  Applied to a situation where the residence 
right of the primary carer of a school-going child of a (former) migrant worker in the 
host Member State is at stake, these paragraphs seem in conflict with the Court’s 
recent case law in that they make the right of residence of the primary carer subject to 
the classic residence conditions of Directive 2004/38, in that they preclude the 
primary carer from taking up employment in the host Member State and in that they 
limit the right of residence to primary carers of children under eighteen.  However, as 
I have argued above, it is possible for Member States to provide for more generous 
residence rights specifically for school-going children and their primary carer.  
Accordingly, it would be possible to have a “special regime” for school-going 
children, which is more generous.  Still then, the current legislative provisions in the 
UK do not themselves make any provision for such more favourable treatment.  This 
is apt to lead to confusion and is detrimental to legal certainty.  Besides, as I have 
remarked higher, the residence right accorded tot the primary carer of school-going 
children in the UK seems at present more narrow than that accorded to the primary 
carer of non school-going children in one respect, namely that the former is only 
enjoyed by parents and stepparents.   
 
It can be concluded that the present situation in the UK is problematic in that no clear 
and unambiguous legislative provisions are in place relating to the residence rights 
                                                 
429  See the discussion , under IV.B.2.a., supra. 
430  Memo DMG 30/10 revised refers, in support of this criterion, to a recent decision of 
Commissioner Judge Jacobs: S of S for W & P v JS (IS) [2010] UKUT 347 (AAC). 
431  ECJ, Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] E.C.R. I-1107, paras 72-74. 
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enjoyed by primary carers and that the provisions and criteria in place seem to be in 
conflict with Union law on a number of points. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
The foregoing discussion showed how the ECJ has, in a number of fairly recent cases, 
recognised a right of residence for the parent who is the primary carer of his or her 
EU children,432 despite the fact that the condition of dependency was not fulfilled.  
Accordingly, the ECJ, in the circumstances of these cases has created a new category 
of privileged ascendants, namely one that is in a relation of “care” with the primary 
beneficiary of the free movement rights, rather than in a relation of dependency, as is 
required by secondary Union legislation.  As I have explained, this holding can be 
based on two justifications, namely the need to preserve the effet utile of the free 
movement provisions, on the one hand, and the need to interpret the free movement 
provisions in accordance with fundamental rights, on the other hand.  These 
considerations justify an extension to the primary carer of a right of residence in the 
host Member State which is a derivative right of the right of residence enjoyed by his 
or her children.  
 
At the same time, it must be remarked that the precise scope of this case law remains 
at present rather difficult to determine.  It is not clear exactly what categories of 
children must be considered entitled to be joined by their primary carer in the host 
Member State and what the (family) relationship must be between the primary carer 
and the children concerned in order to be covered by the principles underlying the 
case law discussed.  As far as children are concerned, I have argued that children of 
all categories of Union citizens should qualify, regardless of the economic activity of 
their parents, and that school-going children have a stronger claim for residence, 
which results in more extensive rights for the primary carer of such children.  As far 
as the primary carer is concerned, I have advocated that not only parents, but also 
other family members belonging to the core family of the child concerned should be 
entitled to claim a right of residence as the primary carer of that child.  These 
categories of persons should be given a broad interpretation, in line with the 
justifications mentioned above.  Accordingly, stepparents, adoptive parents and the 
registered partner of a parent are covered by the said principles.  Exceptionally, the 
same can apply with regard to siblings.  Non-family members such as foster parents 
or legal guardians will not be covered, unless, exceptionally, such would be required 
by Article 8 ECHR.  Besides, it is also possible in my view that multiple persons 
qualify as the primary carer of a child and derive a right of residence from that status.  
In any event, Member States remain free to confer more far-reaching rights on 
primary carers than is required by Union law.  
 
The present uncertainties as to the scope of the case law dealing with residence rights 
of primary carers make it rather difficult for the Member States to give a proper 
implementation of Union free movement law by incorporating the said case law into 
their national legislation and for the competent Member State authorities to apply 
Union free movement law in accordance with the case law of the Courts.  This is clear 
                                                 
432  The case law discussed in fact concerns children who either are Union citizens themselves or are 
the sons or daughters of a Union citizen. In this chapter, I have focussed on the first situation. 
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from the discussion above of the situation in the UK, the Member State whose 
legislation gave rise to all the cases discussed in which the Court explicitly or 
implicitly recognised a right of residence for primary carers.  Neither the present UK 
immigration rules nor the guidance given by the competent UK Ministry seem to fully 
capture, in my view, the importance and scope of the case law discussed. 
 
It is to be hoped that future case law will further clarify the scope of the free 
movement rights enjoyed by primary carers of children in the host Member States by 
giving a clear answer to the questions raised above.  In this connection, it is important 
that the Court bases its case law to the fullest extent possible on secondary Union 
legislation in order not to overstep its constitutional role and to give due weight to the 
interests at stake for the Member States.  Accordingly, while in certain circumstances 
the Court may justifiably leave unapplied restrictive conditions found in secondary 
Union legislation surrounding the residence rights of certain categories of family 
members, it cannot add new categories of privileged family members against the 
apparent will of the Union legislator. 
 
Another option for clarification would be an intervention by the Union legislator 
itself.  Accordingly, Article 2 of Directive 2004/38 could be amended and a new 
category of privileged family members could be added, namely the primary carer.  
The Union legislator could use this opportunity to clarify a number of the questions 
raised above by carefully defining this category of family members.  The definition 
could clarify, inter alia, what categories of children would have the right to be joined 
by their primary carer, the relation required between a child and his or her primary 
carer and whether multiple primary cars could qualify as the privileged family 
member of a Union citizen.  The Union legislator could also opt to amend Article 
12(3) of Directive 2004/38.  Thereby it could enlarge the wording of that Article in 
order to make it applicable not only in the case of death or departure of the Union 
citizen, but also where the latter continues to reside in the host Member State after no 
longer satisfying the conditions for such residence.433  At the same time, it could opt 
to change the definition of primary carer contained in that Article.  These changes 
would be apt to clarify and incorporate the Court’s recent Ibrahim and Teixeira cases 
and would, in fact, render that case law applicable to school-going children of all 
categories of Union citizens who initially derived a right of residence as family 
member of those citizens.434   
 
The bottom-line is that “care” is an element which does not figure in current Union 
free movement legislation, but which should in certain circumstances be taken into 
account in order to guarantee the effet utile of the free movement provisions and to 
give due respect to the right to respect for family life.  At the same time it must be 
emphasised that, when taking this element into account in order to recognise a right of 
residence for the primary carer of a Union citizen, sufficient attention should be paid 
to the financial interests of the Member States.  Accordingly, it would be important 
for the category of primary carer to be defined with precision in the case law of the 
                                                 
433  The special circumstances of “divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of registered 
partnership” are already regulated separately in Article 13 of Directive 2004/38 and would 
presumably continue to fall under that Article.   
434  Merely amending Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38 would not, however, incorporate the 
Court’s case law on the residence rights of the primary carer of non school-going children (case 
Zhu and Chen, in particular). 
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Courts or even in Union legislation in order to make it possible for Member States to 
put clear limitations on the categories of persons they grant a right of residence on 
account of their capacity as the primary carer of a child entitled to reside in their 
territory.  Besides, the right of residence of the primary carer could in normal 
circumstances be made subject to the general conditions of Directive 2004/38, which 
are in part aimed at safeguarding the financial interests of the Member States.  The 
only exception would be the residence right of the primary carer of school-going 
children, which cannot be made subject to the classic residence conditions.  With 
regard to this category of primary carers, Member States should be allowed some 
scope to tackle abuses of rights and to restrict, under certain circumstances, the said 
right of residence to the primary carer of school-going children who are sufficiently 
integrated in their society.   
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
One of the fundamental aspects of the free movement of Union citizens is that Union 
citizens have the right to be joined or accompanied in the host Member State by close 
family members, as defined in secondary Union legislation.  The grant of residence 
rights to family members is commonly explained by the need to abolish obstacles to 
the exercise of free movement rights by Union citizens and by the need to comply 
with the fundamental right to respect for family life.  At the same time, it is clear that 
the conferral by the Union of residence rights on family members can have a great 
impact on the immigration policies of the Member States and can have important 
financial consequences for them.  Precisely to limit this impact and these 
consequences, the Union legislator has surrounded the residence rights of family 
members of Union citizens with restrictive conditions.   
 
The question I have tried to answer in this chapter is whether the Union strikes a 
proper balance between, on the one hand, guaranteeing the effective free movement of 
Union citizens and, on the other hand, the interests of the Member States.  I have 
focused on the residence rights of ascendants of Union citizens and the specific 
conditions surrounding these rights.  My discussion was centred on three contentious 
issues. 
 
In the first place, and least importantly, the meaning of the notion “direct relatives in 
the ascending line” employed by Directive 2004/38 is far from clear.  In particular, 
the qualification “direct”, which is employed by Directive 2004/38 for the first time in 
this context, has given rise to controversies in legal literature and diverging 
interpretations by authorities of different Member States.  I have argued that the 
notion “direct relatives in the ascending line” must probably be understood as 
meaning that only ascendants with legal ties to the Union citizen and/or his spouse or 
partner qualify.  Such would do justice to the underlying justifications for granting 
residence rights to ascendants and be in accordance with the apparent will of the 
Union legislator.  The addition of the term “direct” does not, however, add much in 
this interpretation.  Future case law or guidance from the Union institutions should 
clarify this matter in the interest of legal certainty. 
 
In the second place, I have analysed the precise meaning of the condition of 
dependency, since only dependent ascendants enjoy a right of residence under the 
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Union free movement provisions.  My conclusion is that the condition of dependency 
as it is currently interpreted does not strike a proper balance between the financial 
interests of the Member States and the need to guarantee the effective free movement 
of Union citizens and their family members.  On the one hand, the ECJ’s 
interpretation of dependency as relating to financial dependency only, while in line 
with the wording of Directive 2004/38, is hard to square with the need to remove 
obstacles to the exercise of free movement rights and with the need to comply with 
the right to respect for family life.  On the other hand, by refusing to inquire into the 
underlying reasons for dependency, the ECJ fails to give sufficient weight to the 
financial interests of the Member States.  In addition, even after the clarifications 
brought about by recent ECJ case law, it remains a vague notion, difficult to 
implement by the Member States.  It may be preferable to drop the condition of 
dependency altogether, since it is not fully in line with the underlying justifications 
for granting a right to ascendants, difficult to implement and not needed in order to 
safeguard the financial interests of the Member States. 
 
In the third place, and most importantly, I have analysed recent case law in which the 
ECJ has recognised a right of residence in favour of the primary carer of EU 
children,435 despite the fact that the condition of dependency was not satisfied.  I have 
concluded that the ECJ was right in the circumstances of the cases discussed to leave 
the condition of dependency unapplied, even though that condition figures in 
secondary Union legislation and even though this will remain the case for the 
foreseeable future.  I have argued, moreover, that the reasoning of the Court should 
apply more generally and that primary carers should, if certain conditions are fulfilled, 
be entitled to reside in the host Member States together with the children they are 
caring for.  The precise scope of such residence right remains open for debate.  On the 
basis of the justifications for granting rights to family members, I have argued that 
only family members belonging to the core family of a child should be entitled to 
claim a right of residence as the primary carer of that child and that, while primary 
carers of children of all categories of Union citizens should possibly qualify, primary 
carers of school-going children enjoy more extensive residence rights in the host 
Member State.  At the same time, Member States should be given the possibility to 
safeguard their financial interests, inter alia, by ending abuses of the said residence 
rights and by restricting, under certain conditions, these residence rights to the 
primary carer of school-going children who are sufficiently integrated in their society.  
While the extension of residence rights to primary carers is a welcome evolution, the 
present situation is riddled with uncertainties, which makes it very difficult for 
Member States to give a sensible implementation to this evolution, as was illustrated 
by a detailed study of the UK rules.  Future case law or even an amendment of Union 
legislation should clarify the matter in the interest of legal certainty. 
 
The bottom-line is that the Union, in conferring a right of residence on ascendants of 
Union citizens, generally speaking does a good job at reconciling the interests of 
Union citizens and those of the Member States.  Residence rights enjoyed by Union 
citizens and their ascendants inevitably have an important impact on the immigration 
policies and public finances of the Member States, but a number of mechanisms are in 
place in order to keep this impact within bounds.  However, as the foregoing 
                                                 
435  The case law discussed in this chapter concerns children who either are Union citizens 
themselves or are the sons or daughters of a Union citizen. For my analysis in this chapter, I 
have focussed on the first situation. 
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demonstrates, on a number of points the balance is unjustifiably tilted in favour of the 
interests of either the Union citizens and their family members or the Member States.  
This is in no small part due to the existing vagueness and uncertainties regarding these 
points, which make it difficult for the Member States to give a sensible 
implementation to the residence rights enjoyed by ascendants of Union citizens and 
for Union citizens and their family members to ascertain the precise scope of their 
rights.  Future case law, Union legislation or guidance by Union institutions is needed 
to bring clarification on these points.  In this connection, it must be emphasised that 
striking the balance between the competing interests at stake is a dynamic process, 
which involves a constant interplay between the Court of Justice and the political 
Union institutions.  This is exemplified by the recent line of cases in which the Court 
left unapplied certain restrictive conditions of secondary Union law surrounding the 
residence rights of ascendants of Union citizens in favour of primary carers of EU 
children.  It is to be hoped that this recent evolution, which strikes a better balance 
between the competing interests than the current Union legislation does, will be 
further clarified and consolidated.  
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CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION 
 
“If the people were given the chance, enlightened by the great ideals of the project under 
construction, they would opt for a democratic, federal Europe. It is the outdated, vestigial 
attachment to nations that stands as a screen between the citizens and their rightful European 
inheritance.”1 
 
“Si l’on veut que l’Union gagne la fidélité des citoyens, il faut qu’elle soit une union 
intellectuelle et affective. L’Europe a besoin d’une ‘âme’, un sentiment diffus qui nous 
permette de nous reconnaître dans une identité commune et dans un destin commun.”2 
 
“L’Europe n’est plus qu’une nation composée de plusieurs.”3 
 
 
I GENERAL FINDINGS 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation examined, from a legal perspective, the extent to which the provisions 
on Union citizenship can bring an actual contribution to the European integration process.  
The analysis was firmly situated against the background of an inherent tension between the 
potential contribution of Union citizenship to European integration, on the one hand, and its 
impact on certain key policies and competences of the Member States, on the other hand.  I 
have focussed my research on two crucial aspects of Union citizenship, namely the personal 
scope of Union citizenship and the free movement of Union citizens. 
 
The main finding of my analysis is that the provisions on Union citizenship have a real impact 
on the Member States’ competences in important fields such as nationality, immigration or 
policies with regard to the OCTs.  They oblige the Member States in these fields to take 
account of the consequences of their policies for the enjoyment of Union citizenship rights 
and thereby induce them to adopt a more “inclusive” approach towards Union citizens.  As 
such, the Union citizenship concept does bring a real and tangible contribution to the 
European integration process.  This contribution inevitably restricts the Member States’ 
competence in the said fields to some extent.  Still, as my analysis has consistently shown, the 
Union legal framework provides adequate safeguards for the Member States to protect their 
key interests.  Accordingly, the provisions on Union citizenship do not change the fact, for 
instance, that the Member States remain the ultimate responsible for regulating the said 
competence fields.  Besides, the Member States may rely on overarching interests to justify 
national measures even if they restrict the effects of Union citizenship. 
 
The bottom-line is that Union law at present provides a rather satisfactory balance between 
safeguarding and further developing the effet utile of Union citizenship, on the one hand, and 
safeguarding the interests of the Member States, on the other hand.  At the same time, it must 
                                                 
1  LSE Mackinder Programme Another Europe? After the third no (Dublin, The Lilliput Press, 2008), 22. 
2  Prodi, "La richesse de la diversité : la force de l’Union" (Speech of 9 November 2001 in Innsbruck), cited 
by Jouen and Chambon, L’identité européenne dans les textes et les politiques communautaires, (2006) 
Notre Europe, available at http://www.notre-europe.eu/fr/axes/visions-
deurope/travaux/publication/lidentite-europeenne-dans-les-textes-et-les-politiques-communautaires/. 
3  Montesquieu, Réflexions sur la Monarchie universelle en Europe (1734), cited by Maas, Creating 
European Citizens (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 115. 
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be emphasised that there is considerable room for improvement.  On a number of points, the 
provisions on Union citizenship, at least under their current interpretation, appear to embrace 
approaches which are outdated or ambiguous at best.  Besides, some provisions are riddled 
with uncertainties.  A clearer legal framework, which more consistently takes into account the 
paramount importance of Union citizenship as the fundamental status of the nationals of the 
Member States, would assist the Member States in implementing the Union citizenship 
provisions and the Union citizens in ascertaining their rights.  Besides, the embracement of 
well-funded, more explicit and more transparent justifications accompanying the continuous 
development of Union citizenship would enhance its legitimacy.  It would, moreover, be apt 
to more clearly determine the scope of the impact of the Union citizenship concept and 
thereby presumably diminish the reluctance on part of certain Member States to fully accept 
its consequences. 
 
It can be expected that the future will see a progressive development of the Union citizenship 
concept and a further enhancement of its contribution to European integration.  The main 
responsible for this will likely be the Court of Justice.  Indeed, the gradual development of 
Union citizenship has in the past happened first and foremost through the dynamic case law in 
the field.  Already during the time my Ph.D. research was carried out a number of judgments 
have been rendered relating to both aspects of Union citizenship under consideration which 
will no doubt go down in history as landmark judgments.  In cases like Rottmann or Ruiz 
Zambrano the Court was prepared to radically break with previously accepted status quos and 
to adopt new solutions which more satisfactorily reconcile the effectiveness of Union 
citizenship and the interests of the Member States.  It is to be expected that this development 
will continue and that future case law will further pave the way for a more effective and 
balanced Union citizenship concept.  At the same time it must be pointed out that the Court’s 
role in the development of Union citizenship is necessarily limited.  A legitimate and effective 
development of Union citizenship requires fruitful interaction between judicial and political 
Union institutions and constructive input from the Member States.  At the end of the day, only 
that can guarantee an effective Union citizenship with a potent integrating role. 
 
In what follows I will present the main conclusions of Part I of the dissertation, concerning 
the personal scope of Union citizenship and Part II of the dissertation, concerning the right to 
free movement of Union citizens. 
 
II PART I PERSONAL SCOPE OF UNION CITIZENSHIP 
 
Part I of the dissertation discussed the personal scope of Union citizenship by tackling a 
number of fundamental questions.  On a more general level, it provided an answer to the 
question of who is a Union citizen and who is not.  More important was the related question 
of who is competent to lay down the rules governing the conferral and loss of Union 
citizenship, namely the Union or the Member States.  This, in turn, allowed an analysis of the 
extent to which the application of the rules governing the personal scope of Union citizenship 
has an impact on the competences and policies of the Member States and thus the extent to 
which Union citizenship can be a real factor of European integration. 
 
Chapter 2 analysed the legal regime surrounding the determination of the personal scope of 
Union citizenship.  The main conclusion of the Chapter is that, while the Member States are 
competent to determine the personal scope of Union citizenship on ground of their 
competence to regulate Member State nationality, they do not enjoy unrestricted freedom in 
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this regard.  Through the concept of Union citizenship, Union law impacts on the Member 
States’ competence to regulate nationality in two ways, namely in a direct and in an indirect 
way.   
 
In the first place, Union law indirectly influences the competence of the Member States in the 
field of nationality.  The coupling of Member State nationality and Union citizenship, together 
with the duty for Member States to unconditionally recognize decisions regarding nationality 
taken by another Member State, sets in motion a subtle interplay between the Member States, 
whereby rules and practices regarding nationality in one Member State may have significant 
consequences for other Member States.  This may lead to political pressure on certain 
Member States to change their nationality rules with regard to loss or acquisition of 
nationality.  The clearest example of such change until now is the change of the Irish 
nationality legislation in 2004.  Similar mechanisms of indirect pressure by the Member 
States and the Union institutions may well lead to changes in the near future in the nationality 
laws and practices of Spain, on the one hand, and Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand. 
 
In the second place, Union law also puts direct limitations to the Member States’ competence 
regarding nationality.  Indeed, the Member States have to exercise this competence with due 
regard to Union law to the extent that it impacts on Union citizenship, as was confirmed by 
the Court in its seminal Rottmann judgment of 2 March 2010.  Accordingly, every rule or 
decision concerning acquisition, refusal or loss of Member State nationality must, arguably, 
be in accordance with Union law where it entails the acquisition, refusal or loss of Union 
citizenship – even in the absence of any cross-border dimension.  The precise scope of the 
duty to have due regard to Union law is at present difficult to ascertain.  It seems that five 
Union law rules or principles, in particular, could act as meaningful limitations to the 
competence of the Member States regarding the adoption and implementation of rules 
concerning nationality.  The principle of proportionality is the only limitation until now which 
has as such been recognised by the ECJ.  Other rules or principles of Union law that could be 
relevant in this regard are the right to free movement of Union citizens, the duty to respect 
fundamental rights, the principle of sincere cooperation and the principle of legitimate 
expectations.  The consequence of the existence of these limitations is that Member States are 
required to take them into account when laying down rules on acquisition and loss of 
nationality and when implementing these rules.  Where a Member State adopts a measure that 
violates one or more of the said limitations, the measure concerned will be fully effective 
under Union law and any resulting acquisition, refusal or loss of Union citizenship will have 
to be fully accepted by the other Member States.  At the same time, the Member State 
concerned will be under a duty to bring its legislation or practice in accordance with Union 
law – possibly with retroactive effect - and, where necessary, this duty can be enforced before 
the Union Courts. 
 
The bottom-line is that the determination of the personal scope of Union citizenship hinges on 
a delicate balance between conflicting interests.  On the one hand, it is of capital importance 
that the Union recognizes the principled competence of the Member State to regulate 
nationality and that the application of the provisions on Union citizenship does not encroach 
upon this competence.  Such is required for the Union in order to respect the national 
identities of the Member States, a duty now explicitly enshrined in the Treaties.  On the other 
hand, the effectiveness of Union citizenship and the rights attached to it must be guaranteed, 
and it is of paramount importance therefore that its personal scope is determined in 
accordance with certain fundamental principles of Union law.  Union citizenship, as the most 
fundamental status of Member State nationals, could not be effective if its conferral and 
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withdrawal were completely at the disposal of the Member States.  The present Union legal 
framework adequately reconciles these fundamental interests, by leaving the determination of 
the personal scope of Union citizenship to the Member States, but at the same time requiring 
them to respect certain principles of Union law.  Still, it must be acknowledged that there is a 
real need for clarification with regard to the precise scope of the Member States’ duties in this 
connection.  In particular, it must be clarified what exigencies flow from the principle of 
sincere cooperation in this context and to what extent the Member States are required to 
coordinate their nationality policies in order to avoid consequences damaging for the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of Union citizenship.  ECJ case law and, perhaps, non-binding 
Union law instruments have a pivotal role to play in this regard.   
 
In order to avoid some of the problems associated with the current legal framework, it may be 
envisaged that in the future the Union will be given direct competence to regulate the personal 
scope of Union citizenship.  On the one hand, the Union legislator could be given competence 
to adopt minimum rules on the acquisition and loss of Member State nationality, with a partial 
harmonisation of the Member States’ nationality rules as a result.  On the other hand, it would 
be possible to partially or entirely decouple Union citizenship and Member State nationality 
and establish a self-standing concept of Union citizenship.  Both options would bolster the 
status of Union citizenship and enhance its contribution to the European integration process, 
in particular with regard to long-term resident third country nationals in the Member States.  
At the same time, both options would radically diminish the competences of the Member 
States with regard to the determination of Union citizenship and probably reduce the 
importance of Member State nationality as a legal status.  It is unlikely therefore that the said 
options, which would require a substantive amendment of the Treaty provisions on Union 
citizenship in accordance with the constitutional requirements of the Member States, will 
come about in the near future.   
 
Chapter 3 analysed the specific situation of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) 
associated with the Union from the viewpoint of Union citizenship.  The main finding, after 
studying both the constitutional structure and the nationality laws of the Member States 
concerned and the Union legal framework regarding the OCTs, is that those citizens resident 
in the OCTs who have the nationality of one of the Member States are full-blown Union 
citizens, unless that Member State submits a declaration providing differently.  At present, all 
Danish, Dutch and French nationals and most British nationals living in the OCTs are Union 
citizens therefore.  Hence, they fully enjoy all rights attached to that status.  However, as far 
as the enjoyment of these rights is concerned, most OCT nationals find themselves in a 
somewhat peculiar situation.  The reason is that it is traditionally accepted that only limited 
parts of the Treaties apply to the OCTs and that the Union citizenship provisions are not, in 
principle, among them.  The consequence of this traditional view is that OCT nationals cannot 
normally invoke their citizenship rights in the OCTs, because the latter are outside the 
geographical scope of application of the provisions embodying these rights.  However, there 
are strong arguments for doing away with the said traditional assumption and holding that the 
provisions on Union citizenship apply to the OCTs, at least partially.  This seems necessary to 
guarantee the full effectiveness of the provisions on Union citizenship, but also to protect and 
enhance the association between the Union and the OCTs.  Accordingly, there a strong 
arguments in favour of applying Article 21 TFEU to travels between the OCTs and the 
European territory of the Member States and in favour of the view that the electoral rights 
enjoyed by Union citizens must be enjoyed by OCT nationals to the fullest extent possible.  
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Consequently, the provisions on Union citizenship have a capital role to play in the 
integration of the OCTs and their residents in the European Union.  These provisions entitle 
OCT nationals to important rights which are apt to further the connection between them and 
the Union, such as, in particular, the right to participate in elections to the European 
Parliament, a body with important decision-making powers in relation to them.  As such, 
these provisions have the beneficial effect of obliging the Member States to change their 
policies with regard to the OCTs to a more “inclusive” one, thereby strengthening the ties 
with their distant overseas nationals and further integrating them in the European 
construction.  This is perfectly illustrated by the recent changes in the Netherlands electoral 
laws, extending the right to participate in European Parliamentary elections to Dutch OCT 
nationals, and recent changes in British nationality laws, extending Union citizenship and the 
associated rights to almost all British overseas citizens.  Both changes were arguably induced 
by the provisions on Union citizenship.  At the same time, the provisions on Union citizenship 
make a significant contribution to the close association that exists between the Union and the 
OCTs and to some of its most important purposes, such as furthering the interests and 
prosperity of the inhabitants of the OCTs.   
 
Still it must be remarked that the current policies of the four Member States possessing OCTs 
are not yet fully in line with the consequences flowing from the provisions on Union 
citizenship.  The continuing exclusion, for instance, of (categories of) Union citizens resident 
in the Danish, Dutch and UK OCTs from the right to participate in European Parliamentary 
elections is no longer defensible in the light of these provisions.  It is to be hoped that the near 
future will see a further tendency towards more inclusion of OCT nationals and a full 
recognition of their Union citizenship status and the rights attached to it.  This tendency will 
likely be given a strong impetus by the implementation of the new partnership with the OCTs 
proposed by the Commission, which will be characterised by increased reciprocity and greater 
applicability of the Union acquis.  It would also gain strength with an explicit rejection by the 
Union Courts of the traditional view regarding the non-applicability of the Union citizenship 
provisions in the OCTs.   
 
III PART II FREE MOVEMENT OF UNION CITIZENS 
 
Part II of the dissertation analysed the right of free movement and residence of Union citizens 
and their family members, focussing on the right for Union citizens to be joined or 
accompanied by non-EU family members.  It examined how and to what extent the 
requirements deriving from the implementation of this right can be reconciled with the 
legitimate interest of the Member States in adopting and maintaining an effective immigration 
policy.   
 
The main conclusion of Chapter 4 is that the provisions on the free movement of Union 
citizens and their family members are given a broad interpretation.  As a consequence, the 
influence exerted by Union law, through the provisions on Union citizenship, on the 
immigration policies and competences of the Member States is considerable.  Member States 
have only little scope to apply their immigration laws to non-EU family members of a Union 
citizen who moves or has moved between Member States.  Moreover, it appears that the same 
legal regime has recently been extended, under certain circumstances, to non-EU family 
members of a Union citizen who has never moved, i.e. to situations which were traditionally 
considered to be “purely internal” from the viewpoint of Union law.  This extension is in full 
development and its scope and underlying justifications are at present far from clear.  It seems 
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defensible to limit it to situations where a Union citizen is confronted with a national measure 
de iure or de facto annihilating his Union citizenship and, possibly, to certain cases of 
fundamental rights violations.   
 
This broad interpretation of the free movement provisions is justified.  A more narrow 
interpretation would see the emergence of important obstacles to the effective free movement 
of Union citizens on the territory of the Member States and would not be apt to adequately 
safeguard the Union’s fundamental rights standards.  Given the significant contribution of free 
movement to the completion of a Citizens’ Europe, that would significantly reduce the 
possible contribution of Union citizenship to European integration.  At the same time, it must 
be pointed out that that the broad interpretation far from extinguishes the possibility for the 
Member States to pursue an effective immigration policy.  First of all, its consequences are 
limited ratione personae in that only certain categories of family members of Union citizens 
are affected, and only to the extent that the conditions of Directive 2004/38 are satisfied.  
Moreover, Member States have the power to protect their key interests, since they are still 
allowed to restrict the free movement rights of family members of a Union citizen on grounds 
or public policy, public security or public health or in case of abuse or fraud.  
 
Still, it cannot be denied that the current legal framework surrounding Union citizenship and 
the right relating to family reunification in particular, suffers from a certain degree of 
schizophrenia.  On the one hand, this legal framework is centred on the promotion of free 
movement between Member States and is therefore axed on a requirement of a cross-border 
dimension.  On the other hand, there is a tendency to reduce the relevance of the element of 
movement in favour of the inclusion of static Union citizens and their family members.  In 
this connection, a clear choice will have to be made between two options.  The first option is 
to take the promotion of free movement of Union citizens, and its inherent contribution to the 
aims of a Citizens’ Europe as a focal point.  The consequence is to exclude static Union 
citizens from the benefit of family reunification under Union law, except, perhaps, where 
overarching interests such as fundamental rights or the need to preserve an individual’s Union 
citizenship and the enjoyment of the associated rights are at stake.  This option requires a 
more consistent and meaningful application of the cross-border requirement than what results 
from the present case law. 
  
The second option is to discard free movement as the unique focal point for family 
reunification rights and to extend the benefit of family reunification to static Union citizens.  
This option would put an end to the current possibilities of reverse discrimination on this 
point and would significantly increase the fundamental rights protection available to static 
Union citizens.  By offering enhanced guarantees for equality and fundamental rights 
protection, Union citizenship would certainly offer a more significant contribution to the 
European integration process than under the first option, because it would end the often 
denounced anomaly that Union citizens only become Union citizens when they leave their 
own Member State.4  At the same time, it would radically transform the legal framework 
surrounding Union citizenship and radically alter the division of competences between the 
Union and its Member States.  For this reason, the second option could arguably not 
legitimately be implemented by the ECJ alone, but would require an intervention by the 
Union legislator.  Given the apparent reluctance of the Member States towards accepting the 
full impact of the Union citizenship provisions on their immigration policies and 
                                                 
4  Toner, "Judicial Interpretation of European Union Citizenship - Consolidation or Transformation" (2000) 
7 MJ, 170. 
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competences, the second option does not appear to be one that will be fully embraced in the 
near future.   
 
The analysis in Chapter 5 focused on the specific issue of the free movement and residence 
rights enjoyed by ascendants of Union citizens and the restrictive conditions surrounding 
these rights.  The study of this specific subject functioned as a case study, which allowed me 
to formulate an answer to a more fundamental underlying question, namely whether Union 
law strikes a proper balance between, on the one hand, guaranteeing the effective free 
movement of Union citizens and their family members and, on the other hand, the interests of 
the Member States.   
 
The general conclusion is that the Union, in conferring a right of residence on ascendants of 
Union citizens, generally speaking does a good job at reconciling the interests of Union 
citizens and those of the Member States.  Residence rights enjoyed by Union citizens and 
their ascendants inevitably have an important impact on the immigration policies and public 
finances of the Member States, but a number of mechanisms are in place in order to keep this 
impact within bounds.  However, on a number of points there is scope for improvement.  This 
is in no small part due to the existing vagueness and uncertainties with regard to the 
conditions surrounding the residence rights enjoyed by ascendants of Union citizens, which 
make it difficult for the Member States to give a sensible implementation to these rights and 
for Union citizens and their family members to ascertain the precise scope of their rights.   
 
In the first place, and least importantly, the meaning of the notion “direct relatives in the 
ascending line” stated in Directive 2004/38 is far from clear.  In particular, the qualification 
“direct”, which is employed by Directive 2004/38 for the first time in this context, has given 
rise to controversies in legal literature and diverging interpretations by authorities from 
different Member States.  I have argued that the notion “direct relatives in the ascending line” 
must probably be understood as meaning that only ascendants with legal ties to the Union 
citizen and/or his spouse or partner qualify.  Such would do justice to the underlying 
justifications for granting residence rights to ascendants and be in accordance with the 
apparent will of the Union legislator.  The addition of the term “direct” does not, however, 
add much in this interpretation.  Future case law or guidance from the Union institutions 
should clarify this matter in the interest of legal certainty. 
 
In the second place, it is highly problematic that secondary Union legislation confers 
residence rights on “dependent” ascendants of Union citizens only.  The condition of 
dependency, as it is currently interpreted, does not strike a proper balance between the 
financial interests of the Member States and the need to guarantee the effective free 
movement of Union citizens and their family members.  On the one hand, the ECJ’s 
interpretation of dependency as relating to financial dependency only, while in line with the 
wording of Directive 2004/38, is hard to square with the need to remove obstacles to the 
exercise of free movement rights and with the need to comply with the right to respect for 
family life.  On the other hand, by refusing to inquire into the underlying reasons for 
dependency, the ECJ fails to give sufficient weight to the financial interests of the Member 
States.  In addition, even after the clarifications brought about by recent ECJ case law, it 
remains a vague notion, difficult to implement by the Member States.  It may be preferable in 
the future to drop the condition of dependency altogether, since it is not fully in line with the 
underlying justifications for granting a right to ascendants, difficult to implement and not 
needed in order to safeguard the financial interests of the Member States, given the fact that 
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those interests are adequately protected by other conditions surrounding the residence rights 
enjoyed by ascendants of a Union citizen.  
 
Interestingly, the ECJ appears to have acknowledged to some extent the problematic character 
of the dependency condition, since it has been prepared in a number of recent cases to 
recognise a right of residence in favour of the primary carer of Union citizens, even where the 
condition of dependency was not satisfied.  This exemplifies the fact that striking an 
appropriate balance between the competing interests at stake is a dynamic process which 
involves a constant interplay between the Court of Justice and the political Union institutions.  
The extension of residence rights in favour of primary carers of Union citizens should be 
further clarified and consolidated.  In this connection, it is recommended to restrict the 
possibility to claim a residence right as the primary carer of a Union citizen to family 
members belonging to the core family of that citizen, except where overarching interests such 
as the need to comply with fundamental rights require otherwise.  Moreover, while primary 
carers of children of all categories of Union citizens should possibly qualify, primary carers of 
school-going children should enjoy more extensive residence rights in the host Member State.  
At the same time, Member States should be given the possibility to safeguard their financial 
interests, inter alia, by combating abuses of the said residence rights and by restricting, under 
certain conditions, these residence rights to primary carers of school-going children who are 
sufficiently integrated in their society.   
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